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Abstract
This dissertation is composed by three papers whose unifying themes are the origin and
impact of fiscal institutions. The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it
highlights the usefulness of the concept of fiscal capacity for the macroeconomics and
international finance literatures by demonstrating its impact on sovereign default and
fiscal dynamics during the Great Depression. Limits to the ability to tax have clear
implications for macro-financial research, but are neglected by much of the literature.
Second, my work contributes to the fiscal and state capacity literature by focusing on
municipal level fiscal institutions in Brazil. Although research in this field is burgeoning,
our understanding of the origin and impact of fiscal institutions in many parts of the
world, including Latin America, is still very limited, particularly at the sub-national level.
In terms of structure, the dissertation is a backwards journey from the impact of fiscal
institutions to their origin. The first paper studies one of the ultimate outcomes of fiscal
dynamics – sovereign default – by analyzing the debt crisis of the 1930s. The second paper
takes the collapse in public revenues during the Great Depression as a starting point and
demonstrates that fiscal institutions were a fundamental factor in the dynamics of fiscal
aggregates. By shifting the focus to a single country and a different time period – the
second half of the 19th and the early 20th centuries – the third paper demonstrates that
slavery was deeply detrimental to the development of local governments’ ability to tax and
provide fundamental growth and welfare-enhancing public goods in Brazil.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation is composed by three papers whose unifying themes are the origin and
impact of fiscal institutions. For a long time, economists and economic historians have
thought about taxation, and the power of states more generally, in a negative light. Re-
search focused on the constraints imposed on the executive, which helped to protect the
property rights of citizens and allowed enterprise, trade and prosperity to flourish. In
other words, the object of enquiry was identifying how societies limit the predatory power
of the state. In the last two decades, economic historians and economists have slowly
embraced the idea – which has long history in other social sciences, particularly historical
sociology – that weak states can hinder growth and prosperity as much as unconstrained
ones. The role of states in sustaining institutions, maintaining order, protecting rights and
providing essential public goods has been fully recognized. More importantly, however,
it has been recognized that these basic functions are not to be taken for granted. States
acquire their capacities through complex and non-linear processes that often stretch over
centuries. Historical research has been instrumental in drawing attention to this fact.
Armed with these insights, economists and development practitioners have also reevalu-
ated the experiences of today’s developing countries. The spotlight has shifted from the
predatory action of states, to their powerlessness to enforce rules, provide public goods
and sustain institutions.
This dissertation follows in the spirit of this work. It does so by applying these ideas
to areas in which the deeply-rooted constraints to the fiscal capacity of states have largely
been ignored – fiscal policy and sovereign default during the Great Depression – and by
exploring an under-studied context – that of local institutions in late 19th and early 20th
century Brazil.
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1.1 Overall contribution
The main contribution of this work is thus twofold. First, it highlights the relevance
and usefulness of the concept of fiscal capacity for the macroeconomics and international
finance literatures by demonstrating its impact on sovereign default and fiscal dynam-
ics during the Great Depression. Fiscal capacity is a widely recognized cornerstone in
historical and development research, but as Besley and Persson (2009, 2014) point out,
states’ ability to tax is still mostly taken for granted in the rest of the literature. At the
same time, limits to the ability to tax have clear and fundamental implications for any
macro-financial research involving the public sector. Understanding the origin and impact
of fiscal institutions is thus of fundamental importance, and not only for developing coun-
tries, as the recent European debt crisis has shown. Second, although the fiscal and state
capacity literature is an exciting and prospering field, most of the work is still focused on
Europe and its offshoots north of the Equator, and on East Asia. Our understanding of the
origin and impact of fiscal institutions in many parts of the world, including Latin Amer-
ica, is still very limited, particularly at the sub-national level (Hoffman, 2015; Nafziger,
2016; Koyama and Johnson, 2017). Therefore, my paper contributes to this literature by
focusing on municipal level fiscal institutions in Brazil.
In terms of structure, this dissertation is a backwards journey from the impact of fiscal
institutions to their origin. The first paper studies one of the ultimate outcomes of fiscal
dynamics – sovereign default – by analyzing the debt crisis of the 1930s. This was the,
arguably, largest and most widespread sovereign debt crisis in history. In my analysis, I
find that the collapse in public revenues that hit a number of countries during the Great
Depression played a fundamental role in the default of both national and sub-national gov-
ernments across the globe. The second paper takes the collapse in public revenues during
the Great Depression as a starting point and demonstrates that historically-determined
fiscal institutions were a fundamental factor in the dynamics of fiscal aggregates. The
paper also offers evidence on the mechanisms that shaped the development of these insti-
tutions. Finally, the last paper uses a unique case study to delve deeply into the historical
origins of fiscal institutions. By shifting the focus to a single country – Brazil – and to
a different time period – the second half of the 19th and the early 20th centuries – this
paper demonstrates that slavery was deeply detrimental to the development of local gov-
ernments’ ability to tax and provide fundamental growth and welfare-enhancing public
goods, such as education and infrastructure.
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One of the defining characteristics of this work is the attention it devots to local level
outcomes. This is most direct in the paper on municipal institutions in Brazil. The pa-
per on the interwar debt crisis also tackles sub-national administrative units directly by
investigating the predictors of default at the municipal level, alongside those specific to
national-provincial governments. The paper on fiscal dynamics focuses on central govern-
ments. However, the relationship between local and central governments is at the heart
of one of the mechanisms for the development of fiscal capacity, which I exploit in the
analysis.
Additionally, all three papers feature extensive data collection at the local level. For
the paper on Brazil, I use various sources – such as censuses and statistical yearbooks –
to gather data on the characteristics of municipalities. For my paper on the debt crisis,
I produce new estimates of the debts of sub-national public bodies by putting together
multiple scattered sources. The result is a much more detailed picture of public debts in
the interwar period than that provided by any other existing dataset. For my paper on
aggregate fiscal dynamics, I have collected data on tax revenues for local governments,
whenever possible, in order to assess the evolution of fiscal capacity in the interwar period
in an holistic way.
1.2 Motivation
The three papers in this dissertation grapple with some of the most important economic
and social phenomena of the last two centuries. Unsurprisingly, these have sparked much
research and heated debates amongst economic historians, economists and other social
scientists in the past. They continue to be fertile fields of enquiry today.
More than 20 years after Ben Bernanke coined the expression (Bernanke, 1995), un-
derstanding the Great Depression remains the “Holy Grail of Macroeconomics”. Even
the recent crisis has not been able to dethrone the Depression as the deepest and most
widespread peace-time economic slump in history. Much like the Holy Grail, a complete
and entirely satisfactory explanation for the Depression still appears to be out of reach, if
not entirely mythical, given the complexity of the event and the disparate experiences of
countries around the world.
A consensus regarding the crisis has gathered around Barry Eichengreen’s masterful
“Golden Fetters” (Eichengreen, 1992), which placed the interwar Gold Standard square
at the centre of explanations regarding the devastating effects of the crisis on the world
economy, and whose main message is in line with the views expressed by other giants
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of the professions, such as Peter Temin (Temin, 1989), Ben Bernanke and Harold James
(Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke and James, 1991).1 Eichengreen’s synthesis relied on important
previous work with Jeffrey Sachs (Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985, 1986) and classic works
by Nurkse (1944) and Kindleberger (1973), amongst many others. Eichengreen and Temin
(2013) have recently restated their classic arguments in connection to the recent European
crisis.
However, some questions remain unanswered or only partially answered. For example,
to what extent were monetary forces directly responsible for the Depression?2 What is
the role of the 1929 Wall Street Crash? What determined the outbreak and diffusion of
financial panics and bank failures? Could different fiscal policies have averted the worst
of the slump? How do we rationalize the dramatically different experiences of countries
during the Depression?
Recent research has shown that much can be learned by breaking down the Depression
into its many different aspects and/or country-specific experiences, on the condition of
retaining the international outlook advocated by Eichengreen and Bernanke, and by taking
the connections between different sectors of the economy into account. For example, recent
work has made important steps forward into clarifying the mechanisms for the diffusion
of the Depression through financial channels across countries (Accominotti, 2012; Ritschl
and Sarferaz, 2014).
In addition, while it is generally recognized that the Great Depression provided con-
temporary policy-makers with fundamental lessons for responding to the recent crisis, it
is also the case that the latter has brought new aspects of the Depression into the spot-
light. The role of mortgages in bank failures highlighted by Postel-Vinay (2016) and the
impact of interbank markets in straining the US’s banking sector outlined by Mitchener
and Richardson (2013) are examples of these. In this dissertation, I set out to help answer
some of the remaining open questions of the Great Depression by focusing on two specific
aspects, which also happen to resonate with recent events.
My last paper departs from the Great Depression to tackle the historical origins of
fiscal capacity and of its close companion, public goods provision. It does so for a country
that has been hailed as the nation of the future for most of its independent history, but
1In earlier work, Temin had played down the role of monetary forces in the Depression highlighting, instead,
an autonomous fall in aggregate demand as the most important factor (Temin, 1976).
2Once again, after more than 20 years, Bernanke (1995)’s assertion still stands: there is convincing evidence
that monetary shocks caused the depression by affecting financial stability and real wages, but we cannot
say we fully understand the Depression until we figure out why nominal adjustment in wages did not take
place.
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whose growth performance has been consistently thwarted by institutional shortcomings,
of which the recent massive corruption scandals are just the latest manifestation: Brazil.
The paper studies municipal institutions, which are important players in Brazil’s adm-
nistrative landscape today. They raise a substantial share of public revenue – around
10-15%, a similar percentage to that of my period of analysis in the early 20th century –
and are responsible for an even greater share of expenditure thanks to transfers from the
federal government. Some of their most important responsibilities include the provision of
public education, today as in the past. I link the historical evolution of these institutions
to another fundamental feature of Brazilian history: slavery.
The publication of Stanley Engerman and Robert Fogel’s controversial “Time on the
Cross” in 1974 (Engerman and Fogel, 1974) and the intense debate that followed it have
established slavery as one of the classic themes in economic history. Recent debates on
the role of slavery in the industrial revolution and in the rise of capitalism attest to the
continuing interest around this topic. However, existing research has not yet fully fleshed
out the legacy of slavery in a systematic way, particularly its effect on broad economic
and institutional outcomes. This is especially true for Brazil, the largest importer of
slaves during the Atlantic slave trade. Although attempts have been made to link slavery
to institutional and economic developments in the country, these mostly offer indirect
evidence or are altogether inconclusive. My work offer prima facie evidence on the legacy
of slavery by exploring its impact on local fiscal institutions.
In the next section, I discuss some further motivating factors for my work. In doing
so, I also highlight parallels and lessons that the historical experience offers for today.
1.2.1 Fiscal fragility and debt crises
As mentioned, several aspects of the recent crisis have parallels in the Great Depression.
The 1930s debt crisis, which I study in my first paper, has clear similarities with the
European debt crisis, for example, and comparisons between Germany’s situation in the
30s and that of Greece in the recent past have drawn particular attention in the media.
Academics have also taken part in the debate: see for example the back and forth between
Albrecht Ritschl and Hans-Werner Sinn on The Economist (Ritschl, 2012b). Although
the recent crisis is not comparable in size and scope with the Great Depression, the two
share some key characteristics. Both took place within a fixed exchange rates regime –
the Gold Standard in the 1930s and the Euro in the 2010s – and both helped to fuel the
rise of populist and extremist parties.
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Both crises have also been characterized by, at best, imperfect coordination and co-
operation between countries. The European Union and the Eurozone’s institutions offer
a much more structured environment for the resolution of crises compared to the League
of Nations and the Bank for International Settlements in 1930s, and collaboration be-
tween central banks since 2007 has been a high point in the history of international policy
cooperation. The consequences of the recent crisis would have presumably been substan-
tially more devastating under the institutional setting of the interwar period. Nonetheless
similar problems emerged in both crises. The four clearest and most important are: 1)
excessive borrowing and growing imbalances in some countries 2) the lack of a decisive
and rapid restructuring of unsustainable debts, 3) the (mostly) self-defeating austerity
imposed on trouble countries, and 4) the unwillingness of surplus countries to reflate and
assist the adjustment of deficit countries. The Greek experience stands testimony to these
failures.
Although the debt crisis of the 1930s was widely discussed by contemporaries and has
been studied by scholars thereafter, one of its most striking features – the vastly different
dynamics of public revenues across countries – has largely been neglected by the literature.
As in other aspects, the fiscal troubles of European countries today pale in comparison to
their interwar counterparts. I put this issue front and center in my work and show that the
collapse in tax revenues was the most reliable predictor of sovereign default in the interwar
period, above and beyond other indicators of macroeconomic health. This finding raises
some interesting issues regarding sovereign debt crises in general. In particular, it speaks
to recent work focusing on the determinants and potential endogeneity of fiscal limits (Bi,
Shen, and Yang, 2016; Arellano and Bai, 2016) and the role asymmetric information in
defaults (Cata˜o, Fostel, and Rancie´re, 2011, Forthcoming).
1.2.2 Fiscal policy under constraints: fixed exchange rates, fiscal devel-
opment and austerity
As discussed, the interwar period was characterized by a large volatility and procyclicality
in fiscal aggregates. However, the collapse in public revenues experienced by a number
of countries during the Depression is generally considered as a simple byproduct of the
slump and, in the more careful accounts, as a consequence of the reliance of some coun-
tries on narrow sources of revenues, such as trade taxes and commodity royalties. The
determinants of the dynamics of government financing have thus not been systematically
explored.
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There are many ways in which these phenomena, which are the topic of the second
paper of this dissertation, can negatively affect the economy. Some of these are not tied to
the use of fiscal policy as a tool to actively fight business cycle downturns. They are rather
related to political economy considerations and to the functioning of states. I discuss these
in detail in the paper. Here, however, I want to stress the connection between revenue
cyclicality, procylical fiscal policy and austerity to further highlight the parallels between
the Depression and the recent crisis.
In a tax-smoothing framework, optimal fiscal policy is acyclical: during a slump tax
revenues should decrease in line with output, with expenditure remaining stable, while
the opposite should take place during a boom (Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983).3 In
a Keynesian framework, instead, fiscal policy is meant to be countercyclical: in a slump
tax revenues should go down and/or government expenditure should increase leading to
deficits and aggregate demand stimulus. In either case, borrowing should be used to make
up for the funding shortfall. During the Depression, tax revenues and other government
income did indeed collapse in unison with output. However, borrowing did not generally
compensate for the fall in revenues leading to large falls in expenditure as well, in contrast
to the recommendations of both the Keynesian and tax-smoothing frameworks. In its
extreme manifestations, this contributed to outright austerity and deflationary pressures.
Some countries attempted to stem the tide of falling revenues by increasing tax revenues
in an even starker manifestation of austerity.
The recent crisis has offered the opportunity to assess the impact of austerity on the
economy. Its potentially self-defeating nature has been made evident most concretely
in the case of Greece, which has experienced a Depression level contraction in its out-
put. Research has highlighted that, through hysteresis, austerity can also have negative
effects beyond its impact on the severity of the business cycle. By expanding on the ap-
proach of Blanchard and Leigh (2013), Fata´s and Summers (2016) and Gechert, Horn,
and Paetz (2017) show large costs of negative fiscal shocks – increases in tax revenue or
decreases in expenditure – in the recent crisis, with considerable growth effects in the
medium/long-run. There is furthermore evidence that tax evasion and corruption, the
advanced-country-equivalents of low fiscal capacity, have contributed to making the costs
of fiscal consolidations particularly grievous in countries like Greece (Pappa, Sajedi, and
Vella, 2015).
The Gold Standard is generally seen as the principal impediment to policies which
3This result assumes that expenditure is exogenously determined. See Ferrie´re and Karantounias (Forth-
coming) on how this can change when government expenditure is endogenized.
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could have helped fight the Great Depression. The seeds of the Gold Standard debacle,
according to this view, were already evident in the the run-up to the Depression. With
specific regard to fiscal policies, Eichengreen (1992) stresses that these became highly
politicized after World War I eliminating the guarantee that measures would be taken to
adjust the balance of payments as was, instead, the case during the classical Gold Standard.
This undermined the credibility of the whole system. The loss of credibility also made
domestic policies less effective by exposing countries to the moods of financial markets and
the volatile expectations of investors. As a result of this, Eichengreen argues, international
cooperation became more important. However, this was made difficult by tensions due to
war debts and reparations and to different conceptual frameworks prevailing in different
countries.
Eichengreen further argues that leaving the Gold Standard was a necessary, but in-
sufficient condition for the recovery. While leaving the Standard freed up resources for
monetary and fiscal policy, equally important was abandoning the ethos and financial
orthodoxy that characterized the rules of the game.4 Bernanke and James (1991) argue
that differences in performance in 1929-30 were negligible between countries that left gold
during the first wave of devaluations in 1931 and those that did not. Instead, Eichengreen
ascribes the decision to leave gold and to run more or less expansionary policies to internal
politics and to the economic events of the early 1920s, particularly the inflationary and
hyper-inflationary experiences of countries such as Italy, France, Germany and Austria. In
turn these experiences were rooted in the upsetting of the pre-WWI consensus regarding
the distribution of income and fiscal burdens, which eventually led to countries relying on
the printing press to finance deficits.
Even in countries with no recent history of severe inflation, however, fiscal policy
was generally very conservative, even after the abandonment of the gold anchor. In the
United States, for example, large fiscal deficits were not employed to fight the slump.
Increases in government expenditure, which accompanied Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New
Deal, were bundled with increases in taxes. Moreover, small deficits at the federal level
were compensated by surpluses at the state level (Fishback, 2013). The United Kingdom,
the first country to leave the Gold Standard and the poster child for the benefits of shedding
the golden fetters, also did not engage in a distinctly expansionary fiscal policy (Middleton,
2013). The role of fiscal policy in Germany’s strong recovery from the Depression in the
4The positive effects of abandoning the gold peg were naturally potentially weakened by beggar-thy-
neighbour policies in the context of competitive devaluations, but Eichengreen argues that generalized
devaluaitions still would have had positive effects by reflating the economy.
22
second half of the 1930s was also negligible (Ritschl, 2002a). In general, the idea that
fiscal policy could be a tool to fight the slump was considered distinctly exotic (Almunia,
Be´ne´trix, Eichengreen, O’Rourke, Rua, Tenreyro, and Perri, 2010) and this attitude was
not restricted to the traditional strongholds of financial orthodoxy. The 1934 volume
edited by UK’s Labour economist Hugh Dalton entitled “Unbalanced Budgets” (Dalton,
1934), for example, treats budget deficits as the unavoidable symptom of a malady: the
Depression. Similar attitudes were found in other unlikely quarters such as the communists
in France (Eichengreen, 1992). However, even if budget deficits were not contemplated as a
tool to fight the Depression, smaller contractions in government financing and expenditure
would, at a minimum, not have aggravated the economic and political turmoil of the 1930s.
Doubts remain on whether Gold Standard membership was the only or even the most
important constraint to running a more expansionary or, at the very least, less procyclical
fiscal policy. Germany, for example, faced a borrowing constraint due to large debts and
war reparations. Moreover, debt monetization was constrained by international agree-
ments (Ritschl, 2013). Although these factors were connected to the preservation of the
fixed exchange rate regime, they were also specific to the country. More generally, it is
uncertain that many countries would have been in the position to run effective and credible
fiscal policies just by leaving the Gold Standard. Even in the UK, an expansionary fiscal
policy might have led to a sharp increase in borrowing costs (Middleton, 2013). Thus,
while not disputing the general consensus that the Gold Standard played a pivotal role in
the Depression, it is crucial to investigate what other constraints countries were facing.
In order to spend more, countries faced three non-mutually-exclusive options: 1) bor-
rowing on financial markets, 2) monetizing the debt 3) using financial repression to channel
resources to the public sector. Financial repression was indeed used in a number of coun-
tries, including Germany, but mostly in the second half of the 1930s and in connection
with rearmament and growing economic nationalisms. Moreover, it was particularly viable
in non-democratic and increasingly authoritarian countries. Monetizing the debt was cer-
tainly a possibility for countries no longer on gold. However, the size of the deficits some
countries would have had to finance by borrowing exclusively from central banks would
have potentially led to capital flight, at least in the absence of extensive capital controls,
with important negative economic consequences. Borrowing from financial markets was
also not a simple option. After 1929, international financial markets were highly dysfunc-
tional and could not provide a reliable source of financing. In some countries, domestic
financial markets were underdeveloped, while in others wealth and savings had been wiped
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out by hyperinflations in the 1920s and the financial crash of 1929-31. Nonetheless, bor-
rowing on domestic financial became increasingly important as the Depression progressed.
As I discuss in the paper, the domestic share of public debts increased from 50% in 1927-
29 to 60% in 1933-38. And countries that successfully managed to smooth their revenues
were able to do so predominantly through borrowing.
In the paper, I show that their ability to do so depended crucially on their degree of
fiscal development: the fiscal capacity with which countries entered the Great Depression
was a key determinant of how the slump translated into the loss of public revenues. More-
over, I show that fiscal development was more important for countries off gold than for
those that remained tied to it. This suggests that the decision to leave the Gold Standard
might have been endogenous to fiscal capacity. In other words, countries might have left
the Gold Standard because they were in advantageous position to do so thanks to the
strength of the their institutions.
These considerations are also potentially valid for the current European crisis. Could
countries like Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy have run more countercyclical
fiscal policies had they been outside the Eurozone or not tied to the influence of the troika?
Given the precarious situation of their public finances and/or banking sectors, this seems
unlikely, at least without external help and/or international policy coordination. Both the
former and the latter, however, would have been even less forthcoming in the absence of
European institutions and the common goal of preserving the Euro.
1.2.3 Fiscal capacity, public goods and the shadow of slavery
In the third paper of this dissertation, I outline in detail how slavery affected the develop-
ment of local institutions in Brazil. Here, I briefly discuss the literature on the relationship
between coerced labour, inequality and development in the Americas (and beyond), in or-
der to motivate and set the stage for the more focused discussion in the paper.
The work of Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997,
2012) has been instrumental in shaping research on slavery in the Americas by tying it to
economic and political inequality. In a reformulation of the classic “Staple Thesis”, the au-
thors argued that different initial endowments led to different types of colonization across
the continent. In particular, countries with land suitable for plantation agriculture devel-
oped production systems based on large scale land ownership and slave labour. This gave
rise to high levels of inequality and adverse institutional developments which constrained
growth compared to other parts of the continent. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and
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James Robinson exploited Engerman and Sokoloff’s basic premise that different types of
colonization have shaped long-term development in their seminal 2001 paper (Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). Despite some serious flaws in its identification strategy
and data (Albouy, 2012), this work has spawned a huge and influential literature on the
role of history and institutions in economic growth.
Engerman and Sokoloff’s basic tenet that endowments might affect institutional devel-
opment through the channels of colonization, slavery and inequality has been contested –
or only partially supported – from both a conceptual (North, Summerhill, and Weingast,
2000; Coatsworth, 2005) and empirical (Nunn, 2008a; Williamson, 2010; Bruhn and Gal-
lego, 2012) standpoint. Moreover, the search for a negative relationship between economic
inequality and long-term development has produced a contradictory and inconclusive body
of research.
The attempt to establish a link between political inequality and deficient long-term
development has been more successful; Acemoglu, Bautista, Querub´ın, and Robinson
(2008)’s study of Colombia’s region of Cundinamarca offers an early example of this re-
cent wave of work. Bruhn and Gallego (2012) offer a systematic overview of the legacy of
different types of colonial activities in the Americas, which also supports the importance
of political inequality. They characterize colonial activities as “bad” – those based on
increasing economies of scale – “good” – those not characterized by increasing economies
of scale – and “ugly” – those based on the exploitation of forced labour. The authors find
that “bad” activities are linked to worse economic outcomes today, while the evidence for
“ugly” activities is much weaker. The authors fail to find a connection between these activ-
ities and economic inequality and showed, instead, that political institutions and political
representation were the channels through which they affected development. Single country
studies with sophisticated identification strategies, however, have highlighted that “ugly”
activities based on forced labour also had adverse developmental consequences, which
mostly worked through political channels as well (Dell, 2010; Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno,
and Robinson, 2012).
In the Brazilian context, and more specifically for the province/state of Sa˜o Paulo,
William Summerhill has performed a thorough analysis of the impact of different types of
inequality and of slavery (Summerhill, 2010). The author’s findings highlight the lack of
a robust relationship between any of these indicators and long term development. Funari
(2017) successively applied a similar approach to Minas Gerais, Pernambuco and Rio
Grande do Sul, finding no relationship between political inequality and development. For
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economic inequality, instead, the relationship appears to vary across states, presumably
because of their different colonial experiences.5 Reis (2017) confirmed Summerhill’s finding
of the lack of relationship between slavery and long term growth for the whole of Brazil.
In my work, using a different identification strategy, I establish that slavery had a
negative impact on crucial developmental outcomes: fiscal capacity and public goods
provision. Moreover, I highlight a channel for this effect that depends on neither economic
nor political inequality strictly defined. My findings suggest that slavery affected the
development of local institutions by shaping the settlement of foreign immigrants during
the second half of the 19th century. Political representation is certainly an important part
of the story. However, it was the ability of migrants to “vote with their feet” and exert a
political pressure well beyond their numbers due to Brazil’s labour shortage – rather than
influence exerted through formal political institutions, which are the standard measures of
political inequality – that helped them shape local institutions. The paper also supports
an interpretation of the determinants of development in Latin America outlined by North,
Summerhill, and Weingast (2000) and Coatsworth (2005), which questions a direct and
unbroken link between colonial settlement and long-run economic growth, and highlights
the importance of political and economic developments in the 19th century.
1.3 Structure of the dissertation
The goal of the remainder of the introductory part of this Dissertation is to further set the
stage and motivate the three research papers. In Chapter 2, I offer a detailed literature
review in which I discuss existing research related to my work. There, I outline the lessons
present in the various strands of the literature and identify the remaining gaps in our
understanding. Concomitantly, I illustrate how my own work contributes to filling some
of these. I begin by reviewing the literature on the central theme of this dissertation:
fiscal capacity (Section 2.1). I outline the definition of this concept, how it is commonly
measured and what impact we can expect it to have on economic outcomes. In Section
2.2, I discuss the rich literature on sovereign debt crises drawing on research on the Great
Depression, other time periods, and theory. The final strand of literature I discuss relates
to slavery and development in Brazil (Section 2.3). After presenting the three papers
(Chapters 3-5), I provide my overall conclusions (Chapter 6).
5The author also found an ambiguous relationship between political and economic inequality.
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Chapter 2
Literature review
2.1 Fiscal capacity: definition, measurement and impact
2.1.1 What is fiscal capacity and why does it matter?
Despite a growing recognition of the role of fiscal institutions in shaping economic perfor-
mance, most macroeconomic models still assume that governments always have the ability
to raise the desired or needed tax revenues and are, in general, effective. This was clearly
not the case historically, but neither is it today in many developing countries. Historians,
sociologists and other social scientists have long recognized that the development of means
to raise taxes deserves serious study. Joseph Schumpter argued along these lines already
in 1918 in the wake of the tumultuous changes brought about by World War I (Schum-
peter, 1918). A relatively recent literature in modern Economics has also started tackling
fundamental questions, such as where states’ ability to raise revenues comes from and
what impact it has on the economy, beyond the distortionary effects of taxes commonly
discussed. Tim Besley and Torsten Persson, two pioneers of this literature, argue that
it has been recognized that “[...] the power to tax is about much more than raising tax
revenues – it is at the core of state development” (Besley and Persson (2014), page 100).
At the heart of this literature is the concept of fiscal capacity – coined by historical
sociologist Charles Tilly (Tilly, 1975, 1990) – which is usually understood to represent the
level of development of a country’s fiscal system. Often, it is also considered as a more
general indicator of state capacity and, in particular, of the ability of a government to
implement complex policies (Rogers and Weller, 2013). From a theoretical perspective,
Besley and Persson (2010) show that investments in legal and fiscal capacity are often
complements. This leads to strong links between the ability to raise taxes and to provide
market-supporting institutions. The complementarity between fiscal capacity, state de-
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velopment and institutional quality means that rich countries are also high tax countries,
with good enforcement of contracts and property rights.6 Dincecco and Prado (2012)
and Dincecco and Katz (2016) offer convincing empirical evidence of the positive effect of
fiscal capacity on long-term economic performance at country level, whereas Dittmar and
Meisenzahl (2016) offer evidence of this effect at city-level for pre-modern Germany.
The relationship between fiscal capacity and wider institutional quality is multifaceted.
Fiscal capacity furnishes the necessary resources for the provision of public goods and
the creation and maintenance of a qualified and efficient bureaucracy able to monitor
the economy and society and to implement complex policies. The provision of public
goods, such as public education, can also foster the creation of upper-tail human capital
and help attract highly skilled individuals through immigration (Dittmar and Meisenzahl,
2016). Even in the absence of large scale public goods provision, state capacity can
foster growth and market integration by protecting from external predation, removing
institutional barriers to trade, limiting the ability of local elites to extract rents, and
offering widely applicable rule of law and regulations (Epstein, 2000). A more effective
buereacracy might also be better able to resist the vested interests and rent seeking of the
elites, and to raise taxes in a less distortionary way (Koyama and Johnson, 2017). A high
fiscal capacity, particularly when accompanied by effective restraints on the executive, is
also indicative of an at least partly successful and functional bargain between the state and
the economic elites. A successful bargain with the more or less broad elites is particularly
important in the historical context because of the quasi-voluntary nature of taxation which
still prevailed in some countries in the interwar period, for example Switzerland (Farquet,
2012). Apart from facilitating the taxing of a non-negligibile share of resources, elite
cooperation can also promote the implementation and success of policies.
The measurement of fiscal capacity is directly connected to these considerations. The
share of taxes in GDP, the share of income (direct) taxes in GDP and the share of income
(direct) taxes in total tax revenues are all widely used indicators of fiscal capacity. In my
research, I also rely on these. The key insight is that the amount and types of resources the
state is able of to tax are both important elements of fiscal capacity. They exemplify the
two aspects of institutional quality outlined above: 1) the amount resources available to
support the state’s infrastructure, 2) the level of cooperation of the elites. Income (direct)
taxes are a particularly good indicator of both. Income taxes are generally considered to
be some of the most demanding to collect in terms of monitoring and fiscal infrastructure.
6The incidence of taxes in GDP in rich countries is around 40%, while the same figure for developing
countries is around 10-20% (Besley and Persson, 2014).
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Moreover, reaching a consensus between the state and the more or less broad elites is a
fundamental prerequisite for effective direct taxation. At the other end of the spectrum
are trade taxes. These are considered easy to collect, the tax base – goods entering
and/or leaving the country – is easy to monitor, and the political bargain with the elites
more straightforward. Indeed, Sokoloff and Zolt (2007), amongst others, note that richer
countries have tax systems that are more progressive and rely on personal and corporate
income taxes and broad-based property taxes, whereas poorer ones rely mainly on taxes
on consumption, excise taxes and custom duties.
2.1.2 Limits to the development of fiscal capacity
If one takes a long historical view, some of the changes in fiscal systems may seem abrupt.
However, the difficulties in creating centralized revenue raising institutions are severe and
have undermined the process of state formation for long stretches of human history, with
the first modern fiscal states appearing in Europe only in the last 2-300 or so years. More-
over, centralized taxation represents a necessary, but insufficient condition for the creation
of effective states. Parliamentary supremacy – i.e. an effective control of the executive –
is generally considered to be a necessary complementary feature to fiscal centralization.
This became widespread only in the 19th century in Europe (Dincecco, 2015).
Tilly (1975) provides an overview of the distinguishing features that made Western
Europe as a whole particularly prone to the development of the first modern states. One
is a certain degree of cultural homogeneity due to the diffusion of the Roman Empire,
Christianity, long-standing trade links and similar family structures, despite the existence
of different languages, ethnicities and customs. Tilly argues that these facilitated “[...]
the diffusion of organizational models, [...] the expansion of states into new territories,
[...] the transfer of populations from one state to another, and [...] the movement of
administrative personel from one government to the other.” The Roman Empire also
mattered, according to the author, because its remnants provided the justification for the
existence of a sovereign power and for the consolidation of power within the context of
relatively similar political institutions. A large literature has explored these and other
factors to explain the “rise of the West”; see Koyama and Johnson (2017) for a recent
overview.
A consensus in the literature is that reforms of fiscal constitutions are often the result of
extreme circumstances (O’Brien, 2011). Wars and conflicts, such as the French Revolution,
the English Civil War and the two World Wars, are examples of the type of events that
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can have a major impact on the role of governments in the economy and on the way taxes
are raised. Tilly (1975) famously argued that “War made the state and the state made
war”.
Finding direct empirical evidence for this link is, however, not straightforward. Aidt
and Jensen (2009), for example, find no indication that war spurred the introduction
of personal income taxes in Europe, North America, Oceania and Japan in the period
1815-1939, but their evidence is broadly consistent with expenditure pressure increasing
the likelihood of the introduction of such taxes. Sabate´ (2016) does find a link between
warfare and fiscal expansion by analyzing the period between the mid 19th century and
the present, but also highlights that this is U-shaped in technological changes, with nuclear
weapons determining the downward sloping part of the curve. He also finds that political
institutions can influence the persistence of fiscal reforms brought about by changes in the
nature of warfare. Dincecco, Fenske, and Onorato (2016) also find that warfare spurred
the development of fiscal capacity. However, they highlight that in the African continent
it also led to the creation of special-interest states and the perpetuation of conflict. In
Europe, instead, it facilitated a decrease in civil strife and the rise of general interest
states.
Queralt (2017) recently argued that these mixed results and the differential impact
of warfare on state formation is at least partially explained by the mix of instruments -
taxation and borrowing - countries used to finance wars. In particular, in periods in which
loans were more widely available due to conditions in financial markets, for example after
the development of a global capital market in the 19th century, warfare was not associated
with significant fiscal development due to the possibility of defaulting on the loans after
the end of the conflict. In any case, in parts of the world characterized by a relatively
low incidence of large scale conflicts and where conflicts took place in different historical
circumstances from those of Europe, as was the case in Latin America and Asia, warfare
alone cannot explain the development of states and the variation of fiscal capacity across
space and time (Centeno, 1997, 2002; Gupta, Ma, and Roy, 2016).
Major macroeconomic events can also lead to fiscal reforms by, for example, increasing
the demand for the provision of public goods such as unemployment insurance. The Great
Depression in the United States is an example of this at both the federal and state level
(Wallis and Weingast, 2005; Gillitzer, 2017). In general, any exogenous increase in the
demand for public goods can have both static and dynamic effects on the accumulation of
fiscal and other state capacities. However, differing degrees political resistance to increases
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in taxation will eventually determine how much the state is able to actually expand its
franchise (O’Brien, 2011; Hoffman, 2015).
The underpinnings of the bargain between the economic elites, the broader public and
the state regarding taxation are disputed in the literature and are very probably contingent
on time and place. Resistance to taxation can emerge, for instance, from a desire not to
cede resources to an unaccountable and unrestrained sovereign. When a sovereign cannot
credibly commit to refrain from confiscation, as is often in the case in absolutist regimes,
a low fiscal capacity scenario might be the only viable equilibrium, as shown by Ma and
Rubin (2017) for Qing China.
Both political scientists and economists have also argued that resistance to taxation can
have its roots in the unwillingness to share resources with categories of people perceived
as different. These differences can be due, for example, to racial or regional identities. In
comparing the evolution of income taxation in Brazil and South Africa over the course
of the 20th century, Lieberman (2003) draws on the concept of the National Political
Community (NPC) to argue that institutionalized racial discrimination in South Africa
made the white elites more willing to share resources with a group perceived as homogenous
to them: poorer whites. In Brazil, on the other hand, the formal rejection of racial
discrimination – which was, instead, perpetrated informally – made the white elites more
prone to resist the pooling of resources though taxation. The legacy of this early 20th
century set-up, according to Lieberman, can be seen today in South Africa’s successful
income tax and Brazil’s continuing struggles. In general, many studies have found a
negative relationship between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and the provision of public
goods (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Recent work,
however, suggests that the effect of ethnic and linguistic diversity is not univocal and
depends, in practice, on the actual degree of cross-linguistic and cross-ethnic interactions,
with more mixing leading to more resource sharing (Desmet, Gomes, and Ortun˜o-Ort´ın,
2016).
Religious identity can also play a role in the provision of public goods. Apart from
being an important factor in identity politics, it can also have an impact through its
traditional role in the provision of services normally associated with public goods, such as
health and education. As shown by Chaudhary and Rubin (2016) for the Indian Princely
States, the private provision of education by religious organizations of the same creed as
the ruler lowered the supply of those public goods to the population as a whole. Public
goods unaffected by religious provision did not exhibit this effect.
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As argued by Mares and Queralt (2016), however, fiscal reforms need not be connected
to interclass, interethnic and inter-religious distributional issues or, more broadly, to the
financing of the welfare state. The authors argue that the introduction of the income tax in
Britain, for example, was tied to the redistribution of the tax burden within the economic
elite, from the traditional land-owning class to the recently emerged industrialists.
Even when starting conditions and shocks provide favorable conditions for big changes
in fiscal systems, these cannot happen overnight due to the learning process and the
investments in fiscal and human capital necessary for levying new taxes. An illustrative
example of this is the taxation of the opium trade in Iran, the development of which
stretched over two decades of experimentation in the first half of the 20th century (Hansen,
2001). Indeed, long-run empirical studies confirm a high level of persistence in fiscal
systems; see for example Sokoloff and Zolt (2007) on the Americas.
Thus, countries with inefficiently weak states unable to raise sufficient revenues and to
provide growth and welfare enhancing public goods have existed for most of history and
continue to exist today in many parts of the world. This is the central message of much
of the literature on this topic, which, in one form of the other, maintains that history
matters in the creation and persistence of institutions.7
2.1.3 Fiscal capacity, borrowing and macroeconomic policy
The underdevelopment of fiscal capacity does not only limit countries’ long term growth
potential, but also their maneuvering space to deal with cyclical fluctuations in economic
activity and shocks more generally. As Besley and Persson (2010) point out, fiscal capacity
is not fully utlized at all times, but past investments make it possible to raise revenue when
this is necessary. An example of this is provided by Sylla and Wallis (1998) who highlight
the role of pre-existing state-level revenue structures in the debt crisis of the 1840s in
the US. The authors argue that some states faced insurmountable obstacles to raising
additional taxes, leading to a wave of defaults following the 1839 recession.8 Another is
provided by O’Brien (2011) who highlights that Britain historically faced less constraints
to the expansion of its fiscal base than its main rival powers France, Spain, Austria,
Denmark, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. This means that it was able to weather fiscal
7See, amongst many others, Acemoglu (2005); Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vidigni (2011); Besley and Persson
(2009); Besley, Ilzetzki, and Persson (2013); Besley and Persson (2014); Dincecco and Prado (2012);
Dincecco (2015); Dincecco and Katz (2016); Hoffman (2015); Koyama and Johnson (2017).
8According to the authors, newly established frontier states had narrower tax bases than older ones, and
relied on property taxes which were too politically costly to expand rapidly in order to continue servicing
the debts.
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and financial crises with more ease and with more rapid recoveries.
A key tool to deal with adverse shocks is borrowing, which has historically been inti-
mately linked to fiscal development. Economic historians have long tied Britain’s excep-
tional ability to borrow to its early development as an advanced fiscal state, for example.
North and Weingast (1989) argued that the shift of power from the king to parliament after
the Glorious Revolution of 1688 opened the way for more extensive taxation by transferring
control of the fiscal resources to broad elites. This, in turn, increased Britain’s credibility,
allowing it to borrow extensively and relatively cheaply on financial markets. Some au-
thors stress the importance of earlier periods in British constitutional and fiscal history,
particularly the Commonwealth and Civil War (O’Brien, 2011), but the main message is
unchanged.9 Bordo and White (1991) argue that the superior strength and credibility
of its fiscal system allowed the United Kingdom to borrow and inflate its economy more
extensively than France during the Napoleonic Wars.10 In a comparative setting, Dincecco
(2009) shows that that European countries with centralized and/or limited regimes – the
two preconditions for effective, high capacity states – enjoyed cheaper access to credit in
the period 1750-1913.
Theoretical models have also formalized the idea that the efficiency of tax systems
endogenously affects creditworthiness and thus the ability to borrow (Aizenman, Gavin,
and Hausmann, 2000; Arellano and Bai, 2016; Bi, Shen, and Yang, 2016). Esslinger and
Mu¨ller (2015) show that the relationship between capacity and borrowing can also go
the other way. Through a political economy model that endogenizes choices regarding
investment in fiscal capacity, while explicitly allowing for public debt and the possibility
of default, the authors show that borrowing can facilitate investment in fiscal capacity,
but only if income fluctuations are not too large.
Limits to the ability to borrow are still a key factor in fiscal policy today. Gavin and
Perotti (1997) have argued that borrowing constraints have been important determinants
of pro-cyclical fiscal policy in Latin America. Mendoza and Oviedo (2006) suggested that
the more severe financial frictions faced by developing countries in borrowing markets,
combined with greater tax revenue volatility, can explain the procyclicality of their fiscal
9Stasavage (2016) paints a less optimistic picture. The author argues that institutional reforms rest on two
different narratives that are often conflated. On one side are executive constraints, shared governance and
transparency, which are generally perceived as good. On the other side are restrictions on the influence of
tax payers and the devolvement of decision power to creditors, which are redistributive in nature and not
necessarily welfare enhancing. The author argues that British and European history support the latter
narrative more consistently.
10O’Brien and Palma (2016) make a similar argument on the monetary side, highlighting the importance
of the Bank of England’s previous commitment to an orthodox monetary policy.
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policies and their lower debt-to-GDP ratios compared to industrial countries.11 With
many countries still having to “graduate” from harmful fiscal policy procyclicality (Frankel,
Vegh, and Vuletin, 2013), understanding the origin of the constraints that keep countries
locked in this inefficient policy space is an extremely relevant issue.
2.1.4 My contribution to this literature
The papers of this dissertation are closely tied to the themes of this literature. At the
same time, they aim to help fill some of the existing gaps in our understanding.
My paper on local fiscal institutions in Brazil explores established themes in the liter-
ature: public revenues, public expenditure, and the provision of public goods. However,
it does so in an under-explored setting where our knowledge of the historical develop-
ment of fiscal institutions is still limited (Hoffman, 2015; Koyama and Johnson, 2017).
My findings tie this development to other key aspects of Brazil’s history – slavery and
mass immigration – adding another layer of innovative contribution. Moreover, Brazil is a
country where the low quality of institutions still plays an important role today. Gaining
an understanding of its origin has a clear policy relevance.
My paper on aggregate fiscal dynamics utilizes the concept of fiscal capacity in a setting
where it has largely been ignored. Although the literature clearly suggests strong links
between fiscal capacity and borrowing capacity, the relationship between fiscal develop-
ment and cyclical fiscal policy has not been explored directly. This is particularly true
in the Great Depression literature, which has mostly focused on the constraints imposed
by the Gold Standard and on the impact of WWI to explain the different experience and
policy choices of countries during the Depression. My paper points to the fact that even
more fundamental and deeply-rooted factors, such as fiscal development, contributed to
the course of the Depression.
Finally, my paper on the Great Depression debt crisis studies one of the ultimate
results of fiscal dynamics: sovereign default. Although I do not use the concept of fiscal
capacity directly in this paper, I show that the collapse in tax revenues behind the defaults
cannot be attributed to explicit policy choices and was, instead, rooted in a deep-seated
fiscal fragility.
11See Ilzetzki (2011) for an alternative, political economy-based, explanation for fiscal policy procyclicality.
This is grounded in disagreements amongst successive governments regarding the distribution of public
spending.
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2.2 Sovereign defaults: theory and evidence
In the first paper of this dissertation, I study the debt crisis that engulfed central and
local governments around the globe in the 1930s. The paper is related to several strands
of literature. Firstly, it speaks to the literature on the causes and consequences of the
Great Depression defaults. Secondly, it relates to three main topics within the large
literature in international finance and macroeconomics dealing with sovereign defaults: 1)
the link between fiscal policy and sovereign defaults; 2) the role of asymmetric information
in defaults; 3) debt crises prediction. In this section, I mostly discuss recent work in these
three areas in conjunction with some more general literature on sovereign defaults. This
discussion provides a foundation for the literature on the Great Depression debt crisis
discussed in the paper.
2.2.1 Inability to pay and default
Sovereign defaults take place when national governments are either unwilling or unable
to repay their debts. In either case, creditors have no or limited ability to recover their
loans through courts or the seizure of assets. Moreover, when the debtor is located in
another country with respect to the creditor, the status of sovereign defaulter can be
extended to sub-national governments and even private debtors, who can be shielded by
their country’s sovereignty. Distinguishing between inability and unwillingness to repay is
often a difficult exercise in practice, as political and economic constraints interact with each
other. Nonetheless, the distinction is useful in thinking about the causes and consequences
of defaults.
A further distinction can be drawn within defaults due to the inability to repay. Fol-
lowing Arellano and Bai (2016), one can distinguish between fiscal and aggregate defaults.
The former occur when the government is unable to raise tax rates in order to collect the
necessary resources for repayment due to limited fiscal and/or state capacity. The latter
take place because of an economy-wide resource constraint, which entails that raising tax
rates will not be sufficient to allow the debtor to repay its debt.
A fair number of recent papers has focused on improving the definition and measure-
ment of debt sustainability. A share of these aim to identify the adjustments to fiscal
policy (essentially the size of the primary surplus) necessary to ensure that the debt ratio
does not go beyond the country’s fiscal limit (Ghosh, Kim, Mendoza, Ostry, and Qureshi,
2013; D’Erasmo, Mendoza, and Zhang, 2016). Others investigate how taxing efficiency and
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exogenous shocks affect fiscal limits (Arellano and Bai, 2016; Bi, Shen, and Yang, 2016).
A connected strand of literature focuses on how output volatility and the persistence of
shocks, both of which affect fiscal limits, can become evident only in “bad times” due to
asymmetric information between creditors and debtors (Cata˜o and Kapur, 2004; Cata˜o,
Fostel, and Kapur, 2009; Cata˜o, Fostel, and Rancie´re, 2011, Forthcoming).
This literature has emerged, amongst other reasons, to reconcile the fact that most
models of default stress the debt burden as one of the most important determinant of de-
fault (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981; Arellano, 2008; Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer,
2009; Mendoza and Yue, 2012) with the empirical observations that: 1) some countries
tend to default with low levels of debt, a phenomenon known as “debt intolerance” (Rein-
hart, Rogoff, and Savastano, 2003); 2) the link between “bad times” and default is tenuous
(Tomz and Wright, 2007, 2013; Durdu, Nunes, and Sapriza, 2013).12 The recently devel-
oped definitions of fiscal sustainability highlight the fact that fiscal limits are country
specific and that they can change endogenously following shocks. These adjustments go a
long way in harmonizing the theoretical foundations of default with the empirical facts.
2.2.2 Reputation and the costs of default
At least since the work of Grossman and Van Huyck (1985), inability-to-pay defaults have
been seen as rational responses to adverse shocks in the presence of asset market incom-
pleteness. This is because these defaults make up for the absence of state contingent debt
securities, which pay less or not at all during downturns. Under these circumstances a
default should be considered “excusable”, and should not lead to any reputational conse-
quences for the defaulter.
However, researchers have shown that defaults do affect the conditions under which
countries can access financial markets. Although there was no strong evidence for repu-
tational costs until the recent past (Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer, 2009; Oost-
12 Tomz and Wright (2007) analyze the empirical content of the hypothesis that countries will default in
“bad times” and find only a weak negative relationship between default and output in a sample of 175
sovereign borrowers from 1820 to 2005. The authors conclude that a difficult economic situation is neither
a sufficient nor necessary condition for sovereign default. The authors show that sovereigns defaulted when
output was below trend only 60% of the time, and that the average deviation of output from trend at the
start of a default was only -1.6%. Calibrated default models, instead, predict default almost exclusively
when GDP is below trend and when this deviation is on average -8%. The authors’ results are consistent
with further research on different time periods, samples of countries and approaches to measuring trends
in output (Durdu, Nunes, and Sapriza, 2013). Tomz and Wright offer some suggestions on how to reconcile
theory and empirics. Importantly for this paper, they argue that “bad times” might need to be defined
differently. Good candidates in signaling impending difficulties in debt repayments are large decreases
in exports and government revenues, as well as high world interest rates. Time aggregation might also
cloud the results of this type of empirical exercise if default is caused by large albeit short-lived declines
in output not captured by annual data (Tomz and Wright, 2013).
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erlinck, 2013), Cruces and Trebesch (2013) have shown that larger defaults lead to longer
exclusions from capital markets and to higher borrowing costs. Their insight is simple,
but powerful: defaults vary greatly in size and duration and so should their consequences.
Cata˜o and Mano (Forthcoming) find even stronger reputational costs using different met-
rics for gauging the default premium, a larger sample and a longer time-span. They also
find that once the length of the default is accounted for, the additional informational
content of haircut size for the default premium is small.
The existence of reputational costs can be explained by the fact that defaults are
rarely exclusively driven by inability to pay. Unwillingness to pay can pay an important
role and, in fact, researchers have long investigated why sovereigns would ever willingly
choose to repay their debts. The choice presumably hinges on its costs and benefits. Early
theoretical contributions stressed the role of direct sanctions – for example in trade – and of
future access to financial markets as enforcement mechanisms for sovereign debt. Cole and
Kehoe (1998) further elaborated that the reputational consequences of default need not
be limited to future access to borrowing, but can lead to the defaulting nation as a whole
being seen as untrustworthy in all relationships. Consistently with this notion, Esteves
and Jalles (2016) show that, in the first era of globalization (1880-1913), the private sector
suffered from very large and long-lived reductions in access to credit following sovereign
default.
Research on more recent default episodes also suggests that default can have broad-
based negative consequences on the international economic activity of countries not con-
nected to explicit sanctions. Indeed, defaults often precede large decreases in trade and
foreign direct investment (Rose, 2005; Fuentes and Saravia, 2010; Martinez and Sandleris,
2011), as well as current account reversals and capital flights (Mendoza and Yue, 2012).
Default is also often accompanied by other large negative macroeconomic events, such as
financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).
2.2.3 The heterogeneity of defaults
As mentioned, defaults are vastly heterogeneous. In his review of the historical literature,
Oosterlinck (2013) highlights the difference between various types of contract breach,
with mild defaults – involving only interest payments and possibly sinking funds – on one
hand of the spectrum and complete repudiations on the other. The theoretical literature,
however, has only recently started catching up with the notion of partial defaults (Arellano,
Mateos-Planas, and R`ıos-Rull, 2013). Oosterlinck also points out that what might not
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be considered default by jurists might be so for creditors. The clearest case of this is the
repayment of international debts through the printing and debasing of currency. Naturally
this applies only to countries able to borrow in their own currency. The inability to do so
has been dubbed “original sin” by Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).
Defaults can also vary greatly in their ex-post characteristics, like haircut size and
duration, which in turn can determine the severity of reputational consequences for the
defaulters. Esteves (2013) shows that creditor organizations can play a big role in these
outcomes: before 1914, systematic bondholder representation provided by the British-
based Corporation of Foreign Bondholders reduced haircut sizes and the length of defaults
compared to both unsystematic post-default creditor coordination, which was altogether
detrimental, and the intervention of underwriting banks.
Defaults can furthermore be “selective” and involve only certain categories of debts
or creditors. Erce (2012) identifies three types of default episodes: 1) neutral, 2) dis-
criminatory against foreign creditors, 3) discriminatory against domestic creditors. This
classification is based on a number of indicators such as amounts involved, haircuts and
the timing of involvement. Erce finds that the foreign or domestic origin of the “liquidity
pressure” – i.e. difficulty in rolling over short-term debts – is crucial in selective defaults.
A weak banking sector can also play a role by discouraging domestic default, due to its
potential adverse effect on domestic banks. Finally, Erce argues that a stronger reliance
on foreign finance for the functioning of the economy would make debtor countries more
reluctant to undergo an external default.
Historically, the most common type of discrimination has been against foreign credi-
tors (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). However, there are instances of discrimination between
different classes of domestic and foreign creditors as well. Eichengreen and Portes (1988)
show, for example, that US creditors were treated less favourably than their British coun-
terparts in several cases during the interwar period.13 The existence of different repayment
probabilities for different classes of creditors gives rise to the possibility of an additional
enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt. This is the transfer of debt securities to cred-
itors least likely to be defaulted on through transactions on secondary markets. This
mechanism can lower or eliminate the incentive to default (Broner, Martin, and Ventura,
2008, 2010).14
13A prominent example of this is the German default. Political pressure from the UK government and the
non-interventionist attitude of the US led to a more favourable settlement for British nationals.
14By analyzing the German debt crisis during the Great Depression, Papadia and Schioppa (2016) illustrate
the strong impact secondary markets can have on the actions and expectations of both the authorities of
the debtor country and the creditors.
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2.2.4 Predicting debt crises and defaults
Notwithstanding a large body of literature, the determinants of sovereign defaults are
still not well established empirically. Moreover, serious identification issues have forced
researchers to concentrate on identifying predictors of default rather than strictly causal
factors.
Manasse and Roubini (2009), for example, provide a systematic assessment of factors
related to sovereign debt crises for the period 1970-2002 using data mining techniques.
They find ten variables to be relevant for predicting sovereign debt crises: the total external
debt/GDP ratio; the short-term debt reserves ratio; real GDP growth; the public external
debt/ fiscal revenue ratio; CPI inflation; the number of years to the next presidential
election; the U.S. treasury bills rate; external financial requirements (current account
balance plus short-term debt as a ratio of foreign reserves); the extent of exchange rate
overvaluation and exchange rate volatility.
A more recent contribution by Cata˜o and Milesi-Ferretti (2014) concentrates on the
role of Net Foreign Liabilities (NFL). The authors highlight that looking at net rather
than gross liabilities, particularly net external debt, could be more frutiful in predicting
external crises, and that foreign exchange reserves are the most effective mitigating factor
for external crises.
2.2.5 My contribution to this literature
My work follows the general methodology of papers attempting to predict sovereign debt
crises by studying the association between economic and political indicators and defaults.
Contrary to these studies, however, the objective of the paper is not maximizing predic-
tive power, but disentangling the importance of each explanatory variable in the default
process. The Great Depression setting allows me to do this thanks to the of the fact that
it represents a single huge common negative shock (see the paper for more details).
As it emerges clearly from the discussion above, defaults are complex phenomena and
are often part of larger episodes in which many things happen at the same time. This
requires the testing of several channels at once to avoid omitted variable bias. Analyzing
political or economic factors in isolation will not yield robust predictions, given that it is
their joint effect that pushes countries towards default (Manasse and Roubini, 2009). For
this reason, I have collected a large amount of new data in order to perform this type of
exercise. In the analysis, I include all variables found to be important in previous work
for which data is available.
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The paper also takes several additional cues from the literature compared to previous
studies. In line with the empirical evidence, I construct a new measure of default that
allows me to capture partial defaults. In addition, I allow explicitly for the possibility of
default having feedback effects on other variables by employing a dynamic structure in my
estimations. Finally, I measure “bad times” in different ways. In particular I analyze the
impact of output contractions, fiscal crises and trade collapses separately.
The finding that contractions in public revenues turn out to be the most robust and
reliable predictors of default, even after controlling for the size of the economic contraction,
supports the idea that fiscal limits are not fixed entities. The collapses of tax revenues
experienced by some countries reveal that the Depression affected the ability of states
to tax and/or revealed new information regarding the fiscal fragility of the defaulting
countries. A further interesting possibility is that the size and pervasiveness of the slump
might have revealed fragilities that were unknown not only to the creditors, but to the
debtor countries themselves.
2.3 Slavery, institutions and development in Brazil
In this section, I provide an overview of the history of slavery in Brazil and on its impact
on the development of its institutions and economy. The account of the nature of slavery in
Brazil relies heavily on Herbert Klein and Francisco Vidal Luna’s excellent and exhaustive
2010 book “Slavery in Brazil” (Klein and Luna, 2010). The review of the impact of slavery
draws from a broad literature focused on Brazil and beyond.
2.3.1 The establishment and evolution of slavery
The Atlantic slave trade began almost immediately after the colonization of South America
and the Caribbean by Spain and Portugal. By the 1580s, the forced trasportation of people
from Africa to the Americas had already reached the considerable size of around 3,000
individuals per year.
The establishment of sugar plantations in the Northeast of current Brazil provided the
initial stimulus for the large scale import of African slaves to the country. For various
reasons, including the spread of non-endemic diseases and the distatste of the Spanish
crown for the enslavement of indigenous people after the unification of Spain and Portugal
in 1580, the initial enslavement of local populations was not successful. Pre-existing
links between Portugal and slave markets in Africa proved useful in facilitating this new
enterprise and meant that the Portuguese were early movers in the exploitation of African
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slave labour in their new colonies.
The defining characteristics of the establishment of slavery in Brazil compared to pre-
vious slave-based societies were three, according to Klein an Luna: 1) the prevalence of
slaves amongst agricultural workers, 2) the production of commodities for international
trade, 3) the influence of slaves on local society. Brazilian slavery did not only represent
the largest forced transfer of people during the Atlantic slave trade with nearly 5 million
individuals, but also provided the blueprint for subsequent slave-based enterprises: the
Brazilian model influenced developments in the whole New World and the establishment
of colonies by the English, French and Spanish.
Although the Brazilian sugar industry lost its primacy in the world by the end of the
17th century, it continued to play an important role in world supply and in the demand for
slave labour. Additionally, the discovery of gold – and later diamonds – in the country’s
interior (today’s Minas Gerais and Goia´s) provided new stimuls for the import of slaves
to Brazil. This boom would last until the second half of the 18th century. In the same
century, cotton started becoming an important export in the coastal province of Maranha˜o,
further stimulating demand for slave labour. Slaves continued to be a fundamental source
of labour for the province’s cotton plantations until the 1840s (Pereira, 2017). The late
18th century also saw a revival of the sugar industry and an increase in its producion to
commercial levels in Rio de Janeiro and, to a lesser extent, Sa˜o Paulo, which continued
into the 19th century. This increased slave numbers in this relatively peripheral area.
The last wave of slave imports took place in independent Brazil and was due to the huge
expansion of the coffee industry in the 19th century. This involved the whole Southeastern
region of the country. By the 1830s, coffee was the country’s most important export and by
the 1850s Brazil was the world’s largest producer, responsible for over half of total global
production (Klein and Luna, 2010). Combined with developments from the previous
century, the growth of coffee production led to a sharp increase in the share of slaves
entering the country trough Southeastern ports, mainly Rio de Janeiro. By 1820, these
had overtaken the Northeast’s traditional slave ports (Figure 2.1).
Rio De Janeiro and the Para´ıba valley located across the western border of the latter
and the eastern border of Sa˜o Paulo were the earliest centers of coffee mass production.
The crop then spread at an uneven pace over the century to Minas Gerais and to the rest
of Sa˜o Paulo, leading to the exploitation of virgin lands in the west of the state. The
exploitation of these new territories – still inhabited by independent indigenous people –
began in the 1870s and 1880s, as the abolition of slavery was looming large and eventually
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Figure 2.1: Estimate of the number of slaves disembarked in Brazil per decade during
the Atlantic slave trade according to area of arrival, 1510-1870
Source: Voyages Database: The Trans Atlantic Slave Trade Database (2009)
became reality. After the end of slavery, the coffee frontier continued to expand westwards
and southwards and eventually reached the state of Parana´. Coffee overtook sugar as Sa˜o
Paulo’s most important crop in the 1840s and by the end of the decade the province was
Brazil’s second most important producer after Rio, which was eventually overtaken in the
1880s.
The peripheral role of Sa˜o Paulo in colonial Brazil meant that its relationship with
slavery was markedly different from that of the sugar-producing North-East and even
from that of its neigbours Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais. The former was home to
the country’s colonial capital since 1723, engaged in substantial sugar production, and
featured a key port important for both the trade in slaves and commodities. As such,
Rio de Janeiro received and retained large numbers of African slaves well before the coffee
boom of the 19th century. Minas Gerais, instead, was the most important mining centre
in the country. The discoveries of gold and diamonds in the 18th century stimulated a
large inflow of slaves, but also the development of its vast lands for a variety of agricultural
enterprises such as cattle ranching and, later, coffee production.
Up until the mid 18th century, the coercion of labour in Sa˜o Paulo mainly concerned
the indigenous population through the institution known as the aldeamento (Summerhill,
2010; Klein and Luna, 2010). These were settlements aimed at tying the semi-nomadic
population to the land, converting it to christianity and offering protection from other
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indigenous populations. With the start of large scale coffee production in the early 1830s
the situation started to change, but Sa˜o Paulo still only contained 79,000 slaves by the
late 1830s compared to 78,000 in 1819. Rio de Janeiro, instead, already had over 146,000
slaves and Minas Gerais nearly 170,000 in 1819. By 1872, Rio de Janeiro still had roughly
twice as many the slaves as Sa˜o Paulo – 306,000 compared to 157,000 – and Minas Gerais
almost two and a half times more (Marc´ılio, 1975). Even after African slavery had picked
up in Sa˜o Paulo it was markedly different from that found other parts of Brazil. Slave
holding was generally small scale, evenly distributed geographically and characterized by
more balanced sex ratios.
During the 19th century, international pressure against slavery rapidly mounted. British
influence was particularly important in the piecemeal abolition of slavery in Brazil. In a
1827 treaty, Britain forced Brazil to commit to the abolition of the slave trade within 3
years from its ratification. The treaty also gave British ships the right to inspect their
Brazilian counterparts on the high seas to ascertain the presence of slaves. The Law of
1831, approved during a cull in the slave trade, nominally criminalized the transportation
of slaves from Africa to Brazil, in agreement with the treaty. However, it was almost
completely ineffective and local juries, controlled by wealthy landowners, absloved the few
cases of smuggling of slaves brought to the courts. At this point, the opposition to slavery
within Brazil was very low. Moreover, the expansion of coffee production and the very
limited slave revolts encouraged the continuation and even an increase in the reliance on
coerced labour. Unhappy with the situation, Britain reserved itself the right to treat slave
ships like pirate ships and to apprehend and try slavers in British courts with the Bill Ab-
erdeen of 1846. Following this increased pressure, numerous incidents between the British
navy and the slavers, and the fear of losing British support in the face of a military threat
from Argentina, a series of new provisions were introduced in 1850 under the auspice of
the Brazilian Minister of Justice Euse´bio de Queiroz. These reinforced the 1831 Law, were
effectively enforced, and de facto ended the slave trade. Slave arrivals fell from 54,000 in
1949 to 3,300 in 1851 (Fausto, 1999) and faded out after that.
A remarkable characteristic of Brazilian slavery in both the 18th and 19th century
was, besides its scale, the vast variety of activities the slaves were involved in. Apart
from plantations, slaves could be found in urban and rural activities such as: fishing,
cotton weaving and spinning, ranching, artisanship, food production, domestic services,
construction, transportation and industry. However, the vast majority of active slaves
recorded in the 1872 census worked in agriculture – 808,000 out of around 1.2 million
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– and many of the rest in closely related activities. The number of slaves working in
coffee production was approximately 320,000, more than one quarter of total active slaves.
Although the majority of slaves did not work on plantations even in the Southeast, sugar
and coffee municipalities still had the highest concentration of slaves (and the most unequal
distribution thereof).
This pattern became more pronounced with the abolition of the international slave
trade, after which the internal trade increased in importance. Between 100 and 200 thou-
sand slaves were transported from the Northeastern and the Southern provinces of Brazil
to the Southeastern ports of Rio de Janeiro and Santos benween 1850 and 1888 (Mattoso,
1986). The transfer of slaves also involved individuals within the same province. These
transfers usually relocated slaves from declining areas to the booming coffee-growing re-
gions. This intraprovincial trade might have been even more important than the inter-
provincial one, but is less well recorded (Klein and Luna, 2010).
As a result of these developments, the concentration of slaves on plantations increased
at the same time that slave prices shot up and slave numbers diminished. This might
be an indication that, as the cost of slaves went up, their viability over free labour was
higher where the slaves could be organized in gangs and “incentivized” more effectively
with violence to perform tasks that required mostly physical effort and little skill or care.
This would be in line with the conceptualization of coerced labour provided by Fenoaltea
(1984) and with the experience of the United States and the Caribbean (Klein and Luna,
2010). The former, in particular, also experienced a Second Middle Passage, which led to
the relocation of close to a million individuals from coastal areas to the cotton and tobacco
plantations of the interior in the 19th century (Berlin, 2003).
As the 19th century progressed, Brazil witnessed a rise in abolitionist sentiment and
in slave resistance and unrest. Slavery was finally abolished in 1888 (see the paper for
more details).
2.3.2 Slavery, inequality and development: the general picture
Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff posited that different initial endowments drove
the differential use of slave labor in the Americas. This in turn led to different levels
of economic inequality, which affected the development of institutions crucial for growth
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2012). With regard to taxation, Sokoloff and Zolt (2007)
argued, along similar lines, that the initial level of inequality determined the different
development of fiscal institutions in various parts of the Americas. They suggested that
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Latin America’s high level of initial inequality explains its particularly deficient fiscal
capacity, even in comparison to countries with similar levels of income. According to the
authors, low levels of direct wealth and business taxation – due to low local level taxation
– are a key factor in the radically different patterns of taxation between North and Latin
America, which can still be observed today.15
These assertions have been contested from a conceptual and empirical perspective.
North, Summerhill, and Weingast (2000) contended that factor endowments, at least in
the long-run, are endogenous. The authors furthermore stressed the importance of po-
litical institutions in the late 18th and 19th centuries in shaping successive outcomes.
Coatsworth (2005) argued along similar lines. By comparing Latin American coffee ex-
porters, Nugent and Robinson (2010) point out that endowments alone cannot explain
the different economic and political evolutions of these countries. In line with North et al,
the authors indicate that different political institutions played an important role in the
differential impact of coffee production on economic and political outcomes. More broadly,
Williamson (2010) maintained that Latin America did not have high inequality in com-
parative terms during the colonial period and up to the mid-19th century. Therefore, he
argued, inequality is a product of more recent times, and a central tenet of Engerman and
Sokoloff’s argument does not stand up to scrutiny.
Engerman and Sokoloff’s hypothesis has also found only partial direct empirical con-
firmation. Nunn (2008b) tests it at country level for the Americas and across states and
counties in the US, finding a negative effect of slavery on economic development. However,
he finds no support for the hypothesis that this effect was driven by large scale plantation
agriculture or that the channel of persistence was inequality. In their sub-national study of
the effect of different types of colonial activities in the Americas, Bruhn and Gallego (2012)
find evidence that activities characterized by increasing economies of scale are related to
lower GDP per capita today, but find only weak evidence of a relation between the latter
and forced labour. Moreover, they do not find evidence of these colonial activities being
linked to income inequality. They do highlight, however, that political inequality might
have played an important role.
Evidence on the detrimental effect of slavery and other forms of coerced labour on
various aspects of development in the Americas, if not in Brazil, is abundant. Apart from
15For Spanish America, Irigoin (2016) also identifies the legacy of colonialism as one of the main determi-
nants of state weakness and low fiscal capacity in the continent. However, she stresses different aspects
of Spanish rule compared to Engerman, Sokoloff and Zolt, namely the disconnect between those who
collected and those who spent public revenues and the weak political representation of the citizens in the
colonies.
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the already mentioned work by Nunn (2008b), Bertocchi and Dimico (2014) highlight
the persistently negative impact of slavery on income inequality in the US through the
channel of differential educational provisional and attainment between blacks and whites.
Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2012) illustrate the negative impact of slavery on
long-term development in Colombia, while Dell (2010) shows that coerced labour in mining
in Peru (the mita) is associated with worse economic outcomes today. Interestingly, in
her story, districts where the institution was absent had higher historical land inequality
and this might have actually helped the provision of public goods and the protection
of property rights. Once again, the evidence points to more complex and ambivalent
mechanisms than those highlighted by Engerman and Sokoloff.
Evidence of the adverse developmental impact of coerced labour exists outside of the
Americas as well. Buggle and Nafziger (2016), for example find that the incidence of
serfdom in Russia in 1861 is associated with lower well-being today, while Markevich and
Zhuravskaya (2015) show that its abolition led to a rapid increase in living standards and
industrial development. The Atlantic and other slave trades also left deep scars on the
sending regions of Africa. Nathan Nunn and co-authors have illustrated this in a series of
papers (Nunn, 2008a; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Nunn and Puga, 2012).
2.3.3 The legacy of slavery in Brazil
Criticisms of Engerman and Sokoloff’s hypothesis of a direct line from initial endowments
to economic outcomes today via colonization have traction for Brazil, as well. The deep
structural changes underwent by the country since its Independence suggest a much more
complex story. Nonetheless, the legacy of history on Brazilian development can be clearly
identified.
Naritomi, Soares, and Assunc¸a˜o (2012) study the impact of two extractive colonial
commodity booms – sugar and gold – on long term development in Brazilian municipalities.
They find that areas nearer to the booms are associated with worse economic outcomes
today, such as land concentration and public goods provision. The authors also find similar
effects to those of sugar and gold for the early coffee boom of the 19th century, but no
effect for the late 19th early 20th century boom of the same commodity, suggesting that the
exploitation of natural resources under less extractive institutions need not have adverse
effects on long-term development. The authors also find that distance from Portugal,
a proxy for colonial control, interacted with the extractive booms and determined the
extent of their adverse effects on development. Naritomi et al, however, do not unpack the
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channels through which these effects occurred or persisted through time. The differential
use of slave labour and its institutional legacy are plausible, but unexplored candidates.
The 18th century colonial diamond boom in Minas Gerais analyzed by de Carvalho
(2015) provides further evidence of the complex relationship between endowments and
development. The author finds that the extraction of this commodity also had a long-
run impact, but of the opposite sign compared to gold and sugar. De Carvalho links
the positive effects of historical diamond production to better historical infrastructure
provision and a relatively low exploitation of slave labour.
Fujiwara, Laudares, and Valencia Caceido (2017) offer the only clear-cut direct ev-
idence of the legacy of slavery within Brazil. The authors exploit the Tordesillas line
that divided Portuguese and Spanish holdings in South America as a discontinuity for the
intensity of slavery across Brazilian municipalities. The authors find that municipalities
with more slaves in 1872 are characterized by higher income inequality today, as well as
stronger racial imbalances in income and education and worse public institutions.
In an attempt to uncover the roots of regional inequality in Brazil, Musacchio, Mart´ınez
Fritscher, and Viarengo (2014) analyze a more recent period. The authors suggest that
export growth during the Old Republic (1889-1930) had strongly positive effects on the
provision of public education in Brazilian states . They also find that this effect was muted
in states that had more slavery before abolition or cultivated cotton. However, the authors
make no attempt to establish a causal impact of slavery.
With their longitudinal approach, Musacchio et al convincingly show that cross-sectional
correlations between historical circumstances and outcomes today ignore the deep struc-
tural changes underwent by Brazil over time, as evidenced by dramatic changes in the
educational ranking of Brazilian states between 1872 and 1940.16 However, while the au-
thors emphasize the Republican period as one of deep transformation, which shaped the
face of modern Brazil, structural changes were well under way already in the monarchic
era. In many ways, the developments of the Republican period were simple continuations
of trends that had started in previous decades. The expansion of railways, the decline
of slavery, the start of mass immigration and the coffee boom, all of which crucially con-
tributed to the rise of the Southeast of the country, are clear evidence of this. Indeed
understanding structural changes within Brazil is in good part understanding the rise of
the Southeast, and of the province/state of Sa˜o Paulo in particular, from the mid 19th
century onwards.
16Mart´ınez Fritscher and Musacchio (2010) and Mart´ınez Fritscher (2011) provide further arguments and
analysis along these lines.
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Summerhill (2010) offers a comprehensive illustration of the long-term effect of histori-
cal institutions in Sa˜o Paulo. Despite being a relative backwater in the colonial period, the
province had its own form of coerced labour: the already-discussed aldeamentos. These
were settlements featuring both “extractive” and “inclusive” characteristics. With the
beginning of the coffee boom, more systematic and large-scale forms of labour coercion
became salient in order to satisfy the rapidly growing labour demand. African slavery
proliferated in the province and, in fact, was substantially more widespread in the monar-
chic period than in the colonial era. The snapshot captured by 1872 census, which I use
in my analysis, likely represented the peak of slavery in the province, at least in terms of
absolute numbers.
The author finds no relationship between slavery in 1872 and long term development, as
measured by income per capita in 2000.17 He moreover finds and a positive relationship
between aldeamentos and development. Additionally, the author finds no relationship
between long term development and the classical channels proposed in the literature for the
existence and persistent effect of extractive institutions: historical inequality and political
enfranchisement. The author ascribes this result to the fact that, following the structural
change and reversal of fortunes of the 19th century, slavery in 1872 measured production
possibilities and thus future prosperity rather than the incidence of an extractive colonial
institution. However, the IV strategy he employs to deal with these issues does not yield
any conclusive evidence either. When he performs a cross-state study with earlier levels
of slavery – those in 1819, although the quality of this data is uncertain, as Summerhill
points out – he finds the expected negative result.
Funari (2017) performs a similar analysis and extends it to additional Brazilian states
– Minas Gerais, Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul – confirming the lack of a significant
relationship between political inequality and long-term economic development and finding
mixed results regarding the link between economic inequality and development, presum-
ably due to the different colonial experiences of these states.18 Reis (2017) attempts to
link municipal growth between 1920 and 2000 for the whole of Brazil to a series of factors
including wealth concentration in 1920, the extent of the political franchise in 1914 and the
incidence of slavery in 1872, finding no robust relationships. The authors finds, instead,
a positive effect of the foreign population share in 1920. No attempts to estimate causal
relationship are made by these authors, but the results are once again illustrative of the
17To be precise, the author initially finds a positive association between the incidence of slavery and income
per capita, which, however, disappears with the inclusion of further controls.
18The main difference between Funari’s and Summerhill’s studies is that the latter constructs his inequality
measures for 1905 whereas the latter uses the 1920 census.
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absence of a clear relationship between slavery and development. What emerges, however,
is a potential link between slavery, migrant settlement and development, which I explore
in my work.
de Carvalho Filho and Colistete (2010) focus on a different aspect of development in
Sa˜o Paulo by analyzing the historical determinants of the provision public education. They
find that the presence of foreign born immigrants positively affected the supply of public
education. They argue that the channel for this effect was the establishment of community
schools for the different immigrant groups, the cost for which was partly covered by public
funds. The authors further link the presence and positive impact of foreign farm laborers
and foreign farm owners to the coffee boom. However, the authors do not find a robust
relationship between slavery, or land inequality, and the supply of public education today.
My findings suggest that this might be due to the fact that slavery at least partially shaped
the settlement of foreign immigrants, and thus the outcomes studied by the de Carvalho
Filho and Colistete.
2.3.4 My contribution to this literature
In summary, although a number of studies have attempted to investigate the impact of
slavery or have suggested links between their findings and the incidence of forced labour,
the institutional and economic legacy of slavery in Brazil has not been satisfactorily es-
tablished. Despite a large volume of scholarship on the origin and evolution of slavery
in Brazil, with Klein and Luna (2010) representing one of the most recent examples, the
legacy of a monumental event like the Atlantic slave trade is still nowhere near being fully
fleshed out in the largest slave importer of the time. My third paper offers a contribution
in this direction by focusing on a key factor for long run development: fiscal institutions.
The paper also offers a new perspective on slavery in Brazil by highlighting its impact
on the settlement of foreign migrants during the age of mass migration. Between 1880
and 1909 well over 2 million migrants entered Brazil, and most of them were absorbed by
the plantations and growing factories of the Southeast of Brazil. Although migration is
widely recognized to have decisively contributed to the the country’s economic and political
development, its relationship with slavery has not been explored. I argue that slavery
influenced the settlement of migrants both directly and indirectly. On one side, large
shares of slaves in the population reduced the demand for free labour. On the other side,
the presence of large scale slavery and its legacy after abolition discouraged the settlement
of migrants due to the extremely negative connotation the institution had acquired by the
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second half of the 19th century. The geographical mobility of the immigrants and their
ability to punch above their weight in terms of political influence due to Brazil’s severe
labour needs provided the ingredients for the improvement of local public institutions
and the provision of public goods. The combination of these factors helped to shape the
development of local institutions in Brazil and, potentially, its long-term growth trajectory.
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Chapter 3
Paper 1: Sovereign Defaults
during the Great Depression: The
Role of Fiscal Fragility
3.1 Introduction
The main contribution of this paper is to revisit the pivotal sovereign debt crisis of the
1930s by introducing substantial innovations on the data and methodological side com-
pared to previous studies, and to focus on a so-far largely unexplored factor: fiscal fragility.
The paper also offers a different perspective and approach compared to the existing litera-
ture on sovereign defaults by focusing on a single debt crisis and its dynamics. I show that
the deterioration in public revenues that accompanied the Great Depression was a key
predictor of the wave of defaults of the early 1930s. This result emerges clearly both from
a simple visual analysis of the data and from rigorous testing. Moreover, I identify the
role of public revenues strongly and separately from the direct impact of the Depression
gauged by measures of macroeconomic health, such as changes in GDP and trade. The
finding is furthermore robust to the inclusion of a wide array of controls commonly used
in the literature and to the use of different estimators.
Although the workhorse model of default, which has evolved from the seminal work
of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), posits that sovereigns will renege on their obligations in
“bad times” if they cannot issue state-contingent debt securities, the empirical support
for this hypothesis is mixed (Tomz and Wright, 2007, 2013). My finding that, during the
Great Depression, the trajectory of tax revenues had predictive power beyond that of other
macroeconomic indicators suggests that the response of countries to economic shocks can
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be vastly different and that “bad times” might be captured more effectively by looking at
public revenues rather than GDP, as suggested in recent work (Tomz and Wright, 2007;
Arellano and Bai, 2016). It furthermore indicates that this variable contains information
about the path of future fiscal policy – and thus the sustainability of the debt – and/or
about structural characteristics of countries that affect their ability to respond to shocks
i.e. their “fiscal fragility”.
Collapses in public revenues in the 1930s were not connected to more expansionary
and intentionally unsustainable fiscal policies. On the contrary, the countries which saw
their public revenues fall drastically after the onset of the Depression in 1929 were also
more likely to experience large decreases in expenditures and increases in their primary
surpluses, as well as defaults. Thus, it appears that defaulters attempted to direct their
policy toward debt sustainability through austerity, but could not achieve the desired
result. Non-defaulters, instead, were able to run relatively more – for this conservative,
pre-Keynesian era – lax fiscal policies. The result also holds for sub-national governments,
which experienced severe contractions in their revenues as well.
The more likely explanation for the connection between revenue loss and default is
that defaulters were inherently more fragile than non-defaulters, and that the onset of the
Great Depression revealed the full extent of their vulnerability. In other words, structural
factors – such as their fiscal and administrative capacity – shaped countries’ response to
the Great Depression shock and the probability of default. In my second paper, (Chapter
4)I show that, indeed, country characteristics – summarized by fiscal capacity indicators
– were crucial in determining the response of countries to the Depression: more fiscally
capable countries were able to avert the worst of the collapse in public revenues and to
continue tapping credit markets.
The 1930s offer a rich environment in which to study sovereign defaults. After a large,
but short-lived lending boom in the second half of the 1920s, the onset of the Great
Depression in 1929 kick-started the (arguably) largest debt crisis in history. Between 1931
and 1936, many national and sub-national governments around the globe interrupted
interest and principal payments on their foreign loans. Following Reinhart and Rogoff
(2013)’s definition of external default 19, almost 45% of countries in their sample of 70
countries were in default in the first half of the 1930s.
Although there is substantial research on the widespread domestic and international
19The failure to meet an interest or principal payment on the due date or within the specified grace
period. The episodes also include instances where rescheduled debt is ultimately extinguished in terms
of less favourable than the original obligations.
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consequences of the 1930s defaults, there is surprisingly scant research on their causes. The
most common narrative around the time of the crisis was that the misguided and excessive
international lending of the 1920s triggered the defaults (Harris, 1935; Madden, Nadler,
and Sullivan, 1937; Lewis, 1938; Lary, 1943). More recent research has highlighted the
role of “bad luck” in crisis (Diaz-Alejandro, 1983; Fishlow, 1986) and its systemic nature
(Kaminsky and Vega-Garc´ıa, 2016; Accominotti and Eichengreen, 2016). Additionally,
Flandreau, Gaillard, and Panizza (2010) have argued that the distortions in international
financial markets were not as pervasive as previously thought, strengthening the “bad luck”
interpretation. A partial challenge to the “bad luck” view is the work of Eichengreen and
Portes (1986), who find that both exogenous economic factors and political choices played
a role in the defaults.
Compared to previous work, I provide a wealth of new information, which allows me
to test systematically for the first time a range of channels that have been proposed in
the literature on sovereign defaults in general and on the Great Depression debt crisis
in particular. Most importantly, I provide a more complete and sophisticated dataset on
public debts than available until now (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Abbas, Belhocine, El
Ganainy, and Horton, 2010) – which accounts for maturity structures and sub-national
borrowing for almost 30 countries worldwide – and a new measure of default size.20 On the
methodological side, I employ panel data methods, which offer clear advantages compared
to previous studies of the 1930s defaults.
This paper also offers a different perspective compared to studies looking at many de-
fault episodes over time. The objective of these is usually to maximise their ability to pre-
dict sovereign crises and defaults (Manasse and Roubini, 2009; Cata˜o and Milesi-Ferretti,
2014). For this reason, they attempt to identify powerful and parsimonious predictors of
default, often by combing different variables. Examples of these are public revenues over
external debts, reserves over external debts or net foreign assets. While these variables
improve predictive ability, they also make it impossible to disentangle the contribution of
each of their components. The goal of this paper, instead, is to identify the role of each of
these macroeconomic indicators in anticipating default. From an econometric perspective,
I am able to single out the predictive ability of all of my variables because I can trace their
evolution over the course of a single large event, the Great Depression, which crucially
20At the national level, the sample includes Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ire-
land, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, Uruguay and Venezuela; at the local level data is unvaiable on a consistent basis for Austria, Chile,
Czechoslovakia, Greece, Romania and Venezuela, but is available for Yugoslavia.
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also spawned a sufficient number of defaults for a meaningful analysis.
Analyzing a short time span, presents a further advantage over studies aggregating
many default episodes over long stretches of history because the latter may be unable to
adequately control for the changing international context in which the defaults took place.
This context can affect both the probability of default and the explanatory variables used
to predict external crises. Naturally, studying a single default wave presents drawbacks,
as well as advantages, from both an econometric and conceptual point of view. The main
ones are a relatively small sample size and potential difficulties in generalizing the results
to other episodes of sovereign debt crises i.e. external validity.
In any case, the findings of the paper raise a number of interesting points related to
the literature on shocks, fiscal policy and default, particularly recent work attempting to
better define and measure fiscal limits (the maximum sustainable debt-to-GDP ratio of
a country). Ghosh, Kim, Mendoza, Ostry, and Qureshi (2013) and D’Erasmo, Mendoza,
and Zhang (2016), for example, focus on the conditions needed to achieve fiscal solvency
i.e. adjustments in the primary surplus following changes in the debt level. Bi, Shen, and
Yang (2016) and Arellano and Bai (2016) consider fiscal limits driven by the efficiency
with which the government is able to tax, which bounds effective tax rates. Bi, Shen,
and Yang (2016) further consider how fiscal limits can change endogenously following, for
example, real exchange rate shocks. Finally, Cata˜o, Fostel, and Rancie´re (2011, Forth-
coming) concentrate on the role of asymmetric information, suggesting that creditors only
receive information about the true equilibrium path followed by a debtor country, and
thus its fiscal limit, in “bad times”. I review this literature alongside the most relevant
part of the large empirical and theoretical literature on sovereign debt and default in the
introductory chapters of this dissertation (Section 2.2).
This paper cannot provide definitive evidence for all these mechanisms. However the
results do support an interpretation of the Great Depression defaults, which is consistent
with a number of them. The idea that countries defaulted simply because they hit some
fixed fiscal limit is ruled out by the results. While I do find that countries were more likely
to default if they had a larger debt burden, this factor is neither the only nor the strongest
predictor of default. Instead, the fact that public revenues collapsed more pronouncedly
than output in some countries and that these countries were more likely to default suggests
that the Great Depression endogenously lowered fiscal limits by affecting states’ ability
to raise revenues, revealing the true fragility of countries’ fiscal systems.21 Therefore, the
21The extent to which the governments of debtor countries were aware of their own fragility is unclear
in an era of very imperfect data collection and in the face of a huge shock like the Great Depression.
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findings suggest the need for a convergence between the literature on taxing-efficiency-
driven fiscal limits, the literature on state and fiscal capacity (see Besley and Persson
(2014) for an introduction), and the literature on asymmetric information. This is also
warranted by more recent default crises (1970-2011), which were also accompanied by a
reduction in tax collection as a share of GDP (Cata˜o, Fostel, and Rancie´re, 2011).
Besides the role of fiscal fragility, several further results emerge from the analysis.
Contrary to suggestions in the historiography and in the theoretical economics literature,
I find no relationship between external defaults and the maturity structure of public debts
at the national-provincial level. For municipal defaults, instead, the liquidity pressure
associated with a high share of short term debts is linked to default size. I rationalize
this finding with the fact that scarce resources for repayment were allocated hierarchically
between different levels of government. For national-provincial defaults, I find that the size
of the public debt burden anticipated the occurrence of defaults, consistently with most
models of sovereign default. A greater reliance on the external sector of the economy in
terms of both trade and finance, instead, is negatively associated with national-provincial
defaults, in line with the predictions of reputational models. None of these variables,
however, is as robustly associated with default as public revenue deterioration.
The “bad luck” versus “political opportunism” debate on the Great Depression defaults
introduced above boils down to two fundamental questions. First, were the defaults the
result of misjudgment on the part of creditors and opportunistic behaviour by borrowers
or the inevitable result of factors beyond the control of borrowing countries? Second, to
what extent were the factors leading to default global in nature or specific to individual
countries? Recasting my results in terms of this debate, it is evident that a univocal
answer does not do justice to the magnitude and complexity of the 1930s debt crisis. A
deep economic and fiscal crisis, which hit countries with different intensities, interacted
with political choices, particularly when governments were forced to give preference to
either domestically or externally oriented sectors of the economy. Thus, Eichengreen and
Portes’ conclusion that both politics and economics mattered is confirmed, although I
find the mechanisms that led countries to default to be substantially different from those
identified by the two authors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 offers a historical overview
of the lending boom and debt crisis of the interwar period. Section 3.3 provides details on
the newly assembled data-set. Section 3.4 presents the empirical strategy and discusses
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that they had more information than the creditors.
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the results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Setting the stage: borrowing, lending and defaulting in
the interwar period
The lift of the ban on foreign branching for US banks embedded in the Federal Reserve
Act of 1913 provided a decisive boost for the boom in post-WWI international lending.
US banks set up branches abroad to gather intelligence in order to start underwriting and
selling foreign bonds (Eichengreen, 1989) and between 1924 and 1931, around 60% of total
international lending came from the US (Crafts and Fearon, 2013). By 1929 the dollar
had overtaken sterling as the leading international currency in international finance (Chitu,
Eichengreen, and Mehl, 2014). Thus, in this period the US underwent a transformation
from an essentially closed economy to a an international hegemon (Figure 3.1). The US’s
predominance, combined with the challenge of finding detailed disaggregated information
on loans in other currencies in this period, informs the choice of focusing on defaults on
dollar-denominated debts in the analysis below. The fact that US creditors were treated
less favorably than their British counterparts at the default stage might induce some non-
random measurement error in my default measure, but this differential treatment regarded
the post-default stage rather than the choice to default itself and is thus not problematic.
Cycles of international lending and default were hardly a new phenomenon at the
time of the Great Depression, but never had the scale of defaults been so large and their
incidence so widespread (Winkler, 1933; Eichengreen, 1991). Up to this day, such rampant
insolvency is unique, with the potential exception of World War II and its direct aftermath.
In the US, although international lending was a relatively small share of all capital issues
in the interwar period, default on foreign bonds represented the largest bond default item
of the first half of the 1930s (Table 3.1).
Most of the interwar defaults took place in the early 1930s, the exception being a few
episodes in the early post-war years (e.g. Brazil, Mexico). The temporal concentration of
these episodes motivated the search for a common cause. Contemporary commentators
identified the supposedly speculative and misguided international lending of the 1920s
as the ultimate cause of the defaults (Harris, 1935; Madden, Nadler, and Sullivan, 1937;
Lewis, 1938; Lary, 1943). Their narrative is one of little or no discrimination between
good and bad borrowers by the creditors and of the sudden realisation of the unsoundness
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(a) US balance of payments, 1900-1940
(b) Net outstanding US loans by region, 1915-35
Figure 3.1: The internationalization of the US Economy
Source: the BoP data is from Edelstein (2006) and the data on US loans is from Lewis (1938).
of investments compounded by the Great Depression shock (Eichengreen, 1991).22 Recent
research supports the idea of a common root for the defaults by emphasizing the systemic
nature of the Great Depression debt crisis (Kaminsky and Vega-Garc´ıa, 2016) and the
fact that conditions in creditor countries were decisive in triggering the huge sudden stop,
which set-off the crisis (Accominotti and Eichengreen, 2016).
22Feinstein and Watson (1995) document John Maynard Keynes’ doubts on whether American lending to
Europe in the 1920s followed the same patterns and principles of UK lending during the Classical Gold
Standard era. The underlying conviction was that both lenders and borrowers were driven by distorted
incentives, partial or false information, or downright irrationality.
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Table 3.1: Annual bond defaults: principal amounts in thousands of dollars, 1930-1935
Year Railroads Industrial Public Utilities Real Estate Foreign
1930 841 134,994 96,344 128,158 708
1931 213,228 443,560 201,722 556,908 632,015
1932 201,739 699,034 593,136 543,579 581,385
1933 1,087,909 482,228 363,933 416,052 1,104,748
1934 310,251 206,435 150,244 83,266 256,601
1935 761,701 92,275 149,128 46,785 9,064
Total 2,575,669 2,058,526 1,554,507 1,744,848 2,584,521
Source: Standard Statistics Co., Standard Bond Investments, Weekly Advisory Section, Jan 11, 1936 p.
2,913 as reported by Madden, Nadler, and Sullivan (1937). As pointed out by these authors, the data in
this table has several limitations: it does not represent all bond defaults, but only those large enough to
be known by securtiy markets and the compilers of the data.
Table 3.2: Outcome of US lending by geographical area in thousands of dollars, 1920-1935
Latin America Europe East Asia Total
Total bond investment 1,935,612 3,380.625 869,783 6,186,091
Interest received 692,822 1,708,100 479,523 2,880,445
Principal repayments 693,189,00 1,485,946 395,876 2,575,011
Market value of outstanding bonds 491,108 1,449,007 564,985 2,505,200
Balance -58,493 1,262,428 570,601 1,774,536
Source: Madden, Nadler, and Sullivan (1937), Table 24 page 147.
Some of the claims of those that saw the crisis as the result of mistakes, distorted
incentives and outright dishonesty have also been substantiated. Investigations by the
US Congress revealed the unorthodox practices of some brokers and bankers in placing
the loans, demonstrating that some degree of malpractice was clearly present (Flandreau,
Gaillard, and Panizza, 2010). With regard to German borrowing, for example, Ritschl
(2012a) argues that perverse incentives due to the Dawes Plan of 1924 contributed to
creating moral hazard on both the borrower and lender side by making reparations junior
with respect to commercial debts, leading to excessive borrowing. This set up was then
reversed by the Young Plan of 1930, which contributed to a sudden stop and to plunging
Germany into economic chaos.
However, the overall picture is not as dire as contemporaries made it to be and default,
while pervasive, did not affect all debtors. There is ample evidence of discrimination
at the lending stage (Eichengreen, 1989; Eichengreen and Portes, 1990) and subsequent
satisfactory rates of return for foreign creditors (Madden, Nadler, and Sullivan, 1937;
Eichengreen and Portes, 1988; Jorgensen and Sachs, 1988); see also Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In
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Table 3.3: Rate of return on US foreign bond investments by geographical area, 1920-
1935
Year Latin America Europe East Asia
1920 7.67
1921 7.38 7.77 7.07
1922 7.64 7.79 6.39
1923 6.79 7.41 6.35
1924 6.97 7.67 6.64
1925 6.9 7.66 6.45
1926 7.01 7.54 6.48
1927 7 7.3 6.33
1928 7.34 7.5 6.15
1929 6.71 7.44 6.15
1930 6.23 7.44 6.36
1931 4.5 6.52 5.86
1932 1.98 5.47 5.68
1933 1.34 4.27 6.02
1934 1.14 4.91 19.20
1935 1.78 3.93 6.09
Average 5.41 6.77 7.15
Source: Madden, Nadler, and Sullivan (1937), Table 29 page 157.
a comprehensive study of bond issues in the 1920s, Eichengreen and Portes (1988) show
that ex-ante yield spreads over risk free domestic options – treasury bills in the US and
consols in the UK – more than compensated British investors and almost compensated
US investors for the losses of default. By studying all New York bond issues of the 1920s,
Flandreau, Gaillard, and Panizza (2010) conclude that the desire to maintain their good
reputation meant that underwriters carefully screened and selected loans, leading to less
malfunctioning in the international financial markets than previously thought.
Nonetheless, defaults did impact creditors. Jorgensen and Sachs (1988) find large
differences in rate of returns between Latin American countries: continuously serviced
Argentinean loans yielded higher returns than US Treasury bills, while default in Bolivia,
Chile, Colombia and Peru translated into losses for foreign investors. In general, the
profitability of single bond issues depended strongly on when they were issued. Those
issued during the early 1920s enjoyed unbroken service for a number of years. Later issues
only provided remuneration for a a limited amount of time before default hit in the early
1930s.
Defaults also had large aggregate impact on creditor economies. The German default,
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for example, contributed to the diffusion and severity of the slump in the US through
financial transmission channels (Ritschl and Sarferaz, 2014) and to the UK’s departure
from the Gold Standard through the exposure of banks (Accominotti, 2012). For these
channels, the distribution and timing of losses from defaults, rather than their cumula-
tive amounts, are of central importance. For debtors, the consequences of default were
also non-trivial. Eichengreen and Portes (1990) find that defaulting countries recovered
faster from the Depression on average, even after controlling for the severity of the slump.
Dealing specifically with the case of Germany, Ritschl (2002b) argues that the default was
instrumental in the country’s recovery in the 1930s.
The impact of the defaults went well beyond the 1930s, however. In establishing
the Bretton Woods system, policy-makers – following a classical trilemma framework –
decided to forgo the free movement of capital, rather than either fixed exchange rates or
an independent monetary policy. At the time, capital flows were perceived as speculative
and disruptive in light of the Great Depression experience (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998).
In the US, the debt crisis was furthermore seen – in conjunction with the broader crisis
that affected vast swathes of the banking sector – as the result of the failure of banks to
manage their conflicts of interests, and was used as a key justification for the division of
investment and commercial banking embedded in the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act (Carosso,
1970; White, 1986; Benston, 1990).
Systematic research on the factors that led individual countries to default or not is
not abundant. Diaz-Alejandro (1983) and Fishlow (1986) singled out the magnitude of
the external economic shock of the Great Depression as the main contributor to default.
Eichengreen and Portes (1986), instead, found that both economic “bad luck” factors and
political choices mattered. The authors showed that terms of trade deterioration and the
foreign debt-to-income ratio were related to the extent of default, but so was the degree
to which countries reduced the budget deficit following the onset of the Great Depression,
which was at least partially the result of political choices and constraints.23
In my analysis, I provide a systematic reassessment of the factors associated with
default using new data and econometric techniques. The findings paint a rich picture of
the Great Depression debt crisis, in which structural factors, shocks and political choices
all played a role. Eichengreen and Portes’ general conclusion is thus validated, but, as I
show below, not its specific findings. The clearest difference between my results and theirs
23The authors also find that their estimates over-predicted the extent of default in Australia, and they
linked this to the importance of international political and economic relations, in particular the close ties
of the country to its main creditor: the United Kingdom.
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is the role of fiscal policy: while they find that austerity generally payed off in terms of
avoiding default, I highlight that such attempts tended to fail due to sharp falls in revenue
and that, on the contrary, non-defaulters ran relatively more lax fiscal policies.
3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
I have transcribed a large amount of new data from historical sources to perform a compre-
hensive analysis of the interwar debt crisis. I discuss the data and sources briefly directly
below, and in detail in Appendix 3.B.
3.3.1 A new public debt dataset
The principal data contribution of this work is a new public debt data set. This includes
both domestic and foreign debts and accounts for their maturity structure. Its main
novelty, however, consists in including local public debts. Local level data was left out of
previous work presumably due to its very scattered nature. To the best of my knowledge,
I am the first to provide information on sub-national public debt on a systematic basis for
a sample of almost 30 countries for the interwar period.
The countries included are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Ro-
mania, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. These
countries make up over 90% of US net outstanding foreign loans for the whole period
examined. Not all time series are available for all countries (see Appendix 3.B), therefore
some of the countries drop out in some of the specifications in the econometric analysis
(see Section 3.4). In particular, sub-national debt figures are not available on a continuous
basis for Austria, Bolivia, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, France, Greece, Peru Romania
and Venezuela.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Abbas, Belhocine, El Ganainy, and Horton (2010)
represent two recent efforts to reconstruct public debt statistics over the very long run.
For the interwar period, they both rely on data collected by the League of Nations and later
included in a United Nations volume (United Nations, 1948), which is also the starting
point of my work. The information in the volume is limited to central government and
central government guaranteed debts24, and breaks these down into domestic – long-term
24Government guaranteed debts, normally constituted a small share of total public debts, a notable ex-
ception being Australia, where the commonwealth guaranteed all the outstanding debts of the states on
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and short-term – and foreign debts. Less complete data on the debt service are also
reported.
The compilers of the volume were very transparent about the limitations of their
data, which are mainly due to different reporting standards across countries and which
pose a serious challenge to international comparability. Appendix 3.B provides details of
these issues on a country by country basis. Whenever this was possible, I included or
excluded certain items to enhance the comparability of the data, but the overall picture
is still imperfect. On the positive side, however, the different reporting techniques reflect
the evaluation of the public debt burden by the statistical offices and, presumably, the
governments of the debtor countries. As such, they contain valuable information. In order
to further mitigate the problem of imperfect comparability, I use panel data methods in
the analysis. These rely on the time series variation of variables rather than on the cross-
sectional comparison of levels (see Section 3.4). In this respect, my paper has a similar
approach to Schlularick and Taylor (2012), who face commensurate issues of cross-country
comparability in their study of credit booms and busts.
The principal sources for the local public debt data are the Yearbooks of the German
Imperial Statistical Office (Statistisches Reichsamt, 1936b, 1938, 1939/40). For some
countries (e.g. Argentina), I integrated these sources with the publications of various
bodies, such as the Institute for International Finance – established by Bankers Association
of America in cooperation with New York University in response to the interwar debt crisis
– the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders – created by private British holders of foreign
government securities in 1886 to protect their interests – and rating agency Moody’s
investment manuals (for details, see Appendix 3.B).
These data reveal that the compilers of the UN volume were not fully aware of the
size of local level borrowing. Their claim that central government debt represented the
lion’s share of public debt is unsubstantiated for a number of countries. Moreover, local
public debts, in general, constituted a far from negligible share of total public debts:
31% on average between 1927 and 1936. The relative importance of local debts varied
greatly across countries. Figure 3.2 illustrates this point. Nations with federal structures
and/or large and independent cities were characterised by major borrowing at the local
level. Examples of this type of countries are Brazil, with an average share of local debt
over total debt of 71.7% between 1928 and 1934, and Germany, with an average of 49.7%
between 1927 and 1936. In more centralised and less sizable countries, local borrowing
1 July 1929.
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Figure 3.2: Average share of local debt over total debt, 1927-1936
Source: author’s estimates based on data in United Nations (1948), Moody’s (1931, 1934, 1935), Institute of
International Finance (1927), Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1929), Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b,
1939/40), Werhahn (1937), Francese and Pace (2008). See Appendix 3.B for details.
was much smaller. Belgium and Bulgaria, for example, had an average local share of debt
of 0.8% and 4.5% between 1927 and 1936 respectively.
The local debt data indicates that the comparative debt burden picture is seriously
distorted by the exclusion of sub-national public debts. Whether national, provincial or
municipal, governments service their debts though taxes and other public revenues. In
the case of foreign currency denominated liabilities, the servicing of the debt further relies
on the availability of foreign exchange. Both public revenues and foreign exchange are
generated by the productive activities of the economy; thus, central and local governments
rely on the same base to produce the resources needed to meet their obligations. A holistic
picture of public debts is thus essential in order to obtain a precise measure of the burden
faced by countries, and evaluate with confidence its contribution to default.
3.3.2 A new default size measure
Another important data contribution of this paper is constructing a new measure of default
size for the interwar period. This measure is the outcome variable of the econometric
analysis of Section 3.4 below. Table 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate my estimates of National-
Provincial and Municipal default size. Unfortunately, no distinction can be drawn at this
stage between national and provincial defaults due to incomplete disaggregated annual
information on outstanding dollar debts for all countries.
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Table 3.4: National-provincial default size, 1930-1936
Year AUT BGR CZE GER HUN POL ROU YUG ARG BOL BRA CHL COL PER URY
1930 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0
1931 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.4 0.78 0 1 0
1932 0.24 1 0 0 0.62 0 0 1 0.02 1 1 1 0.53 1 1
1933 0.28 1 0 0.39 1 0 1 1 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1
1934 0.34 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0.26 1 1 1 1 1 1
1935 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0.28 1 1 1 1 1 1
1936 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0.25 1 1 1 1 1 1
Default size is measured as the share of the principal of dollar bonds in default. Source: Authors calcu-
lations. Data on outstanding loans is from Lewis (1938) and data on the defaults is from Moody’s (1933,
1934, 1935, 1936, 1937), see Appendix 3.B for details. AUT= Austria, BGR=Bulgaria, CZE= Czechoslo-
vakia, GER=Germany, HUN= Hungary, POL=Poland, ROU= Romania, ARG=Argentina, BOL= Bolivia,
BRA=Brazil , CHL= Chile, COL=Colombia, PER= Peru, URY=Uruguay.
Table 3.5: Municipal default size, 1930-1936
Year AUT BGR CZE GER HUN POL ROU YUG ARG BOL BRA CHL COL PER URY
1930 0 0 0 0 0 0 – – 0 – 0 0 0 0 0
1931 0 0 0 0 0 0 – – 0 – 0.5 0.14 0.46 0 0
1932 1 0 0 0 1 0 – – 0.6 – 0.83 1 1 1 1
1933 1 0 0 1 1 0 – – 0.67 – 0.75 1 1 1 1
1934 1 0 0 1 1 0 – – 0.82 – 0.77 1 1 1 1
1935 0 0 0.24 1 1 0 – – 0.6 – 0.72 1 1 1 1
1936 0 0 0.23 1 1 0 – – 0.82 – 0.72 1 1 1 1
Default size is measured as the share of the principal of dollar bonds in default. Source: Authors calcula-
tions. Source: Data on outstanding loans is from Lewis (1938) and data on the defaults is from Moody’s
(1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937), see Appendix 3.B for details.. AUT= Austria, BGR=Bulgaria, CZE=
Czechoslovakia, GER=Germany, HUN= Hungary, POL=Poland, ROU= Romania, ARG=Argentina,
BOL= Bolivia, BRA=Brazil , CHL= Chile, COL=Colombia, PER= Peru, URY=Uruguay.
The modern definition of default employed by Standard and Poor’s, which is used in
studies investigating modern debt crises, is a unilateral interruption of the repayment of
the principal and/or interest of contractual debt obligations or – an essentially irrelevant
case in the interwar context – the offer of a swap of new for existing debt with less favorable
terms than the original issue before an interruption of payment, which is accepted by the
creditor (Cata˜o and Mano, Forthcoming). The definition used by my source – Moody’s
investment manuals from the interwar period– is very similar.
I measure default size as the principal of dollar bonds in default compared to the
principal of all outstanding dollar bonds. I argue that this ratio represents the best
measure of default size at the time of the actual defaults. Given the uncertain and drawn
out nature of post-default renegotiations, particularly acute in the interwar period, using
ex-post haircuts would be inadequate. These are the outcome of negotiations that take
place under economic and political conditions that are potentially unrelated or very distant
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from those of countries at the time of their default. Furthermore, they are a static measure
and do not reflect the dynamic process of default that is, instead, evident in my default size
measure. This measure is also preferable to binary default/no default indicators commonly
used in the literature. As discussed above, default episodes are vastly heterogeneous in
size, as well as in duration. Binary measures ignore this heterogeneity and discard a large
amount of informations that, instead, a continuous default size measure will capture.
My default size measure demonstrates the extent of this heterogeneity in the interwar
period. Partial defaults were common at both the national-provincial and municipal levels
and often preceded complete defaults. Some defaults remained partial as in the case of
Austria, Argentina and Czechoslovakia. In Brazil, although the central and most local
governments defaulted, some municipalities – most notably the city of Porto Alegre –
continued to service part of their debts. In Poland and Bulgaria, municipal governments
did not follow the central government into default at all. As the econometric analysis
demonstrates, national-provincial and municipal defaults only share some common factors,
while others help to predict one type of default but not the other. Fiscal fragility, however,
was a common feature in both types of default.
3.3.3 Some descriptive statistics
Keeping in mind the data issues described above, which limit the reliability of raw com-
parisons across countries, it is nonetheless useful to explore some characteristics of the
newly assembled data. In particular, I will illustrate how these data fit with arguments
made in both the theoretical literature and the historiography.
A prominent argument in the historiography is that the maturity structure of inter-
national capital flows played an important role in the interwar debt crisis. Feinstein and
Watson (1995), among many others, emphasize the unusually large size of short-term flows
of the 1920s. Moreover, Germany and South American countries – the most prominent
defaulters of the interwar era – relied heavily on short-term borrowing (Jorgensen and
Sachs, 1988; Ritschl, 2012a, 2013). Theoretical and empirical papers focusing on more
recent crises have also stressed the link between the maturity of debts and the probability
of default (Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001).
Figure 3.3 demonstrates that the share of short-term debts in domestic public debts
debt was indeed generally higher amongst defaulters than amongst non-defaulters. How-
ever, after 1924 – when international lending from the US started to take off – differences
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between defaulter and non-defaulters were small.25 Unfortunately, no systematic informa-
tion is available on the maturity structure of foreign debts. A reasonable assumption is
that this was similar to that to that of domestic borrowing. If anything, short-term debts
were probably lower as a proportion of external borrowing than of domestic borrowing,
given that domestic sources of short-term funds – particularly central banks – were ample,
whereas most foreign loans took place by floating bonds. The econometric analysis below
indicates that differences between defaulters and non-defaulters were insufficient to help to
predict national-provincial defaults. For municipal defaults, instead, I find that the share
of short term public debts was a reliable predictor of default. As discussed below, this
might be due to the fact that national and provincial debts were prioritized over municipal
liabilities when foreign exchange and gold reserves were insufficient to service both.
Figure 3.3: Short-term debt as a share of central government debt, 1913-1938
Source: author’s calculations based on data in United Nations (1948). Short-term debts are those with
maturity of up to two years. Data on the maturity structure of debts is available for to domestic debts
only. See Appendix 3.B for details
Another important feature of the newly-assembled data is that no relationship is ev-
ident between the size of the public debt burden – whether this is just the central gov-
ernment debt, or it includes the borrowing of local authorities – and default (Figure 3.4).
Unsurprisingly, given their heavy involvement in WWI, France and the UK emerge as
clear outliers with huge debt burdens. That these countries did not default attests to the
tenuous unconditional relationship that exists between debt burdens and default. How-
25The high incidence of short-term borrowing in the immediate post-WWI period in countries that would
later default is extremely interesting in its own right, and could be a further sign of their inherent fragility.
Exploring this hypothesis is left for future research.
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ever, even excluding their clearly special case, it is still impossible to find a relationship
between debt size and default. If anything, non-defaulters had larger debts compared to
the size of their economy than defaulters.
(a) Central government debt over GDP, 1914-38
(b) Total government debt over of GDP, 1926-38
Figure 3.4: Public debt burdens and default
Source: author’s calculations based on data from United Nations (1948), Moody’s (1931, 1934, 1935), Insti-
tute of International Finance (1927), Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1929), Statistisches Reichsamt
(1936b, 1939/40),Werhahn (1937), Francese and Pace (2008) for public debts and Klasing and Milionis
(2014) for nominal non-PPP adjusted GDP. See Appendix 3.B for details.
While this fact apparently clashes with most models of default, which highlight the debt
burden as one of the most important determinant of default (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981;
Arellano, 2008; Panizza, Sturzenegger, and Zettelmeyer, 2009; Mendoza and Yue, 2012), it
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is line with a substantial body of literature highlighting the fact that some countries tend to
default with low levels of debt. This “debt intolerance” (Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano,
2003) has various non-mutually-exclusive explanations. One are differences in a wide range
of economic and political characteristics of countries – such as the public’s tolerance for
austerity and the growth prospects of the economy – and in features of the public debts
– like their maturity structure and legal code of issuance (Bowdler and Esteves, 2013).
Another is the volatility of countries’ macroeconomic fundamentals and the persistence
of the shocks their are subject to (Cata˜o and Kapur, 2004; Cata˜o, Fostel, and Kapur,
2009). Finally, past credit history can play a role; for example, by determining how bond
yields will react to new information. My analysis finds that accounting for structural
characteristics, which affect both the ability to borrow and the probability of default,
reestablishes the size of the public debt as an important factor in sovereign defaults also
in the interwar setting.
Figure 3.5: Foreign debt as a share of central government debt, 1926-1938
Source: author’s calculations based on data in United Nations (1948). See Appendix 3.B for details
What emerges clearly from the raw data is that defaulters relied disproportionately
more on foreign borrowing compared to non-defaulters (Figure 3.5). The difference is very
significant. For defaulters the median share of foreign debts as a share of central govern-
ment debt hovered between 60 and 75% in 1926-38 and reached its peak in 1929; it then
declined during the 1930s, as international capital flows came to a grinding halt and do-
mestic sources of finance gained importance. For non-defaulters, the median foreign share
of debts was approximately 33% in 1926 and declined steadily to 14% in 1935. However,
the econometric analysis reverses the result of this raw comparison. Once country charac-
68
teristics are controlled for, the relationship between default and foreign borrowing turns
negative. The result implies that reliance on external sources of finance made countries
more reluctant to renege on their foreign payments and face the possibility of being cut
off from international financial markets.
The final piece of evidence in this section regards the relationship between default
and public revenues. Figure 3.6 shows that defaulters saw their central government tax
revenues contract significantly more than non-defaulters. The picture for local govern-
ments is very similar. Whereas the defaulters experienced a median contraction of more
than 20% in their tax revenues between 1929 and 1933, non-defaulters’ public revenues
contracted by less than 7%. The analysis below reveals that, even after controlling for
a wide array of factors, the relationship between fiscal contraction and default remains
statistically significant and quantitatively important.
As outlined above, a deterioration of fiscal revenues can be an indicator of bad economic
times. However, it is not necessarily simply the reflection of a slump. The reaction of tax
revenues to a fall in income can vary strongly across countries. One reason is that fiscal
policy can be different in different countries. Some governments might react strongly by
cutting taxes and/or raising expenditures, while others might remain passive or even raise
tax revenues in an attempt to continue servicing debts. Another reason is that factors
such as the structure of the economy and fiscal institutions can influence the reaction of
tax revenues to economic shocks. In my second paper (Chapter 4), I show that the level
of development of the fiscal system, as measured by fiscal capacity, strongly influenced
the ability of countries to prevent their government financing from collapsing during the
Depression.
Defaulters do not appear to have reduced tax revenues within the context of a lax fiscal
policy. On the contrary, as Figure 3.7 shows, public expenditure for defaulters fell together
with tax revenues after 1930. The primary surplus of defaulters actually improved for a
while after 1929, as they attempted to keep servicing their debts and reestablish debt
sustainability through austerity. This pursuit failed as the Great Depression progressed,
leading to default. The opposite was true of non-defaulters, who were able to run rela-
tively more lax fiscal policies after 1929, and actually expanded their public expenditure
consistently after the onset of the Depression. Thus, the evidence indicates that some
countries – endowed with more resilient fiscal institutions – were able to avoid collapses
in their fiscal aggregates, contractionary fiscal policies and default.
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Figure 3.6: Central government tax revenues 1914-1938
1929=1. Source: author’s calculations. See Appendix 4.B for details on the sources.
3.4 Econometric analysis
I conduct my analysis on the predictors of default size separately at the national-provincial
and municipal levels. I first outline the methodology in detail (Section 3.4.1). Then, I
present the findings (Section 3.4.2). In Section 3.4.3 I illustrate some robustness checks,
which I then expand in Appendix 3.A. There, I also replicate the analysis of Eichengreen
and Portes (1986), which still represents the reference paper for cross-country studies of
default during the Great Depression.
3.4.1 Methodology
Although the primary focus of the analysis is gauging the predictive ability of public
revenue deterioration for default, the complex and multifaceted nature of defaults means
that I have to account for a variety of factors concomitantly in order to avoid omitted
variable bias. As Manasse and Roubini (2009) show, it is the joint contribution of multiple
factors that will help determine whether a country is likely to defaults. Analyzing any
variable in isolation will yield inconclusive, at best, and misleading, at worst, results.
Therefore, after showing that collapses in public revenues and default are correlated,
no matter what estimator is used, I introduce four sets of controls both independently
and combined. These account for predictors of default found to be important in previous
work (Eichengreen and Portes, 1986; Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2001; Manasse and
Roubini, 2009; Cata˜o and Milesi-Ferretti, 2014), for which data is available. First, I test
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(a) Tax revenues and public expenditure 1926-1934
(b) Primary balance over GDP, 1927-33
Figure 3.7: Fiscal policy and default
1929=1. Source: author’s calculations. The primary balance is calculated as (TaxRevenue −
Expenditure+DebtService)/NGDP . See Appendix 4.B for details on the sources.
whether the severity of the slump was related to the probability and size of default, and
whether this explains away the effect of the contraction in public revenues. Second, I
test whether default was correlated with potential reputational costs by controlling for
countries’ reliance on the external sector in terms of both trade and finance. Third, I
study the predictive power of the size and composition of both public and private debts for
default. Finally, I test whether the fiscal and monetary policies carried out by governments
had any relation with the default outcome. Controls are generally introduced as natural
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logarithms to make interpretation simpler. Those which can take zero values, however,
are introduced as standard variables.
The basic model in my estimations is outlined in Equation 3.1.
DefaultSizei,t = α+ θ
PublicRevenuei,t−1
PublicRevenuei,1929
+ xi,t−1β + i,t (3.1)
where
PublicRevenuei,t−1
PublicRevenuei,1929
is my public revenue loss indicator, x is a vector of controls
and  is the idiosyncratic error term. To reduce the risk of reverse causality, all regressors
are entered with a lag, as is commonly done in the literature.
Assuming all the usual Gauss-Markov conditions are met, OLS yields consistent es-
timates of the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on default size, even if the
dependent variable is constrained in the 0-1 interval. However, the linear model suffers
from well known problems deriving from the fact that the conditional mean of the depen-
dent variable is assumed to be linear in the regressors. This means that the predicted
default size can lie outside the 0-1 interval. Nonetheless, a linear model represents a useful
approximation for two reasons: 1) straightforward interpretation of the coefficients 2) the
possibility of including fixed effects in a simple way.
To overcome the issues associated with linearity, I also run this basic model using the
Probit and Tobit estimators. Probit is often the model of choice in the literature, however
it is not fully adequate in this context since my dependent variable is not a binary crisis/no
crisis indicator, but a continuous variable. Tobit, instead, fits this application well since it
is a corner solution response model where the dependent variable is bounded by one or two
corner values and can have positive probability mass at these (Wooldridge, 2010). In my
case the corners are 0 (no default) and 1 (complete default).26 I also employ the Pseudo
Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator designed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) to deal with the nonlinearity introduced by having logarithms in the estimation.
The results of all the these estimations are vulnerable to omitted variable bias, since
I do not control for potentially crucial unobserved country characteristics through fixed
effects. Unfortunately, consistent estimators are available only for random effects effects
Tobit, while they do not exist for fixed effects Tobit. The former imply the implausible
assumption that the time-invariant country characteristics are uncorrelated with the other
regressors. However, a procedure to run a Tobit model with correlated random effects
26Like all non linear models, the estimated Probit and Tobit coefficients cannot be interpreted as marginal
effects as one would do with OLS or other linear models. The marginal effects need to be computed for
each level of the explanatory variables, but their sign and significance can be interpreted just as in the
linear case.
72
(CRE), which imply only somewhat stricter assumptions than a fixed effects model, is
available (Wooldridge, 2005, 2010). I present its results in Appendix 3.A. The estimates
are very similar qualitatively and quantitatively to those of the linear estimations.27
As a baseline methods, however, I prefer employing both standard and dynamic linear
panel data estimators to account for country fixed-effects in a robust and straightforward
fashion. In particular, I employ the within (FE) estimator as the principal method28 and
the the dynamic system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (Blundell and
Bond, 1995) for robustness. The difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) yields similar
results.29
The model takes the following form with fixed effects:
DefaultSizei,t = α+ θ
PublicRevenuei,t−1
PublicRevenuei,1929
+ xi,t−1β + ci + lt + i,t (3.2)
and, the following general form when dynamics are included:
DefaultSizei,t = α+A(`){DefaultSizei+ PublicRevenuei
PublicRevenuei,1929
+xi}+ci+ lt+i,t (3.3)
where A is a matrix of polynomials in the lag operator, ` is an aribitrary number of lags,
and c and l are country and time fixed effects respectively.
Apart from accounting for fixed effects, an important feature of panel data methods
is that they exploit the time-series rather than cross-sectional variation. As mentioned in
Section 3.3, this is an attractive feature in the context of this paper. Different accounting
and reporting standards make the data imperfectly comparable across countries. By ex-
ploiting the time series variation, all one needs for consistent estimation is that accounting
27 Greene (2004) has shown that the incidental variables problem that aﬄicts non-linear estimators when
fixed-effects are introduced as simple dummies does not affect the slope of Tobit MLE estimates. However
it shows up in the estimate of the variance. The bias appears to diminish quickly as T increases, but any
inference based on this estimator remains doubtful, at best.
28This accounts for fixed effects by subtracting the average value from the variables.
29With a dynamic structure, standard fixed and random effects estimators are biased since the lagged
dependent variable is correlated with the differenced error term. For this reason, a GMM estimator is
necessary. This type of estimator uses longer lags of the variables to instrument the lagged variables. For
this strategy, it is essential that the error be serially uncorrelated. Standard tests exist to verify whether
this condition is met. The Arellano and Bond (1991) exploits the moments conditions generated by
instrumenting differenced variables with longer lags of their levels without losing any observations (apart
from the first) in the process. This is achieved by changing the number of instruments with the lags
available. The Blundell-Bond (a.k.a system) GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1995) performs the estimation
in levels with the lagged differenced variables used as instruments for the regressors. Compared to the
difference estimator, this model uses some additional orthogonality conditions which improve the precision
of the estimates when the autoregressive parameter (i.e. the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable)
is close to one. However, this comes at the cost of additional assumptions. In particular, one has to
assume that the dependent variable is mean stationary.
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standards do not change over time for the same country.
A drawback of panel data methods is that time-invarying explanatory variables are lost
and slow-moving ones are subject to a drastic reduction in their variability, leading to less
precise estimates and, possibly, to coefficients appearing to be statistically insignificant
when in fact they are not. Moreover, these models – like OLS – are linear and suffer
from the shortcomings outlined above. As Wooldridge (2010) argues, both the linear and
nonlinear approaches have advantages and drawbacks, which, at the the current state of
statistical knowledge, cannot be overcome. He suggests reporting and drawing inference
from both, as I do here.
The dynamic element of the GMM estimators is important because persistence in the
case of defaults is a natural assumption. A country could be in default in a certain period
simply because it was in default during the last period. The debt renegotiations that
follow sovereign defaults are notoriously lengthy: even in the face of improving economic
conditions a country might seek to restructure its obligations to obtain a reduction in the
debt, while creditors might hold-up hoping for a better deal. The interwar period was
no exception and some defaults that began in the 1930s were only fully resolved after the
end of World War II. The German one, for example, was settled by the London Debt
Agreement of 1953.
Including a lagged dependent variable in the estimation also drastically reduces the risk
of feedback loops between default and the regressors. This is because defaults tend to have
large macroeconomic repercussions, which would impact the explanatory variables, leading
to reverse causality. However, even including a lagged default indicator does not solve the
issue that the other regressors might be affected by the prospect of default during the run-
up to a debt crisis. This problem is a fundamental limitation of most empirical studies of
defaults and is one of the reasons why these tend to focus on prediction rather than causal
relationships. To account for it as best as I can, I show that my results are robust to
excluding the year a country enters default (see Appendix 3.A). In this way, the feedback
loop between default and the other regressors is accounted for by the lagged default size
indicator, while the immediate run-up to default is excluded, eliminating observations
which could be affected by default-expectation-induced changes in the regressors. The
possibility that default expectations affect the regressors more than two years in advance
of default might still mean that the macroeconomic repercussions of default expectations
are not accounted for. In this instance, the results can still be interpreted as insightful
and robust conditional correlations, as in the existing literature.
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As discussed above, the objective and approach of this paper is different from both
previous studies on sovereign debt crisis in general and those focusing on the Great De-
pression. Compared to Eichengreen and Portes (1986), I have a wider set of controls,
more sophisticated estimates of public debts, a sample that includes all key players and a
panel data approach. Compared to studies on more recent crises, such as Detragiache and
Spilimbergo (2001), Manasse and Roubini (2009) and Cata˜o and Milesi-Ferretti (2014),
I have a continuous rather than a binary outcome variable, which accounts for the dy-
namics of default over time and the existence of partial default. Additionally, the use
of a dynamic methods represents a step forward in the attempt to minimize the issue of
reverse causality. Furthermore, my objective is not maximizing the predictive ability of
the model, as in these studies. The main objective of this work is to identify the impact
of different macroeconomic and political variables on the probability and size of defaults,
combining them as little as possible in composite indicators for which the contribution of
each element cannot be disentangled. The Great Depression setting allows me to do this
because this event represents a single and enormous common shock, which permits me to
trace the evolution of variables over the course of the episode. Studies that aggregate de-
fault episodes over long stretches of history, subject to multiple and idiosyncratic shocks,
cannot construct variables in such a way. Remarkably, however, the portion of the variance
explained by my model is comparable to that of papers focusing on maximizing predictive
power. Naturally, looking at a single default episode has the drawback of a small sample
size and of more difficult generalization of the results to other default episodes.
3.4.2 Baseline Results
National-Provincial Defaults
Table 3.6, shows that, no matter what estimator is used, the size of national-provincial
defaults and the public revenue loss – measured as the natural logarithm of the lagged level
of tax revenues compared to 1929 – are strongly correlated. The estimates demonstrate
that countries that saw their tax revenue deteriorate the least compared to the pre-crisis
year of 1929 were less likely to default and to undergo larger defaults.
In Table 3.7 and 3.8, I retain the FE estimator, which balances efficiency and robust-
ness, and insert the lagged controls one at a time. These follow the four categories outlined
above.
I measure the severity of the slump (columns 1-3) in three different ways: the loss of
nominal GDP, the loss in real GDP per capita and the loss of trade, all relative to 1929.
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Table 3.6: National-provincial defaults & tax revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Probit Tobit PPML FE FD DiffGMM SysGMM
NatProvDefaultSize
L.NatProvDefaultSize 0.881*** 0.771***
(0.0857) (0.0502)
L.LnCentTax/CentTax29 -0.595*** -2.283*** -8.514* -1.321*** -0.438*** -0.172* -0.330*** -0.226***
(0.133) (0.742) (4.782) (0.308) (0.129) (0.0882) (0.0826) (0.0537)
Constant 0.109*** -1.067*** -3.753* -1.975*** 0.128*** 0.0406*** 0.0121
(0.0391) (0.243) (1.963) (0.268) (0.0155) (0.0119) (0.0126)
Country fixed-effects 3 3 3 3
Observations 249 249 249 249 249 221 244 249
Number of countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29
R-squared 0.171 0.095 0.107 0.030
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. L. stands for lagged. Countries included are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, Yugoslavia. For the GMM estimations I use the 3rd, 4th and 5th lag of the explanatory variables
as instruments. I also use the small sample correction, the twostep estimator and the orthogonal option to
minimise the loss o observations in the presence of gaps in the data. Errors are clustered at country level
As expected all three indicators are negatively correlated with default size: countries
whose economic outlook deteriorated the least, were less likely to default. However the
nominal GDP and trade coefficients are more precisely estimated than the real GDP one,
as evidenced by their strong statistical significance. This is presumably due to the fact
that the nominal GDP and trade figures offer a more holistic picture of the slump than
the real GDP figure. This is because the Great Depression was not a simple contraction
in output, but was accompanied by a large deflation and a collapse in international trade,
which the real GDP figures capture only partially.
I assess the predictive power of countries’ reliance on the external sector in columns
4-7. In column 4, I control for the foreign share of the public debt, while in column 5 I
proxy countries’ external financing need using the trade balance over GDP. In column 6,
instead, I control for the total borrowing of the economy in dollars – this includes both
the public and the private sectors – normalized by GDP. Finally, in column 7, I control
for the country’s openness to trade, measured as the share of trade in GDP. The prior
regarding the sign of the coefficients is unclear. On one hand, a higher reliance on the
foreign sector should dissuade countries from defaulting due to the higher cost associated
with being cut off from foreign markets for goods, services and capital. Moreover, a larger
trade deficit would indicate that a country is able to attract capital from abroad, and is
thus potentially more creditworthy in the eyes of investors. On the other hand, a higher
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Table 3.7: National-provincial defaults, tax revenues & controls – FE, Part 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
NatProvDefaultSize
L.LnCentTax/CentTax29 -0.219** -0.332*** -0.176* -0.380*** -0.342** -0.326*** -0.220** -0.378*** -0.481***
(0.0933) (0.108) (0.0935) (0.107) (0.139) (0.0932) (0.100) (0.117) (0.128)
L.LnNGDP/NGDP29 -0.626***
(0.223)
L.LnGDPPC/GDPPC29 -0.469
(0.309)
L.LnTrade/Trade29 -0.339***
(0.0976)
L.ForDebtShare -1.617***
(0.361)
L.TradeBal/GDP 3.651***
(0.954)
L.lnDollarDebt/GDP 0.111*
(0.0552)
L.Openness -0.441***
(0.129)
L.ShortDebtShare 0.580
(0.510)
L.ShortDollarDebtShare -1.247*
(0.662)
Constant 0.0488* 0.101*** 0.00608 0.880*** 0.230*** 0.467** -0.496*** 0.0367 0.147***
(0.0242) (0.0172) (0.0319) (0.170) (0.0325) (0.179) (0.178) (0.0853) (0.0137)
Country fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 225 233 225 227 233 223 225 217 247
Number of countries 26 27 26 27 27 26 26 27 29
R-squared 0.157 0.100 0.257 0.247 0.181 0.112 0.258 0.130 0.124
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. L. stands for lagged. Countries included in columns 1,3, 6,7 are Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and
Yugoslavia; column 2 and 5 additionally include Peru; compared to column 1, columns 4 and 8 include
Bolivia and Peru and, but exclude Yugoslavia; compared to column 1, column 9 includes Bolivia, Estonia,
Peru.
share of foreign debt would translate into a larger welfare gain due to more foregone
payments abroad in case of default and a higher external financing need could be a sign
of fragility, which would make default more likely. The evidence lends some support to
both channels, but is far stronger for the former: openness, the foreign debt share and
trade deficits are strongly negatively associated with default size. However the dollar
debt-to-GDP ratio is positively associated with default, potentially pointing to excessive
borrowing from abroad. The latter result, however, is only weakly significant.
I study the predictive power of the size and composition of the public (and private)
debt burden on default using six different indicators starting from column 8 in Table 3.7
and ending with column 4 in Table 3.8. In order to investigate whether difficulties in
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Table 3.8: National-provincial defaults, tax revenues & controls – FE, Part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NatProvDefaultSize
L.LnCentTax/CentTax29 -0.279*** -0.277* -0.301*** -0.313*** -0.434*** -0.448*** -0.336*** -0.496**
(0.0506) (0.151) (0.0772) (0.0981) (0.129) (0.110) (0.115) (0.196)
L.LnCentralDebt/GDP 0.271***
(0.0942)
L.LnTotalDebt/GDP 0.217**
(0.0902)
L.LnDebtService/GDP -0.0503
(0.0808)
L.LnDomYieldSpread 0.0229
(0.0330)
L.Polity2 -0.0101
(0.0223)
L.FiscBalance/GDP -0.741
(0.788)
L.OnGold -0.267***
(0.0710)
L.LnGoldReserves/GDP -0.0450
(0.0383)
Constant 0.411*** 0.211*** -0.0940 0.111*** 0.165* 0.0420 0.282*** -0.114
(0.105) (0.0554) (0.311) (0.0227) (0.0838) (0.0307) (0.0443) (0.136)
Country fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 209 172 207 187 249 205 249 192
Number of countries 25 22 24 24 29 26 29 22
R-squared 0.183 0.136 0.085 0.093 0.115 0.169 0.254 0.119
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. L. stands for lagged. Countries included in column 1 are Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and UK;
column 2 excludes Austria, Chile and Greece and Romania; compared to column 1, column 3 excludes
Romania while column 4 excludes Bulgaria and Ireland but includes Yugoslavia; compared to column 1,
column 5,7 includes Bolivia, Estonia, Peru and Yugoslavia while column 6 includes just Yugoslavia; column
8 compared to column 1 excludes Chile, Greece and Romania.
rolling over the debt – or liquidity pressures – might help predict defaults, I employ the
short-term public debt and the short-term public and private dollar-denominated debt as
shares of their respective totals (columns 8 and 9 in Table 3.7). The debt service variable
in column 3 of Table 3.8 is also a measure of liquidity pressure as it represents funds a
country needs to raise within a short-time horizon, but can also be interpreted as a more
general measure of the debt burden. I find no systematic association between short-term
debts and default. On the contrary, they appear to be weakly negatively associated in the
case of short-term dollar liabilities.
The central and total (central plus local) public debt indicators, instead, are positively
associated with default (columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.8). This finding is in line with theory
and the conventional wisdom regarding default. However, it disappears in the dynamic
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analysis below casting doubts on its robustness. Neither the public debt service (column
3) as a share of GDP nor the (domestic) yield spread vis-a-vis the USA (column 4) – which
can also help capture expectations – are robustly associated with default.30
I control for differences in fiscal policy in column 6 using the fiscal balance as a share of
GDP and proxy for monetary policy by introducing a gold standard membership dummy
(column 7), and the size of gold reserves as a share of GDP (column 8).31 The direction
of fiscal policy does not appear to be robustly associated with default. Gold standard
membership instead helps to reliably predict default. This is unsurprising: a default while
still on gold would almost certainly have led to capital flight. Countries, instead, tended to
go off gold, particularly by introducing exchange controls, before defaulting. Gold reserves,
often cited as a leading indicator of the ability to service foreign debts, possess the right
sign, but are not strongly enough associated with national-provincial defaults to appear as
significant. Finally, column 5 of Table 3.8 shows that no systematic differences in defaults
existed between more or less democratic countries, as determined by the Polity2 score
from the Polity IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).
The tax revenue loss indicator is strongly negatively correlated with default non matter
what control is added. Moreover, its coefficient is quantitatively similar across all specifi-
cations: a 10% larger ratio of current tax revenues compared to 1929, is associated with
2-5 percentage points smaller default.32
In Table 3.9, I combine the variables that emerged as statistically related to default in
the previous analysis, while also adding time-fixed effects to account for common shocks
and enhance the robustness of the results. The various specifications are as follows. In
column 1, I control for the deterioration of trade and nominal GDP simultaneously. In
column 2, I also control for gold standard membership. In column 3, instead, I combine
information about the reliance of the economy on the external sector by controlling simul-
taneously for the foreign share of the public debt, the trade balance, the size of the dollar
30These results may appear surprising at first: one would expect the debt service and one of its main
components – the yield – to be positively associated with default. However, the debt service naturally
decreases with default given that the latter implies, by its very definition, a reduction in the former.
Inserting the variable with a lag is not enough to account for this source of reverse causality. However,
when I account for the feedback loop between default and debt service, using a dynamic estimation,
the coefficient has the expected sign. In the case of the spread, the sign is correct but the coefficient is
insignificant.
31Data on foreign exchange reserves is very fragmentary so I rely on gold reserves only. However, Lindert
(1969) shows that in 1928, at their probable peak, foreign exchange reserves made up only around 24.5%
of total reserves.
32Given that for defaulters tax revenues in 1933 were on average 0.7 of their 1929 level, a 10% smaller
decrease in revenues translates into a 0.07 larger ratio of current tax revenues compared to 1929, well
within the observed variation in the data, which is between 0.13 and 1.2.
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Table 3.9: National-provincial defaults, tax revenues & controls combined – FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
NatProvDefaultSize
L.LnCentTax/CentTax29 -0.228** -0.230** -0.200** -0.197** -0.264*** -0.259*** -0.235***
(0.0963) (0.100) (0.0791) (0.0821) (0.0535) (0.0594) (0.0788)
L.LnNGDP/NGDP29 0.262 0.205
(0.303) (0.306)
L.LnTrade/Trade29 -0.303 -0.244 0.490
(0.221) (0.217) (0.340)
L.ForDebtShare -0.802 -0.791 -0.841
(0.531) (0.519) (0.523)
L.TradeBal/GDP 0.932 0.743 0.726
(0.788) (0.835) (0.740)
L.lnDollarDebt/GDP 0.105** 0.0997* 0.0690
(0.0468) (0.0498) (0.0438)
L.Openness -0.327 -0.286 -0.939**
(0.204) (0.206) (0.371)
L.OnGold -0.110 -0.117 -0.179** -0.118*
(0.0726) (0.0689) (0.0695) (0.0659)
L.ShortDollarDebtShare -0.311 -0.449 -0.110
(0.463) (0.412) (0.459)
L.LnCentralDebt/GDP 0.113 0.124 0.284*
(0.102) (0.0965) (0.141)
Constant -0.00341 0.0714 0.369 0.474 0.170 0.320** 0.0669
(0.0587) (0.0658) (0.402) (0.409) (0.119) (0.134) (0.509)
Country fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 225 225 203 203 207 207 200
Number of countries 26 26 25 25 25 25 25
R-squared 0.330 0.344 0.396 0.411 0.322 0.361 0.455
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. L. stands for lagged. Countries included in columns 1,2 are Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and
Yugoslavia; columns 3-7 exclude Yugoslavia.
debt relative to GDP and the trade openness. In column 4, I add the on gold indicator. In
columns 5 and 6, I control simultaneously for the short term-share of dollar denominated
debts and the size of central government debts relative to GDP; in column 6, I also control
for gold standard adherence. In column 7, I combine all controls, except the nominal GDP
indicator (including it does not change the results). Gold standard membership, the debt
burden and openness emerge as the key factors in predicting the incidence and size of
national-provincial defaults in this comprehensive specification.
In all specifications, my main variable of interest – public revenue loss – emerges as
strongly negatively associated with default. The size of the coefficient is also similar to
the estimation above: a 10% smaller deterioration in revenues led to an approximate 2-
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3 percentage points smaller default. In a counterfactual world where revenues in 1933
were at their 1929 level, the average national-provincial default would have been up to 11
percentage points smaller, everything else equal.
Municipal Defaults
The structure of the analysis for municipal defaults mirrors that of national-provincial
defaults. I first test the correlation between revenue loss and default. I then introduce
the controls one at a time and finally combine them. In this section, the revenue loss is
measured as the natural logarithm of the level of local government financing compared to
1929. I use government financing – which includes non tax revenue and long term (over
1 year) borrowing – rather than just tax revenues due to a much wider availability of
the former compared to the latter. In principle, the two should be very closely related,
particularly after the widespread collapse of financial markets after 1929, which curtailed
the availability of borrowing.
The municipal data is still less complete than the national-provincial data. This is
partly due to data availability, and partly due to the fact that in some countries, such as
the United Kingdom and Italy, local governments did not borrow in dollars in this period.
This reduces the number of countries in the analysis to 16-19 compared to the 22-29 above.
Table 3.10: Municipal defaults & local government financing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Probit Tobit PPML FE FD DiffGMM SysGMM
MunDefaultSize
L.MunDefaultSize 0.605*** 0.752***
(0.123) (0.0887)
L.LnLocGovFin/LocGovFin29 -0.370* -2.239*** -3.769*** -3.483*** -0.302 -0.0984 -0.324* -0.235
(0.198) (0.859) (0.988) (0.929) (0.175) (0.114) (0.172) (0.157)
Constant 0.0703** -1.524*** -2.532*** -2.969*** 0.0749*** 0.0454** 0.0329*
(0.0282) (0.234) (0.960) (0.408) (0.0118) (0.0195) (0.0179)
Country fixed-effects 3 3 3 3
Observations 140 140 140 140 140 128 126 140
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
R-squared 0.105 0.059 0.083 0.008
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. L. stands for lagged. Countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Switzerland. For the GMM estimations I use all lags after the 2nd of the
explanatory variables as instruments. I use the twostep estimator and the collapse orthogonal option to
minimise the loss o observations in the presence of gaps in the data and reduce the number of instruments,
see Roodman (2009).
Table 3.10 demonstrates that revenue loss and default were related also at the munic-
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ipal level. This result is obtained using both linear – OLS – and non-linear methods –
Probit, Tobit, PPML – as well as standard and dynamic panel data methods – fixed effects,
first differences, difference and system GMM. Although the coefficients are not always sta-
tistically significant at conventional levels, their magnitudes are remarkably similar across
specifications and also relative to the national-provincial estimates above. This suggests
that the smaller number of observations might be the cause of the lack of significance, while
the true relationship between the variables is qualitatively and quantitatively similar to
the one identified above.
The same observation holds for Tables 3.11 and 3.12, in which I introduce the controls
one at a time. The local finance coefficient is negative in all specifications and remarkably
stable in magnitude.
Table 3.11: Municipal defaults, government financing & controls – FE, Part 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
MunDefaultSize
L.LnLocGovFin/LocGovFin29 -0.157 -0.173 -0.163 -0.247* -0.296* -0.234 -0.200* -0.195 -0.264
(0.142) (0.163) (0.114) (0.136) (0.149) (0.152) (0.110) (0.156) (0.156)
L.LnNGDP/NGDP29 -0.566**
(0.259)
L.LnGDPPC/GDPPC29 -0.686
(0.413)
L.LnTrade/Trade29 -0.279**
(0.0976)
L.TradeBalance/GDP 2.573*
(1.438)
L.ForDebtShare -1.043
(0.836)
L.lnDollardebt/GDP 0.0911
(0.0755)
L.Openness -0.367**
(0.131)
L..ShortDebtShare 1.629***
(0.486)
L.ShortDollarDebtShare -1.424
(1.353)
Constant 0.0238 0.0463* -0.00813 0.143*** 0.577 0.346 -0.409** -0.153* 0.0899***
(0.0322) (0.0251) (0.0373) (0.0315) (0.396) (0.216) (0.180) (0.0782) (0.0156)
Country fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 135 134 135 135 131 135 135 126 141
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 19
R-squared 0.190 0.138 0.284 0.160 0.142 0.089 0.275 0.369 0.089
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. L. stands for lagged. Countries included in column 1-7 are Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Switzerland; column 8 addtionally includes Estonia.
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Table 3.12: Municipal defaults, government financing & controls – FE, Part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MunDefaultSize
L.LnLocGovFin/LocGovFin29 -0.298 -0.235 -0.313 -0.286 -0.329* -0.225* -0.306** -0.189
(0.202) (0.163) (0.183) (0.187) (0.175) (0.127) (0.131) (0.155)
L.LnLocalDebt/GDP 0.0988
(0.0782)
L.lnTotalDebt/GDP 0.189
(0.136)
L.LnDebtService/GDP -0.00197
(0.0873)
L.LnDomYieldSpread -0.0114
(0.0289)
L.Polity2 -0.0151
(0.0310)
L.NatProvDeafultSize 0.508**
(0.204)
L.OnGold -0.244**
(0.0926)
L.LnGoldReserves/GDP -0.0810***
(0.0271)
Constant 0.284 0.209** 0.0726 0.101*** 0.157 0.0394** 0.217*** -0.230**
(0.166) (0.0957) (0.339) (0.0162) (0.172) (0.0171) (0.0492) (0.106)
Country fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 119 119 133 110 140 140 140 128
Number of countries 16 16 18 17 19 19 19 17
R-squared 0.139 0.168 0.086 0.075 0.107 0.328 0.310 0.167
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. L. stands for lagged. Countries included in columns 1,2 are Australia, Belgium,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland and Switzerland; columns 3,4 additionally include Austria and Chile, but column
4 excludes Bulgaria; compared to column 1, columns 5,6,7 include Austria, Chile and Estonia; compared
to column 1, column 8 includes Austria.
Similarly to the national-provincial results above, columns 1-3 of Table 3.11 demon-
strate that the loss of nominal GDP, real GDP per capita and trade are associated to
default separately from the loss of local government finance. Although the signs of the
coefficient is in line with those found above, I cannot identify a statistically significant
relationship between the foreign share of the debt and default (column 4). The same goes
for the dollar dominated debt as a share of GDP (column 5). However, trade openness
(column 6), as in national-provincial case, emerges as strongly negatively related to default
at the municipal level. Thus, reliance on the external sector might have been an important
driver of the decision to renege on foreign obligations for municipal authorities, presum-
ably due a reputational mechanisms that would imply higher costs of being excluded from
foreign markets following default. Column 7, suggests that the maturity structure of debts
also played a role in municipal defaults. Countries with a higher share of short term public
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debt were more likely to undergo larger municipal defaults. No similar effect can be found
by looking at the short term share of economy-wide dollar dominated debt (column 8).
In columns 1-4 of Table 3.12, I assess the predictive power of the debt burden on
default, by controlling for for the size of local public debts as a share of GDP, the size
of central plus local public debts as a share of GDP, the incidence of the debt service in
GDP and the domestic yields spread (which serves as a proxy for the foreign yield spread,
for which significantly less data is available). None of these indicators provide statistically
significant additional information on the incidence of default. The same goes for the level
of democracy, as measured by the Polity 2 score in column 5.
When I control for the incidence of national-provincial defaults in column 6, instead,
I find that these help predict municipal defaults. This finding suggests some degree of
spillover from the former to the latter. A fully fledged explanation is beyond the scope for
this paper, but it is likely that, following the default of a higher level political entity the
reputational repercussions of default would be muted for municipalities in case they also
defaulted. Another potential explanation is contagion in the form of higher yield spreads
or capital flight.
As for national-provincial defaults, I find that countries tended to go abandon the gold
standard before defaulting (column 7). Finally, in column 8 I find that the magnitude
of gold reserves – normalized by GDP – helps to predict default. This result contrasts
with the one for national-provincial defaults for which reserves had no impact. This
discrepancy is not difficult to rationalize given the historical context. Gold reserves were
predominantly at the disposal of central governments and only subordinately of local
governments. The seniority of national-provincial debts with respect to municipal debts
was certified by renegotiations following default. It was common practice to prioritize
the repayment of central and – to a lesser extent – provincial government debt compared
to municipal debt. A clear example of this is the renegotiation of Brazilian public debts
in the 1930s. Public liabilities were divided in categories commanding different degrees
of seniority, with national and important provinces’ debts occupying the top positions.
Senior bond issues received pre-determined amounts of foreign exchange, while less senior
ones were assigned residual amounts. Thus, for local governments the constraint on the
ability to repay due to low gold (or foreign exchange) reserves was much more relevant
than for national governments.
In Table 3.13, I combine the controls. The size of the coefficient on local government
financing deterioration is once again stable across specification and comparable to previous
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Table 3.13: Municipal defaults, government financing & controls combined – FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
MunDefaultSize
L.LnLocGovFin/LocGovFin29 -0.212 -0.234* -0.255* -0.223* -0.178 -0.191
(0.143) (0.134) (0.130) (0.119) (0.128) (0.129)
L.LnNGDP/NGDP29 0.183
(0.381)
L.LnGDPPC/GDPPC29 -0.236
(0.594)
L.LnTrade/Trade29 -0.309** -0.261 -0.231 -0.195 -0.164 -0.148
(0.115) (0.212) (0.221) (0.175) (0.187) (0.186)
L.Openness 0.0456 0.0583 0.0867 0.0531 0.0707
(0.256) (0.257) (0.206) (0.222) (0.229)
L.ShortDebtShare 1.338*** 1.216*** 1.182** 1.257** 1.172**
(0.409) (0.418) (0.424) (0.441) (0.454)
L.OnGold -0.0657 -0.0358 -0.0484
(0.0647) (0.0542) (0.0584)
L.NatProvDeafultSize 0.269* 0.199 0.184
(0.147) (0.124) (0.129)
L.LnGoldReserves/GDP -0.0290 -0.0331
(0.0206) (0.0239)
Constant -0.0106 -0.143 -0.0600 -0.0424 -0.223 -0.169
(0.0363) (0.293) (0.285) (0.230) (0.235) (0.239)
Country fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 132 125 125 125 119 119
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 17 17
R-squared 0.307 0.519 0.526 0.579 0.519 0.523
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. L. stands for lagged. Countries included in columns 1-4 are Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Switzerland. Columns 5 and 6 exclude Chile. I do not include
time fixed-effects due to the already limited number of degrees of freedom available. Quantitatively he
results are similar, but standard errors are mucb larger if these are included.
estimations. However, it is statistically significant at conventional levels only in three
specifications out of six. It should be noted, however, that the coefficient does not lose
its significance because of the inclusion of other statistically significant regressors. This
suggests a simple issue of noise in the data combined with a relatively small number
of observations and some multicollinearity. The only other variable that is consistently
significant across all specifications is the share of short term debts.
3.4.3 Robustness: dynamic estimation
In this section, I rerun the analysis above using dynamic panel data methods. The advan-
tages (and disadvantages) of this methodology are outlined in Section 3.4.1 above. Here, it
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is sufficient to say that these estimations are very tough tests to determine the predictive
power of public revenue loss for defaults in the interwar period.
National-Provincial Defaults
I begin the analysis by introducing one control at a time, as above; the results are reported
in Appendix 3.A. From the coefficient estimates, is is immediately clear that defaults are,
indeed, persistent. The autoregressive parameter is large – between 0.714 and 0.921 –
and strongly statistically significant. However, it is statistically different from 1 indicating
that the dynamic process of default requires additional information to be fully explained.
Table 3.14: National-provincial defaults, tax revenues & controls combined – sysGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NatProvDefaultSize ex. 1st year default
L.NatProvDefaultSize 1.117*** 0.317 0.640 1.343*** 0.868*** 0.855***
(0.365) (0.252) (1.272) (0.456) (0.214) (0.142)
L.LnCentTax/CentTax29 -0.794** -0.444* -0.585** -0.656** -0.436*** -0.518***
(0.360) (0.244) (0.244) (0.285) (0.135) (0.143)
L.LnTrade/Trade29 0.355 -0.377*** -1.107 0.363 -0.103 -0.0364
(0.240) (0.143) (0.795) (0.349) (0.423) (0.253)
L.LnDebtService/GDP 0.835 0.541 0.194 0.682 0.540** 0.0376
(0.582) (0.436) (0.330) (0.791) (0.250) (0.165)
L.ForDebtShare 0.774* 0.226 -0.153
(0.423) (0.271) (0.339)
L.Openness 1.744 0.00242 0.135
(1.928) (0.604) (0.424)
L.LnCentralDebt/GDP 0.285 -0.405 0.200
(0.837) (0.303) (0.129)
Constant 3.482 1.647 2.907 3.128 1.473 0.574
(2.574) (1.309) (3.726) (2.770) (1.367) (0.450)
Country fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 207 197 207 202 197 190
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 24
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. L. stands for lagged. Countries included in columns 1-3 and 6 Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. I
use the 3rd, 4th and 5th lag of the explanatory variables as instruments. I use the twostep estimator and
the collapse and orthogonal options to minimise the loss o observations in the presence of gaps in the data
and reduce the number of instruments, see Roodman (2009). Standard errors are clustered at the country
level.
In Table 3.14, I combine the regressors that emerged as significant in this previous
estimation and also include statistically significant regressors from the fixed effects esti-
mation. As above, I include time fixed effects and cluster errors at country level. The
results are also robust to two-way clustering at year and country level. In the last column,
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I exclude observations for the first year a country enters default to minimize the possibility
of a feedback loop between default (and default expectations) and the other regressors.
The public revenue loss indicator once again emerges as statistically negatively as-
sociated with default. It is also substantially larger than in the fixed effects estimation
above. The impact of a 10% smaller contraction in tax revenues compared to 1929 is now
estimated to a have led to a 4-8 percentage points smaller national-provincial default on
average. These magnitudes are similar to those obtained with the CRE Tobit estimator
presented in Appendix 3.A, which range between 4.7 and 6.5 percentage points for average
partial effects. This indicates that approximating the coefficients linearly leads to fairly
accurate results.
No other regressor consistently and reliably helps to predict default. Even the autore-
gressive coefficient is not statistically significant in all specifications. Thus, the results
once again strongly support the idea that fiscal fragility, as identified by the loss of pub-
lic revenue experienced by countries during the Depression, was a leading factor in the
defaults. Notwithstanding different estimators, controls, specifications and the noisy raw
data, this result emerges clearly throughout the whole analysis.
Municipal Defaults
In Table 3.15, I combine the control variables, which emerged as significant in previous
municipal estimations. In column, 1 I control for the deterioration of economic conditions
using the ratio of real GDP per capita relative to 1929, while also controlling for gold
standard membership. In column 2, I add the short term share of public debts and
the amount of gold reserves relative to GDP. In column 3, I retain the GDP and reserves
controls and add the degree of trade openness, while in column 4 I retain the GDP variable
while controlling for the incidence of national-provincial defaults. Finally, in column 5, I
introduce all controls at once. None of these variables emerges as statistically associated
with default in a dynamic framework.
As outlined above, the results for municipal defaults are less precisely measured due to
the lower number of observations. However, once again the public revenue loss coefficient is
consistent in magnitude across specifications and similar to the results for both municipal
and national-provincial defaults presented above. Moreover, it is only insignificant when
all controls are added at the same time, and none of these come out as significant either,
pointing to collinearity and small sample issues. I also find (not shown here) that when the
loss of local public revenues is proxied by the central government’s tax revenue loss – for
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Table 3.15: Municipal defaults public revenues & controls combined – sysGMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MunDefaultSize
L.MunDefaultSize 0.595*** 0.582* 0.860*** 1.617*** 0.552
(0.106) (0.348) (0.173) (0.469) (0.768)
L.LnLocGovFin/LocGovFin29 -0.389*** -0.245** -0.259* -0.205** -0.235
(0.122) (0.107) (0.141) (0.0932) (0.194)
L.LnGDPPC/GDPPC29 0.0796 -0.238 -0.0619 -0.325 -0.0710
(0.221) (0.455) (1.008) (0.844) (0.721)
L.OnGold -0.145 -0.00734 0.0242
(0.0999) (0.0577) (0.124)
L.ShortDebtShare 1.458 1.174
(1.078) (0.929)
L.LnGoldReserves/GDP -0.0161 -0.00393 0.00534
(0.0332) (0.0233) (0.0708)
L.Openess -0.0904 -0.0716
(0.118) (0.186)
L.NatProvDefaultSize -0.640* -0.0415
(0.383) (0.479)
Constant 0.109 -0.249 -0.124 0.00350 -0.219
(0.0763) (0.253) (0.151) (0.0439) (0.345)
Country fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 132 117 126 132 117
Number of countries 18 17 17 18 17
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. L. stands for lagged. Countries included in columns 1 are Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Switzerland; column 2,3 and 5 exclude Chile. I use all lags of
the explanatory variables as instruments staring from the 2nd, in combination with the collapse and
principal component analysis options to reduce the number of instruments. I use the twostep estimator
and orthogonal option to minimise the loss o observations in the presence of gaps in the data, see Roodman
(2009). Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
which data is more widely available – the coefficient is consistently statistically significant
and negative across specifications and similar in magnitude to all other estimations.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have revised a crucial episode of the Great Depression and one of the
most important economic events of the 20th century: the sovereign debt crisis of the early
1930s. The paper helps to fill an important gap in our understanding of the crisis by
rigorously testing the most important hypotheses put forward in the historiography and
the recent empirical and theoretical literature on defaults in general.
I present two fundamental innovations with respect to previous research. First, I
construct a new data set on public debts. This features, for the first time, sub-national
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bodies in a consistent manner for a substantial number of countries worldwide, and it allows
me to study national-provincial and municipal defaults separately. Second, I employ a
flexible and robust econometric strategy, which features both standard and dynamic panel
estimations. The Great Depression context also allows me to assess the predictive power of
various macroeconomics and political variables without combining them into composites,
which would rule out the possibility of disentangling the predictive power of each indicator.
The main focus of the paper is the relationship between fiscal fragility – epitomized
by the severe deterioration in public revenues experienced by a number of countries – and
default. I find this to be a quantitatively important and robust factor in the interwar de-
faults. The fact that this result survives the inclusion of other indicators of macroeconomic
health and country fixed effects suggests that this variable contains additional and useful
information for predicting default, as also suggested by recent work (Tomz and Wright,
2007; Arellano and Bai, 2016). Supported by further evidence presented in my second
paper (Chapter 4) I argue that this additional information is the inherent fragility of a
country’s fiscal system. In accordance with recent contributions highlighting the role of
asymmetric information in sovereign debt crisis (Cata˜o, Fostel, and Rancie´re, 2011, Forth-
coming), I it appears that this only became evident as the Great Depression unfolded, and
is thus not captured by country fixed effects.
The introduction of this paper posed two questions. 1) Were the defaults the result
of misjudgment on the part of creditors and opportunistic behaviour by borrowers or the
inevitable result of the worldwide slump and other factors beyond the control of borrowing
countries? 2) To what extent were the factors leading to default global in nature or specific
to individual countries?
As regards the first question, I show that both global shocks and specific country cir-
cumstances mattered. The Great Depression was a global event, but the degree of its
severity and the prior economic and political health of countries were wildly at variance.
The first question is more difficult to answer. While I find that all the variables which help
predict the defaults are economic, some of them are the result of political processes and
constraints. In particular, the lower default likelihood for countries with a strong depen-
dence on foreign financing and trade might indicate a prioritization of the internationally
oriented sectors of the economy compared to the internally oriented ones. Thus, external
shocks certainly played an important role, but so did political choices and constraints.
Above all, however, the radically different responses of countries’ fiscal systems to the
slump determined the incidence and size of defaults at both the national-provincial and
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municipal level. Countries which saw the largest collapses in their public revenues as a
consequences of the Depression experienced the largest defaults. Their attempts to run
primary fiscal surpluses and continue servicing the debts were unravelled by deep fiscal
crises.
Even though fiscal fragility emerges as the leading predictor of default in the interwar
period, the comprehensive picture of the Great Depression debt crisis I offer in this paper
suggests that monocausal interpretations of this event – which assign the key role to either
“bad luck” or the irresponsible behaviour of borrowers, lenders and middle-men – should
be taken with caution. The interwar debt crisis was a key event of the Great Depression
and it influenced policy-makers, academics and the public opinion for decades thereafter.
As it could be expected, it was a highly complex affair in which exogenous shocks and
discretionary choices all played a role.
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Appendices
3.A Additional analysis and robustness checks
3.A.1 Replicating Eichengreen and Portes
In what is still the reference study of defaults during the Great Depression, Eichengreen
and Portes (1986) perform a cross-sectional regression by pooling data from 1934 to 1938.
Their main variable of interest is the combined default size of all public bodies of a coun-
try as a share of their total dollar and sterling denominated debts. My sample differs
from theirs, in that it only reaches 1936 and excludes Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Bulgaria,
Mexico, Spain, Costa Rica and El Salvador. On the other hand, it includes major coun-
tries – Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom – which
are absent from Eichengreen and Portes’ analysis. Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and
Sweden are common to both samples.
Another difference between my and Eichengreen and Portes’ analysis is that I only look
at defaults in Dollar bonds. It is sensible to treat Dollar and Sterling defaults separately
given that Eichengreen and Portes’ own work (Eichengreen and Portes, 1988) shows that
Sterling and Dollar bondholders were treated quite differently. The final difference with
is that, lacking a reliable measure of terms of trade deterioration, I prefer using lagged
deterioration in total trade instead. I also lack measures of notes in circulation and/or
gold reserves for a number of countries , so I run the regressions without the gold coverage
variable, but the qualitative results do not change if this variable is included. In any case,
unlike for Eichengreen and Portes, this variable has the expected negative sign.
Table 3.16 presents the results of the two specifications proposed by Eichengreen and
Portes estimated by both OLS and Tobit. The two specifications differ in the definition of
trade deterioration used. My results do not fully match those of Eichengreen and Portes.
This is probably due to the differences in the sample outlined above, and could indicate
that their results are not very robust. In any case, the estimates need to be taken with a
grain of salt due to major potential issues of endogeneity.
Unlike Eichengreen and Portes, I do not find a robust positive relationship between
a higher foreign debt burden and default size. However, in the estimations performed in
the paper, this result is partially recovered. I do find that an adverse shock to trade has
the right sign in the first specification (colums 1 and 3) – countries which experienced a
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Table 3.16: Replicating Eichengreen and Portes (1988)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
VARIABLES DefaultSize DefaultSize DefaultSize DefaultSize
ForDebt/GDP 0.631 0.927** -0.221 6.631
(0.481) (0.447) (5.047) (4.865)
Trade31/Trade29 -1.641*** -8.343*
(0.339) (4.743)
Trade28/GDP -0.602 -19.99**
(0.387) (8.033)
%∆Deficit29-31 0.0309*** 0.0168*** 2.642** 2.289*
(0.00439) (0.00534) (1.281) (1.359)
SouthAmerica 0.265*** 0.335** 2.748** 2.564*
(0.0824) (0.147) (1.231) (1.299)
Australia -0.714*** -0.827*** -10.84 -14.29
(0.228) (0.231) (0) (0)
L.Trade/Trade29 0.0794 5.870
(0.357) (5.560)
L.Trade/GDP -2.163*** -42.15**
(0.618) (17.00)
Constant 1.437*** 0.592** 9.449** 2.234
(0.296) (0.272) (4.541) (2.967)
Observations 62 62 62 62
R-squared 0.530 0.509
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
L. stands for lagged. Countries included are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom
larger deterioration in their trade compared to 1929 were more likely to default – but in
the second specification (columns 2 and 4), the coefficient has an unexpected positive sign,
but is insignificant.
Eichengreen and Portes, find a positive and insignificant effect of openness on the
probability of default. Consistently with economic intuition, I find, instead, that more open
countries were less willing to default in three specification out of four. This result is very
much in line with economic theory and intuition and its interpretation is straightforward:
countries whose GDP consisted for a greater share of imports and exports had more to
lose from the fall in trade that normally accompanies defaults due to their direct (e.g.
sanctions, embargoes) or indirect (lack of trade finance) effects.
I also find that my South America dummy (Eichengreen and Portes use a Latin America
one, which they find to be insignificant) has explanatory power for default. Given the
prevalence of default among South American nations, this is not surprising. The Australian
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dummy is also found to be significant, although with an opposite sign. Eichengreen and
Portes, who also find this result, argue that this could be due to the political and economic
ties between Australia and its main creditors – the UK and the USA – which, everything
else equal, would decrase the incidence of default.
Finally, Eichengreen and Portes find an inverse relation between default size and the
change in the deficit, which would seem to indicate that an increase in “austerity” would
be helpful for avoiding default. In my estimation, I find the opposite result, and this
emerges quite strongly. This finding is supported by the data presented in the body of the
paper and by the findings of my second paper (Chapter 4), which show hat “austerity”
was – in many cases – not a choice but the only option for fiscally weak countries who
were unable to borrow. These same countries, were more likely to default as demonstrated
by the association between tax revenue deterioration and default found throughout the
paper.
Compared to Eichengreen and Portes’s estimations, this paper offers substantial ad-
vances. First, the inclusion of major borrowers such as Canada, means that a much greater
share of US lending abroad is included in the analysis. Second, the focus on dollar de-
nominated bonds reduces noise associated with the different treatment different classes of
creditors received, which cannot be captured except in a bilateral analysis. Similarly, the
distinction between national-provincial and municipal defaults allows me to treat different
classes of debtors and creditors separately. Third, my analysis captures the full dynamic
process of default: the analysis starts in 1927 when all countries except Brazil had not
yet defaulted and follows them all the way to 1936 when Poland – the last country to do
so – defaults. Fourth, I bring to the table newly collected data on public debts, including
their composition and sub-national magnitudes as well as tax and other public revenues at
both the national and local level. I also have additional data on variables such as nominal
GDP and Openness, coming from recent work by other researchers. Finally, my panel
and dynamic analyses account for unobserved and unobservable country characteristics
and feedback loops between default and the other controls, radically reduce the risk of
endogeneity and, thus, biased estimates.
3.A.2 Further robustness checks
In this section, I perform two robustness check. The most important consists in showing
that the linear models used above approximate well the parameters of interest. I do so
by using the Tobit estimator, which fits very well the nature of my dependent variable.
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In fact, this model is able to capture both the fact that the default size indicator has
probability mass at two values – 0 (no default) and 1 (complete default) – and the fact
that it can take any value in between (partial default). Moreover, although non-linear
models suffer from the well known incidental parameters problem when fixed effects are
included in the regressions, Wooldridge (2005, 2010) has proposed a procedure to deal
with this, which allows the researcher to included correlated random effects (CRE) in the
analysis. This is a substantial step forward compared to random effects models which
assume that the regressors and the unobserved country heterogeneity are unrelated. The
procedure consists in conditioning the estimates on the average value of the regressors.
The second robustness check consists in showing how the tax revenue coefficient estimates
are affected when I introduce my controls one at a time in a dynamic setting
National-Provincial Defaults
I present the results of the CRE Tobit estimation for national provincial defaults in Table
3.17. The contraction in tax revenues emerges once again as a key factor in predicting
default. I compute average partial effects (APE) as suggested by Wooldridge to gauge the
quantitative significance of the coefficients and find that these are larger than the fixed
effects and similar to the GMM estimates: they indicate that a 10% smaller contraction
in tax revenues led to 4.7 and 6.5 percentage points smaller default. This suggests that
the linear models yield good approximations of the coefficients. Additional results found
above are also confirmed by this estimation. Countries more dependent on the external
sector, as evidenced by the share of foreign debts, the trade balance and trade openness,
were less likely to default. More indebted countries, as proxied by the dollar debt to GDP
ratio, instead, were also more likely to default.
Tables 3.18 and 3.19 illustrate the impact of introducing the controls one by one a
dynamic setting for national-provincial defaults. Public revenues loss emerges once again
as strongly significant in all specifications – except for two – and similar in magnitude to
the standard panel estimation above. The only two instances where the coefficient is not
significant is when the dollar debt as a share of GDP and the short term dollar debt are
introduced in the regression. In these instances the coefficients of the revenue loss variable
more than halve while the standard errors become larger. This is puzzling because the
variables have no statistically significant impact on default and are not strongly correlated
with the revenue loss variable. It is therefore unclear why they would render it insignificant.
Presumably this is simply an issue of noisy data.
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Table 3.17: National-provincial defaults, tax revenues and controls combined – CRE
Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NatProvDefaultSize
L.LnCentTax/CentTax29 -3.134*** -2.689** -3.208*** -3.105*** -3.761*** -3.710***
(1.004) (1.046) (1.211) (1.175) (1.283) (1.261)
L.LnNGDP/NGDP29 3.358*
(1.919)
L.LnTrade/Trade29 -1.669** 4.410*
(0.710) (2.354)
L.ForDebtShare -7.026** -6.444** -6.342**
(3.015) (3.035) (3.133)
L.TradeBal/GDP 9.903 13.15* 14.52**
(7.112) (7.950) (7.396)
L.lnDollarDebt/GDP 1.622** 1.736** 2.332**
(0.783) (0.702) (1.046)
L.Openness -4.299*** -4.267*** -8.821***
(1.240) (1.285) (3.060)
L.OnGold -0.237 0.468 -0.0502
(0.984) (1.013) (0.765)
L.ShortDollarDebtShare -4.685 -6.626 2.071
(4.979) (4.808) (5.982)
L.LnCentralDebt/GDP -0.0893 -0.183 0.323
(0.630) (0.678) (0.774)
Constant -10.71 -21.05 -20.81 -11.43 -9.429 -18.40
(1,098) (115.6) (294.6) (2,391) (176.2) (244.1)
Country fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 225 203 203 207 207 200
Number of countries 26 25 25 25 25 25
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. L. stands for lagged. Countries included in columns 1 are Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and
Yugoslavia; columns 2-6 exclude Yugoslavia.
Regarding the other regressors, the economic contraction indicators emerge once again
as reliable predictors of default. Unlike above, the impact of the debt service emerges as
positively and significantly correlated with default. No other control is strongly enough
correlated with default to emerge in a dynamic specification. In particular, the dollar debt,
the public debt burden, the foreign debt share and the degree of trade openness all lose
their statistical significance compared to the fixed effects estimation above, demonstrating
the very high bar for robust estimation set by the GMM estimator.
Municipal Defaults
I run the same robustness check as above for municipal defaults. As pointed out above,
the results for municipal defaults are less precisely measured due to the lower number of
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Table 3.18: National-provincial defaults, tax revenues and controls – sysGMM Part 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NatProvDefaultSize
L.NatProvDefaultSize 0.775*** 0.781*** 0.736*** 0.760*** 0.906*** 0.760*** 0.725*** 0.921***
(0.0594) (0.0507) (0.0821) (0.0523) (0.0610) (0.0650) (0.0597) (0.0385)
L.LnCentTax/CentTax29 -0.134*** -0.110** -0.183*** -0.199*** -0.0870 -0.214*** -0.202*** -0.0526
(0.0506) (0.0469) (0.0444) (0.0532) (0.0724) (0.0482) (0.0482) (0.0745)
L.LnNGDP/NGDP29 -0.229**
(0.109)
L.LnGDPPC/GDPPC29 -0.407**
(0.163)
L.LnTrade/Trade29 -0.0915**
(0.0395)
L.ForDebtShare 0.0406
(0.0650)
L.lnDollardebt/GDP 0.0245
(0.0174)
L.lnOpenness -0.0398
(0.0271)
L.ShortDebtShare 0.118
(0.0853)
L.ShortDollarDebtShare 0.461
(0.373)
Constant -0.0172** -0.00678 -0.0253*** -0.0112 0.100 -0.0518 -0.00981 0.0301*
(0.00852) (0.00921) (0.00888) (0.0296) (0.0610) (0.0339) (0.0121) (0.0160)
Country fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Number of countries 26 27 26 27 26 26 27 29
Observations 225 233 225 227 223 225 217 247
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. L. stands for lagged. Countries included in columns 1, 3, 5, 6 are Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, Yugoslavia; columns 2, 4, 7 additionally include Peru; column 8 additionally includes
Bolivia and Estonia. For the GMM estimations I use the 3rd, 4th and 5th lag of the explanatory vari-
ables as instruments. I employ the twostep estimator and the orthogonal option to minimise the loss o
observations in the presence of gaps in the data, see Roodman (2009).
observations. The dynamic estimation confirms this: the coefficient for the revenue loss is
statistically significant only in half of the specifications in Tables 3.20 and 3.21. However,
once again the coefficient is consistent in magnitude across specifications and similar to
the results for both municipal and national-provincial defaults presented above. The only
exceptions are when the local and total debt variables are introduced in the regression,
although these are not statistically significant themselves. In these instances the coefficient
become much smaller. Presumably, the explanation is in multicollinearity and noisy data,
combined with a relatively small sample. The hypothesis that a small sample size is behind
the lack of significance is strengthened by the finding (not shown here) that when the loss
of local public revenues is proxied by the central government’s tax revenue loss, for which
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Table 3.19: National-provincial defaults, tax revenues and controls – sysGMM Part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NatProvDefaultSize
L.NatProvDefaultSize 0.714*** 0.845*** 0.762*** 0.719*** 0.768*** 0.786*** 0.805*** 0.781***
(0.0726) (0.0963) (0.0986) (0.0869) (0.0600) (0.0980) (0.0558) (0.0658)
L.LnCentTax/CentTax29 -0.184*** -0.286** -0.128** -0.251*** -0.144*** -0.146** -0.189*** -0.129**
(0.0351) (0.135) (0.0569) (0.0560) (0.0530) (0.0631) (0.0530) (0.0640)
L.LnCentralDebt/GDP -0.0121
(0.0157)
L.LnTotalDebt/GDP 0.0530
(0.0338)
L.LnDebtService/GDP 0.0354**
(0.0141)
L.LnDomYieldSpread 0.01076
(0.02468)
L.Polity2 -0.000781
(0.00479)
L.FiscBalance/GDP -0.860
(0.927)
L.OnGold 0.000664
(0.0170)
L.LnGoldReserves/GDP -0.0209
(0.0141)
Constant -0.00733 0.0314 0.147*** 0.001 0.0267 -0.00451 0.00419 -0.0654
(0.0194) (0.0290) (0.0550) (0.0160) (0.0263) (0.0223) (0.0101) (0.0434)
Country fixed-effects 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 209 172 207 187 249 205 249 192
Number of countries 25 22 24 24 29 26 29 22
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. L. stands for lagged. Countries include in column 1 are Argentina, Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom; compared to column 1, column 2 excludes Austria, Chile and Romania; column 3 only excludes
Romania; compared to column 1, column 4 includes Yugoslavia and excludes Bulgaria and Ireland; com-
pared to column 1, columns 5 and 7 additionally include Bolivia, Estonia, Peru and Yugoslavia; while
column 6 only additionally includes Yugoslavia; compared to column 1, column 8 excludes Chile, Greece,
Ireland and Romania. For the GMM estimations I use the 3rd, 4th and 5th lag of the explanatory vari-
ables as instruments. I also use the small sample correction, the twostep estimator and the orthogonal to
minimise the loss o observations in the presence of gaps in the data, see Roodman (2009).
data is more widely available, the coefficient is consistently statistically significant across
specifications and similar in magnitude to all other estimations.
I find that no other variable introduced in the regressions is statistically associated
with municipal defaults. Once again, this is probably due to the relatively small size of
the sample.
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Table 3.20: Municipal defaults, local government financing and controls – sysGMM Part
1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MunDefaultSize
L.MunDefaultSize 0.691*** 0.900*** 0.722*** 1.062* 0.577*** 0.652** 0.766*** 0.855***
(0.160) (0.127) (0.116) (0.619) (0.193) (0.270) (0.199) (0.130)
L.LnLocGovFin/LocGovFin29 -0.274*** -0.196** -0.349*** -0.272 -0.237 -0.475*** -0.321** -0.241
(0.0921) (0.0899) (0.110) (0.694) (0.232) (0.173) (0.139) (0.187)
L.LnNGDP/NGDP29 -0.0250
(0.118)
L.LnGDPPC/GDPPC29 -0.0484
(0.433)
L.LnTrade/Trade29 -0.0584
(0.0643)
L.ForDebtShare -0.873
(4.472)
L.LnDollarDebt/GDP 0.131
(0.133)
L.Openness -0.0519
(0.138)
L.ShortDebtShare 0.720
(0.671)
L.ShortDollarDebtShare 1.067
(0.983)
Constant -0.0115 -0.00504 -0.0222 0.437 0.395 -0.0560 -0.0986 0.0123
(0.00732) (0.0109) (0.0138) (2.273) (0.357) (0.160) (0.0739) (0.0268)
Observations 134 132 134 130 134 134 125 140
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 19
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. Countries included in columns 1-7 are Australia, Austria, Belgium Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Chile Colombia, Czechslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Poland and Switzerland; column 8 additionally includes Estonia. I use all lags of the explanatory
variables as instruments staring from the 2nd, in combination with the collapse and principal component
analysis options to reduce the number of instruments. I use the twostep estimator and orthogonal option
to minimise the loss o observations in the presence of gaps in the data, see Roodman (2009). Standard
errors are clustered at the country level.
3.B Data Sources
In this Appendix, I provide detailed information on all the data collected. Firstly, however,
I evaluate the reliability of the sources. In particular, I discuss the publications of the
German Imperial Statistical Office (Statistiches Reichsamt) from which I extract a large
share of the local public debt data.
During the interwar period the collection of economic and social statistics underwent
a significant development in many countries, and Germany was no exeption. As Adam
Tooze argues:
In the aftermath of the First World War enthusiasm for statistics and eco-
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Table 3.21: Municipal defaults, local government financing and controls – sysGMM Part
2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MunDefaultSize
L.MunDefaultSize 0.627*** 0.789*** 0.823*** 0.826*** 0.590*** 1.037*** 0.682*** 1.013***
(0.108) (0.118) (0.119) (0.124) (0.132) (0.248) (0.137) (0.295)
L.LnLocGovFin/LocGovFin29 -0.0518 -0.0331 -0.256*** -0.217 -0.169 -0.199 -0.522*** -0.447**
(0.0558) (0.0697) (0.0968) (0.212) (0.380) (0.158) (0.201) (0.205)
L.LnLocalDebt/GDP 0.0388
(0.0413)
L.LnTotalDebt/GDP 0.0840
(0.0822)
L.LnDebtService/GDP -0.0165
(0.0436)
L.LnDomYieldSpread 0.0392
(0.0556)
L.Polity2 0.00251
(0.0549)
L.NatProvDefaultSize -0.0653
(0.161)
L.OnGold -0.129
(0.0812)
L.LnGoldReserves/GDP -0.00323
(0.0577)
Constant 0.103 0.0752 -0.0509 0.0114 -0.00107 0.00455 0.0870 -0.0262
(0.0996) (0.0709) (0.179) (0.0333) (0.397) (0.0164) (0.0689) (0.212)
Observations 119 119 133 110 140 140 140 128
Number of countries 16 16 18 17 19 19 19 17
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-36. Countries included in columns 1,2 are Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada,
Colombia, Czechslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and
Switzerland; columns 3,4 additionally includes Austria and Chile, but column 4 excludes Bulgaria; com-
pared to column 1 columns 5-7 include Austria, Chile and Estonia while column 8 includes Austria only.
I use all lags of the explanatory variables as instruments staring from the 2nd, in combination with the
collapse and principal component analysis options to reduce the number of instruments. I use the twostep
estimator and orthogonal option to minimise the loss o observations in the presence of gaps in the data,
see Roodman (2009). Standard errors are clustered at the country level.
nomic research was not confined to Weimar Germany. Indeed, in its early
years Wagemann’s institute [The Institut fu¨r Konjunkturforschung, founded
in 1925] drew its inspiration mainly from abroad. The major influences were
the Harvard Committee for Economic Research, the NBER in Washington,
the statistical initiatives of Herbert Hoover’s Department of Commerce, and
the Soviet Conjuncture Institute. In France and Britain also, there were calls
for the government to play a greater role in data gathering and economic re-
search. In the early 1920s private institutes for business-cycle research had
been established in London and Paris along similar lines. However, no other
European service ever achieved the size or authority enjoyed by the Berlin in-
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stitute. The Weimar republic was unique among west European states in the
scale of its support for economic research which was not academic in character
but designed specifically to supply information to government.
Tooze (1999)
Ernst Wagemann, the founder of the Institut fu¨r Konjunkturforschung, was also the
head of the Statistiches Reichsamt from 1924 to 1933. The work of the institute and of the
Statistical Office were closely tied together. Even after Wagemann lost his position as the
head of the Statistical Office, he retained his lead at the Institute, with Hitler’s personal
backing and support. Under the Nazis, both the Institut fu¨r Konjunkturforschung and the
Statistiches Reichsamt enjoyed a sort of golden age in terms of manpower and resources
(Tooze, 1999), which resulted in the collection of a huge array of domestic and international
statistics, a small part of which are used in the current paper.
Some of the original data reconstructions produced by the Institute were highly re-
garded and found their way into international publications. For example, the Institute
reconstructed the international foreign debt position of a number of countries in 1932,
and this was published in Moody’s Investment Manuals unfailingly for a number of years
thereafter.
However, the work of Rainer Fremdling – see, for example, Fremdling (2005, 2007) – has
revealed that both the Institute and the Statistical Office worked under enrmous pressure
from the authorities. This was mostly connected to the strategic planning for the war effort
and the desire not to reveal too many details about the state of the German economy.
For this reason, information was at times hidden through aggregation, misreported or
not reported altogether. The data I use in this paper, however, would not be considered
as sensitive information with regard to the war effort and is thus likely to be free of
manipulation. Cross referencing with alternative, non-German sources (Moody’s manuals
in particular) has revealed no inconsistencies.
The United Nations (1948) volume, which I also use extensively, drew on the best
available evidence of the time. The League of Nations regularly collected a wide range
of international data in its Statistical Yearbooks, which the compilers of the UN volume
organised and presented in a unified and coherent fashion. The issues with these data
are discussed in detail below. In any case, the volume represents a remarkable, and
transparent, effort to reconstruct a precise picture of central government debt in the
interwar years.
My last major source of data are private publications created for the benefit of clients
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and members of the general public by Moody’s rating agency, the Institute for Interna-
tional Finance and the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders. The data found in these
sources is often in agreement with data reported elsewhere. Moreover, the provision of
accurate quantitative and qualitative information represented part the core business of
these institutions. Moody’s, in particular, was the first company in the world to produce
foreign government bonds ratings in 1918, and were based directly on the data collected,
as the information provided by Gaillard (2012) shows.
The biggest data contribution of this paper is a new public debt dataset. For central
government debt this relies on data collected by the United Nations (1948), which presents
some serious issues in terms of cross country comparability. The debt figures normally
include the debt of state-owned enterprises, but there are some exception as in the case
of the railways of Canada and Switzerland. More generally, the budgetary methods and
accounting practices varied significantly across countries. Debt is sometimes shown as
gross, sometimes as net with no consistent definition of these two terms across countries.
Generally, net debt is the gross debt minus whatever claims against creditors – often the
Central Bank – are held by the Treasury.
No consistent definition of short term debt existed either. The compilers of the volume
settled for classifying debts with maturity of two years or less as short term debts. I retain
this definition in the paper. The distinction between domestic and foreign debt was also
often not the same across countries. Some classified their debts based on the currency of
issues, some on the place of issuance, while other based it on the domicile of the creditors,
whenever this was known. Conversions from foreign currency into domestic currency were
also carried out in different ways. In most cases, the parities at which the debt was issued
were used. In a few cases, current exchange rates were used, while in others the parity
was adjusted periodically. Finally, in some instances war debts are included in the figures,
while in others they are excluded. The inclusion or exclusion of these particular debts
depended on the recognition of these obligations by the debtor state. Below, I discuss
these issues on a country by country basis.
3.B.1 Common sources
Default size: I compute default size as the share of the principal of dollar bonds in
default with regard to interest and/or interest payments. I construct separate measures
for national-provincial and municipal levels of governments. I collect information on the
timing and magnitude of bonds in default from Moody’s (1933) page a17 for defaults up
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to 1932, Moody’s (1934) page a44 for 1933, Moody’s (1935) page a45 for 1934, Moody’s
(1936) page a47 for 1935 and Moody’s (1937) page a41-a44 for 1936. Outstanding dollar
debts, instead, are from Lewis (1938).
Tax revenues and government financing: Tax revenues include all tax categories.
Public financing is a composite, which also includes non-tax revenues and long-term (over
1 year maturity) borrowing. This item represented, in essence, the budgeted portion of
government revenue and expenditure, with short term sources of finance (sometimes these
were large) making up the slack. Most of the data comes from the German Imperial
Statistical Office yearbooks, for both central and local level data. Details are provided in
Appendix 4.B.
Dollar denominated debts: Information on total – public and private – dollar-denominated
debts and their maturity composition on a annual basis are from Lewis (1938), Statistical
Table 1, page 619-629. Lewis classifies short term debts as those with a maturity below 5
years. Unfortunately, disaggregated data is not available to make the short-term definition
correspond to the below 2 years maturity used in the UN volume.
Gold Standard membership: The dates in which countries return to and leave the Gold
Standard – either by devaluing or by introducing exchange controls – are from Crafts and
Fearon (2013).
Nominal GDP: I use the nominal, non-PPP-adjusted GDP figures estimated by Klas-
ing and Milionis (2014) for the period 1870-1949. These are based on Maddison’s GDP
estimates and obtained using the so-called “short-cut method”. This method has a long
history; Prados de la Escosura (2000) offers a detailed description. In essence, it exploits
the relationship between PPP adjusted and non-PPP-adjusted GDP determined by the
relative prices of traded and non-traded goods and the relative income level of the country
compared to the benchmark country. In doing this, it makes use of the Balassa-Samuelson
theorem. These data offer clear advantages compared to standard GDP figures in con-
structing measures of the debt burden, given that the latter are also in unadjusted nominal
terms. They also capture an important additional feature of the Great Depression besides
the contraction of output: the huge deflation that accompanied it.
Real GDP per capita: GDP per capita is taken from the Maddison’s Project’s latest
update (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013).
Trade and openness: Trade and openness figures are from Klasing and Milionis (2014).
The authors obtain the openness figures by combining their estimates of nominal GDP
with trade data from Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009). The trade balance as a share
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of GDP data are from Cata˜o and Mano (Forthcoming).
Polity score: This is the Polity2 score from the POLITY IV database (Marshall and
Jaggers, 2005). It is a combined score of autocracy and democracy (both measure between
0 and 10) and is obtained by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy one.
The two scores are weighed indicators of the competitiveness of political participation,
the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief
executive.
3.B.2 Country-specific sources
Argentina
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 11 in millions of Pesos on 31 December 1914-1938. Data
includes treasury bills obligations. Foreign debt shown at legal parity except for some
shown at contractual rates. In the original figures, bonds held by the treasury have been
discounted since 1927, I have kept them in to improve cross-country comparability. Short
term debts in 1927 do not include oustanding unpaid commitments. Original source:
Memoria del Departemento de Hacienda; Memoria de la Contaduria de la Nacion; El
Ajuste de Los Resultados Financieros de los Ejercisios de 1928 a 1936, Buenos Aires;
Direccion general de Estadistica, Informe No. 6, Series F., No. 2, Buenos Aires, 1923,
Revista de Economia Argentina.
Local Government debt: I gathered this data from a variety of sources. No figure is
available for 1928 and is interpolated as a the average between 1927 and 1929. No evident
signs of jumps are present between the different series and the substantial overlap between
the main data sources insures that the figures are consistent over time. The figure for 1927
is from Institute of International Finance (1927) – Credit Position of Argentina. and the
1929 figure is from Corporation of Foreign Bondholders (1929). The 1930 and 1931 figures
are derived as the difference between the total public debt reported in Moody’s (1931) page
10 and Moody’s (1934) page 1667 and the central government debt reported in Moody’s
(1935). The 1932-1934 figures are taken from Moody’s (1935) page 1771. The figures from
1935 to 1937 are taken from Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40). The sub-national bodies
covered in all sources are essentially the same. Minor differences exist between Institute of
International Finance (1927), which includes the following municipalities: Buenos Aires,
Rosaio, Cordoba, Santa Fe, Bahia Blanca, San Juan; and provinces: Buenos Aires, Santa
Fe, Cordoba, Mendoza, Tucuman, Entre Rios, Santiago del Estero, Corrientes, San Juan,
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Jujuy, San Luis, and the rest of the sources which include a number of additional minor
bodies which, however, have a very small overall impact. These are the municipalities
of: Rio Cuarto, Mendoza, Tucuman, Parana, Monteros, Santiago de Estero, Catamarca,
Salta, La Rioja; and the provinces of: Salta, Catamarca, La Rioja and Jujuy. All figures
are in millions paper Pesos.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 415, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Australia
Central and local Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and
debt service: United Nations (1948) page 15 in millions of Pounds on 30 June 1914-
1938. Australia is one of the few instances where the original data included both central
government (Commonwealth) and State debts. These data is included throughout the
period even though the Commonwealth took over the outstanding debts of the States only
on July 1 1929 under the terms of the Financial Agreement between the Commonwealth
and the States. In the analysis, I have separated the two types of debts in order to
insure a better comparability across countries. The separate state debts data comes from
Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) (30 June 1926-1938). Original sources: The Budget,
Finance Bulletins – Summary of Australian Financial Statistics, the Treasure’s Statements
of Receipts and Expenditure, Official Year-Book of the Commonwealth of Australia.
Gold reserves and notes in circulation: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a)
page 526, Jahreszahlen; 1930-33 including gold held abroad; 1934-1938 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1939/40) page 258*-259*.
Austria
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt ser-
vice: United Nations (1948) page 19 in millions of Schillings on 31 December 1914-1938.
Increase from 1930 partially due to the inclusion of some pre-1914 debts previously not
recognised by the Austrian government. Original figures include some foreign loans issued
in Austria, which I exclude to improve comparability across countries. Foreign debt data
in foreign currency, 1924-31: converted into Shillings at the current exchange rates; 1932:
converted at the official rate; 1933-37: converted at the average rates of private clearings
on the respective dates. Debt service charged against ordinary revenue (excluding pro-
ceeds from loans). Original source: Bundes-Rechnungsabschluss der Republik Oesterreich,
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Statistiches Handbuch fuer die Republik Oesterreich.
Local Government debt: no continuous series is available, a single data point is avail-
able for 1932 from Statistisches Reichsamt (1935).
Gold reserves: 1924-1933, Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 208, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1937 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) page 258*-259*.
Belgium
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign –and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 21 in millions of Francs on 31 December 1914-1938. Short
term data includes medium term debt. Foreign debt data converted at current rates of
exchange with the exception 1932 and 1934 francs loans converted at parity rates before the
devaluation of October 1936. Intergovernmental debts are included throughout. Increase
from 1924 to 1925 is partly due to certain war debts for which Belgium previously did not
hold itself responsible being included in accordance with an agreement with the US. Debt
service represents total expenditure against ordinay expenditure. Up to 1930 it includes
ex service men’s fund and pensions, which cannot be separated from the rest.Original
source: Office Central de Statistique, Annuaire Statistique, Evolution des Finances de
l’Etat, 1931-40, Banque Nationale, Bulletin d’Information et de Documentation.
Local Government debt: Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) on 31 December 1926-1937
in millions of Francs, data refers to provinces only.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 43, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) page 298*-299*.
Bolivia
Central Government debt –long-term, short-term, foreign –and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 25 in millions of Bolivianos on 31 December 1914-1938. Start-
ing from 1933 arreas of interest, which accumulated since 1927 are included, the total
amount on 31 december is 3.2 millions, but cannot be separated on a yearly basis. For-
eign debt data includes arreas of interest throughout. Original sources: Oficinia Nacional:
Estadistica Financiera, Estadistica Boliviana. Direccion General de Estadistica: Extracto
Estadistico. Ministeirio de Hacienda, Direccion General de Estadistica: Finanzas. Banco
Central de Bolivia: Boletin.
Local Government debt: not available.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 424, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
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1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Brazil
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 27 in millions of Milreis on 31 December 1914-1938. The
original short term debts figures included paper notes in circulation. These have been
removed for better comparability. The debt service figure for 1933/34 is for 15 months
ending 31 march 1934 and the debt service figyre for 1934 is for 9 months ending December
1934. The service of the foreign debt includes for 1931, 1934, 1937 and 1940-45 the portions
not transferred but allocated to special accounts which forms part of the floating domestic
debt. In september 1931, the payment on the foreign debt service was suspended. in march
1932 a plan for partial repayment of the service on the foreign debt was established for the
period april 1934 to march 1938 and then suspended in 1937 again. Most of the foreign
debt and a small part of the domestic debt are expressed in gold milreis. The gold milreis
was a unit of account used starting from the 19th century to report certain items by the
Brazilian government. The gold milreis figures have been converted into paper milreis at
the official parity of 27 pence per gold milreis. The floating (short-term) debt has been
converted into paper milreis at current rates of exchange. It is made up of promissory notes
destined to liquidate frozen credits of foreign exporters in accordance with the commercial
agreements between Brazilian government and foreign exporters. The decline from 1927 to
1928 is partly due to the fact that the French 5% 1908-09 Itapura-Corumba Railway Loan
considered up to 1927 as being in gold francs was unilaterally converted into paper francs.
Beginning with 1923, the funded (long term) domestic debt does not include obligations
held by the Caixa de Amortizacao (1932: 32 millions paper milreis). Original sources:
Contadoria Geral de la Republica: Balancos Gerais da Uniao (title varies slightly during
period 1914-43), Anuario Estadistico do Brasil, Sir Otto Niemayer: report submitted to
the Brazilian Government, 1931.
Local Government debt: Moody’s (1936) between 1928 and 1934 in millions of paper
milreis. Data is available only for external debt. The total debt figure is inferred by as-
suming that the proportion between internal and external debt is the same as the national
one.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 426, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
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Bulgaria
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page in millions of Leva on 31 December 1914-1926, 31 March
1928-1934, 31 December 1934-1938. Short term debt data include debts to national bank.
Foreign debts converted at the appropriate parity for compatibility. Share of Ottoman
debt owed by Bulgaria is not included throughout. Debt owed to Bulgaria due to prop-
erty sequestrated and liquidated in the UK is also not included. Debt service includes
reparations starting from 1928/29. During WWI, these payments were suspended and
then resumed through agreements in 1920. 1925 and 1927 until further suspension in
April 1932.
Local Government debt : Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) on 31 December 1926-
1931 and 1935 and 31 March 1932-1934 in millions of Leva. Data includes Provinces and
cities.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 43, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) page 298*-299*.
Canada
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt ser-
vice: United Nations (1948) page 34 in millions of Dollars on 31 March 1914-1938. Long
term debt data, according to Canadian classification includes treasury bills and deposit
certificates. Short-term floating debt consists of various demand liabilities. Total debt
represents gross debt. Foreign debt is shown at parity. Original source: Public Accounts;
Canada Year-Book.
Local Government debt: Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) between 1926 and 1936.
The data includes provincial and municipal debt.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 377, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Colombia
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 34 in millions of Pesos on 31 December 1927-1938. Domestic
short term debt excludes state notes in circulation. The foreign debt is transformed
in the national currency at parity $1=1 peso and £1=5 pesos. Redemption of foreign
debt was suspended since 1932 and interest payments since 1935, however some partial
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payments were made. Original Source: Informe Financiero de Contralor General, Anuario
Estadistica, Boletin del departemento de Contraloria.
Local Government debt: Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) between 1926 and 1937 in
millions of Pesos. The data includes the debt of municipalities and departments.
Gold reserves and notes in circulation: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a)
page 453, Jahreszahlen; 1934-1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Czechoslovakia
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 49 in millions of Kroner on 31 December 1918-1938. Long
term domestic debt includes debt to national bank (state notes debt), except for for 1919-
23. Part of the increase in the debt is due to the settlement and adjustment of pre-1914
and 1914-1918 war debts. The foreign debt 1920-1930 is converted into national currency
at the rate ruling at the moment of inscription of the various loans in the debt ledger.
Beginning with 1934, the debt in foreign currency has been converted at the rates of
exchange on respective dates. Some of the original debt service figures do not include
commissions, I have added them to improve comparability. The reduction in amortization
and interest in foreign debts since 1931 was due to the Hoover Moratorium of June 1931
and the Lausanne conference of 1932. From 1933, the regular redemption of domestic debt
was suspended, but bonds were accepted for payment of arreas of taxes and purchases of
bonds were effected by the state. Original sources: Closed Accounts, Office National
Statistique, Renseignements Statistique. Ministry of Finance, Dr. J. Dolansky, Vyklad k
Rozpoctu Na Rok 1947 (budget Expose’ 1947).
Local Government debt: No continuous series is available. A single data point for 1933
is present in Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 293, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Denmark
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 51 in millions of Kroner on 31 March 1914-1938. In 1933/34,
the loss on exchange in repayment of the foreign debt is included with “interest”. The
short-term debt includes treasury bills and, up to 1931, also debts from unpaid interest.
It does not include overdrafts on ther current account of the ministry of finance with the
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central bank and other banks which are normally more than offset by assets with those
banks. Debt towards central bank is available but has not inculded for compatibility with
other countries where it is reported on net. The foreign debt is shown at legal parity,
except for some French loans. Beginning in 1925/26, interest payments as published by
official accounts are offset by interest received from capital invested in real estate, plan
equipment and by a percentage invested in capital for depreciation. The net balance is
added or deducted from current receipts. Data on total interest received is available,
but negligible. I also use real cost of redemption rather than the nominal one. Original
Sources: Statsregnskab (closed accounts), Statistik Aarbog, Danske Staatslaan.
Local Government debt: Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) on 31 March between 1926
and 1938 in millions of Kroner. The data includes the debt of municipalities and depart-
ments.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 62, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Finland
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 60 in millions of Finnish Marks on 31 December 1916-1938.
Data excludes debts repurchased and held by public debt administration. Debts are shown
at book value. For 1914-1931, the debt service is total expenditure charged against or-
dinary revenue (receipts exceeding proceeds from loans). For 1932-1945, the expenditure
is charged against current receipts. Foreign interest payments include exchange losses.
For 1932-1945, redemption payments are charged against capital receipts, which include
proceeds from loans. Amounts therefore include conversions. Original Sources: Accounts,
Bureau Central de Statistique, Annuaire Statistique de Finlande, Recueil de Statistique,
Communication from Bank of Finland, Institute for Economic Research.
Local Government debt : Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) on 31 December between
1926 and 1936 in millions of Finnish Marks. The data includes the debt of municipalities
and other local communities.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 62, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
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France
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 64 in millions of Francs on 31 December 1917-1919 and 1922-
38, 31 May 1920 and 31 March 1921. Debt figures up to December 1937 are in comptes
generaux, yearly data, figures after 1937 are not directly comparable to earlier ones. Long
term debt also includes medium term debt, mainly bonds of more than two years maturity
at time of issuance (which are long term debt according to the UN classification used in
their 1948 volume). For 1914-1935,short term debt includes advances from the cental
bank, while for 36/37these are excluded and re-included starting from 1938. Foreign debt
was converted in Francs at the exchange rate at the date in question. The foreign debt
was excluded from official statements from 31 march 1932 to 31 december 37. Starting
from 1938, data excludes excludes interallied debts from WWI. The debt service data for
1920/21 are figures from 1920,. 1921/22 figures from 1921, 1929/30 from1929, for 1929
last 9 months only. 1927-32 are provisional figures. Original Sources: Closed Accounts
(Comptes Generaux), Ministe’re des Finances, Dette Publique (Situation Mensuelles),
Inventaire de la Situation financie’re (1913-1946).
Local Government debt data: Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) on 31 March between
1926 and 1930 in millions of Francs. The data includes the debt of municipalities and
departments. The figures are very small compared to the central government debt (around
3% in 1930). For this reason they are assumed to be negligible for the empirical analysis.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 95, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Germany
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 67 in millions of Reichsmarks on 31 March 1914-1938. Between
1913/14 and 1922/23 most of the debt (almost entirely internal in nature) was wiped out
by the hyperinflation and the redemption of the paper mark Treasury bills held by the
Reichsbank by payment in new Rentenmarks (1 rentenmark= 1 trillion paper marks). The
increase from 1925 to 1926 was due to the fact that most “pre-stablisation” debts had been
converted into the new “loan liquidation debt” which was shown for the first time in the
public debt statement of 1 March 1926, this amounted to 5,500 millions RM. For 1919/20
to 1922/23, the long term includes debts taken over from the states (largely railway). For
the same period, miscellaneous obligations and guarantees in the form of treasury bills are
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included. For 1932/33 to 1944 tax payment certificates are included. The foreign debt is
shown at par until 31 march 1933. From march 1934 loans issued in US Dollar, Sterling
an Swedish Kroner have been converted at the mean exchange rate of the respective years.
The decrease from 1933 to 1934 is chiefly the result of the change in the conversion rates.
The further gradual decline is due not only to actual transfers to the creditors abroad
but has resulted also from amounts in marks deposited in favour of foreign creditors at
the Reichsbank but not transferred due to the lack of foreign exchange, which have been
deducted from the outstanding debt. These amounted on 30 sept. 1944 to Reichsmarks
150.4 million. Original sources: Closed Accounts, Reichs-und Staatsanzeiger, Statistiches
Reichsamt, Statistiches Jahresbuch, Wirtschaft und Statistik.
Local Government debt: Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b) between 1928 and 1934
Statistisches Reichsamt (1938) in millions of Reichsmarks; 1935-1938 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1938). The data includes the debt of States, Municipalities and Free Cities.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 16-17, Jahreszahlen;
1934-1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) page 258*-259*.
Greece
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 71 in millions of drachmae on 31 December for 1913-1918
and 31 March for 1913-1938. The foreign devt is shown in gold drachmae at pre 1914
parity for 1913-27. From 1928, it is shown at the new parity. The debt service is the total
interest due on foreign loans. The non-transfered portions are set off on the receipt side
of the budget account as loans guaranteed by creditors. Redemptions include expenditure
from loan receipts. Original sources: Annuaire Statistique de la Grece, Bulletin Mensuel
Statistique.
Local Government debt: No continuous series is available.
Gold reserves and notes in circulation: No continuous series is available.
Hungary
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 67 in millions of Peng on 30 June 1924-1938. Beginning with 30
june 1932 the monthly reports on the financial conditions of Hungary include ceratin items
not shown in the original UN figures. These additional amounts are available and I have
included them together with administrative liabilities. The foreign debt is shown at official
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rates of exchange on the corresponding dates. The decrease in 1932 has been due in part
to the depreciation of the Sterling and US Dollar. The debt service figures do not include
the amounts of debt service paid directly by the public undertakings. For 1926/27 and
1927/28 administrative expensive have been included. Since december 1931, the foreign
debt service has been partly suspended and the Peng equivalents of the untransferred
portion were paid into blocked accounts from where large amounts re-borrowed by the
Hungarian government against treasury bills. Original sources: Closed accounts, Monthly
Statements on Financial Conditions in Hungary.
Local Government debt: No continuous series is available. A single data point for 1931
is present in Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 304. Jahreszahlen. Re-
serves only: 1934-1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Ireland
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 87 in millions of Pounds on 31 March 1923-1938. In addition
to amounts recorded in the UN volume there is a liability under the housing act of 1932
and also a liability under the damage of property act amounting on 31 March 1945 to
£9.4 and £4.3 million respectively. The latter liability on which an annuity of £250,000 is
payable for a sixty year period commencing in 1926 has been included since 1944/45 in the
official debt statements. The debt redemption consists of net amortization payments out
of ordinary revenue. Original Sources: Eire Finance accounts; Ireland Statistical Abstract.
Local Government debt data: Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) on 31 March between
1926 and 1937 in millions of Pounds. The data includes the debt of all local bodies.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 140. Jahreszahlen. Re-
serves only: 1934-1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Italy
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 89 in millions of Lire on 30 June 1914-1938. The foreign debt
was converted at old parity rates. The original foreign debt figures exclude the war debt
1914-1918, consisting chiefly of obligations to the governments of the UK and the US, I have
included these to improve comparability. I have also included interest payments on the
war debt of 1914-1918. Redemptions include conversions. Original sources: Rendiconto
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Generale, Annuario Statistico Italiano, Compendio Statistico Italiano.
Local Government debt: The figures for 1926 and 1935 are from Statistisches Reich-
samt (1939/40). The data in between is estimated using the shares of local and central
government debt in Francese and Pace (2008) and the central government debt in United
Nations (1948). All data is in millions of Lire and covers all local public bodies.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 144, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Japan
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 92 in millions of Yen on 31 March 1914-1938. The figures
include the debt incurred for the general as well as the special accounts. The figures
presented under “other borrowings” in the UN volume represent “loans at various rates
of interest” which could not be subdivided into domestic and foreign issues. I have added
them to the domestic debt. The short term debt includes special exchequer notes, treasury
notes, rice purchase notes and silk-purchase notes. The foreign debt was converted into
yen at the gold parity rates (£1= 9.763 yen, $1= 2.006 yen, 1 French Franc = 0.387 yen).
Original sources: Department of Finance, financial and economic annual of Japan, resume’
statistique de l’empire du Japon, Bank of Japan, Economic Statistics of Japan, Oriental
Economist, Supreme commander for the allied powers, Japanese economic statistics.
Local Government debt: Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) on 31 March between 1926
and 1937 in millions of Yen.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 37, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Netherlands
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt ser-
vice: United Nations (1948) page 90 in millions of Guilders on 31 December 1914-1938.
Total domestic debt does not include advances by the national bank guaranteed by the
government against assets in Reichsmarks amounting to Gulden 4,500 million on 31 de-
cember 1944. The foreign debt, when present, is included in the amounts shown under
”long term domestic debt”. In 1922 two loans of Florins 125 million and in 1924 another
loan of florins 100 million were issued in America. These loans were redeemed in 1932
and 1929 respectively. Total interest payments defrayed from ordinary receipts and up
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to 1933 inclusive also expenditure from Loan Fund. Receipts of the loan fund which was
abolished in 1934 consisted chiefly of taxes additional to certain excise funds. The do-
mestic redemption represents expenditure charged against ordinary revenue only. Certain
extraordinary payments were made during 1920-1944. Original sources: Jaarcifers voor
Nederland, Maandschrift van het Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek.
Local Government debt: Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) on 1 January between 1927
and 1938 in millions of Guilder. The data covers local communities and provinces.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 185, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Norway
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 106 in millions of Kroner on 30 June 1914-1938. The long
term debt figures after June 1932 do not include the loan from the invalidity fund amount-
ing to kroner 4.5 million on the above mentioned date. The figures include the “unpaid
capital by the state-guaranteed banks”. From 30 June 1933, the item is not included with
the debt proper but shown separately as a state liability in the official accounts. The
foreign debt is shown at parity rates (£1=18.16 Kroner, 1 Franc=0.72 Kroner, $1 =3.73
Kroner, 1 Swedish Kroner= 1 Norwegian Kroner, 1 Swiss Franc= 0.72 Kroner with the
exception of certain loans in Pounds converted at the rate £1=18.12, 18.16 or 18.18 Kro-
ner and Swedish Kroner converted at the rate of 1 Swedish Kroner=1.02575 Norwegian
Krone. Interest payments include commissions and other expenses. Redemption expendi-
ture is charged against capital receipts (including proceeds from loans). Original sources:
Closed Accounts; Statistique Officielle de la Norve’ge, Seire VIII; Statistical Year-books
of Norway.
Local Government debt: Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) on 30 June between 1926
and 1936 in millions of Kroner. The data covers municipalities and prefectures.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 197, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Peru
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 113 in millions of Soles on 31 December 1918-1938. Non
comparable data is available for the period 1914-1917. The foreign debt was converted
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into Soles at parity rates. The increase in foreign debt in 1930 and 1931 was chiefly due
to the adoption of higher converson rates. As interest payments on the foreign debt were
suspended in May 1931, arreas of interest were added to the outstanding capital. The
service on the foreign debt was completely suspendeed with the exception of the stetling
7.5% guano loan. Interest payments on the foreign debt were partially resumed in 1937.
Original sources: Balance y Cuenta de la Republica, Extracto Estadistico del Peru.
Local Government debt: figures are available for external debt only, between 1927 and
1933 from Werhahn (1937).
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 482, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*. Data also includes foreign ex-
change reserves.
Poland
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 116 in millions of Zloty on 31 March 1919-1938. Short term
debts for the period 1919-23 are in Polish marks and consist mostly of treasury bonds and
loans by the central bank in form of large advances in paper money to the government.
For the period 1924-39, short-term debts consist of treasury notes, non-interest bearing
advances from the Bank of Poland and the remainder of bonds and notes matured. The
foreign debt for the period 1919-23 is shown in Zloty at the rate of 5.183 zloty=$1. For
1924-1939, the foreign debt is shown at the rates of exchange on the respective dates with
the exception of the dollar issue of the 7% stabilisation loan of 1927 and the debt taken
over from the former Austrian monarchy, which have been converted at par. Original
sources: Budgets, Closed Accounts, Annuaire Statistique de la Republique Polonaise, the
Statistical Bulletin of the Ministry of Finance, the Bulletin of the Bank of Poland, Central
Statistical Office, Statistical News.
Local Government debt: Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) on 31 March between 1926
and 1938 in millions of Zloty. The data covers all local public bodies.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 197. Jahreszahlen. Re-
serves only: 1934-1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Romania
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 124 in millions of Lei on 31 March 1919-1938 except for 1923-
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31 on March 31. Long term debts since 1925 include consolidated debts owed to the central
bank. or 1920-24 these were included in the short term debts. From 1933 short term debts
include temporary advances from the central bank. For 1914 the foreign debts converted
at the pre-1914 parity; for 1929-31 is is calculated at new parity rates. For 1933 the debt
in sterling is converted at the rate £1=560 lei and $1=110 lei at at stabilization rates for
other currencies. From 1935, war debts are excluded from the figures, I reintroduce them
to improve comparability. Redemption of both foreign and domestic debt was suspended
in 1933. Original sources: Budgets, Central Statistical Institute, Statistical Year-books,
National Bank, Bulletin d’Information et de Documentation.
Local Government debt: Not available.
Gold reserves: Not available.
Sweden
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 133 in millions of Kroner on 31 December 1914-1922 and 30
June 1923-28. The original figures of domestic long-term includes foreign debt starting
from 30 June 1923. I have separated the two using foreign debt figures on 31 December of
the same year. The foreign debt was converted into kroner at parity and consists solely of
bonds in the hands of creditors resident abroad. The fall in foreign debt is partially due
to repayments and repurchases by Swedish residents. The debt service represents total
budgetary expenditure. Original sources: Closed Accounts, Year-books of the National
Debt Office (Riksgaeldskontoret), Statistical Year-books of Sweden.
Local Government debt data: Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) on 31 December
between 1926 and 1935 in millions of Kroner. The data covers municipalities and provinces.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 260, Jahreszahlen;
1934-1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Switzerland
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 137 in millions of Francs on 31 December 1914-1938. The
original figures for the public debt are those of the confederation, excluding the debt of the
Cantons and the federal railways debt. I have included the railways debt. The debt service
figures do not include railway debt. Administrative costs are included in redemptions up
to 1923 and in interest payments from 1924. The debt service expenditure is charged
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against ordinary revenues (excluding expenditure from loan proceeds). Original source:
Comptes d’Etat, Statistical Year-books of Switzerland.
Local Government debt: Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b) between 1925 and 1935 in
millions of Francs. The data covers the cantons and municipalities.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 272, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
United Kingdom
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
United Nations (1948) page 147 in millions of Pounds on 31 March 1914-1938. The
aggregate liabilities of the state do not include the funding loan and victory bonds tendered
for death duties but not yet cancelled. The foreign debt is shown at par. The debt service
includes not only appropration from revenue but also interest payments on national savings
certificates paid in excess of the provision in the permanent debt change and interest met
from receipts under section 1 (5) (b) of the defence loan act, 1937. Payments on the war
debt of 1914-1918 have been suspended completely since 1934. Original source: Finance
Accounts of the United Kingdom.
Local Government debt: Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) on 31 March between 1926
and 1936 in millions of Pounds. The data covers England, Wales and Northern Ireland,
but not Scotland.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 123, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Uruguay
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service
United Nations (1948) page 154 in millions of Pesos on 31 December 1914-1938. The
domestic debt includes the so-called “international debt”, consisting of two Brazilian is-
sues, which are payable in Uruguayan Pesos and are held in Uruguay. No information is
available for short-term debts between 1914 and 1928. The foreign debt was converted at
old parity rates (4.7 Pesos=£1), 0.966 Pesos =$1, 0.1865 Pesos=1 gold Franc). In 1915
the redemption of the the foreign debt was suspended in agreement with the bondholders.
In 1916, it was agreed to prolong the suspension until one year after the war. Redemption
of the foreign debt was again suspended on 20 January 1931 and resumed partially on
1 January 1937 and completely on 1 January 1939. Domestic debt payments were sus-
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pended on 1 November 1932 and resumed on 27 February 1937. I have added/substracted
exchange losses to the debt service in order to improve comparability. Original sources:
Deuda Publica Nacional, Anuario Estadistico.
Local Government debt: the figures from 1928 to 1933 are from Moody’s (1935) and
from 1936 to 1928 from Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40). The debt is recorded on 31
December in millions of Pesos.
Gold reserves: 1920-1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 490, Jahreszahlen; 1934-
1938, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40)page 258*-259*.
Yugoslavia
Central Government debt – long-term, short-term, foreign – and debt service:
not available.
Local Government debt: Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) on 31 December for 1930,
1933 and 1936 from .
Gold reserves: not available.
3.B.3 Alternative sources
Moody’s manuals offer an excellent opportunity to cross-check the data collected from
other sources. While the manuals do not generally offer time series that are as complete
and systematic as the German sources and the League of Nations, they contain a huge
amount o information that the agency used for its own ratings (Gaillard, 2012) and was
thus very careful in collecting. The local debt debt has been carefully cross-checked when-
ever possible thanks to the sometimes substantial overlap between different sources. The
picture is that of general agreement. The general rule in case of disagreements between
the sources has been to prefer the later source to account for revisions.
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Chapter 4
Paper 2: Fiscal Capacity, Tax
Composition and the (In-)Stability
of Government Revenues in the
Interwar Period
4.1 Introduction
Fiscal policy is both simple and incredibly complex to evaluate between the
wars: apparently simple to comprehend, because the goals appear straightfor-
ward [...]. In practice, however, evaluation is incredibly complicated, as the
period witnessed a complex of enormous pressures for expenditure growth, a
budget now significantly enlarged from pre-war and highly cyclically sensitive,
and all of this within the context of considerable macroeconomic instability and
the pressures for the Keynesian solution which, importantly, predate the 1929
downturn.
Middleton (2013)
As Roger Middleton argues in the quotation above, fiscal policy in the interwar period
was a complicated affair. The author highlights this with reference to the United Kingdom,
but other countries faced even more formidable challenges, due to significantly greater
economic instability combined with younger, less centralized and less fiscally endowed
states. Both public revenues and expenditures were extremely volatile in the interwar
period and this contributed to overall uncertainty in the economic and political spheres.
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Thus, studying this unique era, apart from the interest in the event itself, allows me
to assess the behavior of governments under extreme economic circumstances, which put
their very existence into question, as demonstrated by the numerous revolutions and regime
changes, which took place in the early 1930s.
This paper investigates the determinants of the volatility of fiscal aggregates and, con-
sequently, of fiscal policy in the interwar period by engaging with the following questions:
1) How did fiscal capacity affect the volatility of tax revenues and government financing
in the interwar period? 2) Through which channels did this effect occur? 3) How did
fiscal capacity influence countries’ ability to borrow and thus run fiscal deficits? I tackle
these questions using newly collected data for a large panel of developing and developed
countries (19 to 35, depending on the specification) .
I carry out the empirical analysis that is the centerpiece of this paper in three steps.
First, I show that the fiscal capacity of countries – as proxied alternatively by overall
tax revenue over GDP and income tax revenue over GDP33 – played a major role in
reducing the volatility of government financing. Second, I show that the smoothing effect of
fiscal capacity worked principally by guaranteeing countries an easier access to borrowing.
Specifically, I show that high capacity countries had higher initial debt stocks, were able
to borrow more compared to low capacity countries in the interwar years, and also had
lower sovereign bond yield spreads, which allowed them to borrow more cheaply. Third,
by focusing on the composition rather than just the magnitude of tax revenues, I provide
evidence that this effect was due to fiscal capacity signaling higher institutional quality,
rather than simply a higher present value of future tax receipts.
Naturally, this type of exercise is potentially vulnerable to many sources of bias and
measurement error.34 I deal with the potential endogeneity of fiscal institutions and the
confounding effects of temporary changes in tax policy with two strategies. The first is
holding the structure of fiscal systems stable by using 1914-1926 average fiscal indicators
to study changes in government revenues between 1927 and 1938. The second is an
instrumental variable approach.
I employ two instruments for fiscal capacity: 1) the number of years spent by countries
in major external conflicts between 1816 and 1913, as reconstructed by Dincecco and
33These are two commonly used fiscal capacity indicators. See for example O’Brien (2011) and Besley and
Persson (2009)
34For example, if countries with more volatile revenues decided to invest more in fiscal capacity to mitigate
this, the effect of the latter would be underestimated in the regressions. Rodrik (1998) discusses the issue
of the co-determinateness of volatility and government size in the context of estimating the effect of
openness on government size. Conversely, if the revenue volatility made investments in fiscal capacity
more difficult, the impact of fiscal capacity would be overestimated.
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Prado (2012), 2) the number of natural disasters to hit a country between 1900 and
1926, which I calculate based on data from the EM-DAT dataset of the Centre for the
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, 2017). The choice of these variables has historical,
theoretical and empirical foundations that are discussed in detail below. In short: external
conflicts facilitate the extension of the state’s franchise because they lead to an exogenous
increase in the demand for a public good – national defense – which needs to be financed
through taxation. Indeed, the historical record shows that warfare encouraged reforms,
which had far reaching consequences for the fiscal development of countries. Natural
disasters, instead, are a counter-force to the concentration of fiscal resources in national
governments. This is because of their predominantly small scale, which spurs the creation
of targeted local, rather than central, institutions and revenue streams to deal with both
their prevention and consequences.
The paper speaks to four main strands of literature. First, it addresses the economic
history literature on policy reactions to the Great Depression. Amongst many others,
Temin (1989) and Eichengreen (1992) have pointed out that these were either misguided
– in core countries – or extremely limited – in the periphery. Eichengreen maintained that
this was due to the constraints imposed by the dysfunctional interwar Gold Standard, in
conjunction with weak international cooperation and an inadequate conceptual framework
based on balancing the budget. Temin similarly claimed that the Gold Standard was the
key mechanism for the diffusion and severity of the slump. I argue that the pre-existing
structure of fiscal systems also severely constrained the policy responses of countries that
saw their tax revenues collapse and financial markets dry up. Thus, besides the Gold
Standard straitjacket invoked by the literature, countries faced additional and more-deeply
rooted constraints. This is also illustrated in my first paper (Chapter 3), in which I show
that the collapse in public revenue experienced by some countries played a key role in the
debt crisis of the early 1930s: countries that experienced larger decreases in their revenues
were more likely to default and to undergo larger defaults.
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the cyclicality of fiscal policy and
the literature on the determinants and impact of macroeconomic volatility. It is now a
well-established stylized fact that in the post-World War II era industrialized economies
have consistently run countercyclical or acyclical fiscal policies, while developing countries
have followed procyclical ones, which have presumably contributed to their macroeconomic
volatility.35 High fiscal policy volatility is not only related to macroeconomic volatility,
35See Gavin and Perotti (1997), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004), Talvi and Vegh (2005), Mendoza
and Oviedo (2006), Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008), Frankel, Vegh, and Vuletin (2013) and Vegh and Vuletin
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but also to lower growth. Fata´s and Mihov (2013) provide empirical evidence for this link,
while Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2017) illustrate a potential political economy channel
for it, which ties budget volatility to a lower efficiency in public policy. A further stylized
fact for the post-WWII era is that countries with larger governments tend to have less
volatile economies. This has been attributed to the combination of automatic stabilizers36
and a composition effect (Gal´ı, 1994; Fata´s and Mihov, 2001; Andre´s, Dome´nech, and
Fata´s, 2008). The argument for the latter is that the public sector is more stable than the
private sector, therefore countries with larger public sectors will be less volatile overall.
I add an historical dimension to this literature by showing that both government
revenue and expenditure were more volatile than GDP on average in the Great Depression
years. Thus, the historical record, as well as the experience of developing countries today
(Mendoza and Oviedo, 2006), demonstrate that a lower volatility in the public sector
compared to the private sector should not be taken for granted. The paper’s findings also
support the the notion that institutionally-determined credit constraints in countries with
weak and small governments can play an important role in fiscal policy pro-cyclicality
and volatility. Consequently, the ability of stronger governments to run more counter-
cyclical and less volatile fiscal policies might help explain the negative correlation between
government size and macroeconomic volatility and, as a consequence, also lower growth.
Third, my findings shed further light on the far-reaching impact of fiscal institutions
on economic outcomes. The literature linking fiscal capacity to long-term economic devel-
opment both theoretically and empirically is now an established and burgeoning field. I
review this literature in detail in the introductory portion of this Dissertation (Section 2.1).
Even though there is a consensus that fiscal development is an important determinant of
the ability to borrow (North and Weingast, 1989; Bordo and White, 1991; Dincecco, 2009;
O’Brien, 2011), there are no empirical studies linking fiscal capacity directly to cyclical
economic outcomes and fiscal policies. This paper helps fill this gap.
The final contribution of the paper is to provide new data on the fiscal history of the
interwar period. At the time, the fiscal development of countries was still very limited.
Levels of taxation in rich countries were comparable to those of poor countries today,
while poor countries already lagged behind in their fiscal capacity. The extreme economic
downturn and widespread collapse in public revenues caused by the Great Depression
forced a broad spectrum of countries to reconsider their taxing strategies, and for some
(2015), amongst others.
36See McKay and Reis (2016) for a recent study of automatic stabilizers in the US which finds that they
had a limited role in dampening the business cycle in the last two decades.
122
nations the early 1930s represent the beginning of far-reaching changes in taxation and in
the role of governments in the economy. In the United States, for example, the expansion
of income taxation and of Federal spending programmes in the 1930s ushered in a new
era (Wallis, 2000; Fishback and Wallis, 2013). This is also true at the sub-national level:
Gillitzer (2017) shows that US states that were hit more severely than average by the
Depression were more likely to introduce new taxes compared to states hit by smaller
slumps. Argentina provides another illustration. The country introduced its very first
income tax in 1932 as response to the Depression (Alhadeff, 1985). Furthermore, the
share of countries with withholding doubled during the interwar period opening the way
for the tax systems we have today (Besley and Persson, 2014).
More generally, using newly-assembled data, I document that the rapid increase in
fiscal capacity in Europe and North America witnessed over the course of the 20th century
was already under way in the interwar period, and that it was particularly rapid in the
aftermath of the Depression. Events such as WWII and the consolidation of welfare states
in the War’s aftermath certainly contributed to the patterns of taxation we see today,
but divergent paths were already visible in earlier periods. The data also includes local
governments; therefore, this paper is a primer in terms of local level tax data. However,
further work is necessary to increase the coverage on local governments – in the interwar
period, as in many other historical contexts – in order to fully grasp changes in taxation
patterns (Hoffman, 2015; Dincecco, 2015).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, I discuss how revenue
volatility can affect policy and the action of states more generally. In Section 4.3, I briefly
discuss the data, with particular emphasis to the evolution of fiscal capacity over the
interwar period. Section 4.4 illustrates the econometric strategy to investigate the link
between fiscal capacity and government financing smoothing. Section 4.5 discusses the
results of the estimation and their quantitative importance, while Section 4.6 explores the
borrowing channel through which fiscal capacity affected government financing. Section
4.7 concludes.
4.2 The impact of revenue volatility
Figure 4.1 illustrates annual percentage changes in central government tax revenues, fi-
nancing (tax revenues+non-tax revenues+long-term borrowing) and expenditure in ab-
solute terms and as a share of GDP in the interwar period for the countries in my
sample. These are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
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Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay and Yugoslavia
with various degrees of temporal coverage between 1927 and 1938.37
The dispersion of the variables is very large and – as panel (b) demonstrates – can
only be partially attributed to changes in economic activity. In fact, as mentioned above,
both government revenue and expenditure were more volatile than GDP in this period.
Although it is not immediately apparent from the charts, the analysis below shows that tax
revenues moved very closely with economic activity. Government financing, instead, was
less responsive to changes in output thanks to the contribution of non-tax revenues, which
were essential in smoothing government expenditure. I show below that fiscal capacity
was a key determinant of this smoothing effect because it provided an easier access to
borrowing.
The government financing variable is also interesting because it represents how statis-
tical offices in the interwar period classified public revenues. Moreover, it is a measure of
the planned and budgeted part of government expenditure and fiscal policy more generally,
which made up the vast majority (96%) of public budgets. Although short-term borrowing
was used to make up for budget short-falls, the financing variable, and long-term borrow-
ing in particular, are the portions of public intakes that are most closely related to fiscal
capacity and the quality of institutions more generally.
4.2.1 Fiscal policy: the interwar experience
Given this backdrop of revenue instability, how was fiscal policy conducted in the interwar
period? Fiscal deficits, when at all present, tended to be very small, especially in compar-
ison to the loss of GDP (Almunia, Be´ne´trix, Eichengreen, O’Rourke, Rua, Tenreyro, and
Perri, 2010). For example, in the US the deficit was less than 6% of GDP in 1933. By com-
parison, in 2009 it was 10%. At the same time, the cumulative contraction of real GDP per
capita between 2007 and 2009 was less than one sixth of the Great Depression one, around
5% compared to 31%. Additionally, deficits in early 1930s US were mostly the unexpected
product of mistakes in budgetary planning, rather than a form of proto-Keynesianism,
which developed only late in the decade (De Long, 1998). Even in Germany, a country
37Some of these countries are later left out of the analysis due to lack of data on the co-variates. Greece,
instead is left out of this because it experienced some very dramatic changes in revenue which cloud the
overall picture.
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(a) Absolute numbers
(b) As a share of GDP
Figure 4.1: Yearly percentage changes in central tax revenues, government financing and
expenditure, 1927-38
Government financing is composite, which includes tax revenues, revenues from publicly owned enterprises
and capital, other unclassified revenues and long term (over 1 year maturity) borrowing and represented
96% of total government financing on average in the interwar period. Source: Statistisches Reichsamt
for the revenue data and Klasing and Milionis (2014) for the nominal non-PPP-adjusted GDP data. See
Appendix 4.B for details.
that is conventionally seen as having embraced Keynesianism ante-litteram, the recovery
of the 1930s was not driven by fiscal policy (Ritschl, 2002a); a similar story applies to
Sweden (Scho¨n, 2007).38
The extremely limited use of fiscal (and monetary) policy has led researchers to ar-
38As cited by Almunia, Be´ne´trix, Eichengreen, O’Rourke, Rua, Tenreyro, and Perri (2010)).
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gue that governments’ responses to the Great Depression were gravely inadequate and
potentially aggravated the slump. In Barry Eichengreen’s classic book “Golden Fetters”
(Eichengreen, 1992), the author highlights the lack of international cooperation – fuelled
by mutual suspicion – and the dominant conceptual framework – underpinned by the
balanced budget ideology – as two key determinants of the weak policy responses to the
Depression. Indeed, even for those potentially well disposed towards Keynesianism, the
dogma of the balanced budget was hard to displace. The smoothing of the business cycle
through fiscal and monetary policy was a radical notion even among economists in the
Labour camp in the UK – see for example (Dalton, 1934) – or the Communists in France
(Eichengreen, 1992). Eichengreen furthermore identifies the dysfunctional interwar Gold
Standard as the institutional straitjacket that limited countries manoeuvring space on both
the monetary and fiscal fronts. According to the author, the unwillingness to let go of the
gold anchor, seen by many as the last connection to the successful pre-WWI monetary
order, constrained expansionary policies and piled further deflationary pressures and aus-
terity on ailing countries. Temin (1989) similarly argued that the Gold Standard-imposed
limitations to maneuvering space for policy were the fundamental channel for the spread
of the Depression.
But how much room for manouver would countries have possessed had they been free
from the golden fetters? What constraints, apart from Gold Standard membership, did
they face? On the fiscal side, many countries probably had limited possibilities to act
for a number of reasons. First, governments in the interwar period were small. Leaving
aside the issue of fiscal capacity and borrowing constraints for a moment, the simple fact
that states were modestly-sized relative to the economy made large scale fiscal stimuli
practically impossible to implement. Second, sources of finance for governments shrunk
very quickly during the Depression. After 1929, international financial markets, which had
been bolstered by an outburst of US foreign lending after WWI, essentially dried up. Many
countries that had experienced substantial capital inflows during the second half of the
1920s experienced dramatic reversals and capital flight. On top of this, domestic financial
markets were underdeveloped in many countries and the legacy of the 1920s hyperinflations
and the post-’29 collapse in asset prices greatly reduced the wealth governments could tap
for domestic borrowing. Borrowing from central banks was certainly an option for countries
not on gold. However, it is difficult to imagine that the scale of the loans some countries
would have needed to counterbalance the funding shortfall through money printing alone
would not have had major economic consequences in terms of inflation and/or further
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capital flight.
I argue that, in addition to these factors, a low level of development of the fiscal
system was a major constraint on countries’ ability to smooth government financing, or
– at a minimum – limit the procyclicality of public expenditure through borrowing. The
argument is supported by the econometric analysis below. In Section 4.5.4, I discuss the
specific examples of the United States and Argentina to further illustrate how a low level
of fiscal development translated into damagingly pro-cyclical fiscal policy in the interwar
period.
4.2.2 Beyond fiscal policy: revenue volatility and the action of states
Apart from contributing to procyclical fiscal policies, public revenue volatility can have
further negative repercussions through four main channels. First, if revenue volatility
contributes to macroeconomic volatility it can negatively impact economic growth (see
Loyaza, Rancie´re, Serve´n, and Ventura (2007) for an overview of the link between volatility
and growth).39 Empirical evidence for the post-WWII period highlights a link between the
size of governments and economic volatility: countries and regions with larger governments
consistently display a lower volatility of output (Gal´ı, 1994; Fata´s and Mihov, 2001; Andre´s,
Dome´nech, and Fata´s, 2008). Some studies take this as a starting point to argue that
countries facing more external shocks due to their openness will choose to have a larger
government sector as a form of self-insurance (Rodrik, 1998; Epifani and Gancia, 2009).
However, the channels through which governments may actually stabilize the economy are
not yet clear. Researchers have argued that automatic stabilizers and a simple composition
effect might both contribute to the smoothing of output.40 Automatic stabilizers were
extremely limited in geographical diffusion and scope in the interwar period, however, and
their role in dampening business cycle fluctuations is unclear even in modern economies;
see for example McKay and Reis (2016) on the US. The composition effect depends on
the assumption that the public sector is less volatile than the private sector and, thus,
39Bleaney, Gemmell, and Greenway (1995) and Ebeke and Ehrhart (2011) offer interesting insights by
focusing on sub-Saharan Afica. Both studies find adverse effects of revenue instability on the volatility of
government investment and expenditure, and on the level of public investment.
40The mechanism through which government size reduces macroeconomic volatility proposed in the recent
literature (Andre´s, Dome´nech, and Fata´s, 2008) is quite different in spirit to how the smoothing effect
of automatic stabilizers in the traditional Keynesian framework. The latter posits that taxes react more
than proportionally to income shocks so that disposable income, and therefore consumption of credit-
constrained consumers, are smoother than income (De Long and Summers, 1986). This basic mechanism
can be extended to government transfers and general government spending. In Andre´s et al, however, the
requirements of Real Business Cycle (RBC) general equilibrium modeling lead to the outcome that gov-
ernments smooths consumptions because higher taxes mean that consumers have less disposable income
to begin with, so that when a productivity shock hits, the fall in disposable income is smaller in relative
terms.
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a stabilizing force in the economy. This, however, is based on the limited experience of
developed countries in the recent past. In modern developing countries and in the interwar
period, governments were certainly not a stabilizing force on average, given that both their
revenues and expenditures were more volatile than GDP. The volatility of government
financing can thus play an important role in determining to what extent governments
reduce or increase macroeconomic volatility.
Second, as shown empirically by Fata´s and Mihov (2013), countries with more volatile
fiscal policies have substantially lower long-term growth. Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier
(2017) propose a political economy mechanism though which high public revenues volatility
can reduce the efficiency of public policy and, as a consequence, directly lower economic
growth, without going through the channel of macroeconomic volatility discussed above.
The mechanism is the following: volatility in public income lowers re-election probability
by reducing the benefit of staying in power; this, in turn, reduces the (political) cost of
inefficient policies, such as patronage and clientelism, thus negatively affecting economic
growth.
Third, the tax-smoothing literature pioneered by Barro (1979) and Lucas and Stokey
(1983) shows that deviations from the optimal path of keeping tax rates (the share of
income paid into taxes) stable over the business cycle will lead to additional distortions
and welfare losses for any given level of government spending. Thus, even dismissing a
Keynesian approach, optimal fiscal policy requires the ability to borrow during slumps to
allow taxes to fall in line with output while keeping public expenditures stable.41
Finally, in countries which raise small amounts of revenues compared to the size of
the economy – as was the case almost everywhere in the interwar period, and is the case
in many developing countries today – sudden falls in government financing can disrupt
the very functioning of states and their ability to provide public goods. In extreme cases,
this might lead to regime changes. Although no causal claim is made in this paper, I
note in passing that in the early 1930s many countries around the world experienced
dramatic regime changes. The case of Germany with the rise to power of the NSDAP
in 1933 is notorious, but further regime changes and general increases in autocracy took
place in many countries in Eastern and Central Europe and Latin America, for example.
de Bromhead, Eichengreen, and O’Rourke (2013) analyze the link between economic hard
times and right-wing extremisms during the interwar period and find that where depressed
economic conditions were allowed to persist, the wise of extremism was more likely. The
41This result can change if expenditure is endogeneized, see Ferrie´re and Karantounias (Forthcoming).
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inability to prevent a collapse in government financing may have played a role in this.42
An issue in this research, as in much of the macroeconomics literature, is that taxation,
and the revenue side of fiscal policy more generally, are only discussed in light of potential
distortionary effects. The origin of countries’ ability to raise revenue and spend are not
normally considered. This means that some key questions remain without answer. Under
which conditions will the public sector be able to smooth its revenues effectively and be
more stable than the private one? Does the ability to sustain automatic stabilizers or
run an effective fiscal policy depend on the size of the government itself? What are the
determinants of the fiscal development of states? This paper offers some insight into these
questions against the backdrop of the largest and most widespread peace-time economic
downturn in history.
4.3 New data and some descriptive statistics
Existing datasets on fiscal variables in the interwar period are incomplete. The most
comprehensive sources collecting international data are Mitchell’s International Historical
Statistics volumes (Mitchell, 2007) and Flora et al’s data handbook on Western Europe
(Flora, Kraus, and Pfenning, 1987). However, these do not provide detailed information
on tax structures and are almost exclusively focused on central governments.
I have transcribed data from various publications of the German Imperial Statistical
Office (Statistiches Reichsamt) on the size and composition of countries’ central govern-
ment tax revenues, as well as some more limited information on local governments. The
local level data remains incomplete and the econometric analysis below focuses on central
governments. Nonetheless, I draw some interesting stylized facts from both central and
local data, which improve our understanding of taxation in the interwar era. Directly
below, I discuss my two fiscal capacity indicators: tax revenues as a share of GDP and
income tax revenues as a share of GDP. I also provide a snapshot of the size of local
governments in the interwar period. In Appendix 4.B, I discuss the other data and the
sources in detail.
Table 4.1 offers a comparative picture of tax revenues as a share of GDP. Direct
comparisons across countries are imperfect due to different accounting standards, but
are nonetheless useful. The very low incidence of taxation by the standard of today’s
developed countries is immediately evident. Rich countries today tax around 40% of
42Other past regime changes have also been linked to fiscal factors, for example the French Revolution
(Tilly, 1975; Sargent and Velde, 1995).
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Table 4.1: Tax revenues as a percentage of GDP
Central tax revenue/GDP Central & Local tax revenue/GDP
Pre-GD 1929-33 Post-GD Average Pre-GD 1929-33 Post-GD Average
Austria 8 10 15 10 15 21 16
Belgium 5 7 10 7 5 8 11 8
Bulgaria 7 6 8 7 8 8
Czechoslovakia 10 17 14
Denmark 7 5 6 6 12 9 10 10
Finland 7 6 7 7
France 9 13 16 12 15 22 17
Germany 3 7 12 7 12 15 22 17
United Kingdom 14 14 16 14 17 19 18
Greece 8 5 7
Hungary 10 9 15 11 12 20 15
Ireland 14 20 17
Italy 7 9 14 10 10 14 12
Netherlands 6 6 9 7 8 10 16 10
Norway 10 8 8 8 20 14 14 16
Poland 5 7 10 8 13 13 13
Romania 14 15 15 15
Spain 9 8 9
Sweden 6 6 7 6 10 10 10
Switzerland 3 4 6 4 7 10 9
Yugoslavia 11 11
Canada 6 6 7 6
USA 3 3 5 4 8 12 12 10
Argentina 5 4 6 5
Brazil 4 5 4
Chile 8 8 7 8
Colombia 5 5 3 4
Australia 6 7 6 6
India 2 2 2 2
Japan 6 5 4 5
Turkey 6 13 8
Egypt 10 10 14 11
South Africa 7 7 10 8
Average 7 7 10 8 10 11 13 12
Western Europe average 7 7 10 8 9 11 15 11
European core average 7 9 13 9 9 13 18 14
Eastern Europe average 9 9 13 11 11 17 12
Latin America average 6 5 5 5
Source: author’s estimates, see Appendix 4.B for detail on the sources. The post-Depression figure for
the United States is from the Historical Statistics of the United States, millennial edition (Wallis, 2006).
Pre-GD=1918-28. Post-GD= 1934-38. Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. European core: Belgium, France,
Germany, UK, Italy, Netherlands. Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czechslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania.
Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chie, Colombia.
GDP on average (Besley and Persson, 2014). The average incidence of central government
taxation between 1918 and 1928 was around 7% and had increased to 10% in 1934-1938.
These levels are similar to those of low-tax developing countries today. The inclusion
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of local level taxation for the countries for which these data are available only increases
the fiscal capacity indicator to 15% and 12% in post-Depression Western Europe and US
respectively.
However, a clearly divergent trend emerges when Europe and the United States are
compared to the rest of the world. In Western Europe, the incidence of taxation at the
central level increased on average from 7% before the Great Depression to 10% after, and
from 10% to 13% when local governments are included. The incidence of taxes rose in
almost all the Western European countries considered in the sample, the exceptions being
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Greece. In the US the increase was from 3 to 5% and 8
to 12% respecively. Data on government financing are more complete than the tax data
and allows a broader comparisons of public finances at the local level. When the tax
and financing data overlap, they offer a very similar picture. However, the inclusion of
local level financing means that Canada can now clearly be assimilated to the European
and US experience of relatively high and increasing revenues levels. These increases were
particularly strong in the post-Depression era. No similar general upward trend is visible
in the rest of the world, with the exception of Egypt and South Africa.
The relatively high and increasing taxation levels of Eastern Europe are also notewor-
thy. These were slightly greater than those of Western Europe as a whole, but lower than
those of the European core constituted of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. The two African countries in the sample, Egypt and South
Africa, also stand out for their generally high taxation levels, given their level of economic
development. This could be at least partially explained by the fact that they were a
British protectorate and a recently independent British ex-colony respectively. In Asia,
Japan’s taxation levels are below average, while India’s are the lowest of the whole sample.
Unfortunately, the coverage of Asia and Africa is limited to these four countries and to
the central government level due to data availability. This rules the assessment of broader
developments in the two continents.
The most striking aspect of the table, however, is Latin America’s overall very low
and stagnant level of taxation, which has persisted, in relative terms, until today (Sokoloff
and Zolt, 2007). The only partial exception is Argentina, a country which introduced
substantial reforms – for example by implementing its first income tax – as a result of the
Depression.
The increase in fiscal capacity in Europe and North America documented in the table
suggests that the staggering increase in the incidence of taxation, which took place over
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the course of the 20th century, was already well under way in the interwar era. Research on
the US has fidentified the Great Depression as a crucial episode in triggering an increase in
the role of government in the economy (Wallis, 2000; Gillitzer, 2017), and it would appear
that a similar pattern can also be identified for Europe.
Table 4.2: Income (direct) taxes as a percentage of GDP and total tax revenues
Income Tax Revenue/GDP Income Tax Revenue/Total Tax Revenue
Country Pre-GD 1929-33 Post-GD Average Pre-GD 1929-33 Post-GD Average
Austria 2.5 2.4 2.9 2.5 30.4 24 19.2 26.1
Belgium 1.9 2.4 3 2.3 37.9 33.3 30.3 33.3
Bulgaria 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.7 21.5 26.3 20.5 23
Czechoslovakia 2.1 3.1 2.6 20.4 17.7 19.1
Denmark 2.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 38.4 34.1 30.2 33.8
Finland 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.5 22.1 23.8 20.5 22.1
France 3.3 4 4.7 3.9 35.6 32.2 29.1 32.6
Germany 1.1 1.5 6 2 19.1 22 50 24.8
United Kingdom 7.9 7.6 7.8 7.7 57.3 56.3 49.6 53.5
Greece 1.6 1.2 1.4 19.7 22.8 21
Hungary 2.4 3 4.8 3.4 23.9 33.2 31.7 30.6
Ireland 3.9 4.9 4.4 27.9 25.1 26.5
Italy 2.8 2.8 3.5 3.3 39.4 32 25.4 32.8
Netherlands 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.5 45.3 40.5 27.5 38.4
Norway 4 2.4 2.6 2.7 38.4 31.7 30.3 31.7
Poland 1.7 2.3 3.4 2.5 31.6 30.8 34.4 32.2
Romania 3.8 4.2 3.1 3.5 26.9 29.2 20.9 24.1
Spain 2.9 2.8 2.8 32.4 33.2 32.8
Sweden 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.7 28.3 26 23.9 25.5
Switzerland 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 17.2 13.1 12.6 13.6
Yugoslavia 2.5 2.5 22.9 22.9
Canada 1 1.3 1.6 1.2 17.4 20.9 22.9 19.9
United States of America 2.2 2 2.4 2.2 66.1 60.9 47.9 58.7
Argentina 0.2 0.4 1 0.5 4.3 8.8 17.1 10
Brazil 0.2 0.4 0.3 6.8 9.1 8
Chile 1.8 2.4 1.8 2 21.5 30.2 24.4 26.1
Colombia 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.4 4.8 9.8 16 10.3
Australia 1.6 2 1 1.4 26.3 28.8 17.8 22.5
India 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 21.6 22.1 21.6 21.7
Japan 2.1 1.7 1.3 1.7 32.9 30 39.1 32.6
Turkey 1 4.5 2.4 17.1 35.8 23.3
Egypt 2.8 2.8 3.9 3.2 29.3 27.8 27.3 28.1
South Africa 3 3.9 5.9 4 42.8 43.1 56.1 47.9
Average 2.2 2.2 2.8 2.3 29.8 28.1 27.6 27.6
Western Europe average 2.5 2.4 3 2.5 31.6 28.7 26.8 28.7
European core average 3.3 3.5 4.6 3.6 39.1 36.1 35.3 35.9
Eastern Europe average 2.3 2.8 3.2 2.7 24.9 29.9 25 25.8
Latin America average 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.8 10.2 13.9 16.6 13.6
Source: author’s estimates, see Appendix 4.B for detail on the sources. The post-Depression figure for
the United States is from the Historical Statistics of the United States, millennial edition (Wallis, 2006).
Pre-GD=1918-28. Post-GD= 1934-38. Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. European core: Belgium, France,
Germany, UK, Italy, Netherlands. Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czechslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania.
Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chie, Colombia.
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Tables 4.2 offers an even more more clear-cut picture of the difference in taxation
patterns across countries by presenting information on income (direct) taxes. Europe,
and the European core in particular, stand out for their high level of direct taxation
both as a share of GDP and as a share of overall tax revenue. As expected, the United
Kingdom emerges as the country with the most developed system of income taxation.
Latin America, instead, is confirmed to be lagging behind severely in the development of
its tax system, with the partial exception of Argentina.
The dynamics of direct taxes offer an interesting picture as well. In most European
countries – the exceptions are Germany, Greece, Hungary and Poland – and in some non-
European countries – the US and Australia – the share of income taxes in overall tax
revenues decreased significantly over the course of the interwar period, even if their share
in GDP tended to increase. This partly reflects a return to lower levels of income taxation
after the fiscal strain of WWI, which relied heavily on increases in direct taxes. The
expansion of indirect taxes – such as taxes on sales, consumption, capital transactions and
transportation – also played an important role in the decrease in the relative importance
of income taxation in this period. The picture for custom duties, instead, is less clear
cut. In general, they lost some relevance in this period, but the pattern is different in
every country. This illustrates the complex evolution of tax systems over the course of the
interwar period.
Table 4.3 offers a snapshot of the size of local governments in the early 1930s by illus-
trating the local share of government financing, taxes and public debt over their respective
nationwide totals. The table demonstrates that the size of local governments varied widely
across nations, with relatively centralized countries – such as Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy and
France – on one end of the spectrum and decentralized ones – such as Australia, Brazil,
the Netherlands and Germany – on the other. Noteworthy is also the high degree of
decentralization of the relatively sparsely populated Scandinavian countries. The three
indicators in the table broadly tell the same story: countries with relatively larger local
revenues had higher shares of local taxation and their local governments also had larger
debts, but the relationship is not one-to-one. Many factors played a role in determining
the degree of fiscal federalism in each country. As I argue in Section 4.4.4, one of these is
the incidence of natural disasters, which I exploit in my instrumental variable analysis.
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Table 4.3: Local government financing, taxes and debt as a percentage of their respective
totals
Country Year GovtFin Taxes Debt Country Year GovtFin Taxes Debt
Argentina 1931 20 Ireland 1931 31 37
Australia 1931 68 48 Italy 1932 33 21 9
Austria 1931 37 35 20 Japan 1931 56 26
Belgium 1931 21 12 1 Latvia 1931 37
Brazil 1931 40 77 Lithuania 1931 8
Bulgaria 1932 18 14 5 Netherlands 1931 64 37 46
Canada 1931 56 58 48 New Zealand 1931 19
Chile 1931 21 Peru 1931 4
Colombia 1931 41 42 Poland 1933 24 20 18
Czechoslovakia 1930-1933 25 23 Spain 1931 18
Denmark 1931 69 44 44 Sweden 1931 51 39 46
Estonia 1931 21 Switzerland 1931 70 61 35
Finland 1931 21 47 Turkey 1931 21
France 1930 13 12 3 South Africa 1931 46
Germany 1931 60 53 54 Uruguay 1931 18
Greece 1931 6 United Kingdom 1931 40 19 16
Hungary 1931 26 32 United States 1932 41 70 50
India 1931 52 Yugoslavia 1931 20
Source: Author’s estimates. For the sources of the debt and financing/tax data see Appendix 3.B and 4.B
respectively. The tax figure for Canada is from Sokoloff and Zolt (2007). The post-Depression figure for
he United States is from the Historical Statistics of the United States, millennial edition (Wallis, 2006).
4.4 Empirical strategy
This section outlines the empirical strategy of the principal analysis of this paper. Its ob-
jective is detecting and quantifying the effect of pre-existing tax structures, in conjunction
with changes in economic activity, on changes in tax revenues and government financing.
More precisely, I study the impact of fiscal capacity on tax revenues and on a composite
made up of tax revenues, non-tax government income – i.e. the profits of publicly owned
corporations and public monopolies and other unclassified revenues including the sales of
some commodities abroad – and long-term – over 1 year maturity – borrowing. I refer to
this composite as simply government financing. As mentioned above, the latter variable
represented the bulk of resources at the disposal of governments in the interwar period –
96% on average between 1927 and 1938 – while tax revenues represented on average 73%.
Governments also relied on short-term borrowing from various sources – including central
banks – to ramp-up spending within short time horizons.
The results indicate a major role for fiscal capacity in reducing the instability govern-
ment financing, while the results for just tax revenues are not conclusive. This suggests
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that high capacity countries were able to smooth their public revenues though non-tax rev-
enues, as would be desirable in an optimal fiscal policy scenario. I ascribe these findings
to the impact of fiscal capacity on countries’ ability to borrow and explore this channel
in detail in Section 4.6. I conclude that fiscal capacity, by signaling higher institutional
quality, allowed countries to borrow more extensively and more cheaply. These findings
strongly suggest that policy responses during the interwar period were constrained by
preexisting fiscal systems, and not only Gold Standard membership and ideology as sug-
gested by much of the literature. Faced with dwindling tax revenues and the inability to
tap financial markets, some countries were not in the position of running expansionary
fiscal policies – or even simply avoid a collapse in public expenditure – even if they had
wanted to and regardless of their commitment to gold.
The section is structured as follows. I firstly discuss the model used in the estimations
(Section 4.4.1). I then discuss two important issues: the interpretation of the fiscal capacity
coefficients (Section 4.4.2), and the possibility of reverse causality between my outcome
variables and output (Section 4.4.3). Finally, I outline my instrumental variable (IV)
strategy (Section 4.4.4).
4.4.1 Model
The basic empirical approach consists in relating annual changes in public revenues to
annual changes in economic activity measured by GDP. This approach is common in
the empirical literature on the elasticity of revenues to changes in output. For an early
example see Vogel and Trost (1979)’s study of the elasticity of tax receipts to changes in
income in US states between 1957 and 1975; Kodrzycki (2014) applies the methodology to
contemporary US states revenues, Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) use it in a cross-country setting
and Bru¨ckner (2012) employs to focus on sub-Saharan African countries. In a different,
but connected application, Vegh and Vuletin (2015) use it to study the cyclicality of tax
rates, rather than revenues, across countries. Following the literature, I study revenues as
a whole rather than estimating an equation for each of their components separately. The
former is preferable due to the interdependence between different types of receipts, which
would make ex-post aggregation problematic using the latter approach.
I introduce several innovations compared to previous studies. Firstly, to my knowl-
edge, I am the first to investigate the impact of fiscal capacity on government revenues
volatility. Secondly, I control for the composition of tax revenues, the degree of fiscal
capacity and the other control variables by keeping them constant at their average values
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before the period of observation. I adopt this strategy to reduce the risk of reverse causal-
ity – countries might choose a particular tax system because of changes in their revenues
– and to deal with confounding effects due to idiosyncratic changes in the regressors un-
related to true changes in fiscal institutions. This is important because my objective is
establishing how the persistence of fiscal systems locks-in countries leading to differences
in the response of revenues to economic shocks. Thirdly, I deal with potential endogene-
ity by instrumenting fiscal capacity with the time countries spent fighting major external
conflicts, in line with the literature studying the impact of fiscal capacity on long-term
development (Dincecco and Prado, 2012), and by introducing a novel instrument: the
incidence of natural disasters.
I begin the analysis by simply estimating the elasticity of tax revenues and government
financing to economic activity. Economic activity is measured by the nominal, non-PPP-
adjusted GDP provided by Klasing and Milionis (2014) (NGDP). This is a useful indicator
given that changes in revenues are driven by both changes in real economic activity and
prices. The alternative would be to use changes in real GDP and convert the revenues
into constant prices, but the choice of deflator is problematic and particularly challenging
in the strong deflationary context of the the Great Depression. Even with an adequate
deflator, the PPP adjustment would have to be accounted for. Using Klasing and Milionis’
data represents the most straightforward solution. The differences models is outlined
in equation 4.1 where ci are country fixed effects, lt are year fixed effects and i,t are
idiosyncratic disturbances.
∆Revenuei,t = β0 + β1∆NGDPi,t + ci + lt + i,t (4.1)
I retain the differences specification for the whole analysis in order to account for the
probable persistence and non-stationarity of the data. Due to the large size of the swings
in the dependent variables, I use percentage changes rather than log differences given that
the latter represent precise approximations only for small percentage changes.43
The inclusion of country fixed effects allows to control for a vast array of time invariant
or slow moving country characteristics – including geography, demography and economic
structure – and to thus minimize the danger of omitting a variable correlated with the re-
gressors and causal for the dependent variable. Time fixed effects allow me to account for
common shocks. Panel estimation also minimizes issues of cross-country comparability of
43Both are straightforward solutions to problems often ignored in the literature. I cluster the standard
errors at country level to account for heteroskedasticity.
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the data by exploiting the time series rather than cross-sectional variation of the variables.
Although the within (FE) and first differences (FD) estimators both account for country
fixed effects, the underlying assumptions for unbiasedness and consistency are weaker for
FD: whereas the regressors have to be uncorrelated with idiosyncratic errors in the past,
present and future for FE, for FD these just need to be uncorrelated with the current,
previous and next disturbances. The FD estimator thus provides a more reliable estima-
tor of causal effects, but this comes at the cost of less efficiency, since first-differencing
substantially reduces the variability of the regressors, leading to larger standard errors.
Throughout the analysis, I will present both FE and FD estimations, using them in con-
junction to provide a thorough interpretation of the results.
After estimating simple elasticities, I expand the model include my fiscal capacity indi-
cator. In addition, I control for the structure of tax revenues – since these are potentially
correlated with both the outcome and the capacity indicator – and a series of other con-
trols included in vector x. The structure of tax revenues is measured as a the share of
income and the share of indirect taxes in total tax revenue. Custom duties are excluded to
avoid collinearity, but the results are robust to their inclusion in place of either the income
or indirect tax variables. The rest of the right hand variables are discussed throughout
the analysis, and described in detail in Appendix 4.B.
As mentioned above, I use two indicators of fiscal capacity: taxes as a share of GDP
and income taxes as a share of GDP. The objectives of the paper is to estimate the effect
of fiscal capacity separately from the effect of the composition of tax revenues. The two
effects are different because the former regards the reaction of revenues to changes in a
particular tax base (income) while the latter deals with the more general way in which
the level of development of a tax system influences changes in revenues. The empirical
analysis demonstrates that, indeed, the income tax share of revenues measures something
different from the fiscal capacity indicators, at least in the interwar context. I find no
significant connection between the share of income taxes in tax revenue and government
financing volatility, however measured. It appears that for the purpose of determining the
effect of fiscal capacity on the cyclicality of revenues, the share of income taxes in revenue
is not an appropriate indicator of fiscal capacity.
The model takes the following form.
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∆Revenuei,t = β0 + β1∆NGDPi,t + φ1FiscalCapacityi,av + φ1IncomeTaxSharei,av
+φ2IndirectTaxSharei,av + xi,avγ + ci + lt + i,t
(4.2)
The av subscripts on the regressors indicates that they are 1914-1926 averages, while the
regressions are run from 1927 to 1938. Unfortunately, observations before 1926 are limited,
so the averages at times refer to 1 to 3 observations only. For robustness, I also run the
model for a longer sub-period, 1921-38, using alternatively full sample averages (1914-38)
and 5-year moving averages as regressors. The results are very similar.
The model of equation 4.2 is not yet satisfactory for three reasons. First, it simply es-
timates whether, given a certain fiscal structure and a certain change in economic activity,
changes in revenues are smaller or larger on average. This is not particularly informa-
tive given that changes in activity and revenues can be both positive and negative. The
result of the estimation will be a simple average of the two. Second, there is no reason
to believe that the response of revenues to changes in economic activity should be linear.
One could expect large shocks to be different from small shocks. Third, the presence of
time-invarying regressors makes the estimation problematic because, with standard panel
data methods, the φ coefficients cannot be estimated. Failing to quantify these might lead
to a partial picture of the marginal effect of fiscal systems on revenues. My solution to
overcome all these issues is twofold. First, similarly to Bru¨ckner (2012), I interact the
percentage change in economic activity (∆NGDP) with all the other regressors. The re-
sult is that all the variables become time-varying and that I can now identify non-linear
relationships in the data. Second, I employ the the Hausman and Taylor (1981) (HT)
approach alongside standard estimators. This allows me the obtain the coefficients of
time-invarying regressors, while controlling for fixed-effects.
The model is now as follows:
∆Revenuei,t = β0 + β1∆NGDPi,t + φ1FiscalCapacityi,av + φ2IncomeTaxSharei,av
+φ3IndirectTaxSharei,av + xi,avγ + ∆NGDPi,t ∗ zi,avθ + ci + lt + i,t
(4.3)
where z = {FiscalCapacity, IncomeTaxShare, IndirectTaxShare,x}.
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In this model, the marginal effect of the variables changes with the value of the variable
with which the interaction occurs. For example, the marginal effect of ∆NGDP is now
E(∆Revenue|∆NGDP + 1, z) − (∆Revenue|∆NGDP, z) = β1 + zθ, where the vector z
is held constant at a specific value. In turn, the marginal effect of the element j of z is
E(∆Revenue|zj + 1,∆NGDP ) − E(∆Revenue|zj ,∆NGDP ) = φj + θj∆NGDP , where
this time ∆NGDP is held constant. More details on interpretation and some numerical
examples are provided in Section 4.5.4.
4.4.2 Interpreting the fiscal capacity coefficients
The main coefficients of interest in the analysis illustrate the reduced form relationship
between fiscal capacity (interacted with changes in NGDP or not) and changes in tax
revenues and government financing. The underlying hypothesis is that fiscal capacity
will affect the extent to which revenues change following shocks to economic activity. In
the interwar context, it is sensible to interpret yearly changes in public revenues as a
combination of three factors: 1) automatic reactions to changes in the tax base (i.e. the
elasticity), 2) changes in fiscal policy; 3) a general positive trend in public revenues (to
the extent that this does not get filtered out by first differencing). The first two elements
depend directly on changes in economic activity, so that:
∆Revenue = ∆NGDP × {Elasticity + PolicyReaction}+ Trend
A distinction can be drawn between the two outcome variable of the analysis. In
the case of tax revenues, for policy reactions to play an important role one would need
to assume that fiscal policy in the interwar period responded in a systematic way and
with no lag to economic conditions. Based on what we know, this is not a realistic
assumption. Fiscal policy was essentially not employed as a tool if not in an extremely
limited way and in a handful of countries. Delay in budgetary processes and parliamentary
approval would have made it very difficult for governments to change tax policy to respond
contemporaneously to changes in economic conditions. Moreover, although the monitoring
of economic activity made significant progress in some countries in the interwar era, this
was still a relatively new and limited phenomenon making it difficult for governments
to respond in real time. In particular, the concept of GDP did not exist and it is thus
difficult to fathom the existence of fiscal policies designed to respond to yearly changes in
this variable.
In summary, it is implausible to assume systematic and contemporaneous policy reac-
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tions in terms of tax law changes to changes in economic activity in the interwar period.
Therefore, the bulk of the variation in tax revenues should reflect the elasticity of tax
revenues to changes in economic activity and the trend. In this scenario, fiscal capacity
should affect tax revenues only to the extent that it captures the breadth of the tax base.
Since I control for the structure of tax revenues, however, the expectation is that fiscal
capacity should not affect the response of tax revenues to changes in output. This is indeed
the case, as my IV results demonstrate.
When considering government financing, however, the role of policy reactions can no
longer be ignored. This is because the amount a country borrows (a component of the
financing variable) is a policy choice, which needs to be taken however imperfect the
information available to the policy maker might be. This choice can be further broken
down into two components. One is the extent to which a country smoothes its revenues on
average through borrowing in response to changes in economic activity, which depends on
country specific factors, such as fiscal capacity. The other is discretionary changes in the
preference for borrowing. The smoothing effect of fiscal capacity on government financing
represents my quantity of interest, whereas the discretionary component, if unrelated to
fiscal capacity or the other regressors, will simply end up in the error term without affecting
the estimates. With the inclusion of an adequate set of controls, which account for country
characteristics and changing economic and political conditions, the model outlined above
should be able to capture precisely the magnitude of interest. Indeed, the smoothing effect
of fiscal capacity on financing emerges strongly and clearly throughout the whole analysis.
4.4.3 Reverse causality between changes in revenue and economic ac-
tivity
Although estimating the relationship between changes in economic activity and revenue is
the not the primary goal of this paper, it is nonetheless important to insure that reverse
causality between economic activity and revenues does not mar the estimation. This is
because the resulting bias might affect the other coefficients as well. Fortunately, there
are substantial reasons to exclude dangers to inference.
First, for the reverse causality between economic activity and revenues to be a concern,
one would have to assume that NGDP in the interwar period responded in a systematic
way and with no lag to changes in public revenues. Leaving aside the long-standing and
so far inconclusive empirical and theoretical debates on the effects of fiscal policy on
economic activity, there is no strong theoretical prior regarding the impact of an increase
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in revenue, narrowly or broadly defined, on GDP without regard to what is happening on
the expenditure side. Changes in revenue alone tell us nothing about the stance of policy.
The correlation between changes in my government financing variable and expenditure,
albeit strong (0.624), is far below 1. As mentioned earlier, changes in expenditures were
influenced by short term borrowing, which is excluded from my analysis. The correlation
between changes in tax revenue and expenditure, instead, is low at 0.158.
Second, our knowledge of the Depression years indicates that changes in output were
most likely little related to fiscal policy. As discussed above, in most cases fiscal policy
was not used. In the few cases in which countries did run deficits, these were too small
to be effective. (Almunia, Be´ne´trix, Eichengreen, O’Rourke, Rua, Tenreyro, and Perri,
2010).
Third, while basic economic theory tells us that a higher tax burden will distort eco-
nomic activity leading to lower output, the regression coefficients do not square with
causality running from changes in revenue to changes in output in the interwar period.
Whereas one would expect a negative correlation between changes in tax revenues and
GDP, this is positive, and strongly so. Moreover, one would expect changes in govern-
ment financing (which includes long term borrowing) to be more positively correlated with
GDP than tax revenues, since more borrowing should lead to more public expenditure and
higher output. However, I find the opposite: government financing is less strongly pos-
itively correlated with GDP than tax revenues. This indicates that causality ran from
changes in economic activity to changes in tax revenues, which were then partially miti-
gated by non-tax revenues.
Despite this evidence, worries that changes in revenue could affect economic activity
remain. As a final reassurance that my results are not affected by reverse causality, I
run a robustness check in which I use a similar methodology to Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008):
I instrument changes in output with average changes in the nominal GDP of trading
partners weighed by the pre-Depression share of exports going to that country. By using
this methodology, I can also employ expenditures directly as my outcome variable without
worries about reverse causality. I report the results of this exercise, which yields very
similar results to the baseline analysis, in Appendix 4.A.
4.4.4 IV strategy
The main empirical relationship of interest, that between changes in revenues and fiscal
capacity, might also be affected by endogeneity. A plausible way in which this can operate
141
is that countries with a higher revenue volatility might invest more in fiscal capacity in
order to reduce it. In this case, the effect of fiscal capacity on changes in revenue would
be underestimated and biased towards zero. The issue of the potential co-determinateness
of economic volatility and government size arises also in other contexts, as demonstrated
by Rodrik (1998)’s study on the effect of openness on government size. Another potential
source of endogeneity, of the opposite sign, is that a higher revenue volatility might make
investments in fiscal capacity more difficult. Thus, the direction of potential bias is a priori
unclear. In order to overcome this threat to causal inference, I employ an instrumental
variable approach.
I use two variables to instrument fiscal capacity. The first is the number of years a
country spent fighting major external conflicts between 1816 and 1913, as reconstructed
by Dincecco and Prado (2012). The use of this variable follows a large literature linking
armed conflicts, fiscal reforms and fiscal development. The second is a novel instrument
which, I argue, captures a different mechanism of fiscal capacity formation. The variable
is the number of natural disasters to hit a country between 1900 and 1926.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the unconditional correlation between the instruments and my
two fiscal capacity indicators. This is positive and strong for the conflict variable (panels
4.2a and 4.2b) even if the United Kingdom, an outlier with significant leverage, is excluded.
The correlation is negative and somewhat weaker for the disasters variable (panels 4.2c
and 4.2d), but the analysis shows that both variables represent relevant instruments for
fiscal capacity when used alone and in conjunction. Directly below, I outline why the
instruments are relevant and valid, starting with the conflicts instrument and proceeding
with the disasters variable.
The warfare instrument
In their work, Dincecco and Prado (2012) use the incidence of major past external conflicts,
which are more likely to have led to substantial and lasting fiscal reforms compared to
small conflicts, as an instrument for contemporary fiscal capacity in order to quantify its
effect on long-term development. The authors construct their instruments from Clodfelter
(2002)’s database of major external conflicts in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and
Oceania between 1500 and 2000. Their preferred instrument is the number of casualties
due to major external conflicts between 1816 and 1913 normalized by country size, while
their fiscal capacity indicator of choice is the share of direct taxes in total tax revenue. My
instrument of choice, instead, is one they construct for robustness: the number of years a
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(a) Tax Revenues/NGDP (b) Income Tax Revenues/NGDP
(c) Tax Revenues/NGDP (d) Income Tax Revenues/NGDP
Figure 4.2: Fiscal capacity, the incidence of external conflict and natural disasters
The years at war variable can exceed 97 if countries were involved in more than one conflict in a given year.
Source: The years of war data is from Dincecco and Prado (2012), the natural disasters data is from the
EM-DAT dataset of the Centre for the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, 2017), the GDP data is from
Klasing and Milionis (2014), for the historical tax revenue data see the text and Appendix 4.B for details.
countries spent at war between 1816 and 1913. I choose this variable over the casualties
indicator due to its strong correlation with my fiscal capacity indicators. The casualties
variables, instead, is very weakly related to these.
For the warfare instrument to be relevant, different degrees of engagement in external
conflicts between 1816 and 1913 need to have led to the accumulation of different degrees of
fiscal capacity, which then persisted at least until the interwar period. For the instrument
to be valid three conditions need to be met, conditional on controls: 1) the incidence
of conflicts between 1816 and 1913 must have had no effect on changes in government
revenues between 1927 and 1938 except through its effect on interwar fiscal capacity; 2)
changes in revenues in 1927-38 are not related to the incidence of conflicts in 1816-1913;
3) there is no reverse causality between fiscal capacity and warfare. A violation of the
first condition could occur if, for example, a higher incidence of external conflicts raised
the probability of a country gaining (losing) access to a revenue source that was more
(less) volatile than its existing tax base. This could be a territory, a port, or a tradable
natural resource. The second condition could be violated if the volatility of revenues in
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1927-36 was correlated through persistence to the volatility of revenues in 1816-1913 and
this in turn influenced the probability of fighting wars in this period. Finally, and more
worryingly, the exclusion restriction would be violated if fiscal capacity drove the decision
to engage in conflicts rather than vice versa.
Based on a large body of research by historians, economic historians and other scholars,
Dincecco and Prado argue that “war participation drove fiscal capacity improvements, but
that capacity constraints themselves did not significantly influence whether rulers went
to war.” (page 175). Indeed the work of authors such as Brewer (1990), Tilly (1975,
1990), Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997), O’Brien (2011), Dincecco, Federico, and Vidigni
(2011) and Hoffman (2015) indicates that in the early modern and modern period the
incidence (and threat) of war stimulated fiscal reforms and other innovations to increase
fiscal capacity, particularly in Europe.44 Recent empirical evidence seems to support the
existence of a link between warfare and the development of fiscal capacity although this
might not always persist (Sabate´, 2016), lead to development of general interest states
(Dincecco, Fenske, and Onorato, 2016), or be as strong outside of Europe (see Centeno
(1997, 2002); Gupta, Ma, and Roy (2016) and references in Dincecco (2015), page 909-11).
From a theoretical perspective, Besley and Persson (2010) conceptualize this mecha-
nism by arguing that war leads to an exogenous increase in the demand for a public good
– defense – which needs to be financed through taxation. The increase in fiscal capacity
due to war, is then maintained and amplified due to the dynamic interactions between
fiscal capacity, legal capacity and development.45 Alesina, Reich, and Riboni (2017) offer
a complementary perspective by arguing that warfare can shift public expenditure towards
public goods during times of war in order to foster support in the population.46
Naturally, countries that faced less political resistance to increases in taxation would
have been able to raise more tax revenues for any given incidence of external conflicts
44Dincecco and Prado make an important distinction between external and internal conflicts. While the
latter contribute to the strengthening of fiscal and state capacity, the former can severely damage it. See
also Besley and Persson (2010) on this point.
45Dincecco and Prado illustrate two further channels through which increases in fiscal capacity might
persist after the end of conflicts. First, after the creation of strong and centralized fiscal institutions due
to wars “the new executives inherit strong fiscal institutions, they may wish to exploit them for their own
purposes rather than cede authority back to traditional elites.” Second, the changing nature of warfare
in the 19th century may have led to the elites conceding an increase in the resources made available for
taxation in a bargain with the rulers. Once these changes were implemented, the new taxes might have
been redirected towards public services valued by the elites, rather than the taxation being rolled back
to pre-war levels.
46More precisely, the authors argue that states will attempt to modify the degree of political resistance
in the population by employing positive and/or negative nationalisms. The former is tied to creating a
national identity and a common language through the provision of public goods. The latter consists of
aggressive negative propaganda towards to opponent and is the go-to option when the capacity to provide
mass public goods is absent.
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(O’Brien, 2011; Hoffman, 2015). Moreover, Queralt (2017) argues that the ability to rely
on borrowing to finance wars might undermine the impact of warfare on fiscal capacity
development since countries can default after the end of conflicts instead of increasing
tax revenues. These considerations are not inconsistent with the causality running from
conflict to capacity, it simply means that the effects of warfare were not homogeneous
across countries due to other factors also playing a role. Gennaioli and Voth (2015),
however, qualify these arguments in a theoretical model that incorporates the idea that
causality might also run from fiscal and state capacity to conflict. Their key insight is
that the threat of war after the Military Revolution, which made monetary resources
more important in conflicts, led to cohesive states investing in state building in order to
fight wars, while divided ones dropped out of the competition. Thus, they argue, conflict
might not necessarily lead to the accumulation of fiscal capacity. It is the underlying
characteristics of countries that make these investments possible in the first place.
The panel framework of my analysis allows me to dispel many of these worries. This
is because, by using fixed effects, I control for structural differences across countries and
for pre-1927 historical events. Thus, the inclusion of fixed effects eliminates the possi-
bility that the incidence of pre-1913 conflicts could influence the magnitude of revenue
changes post-1926 through channels other than fiscal capacity. The only way in which
the exclusion restriction might still be violated is that a transformation in the nature of
pre-1927 circumstances took place in the 12 years between 1927 and 1938 (this circum-
stances would have to have been caused by pre-1913 conflicts); this would, in turn, need
to have an effect on the volatility of post-1927 revenues. This instance cannot be ruled
out, but appears very unlikely given the short time span considered. Also, I am not aware
of any study which claims such an instance. Furthermore, the inclusion of fixed effects
also guarantees that pre-1913 fiscal capacity and revenue volatility are all controlled for
in the regressions, since these are time-invarying country characteristics from the vantage
of point of the period studied in this paper. This accounts for the potential bias coming
from correlations between past capacity, past revenue volatility, past conflicts and current
changes in revenues.
The over-identifying tests conducted below thanks to the combined use of historical
conflicts and natural disasters further help dispel worries that warfare might not be a
valid instrument These tests, however, are only valid conditional on the natural disasters
variable being a relevant and valid instrument. I now turn to arguing that this is the case.
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The disasters instrument
I argue that the incidence of natural disasters can affect the creation of centralized revenue
raising institutions. Moreover, I argue that this effect also applies to countries outside of
Europe. Thus, apart from helping dispel worries of reverse causality between conflicts and
fiscal capacity outlined above, introducing an additional instrument with a broader scope
presents advantages also from this point of view.
Table 4.4 offers an overview of all disasters for my sample of countries and time period
contained in the EM-DAT Database of the Centre for the Epidemiology of Disasters at the
Universite´ Catholique de Louvain (CRED, 2017). The starting point of the data is 1900
because no information is available before this date. The endpoint is 1926, one year before
the starting point of my analysis, in order to avoid a direct relationship between disasters
and yearly changes in revenue. For an event to qualify as a disaster at least one of these
conditions needs to be met: 1) ≥ 10 casualties, 2) ≥ 100 people affected, 3) declaration
of a state of emergency, 4) call for international assistance. This broad definition means
that the data includes natural disasters of very different magnitudes. This is reflected by
the information on the number of deaths due to the disasters, which varies between 0 and
millions for a single incident.
The reporting of historical disasters is clearly not as complete as that of more recent
episodes. In particular, small-scale disasters in countries outside of Western Europe and
North America are potentially under-reported in the dataset. Thus, the negative corre-
lation between fiscal capacity and disasters found in the data is likely to be lower bound
of the true one, given the relatively lower level of fiscal capacity found outside of Western
countries. South American nations, historically characterized by low fiscal capacity, seem
to be particularly underrepresented compared to their long-run disasters incidence. This
measurement error could bias my results indirectly through its effect on the strength of
the instrument. Standard tests, however, suggest that the instrument is strong enough to
limit this potential source of bias within reasonable bounds. Robustness checks performed
using the long-term disaster incidence, which is less likely to be affected by this issue, are
very similar.
A potential problem with the disasters instrument is that a lower fiscal capacity might
simply reflect lower tax revenues due to the direct incidence of disasters on the tax base.
However, this would mean that the effect of disasters on the tax base is not captured
by changes in output, which is the denominator of my fiscal capacity indicators. This
is possible, but very unlikely, particularly for the income taxes capacity indicator, given
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that nominal GDP is precisely a measure of income. Moreover, by analyzing a century of
disasters data in the US, Boustan, Kahn, Rhode, and Yanguas (2017) show that only major
disasters tend to to have significant economic repercussions. Finally, I find absolutely no
direct relationship between the incidence of disasters and revenue volatility in my data.
Table 4.4: Natural disasters by country and type, 1900-26
Country Type Frequency Deaths Total disasters Total deaths
USA
Storm 13 9,448
23 13,296
Flood 5 713
Wildfire 1 1,000
Earthquake 4 2,135
Japan
Volcanic activity 4 439
15 155,350
Earthquake 7 145,332
Flood 1 1,379
Storm 3 8,000
Landslide 1 200
India
Drought 1 1,250,000
11 5,794,622
Earthquake 1 20,000
Epidemic 5 4,523,000
Storm 2 1,622
Flood 1 0
Canada
Mass movement (dry) 5 245
9 50,389
Wildfire 2 116
Storm 1 28
Epidemic 1 50,000
Indonesia
Earthquake 4 16,147
7 26,687Epidemic 1 40
Volcanic activity 2 10,500
Italy
Earthquake 4 107,480
6 108,280Volcanic activity 1 700
Landslide 1 100
Romania
Earthquake 4 0
5 1,000
Flood 1 1,000
Belgium Flood 3 6 3 6
Chile Earthquake 3 21,100 3 21,100
Germany Flood 3 0 3 0
Turkey Earthquake 2 6,923 2 6,923
Colombia
Earthquake 1 400
2 500
Landslide 1 100
France
Earthquake 1 46
2 74
Landslide 1 28
Peru Earthquake 1 150 1 150
New Zealand Epidemic 1 6,700 1 6,700
Egypt Earthquake 1 12 1 12
Total 94 6,185,089
Source: EM-DAT Database of the Centre for the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED, 2017).
I argue that natural disasters can affect fiscal capacity in two ways. First, when
resources have to be deployed towards disaster relief, all else equal, less resources can be
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spent on fiscal institutions. As Besley and Persson (2010), argue, countries need to invest
in order to create and strengthen these institutions, and large scale disasters can drain
substantial resources, delaying or impeding these investments altogether. The devastating
flood which affected around 20% of China’s provinces in 1823 offers an example of this: the
Qing administration devoted around half of its small (relative to the size of the economy)
annual budget to disaster relief and this severely slowed down long-term investments in
the provision of public goods, such as defense and infrastructure (Yuping and Uebele,
2015). Thus, disasters might divert enough resources towards relief to significantly slow
down investments in fiscal institutions, particularly under conditions of low initial fiscal
capacity.
Two objections can be raised against this argument. The first is that war, much like
disaster relief, drains resources away from public investments; however, the historiography
and this paper argue that armed conflicts can lead to the accumulation of fiscal capac-
ity. Why should the effect of natural disasters be the opposite? A rebuttal for the first
objection is that the accumulation of fiscal capacity is a long-run phenomenon. In the
short-run, conflicts, like disasters, might have led to investment diversion, but in the long
term they led to fiscal capacity accumulation by making fiscal reforms easier. The short
time span of my disasters variable means that it overlaps with my fiscal capacity indica-
tors, whereas the conflict data precedes the observation period. This gives the argument
potential traction. However, it is ultimately unconvincing because, as Table 4.5 shows,
the historical incidence of natural disasters is correlated with a lower fiscal capacity also
nowadays.47
The second objection is that most disasters in my sample were not large enough to
cause a significant displacement of resources. More than two-thirds of the total death toll
for the 1900-26 period is accounted for by just three epidemics in India, and over half of the
disasters led to under 500 casualties, while the mean population size of the countries in the
sample is over 20 million. The second channel I propose addresses all these concerns and
also offers a robust and intuitive mechanism through which disasters affect fiscal capacity.
The argument goes as follows. First, certain geographic features of countries make
them more or less prone to experience natural disasters. More precisely, the interaction
between land size and the presence of volcanoes, the proclivity for seismic activity, the
vulnerability to storms and floods, etc. will determine the incidence of disasters in a
47Interestingly, Dincecco and Prado’s preferred fiscal capacity indicator, the share of direct taxes in total
tax revenue, is positively associated with historical disasters (but not long-run disaster proclivity) both
today and in the interwar period, which once again highlights the different informational content of
different fiscal capacity indicators.
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country. Second, the historical disasters data is an accurate reflection of countries’ average
long-term vulnerability to disasters. This is easily demonstrated by the fact that the
correlation between disasters in 1900-26 and 1900-90 is indeed very high (0.87) and strongly
statistically significant.48 Third, most natural disasters are small scale events affecting
limited areas of a country and shares of the population. Fourth, this means that localized
relief might be better suited – for example because of local level specialization in areas
vulnerable to specific types of disasters – and quicker to reach the affected area compared
to centrally financed and coordinated efforts. Local governments might also be held more
easily accountable by citizens with regard to the provision of relief. Moreover, even large
scale disaster relief undertaken by central governments relies on local level monitoring
and infrastructure in order to be timely and effective, as evidenced by India’s famines
(Dreze` and Sen, 1989; Besley and Burgess, 2002).49 Fifth, the need to finance local level
disaster relief will stimulate the accumulation of local-level fiscal capacity. Indeed, there is
a positive and statistically significant correlation between the number of natural disasters
and the share of taxes raised at the sub-national level in countries for which data is
available in 1914-38.50 Sixth, the local nature of disasters, of relief and of the institutions
created to deal with them will make the centralization of fiscal resources more difficult in
disaster-prone countries leading to the observed negative relationship between disasters
and fiscal capacity.
The reasoning can also be applied from the standpoint of the citizens of areas of a
country unaffected by natural disasters. These might be unwilling to mutualize resources
through the central government, since part of these would fund a pubic good – disaster
relief – that only benefits the citizens of the affected area and is very likely characterized
by low spillovers. Under these conditions – heterogeneous preferences over public goods
and low spillovers – decentralized political systems are known to outperform centralized
systems (Oates, 1972; Besley and Coate, 2003). As above, this reasoning applies to recur-
48I pick 1990 as the endpoint of my data because in recent years there has been an increase in natural
disasters potentially linked to Global Warming and exposure hazard due to population growth, and thus
unrelated to the historical data generating process, see Stro¨mberg (2007). However, if the period 1900-
2015 is considered, the correlation is practically identical (0.86).
49In the case of large disasters, countries might also expect to be able to draw on international assistance,
as was common also in the pre-WWII era, leading to the need to accumulate less fiscal capacity to provide
relief.
50These are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, France, UK, Hungary, Italy,
Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, USA. The data furthermore feature a positive correla-
tion between disasters and the share of income taxes in total tax revenue, as shown in Table 4.5. This is
also compatible with the idea that disasters might stimulate the creation of local level capacity, making
it easier for local governments to raise direct taxes. This, in turn, may also open the way for centralized
direct taxation, but not high overall levels of taxation.
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ring disasters due to a region’s geographical characteristics, which make it more vulnerable
to certain types of events, rather than to idiosyncratic occurrences of disasters.
Table 4.5: Correlation between contemporary and historical fiscal capacity indicators
and instruments
1914-26 averages 1990s averages Instruments
Tax/GDP IncomeTax/GDP IncomeTaxShare Tax/GDP IncomeTaxShare YearsAtWar NatDisasters
1914-26 averages
Tax/GDP 1
IncomeTax/GDP 0.799*** 1
( 0.000)
IncomeTaxShare 0.218 0.675*** 1
(0.222) (0.000)
1990s averages
Tax/GDP 0.546*** 0.519**** 0.367** 1
(0.001) (0.002) (0.026)
DirectTaxShare 0.002 0.125 0.399** 0.350** 1
(0.992) (0.489) (0.013) (0.027)
Instruments
1816-1913 YearsAtWar 0.310* 0.576*** 0.446** 0.129 0.1560 1
(0.085) (0.006) (0.056) (0.436) (0.325)
1900-26 NatDisasters -0.332* -0.149 0.381** -0.318** 0.326** 0.001 1
(0.059) (0.409) (0.018) (0.045) (0.037) (0.998)
1900-90 NatDisasters -0.493*** -0.275 0.271* -0.461*** 0.157 0.143 0.868***
(0.009) (0.121) (0.099) (0.003) (0.328) (0.381) (0.000)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Significance levels in brackets. Source: The 1990s indicators and the conflict data are from Dincecco and
Prado (2012); the natural disasters data is from the EM-DAT Database of the Centre for the Epidemiology
of Disasters (CRED, 2017); for the historical indicators see text.
An obvious rebuttal of this argument is the possibility of reverse causality: countries
might experience less natural disasters thanks to better infrastructure and other means of
disaster prevention made possible by a higher level of fiscal capacity. However, the con-
sensus in the literature appears to be that “good institutions”, and economic development
more generally, strongly affect the severity of the consequences of disasters, but not their
frequency (Kahn, 2005; Stro¨mberg, 2007; Lin, 2015). In other words, disasters are indeed
natural, in the sense that they are caused by geographical features, but there is ample
scope for policies to mitigate their death tolls, the number of people hey affect and the
material damage they create.
4.5 Results
Table 4.6 illustrates the elasticity of tax revenues and government financing to changes in
nominal GDP for 1927-38. The first two columns feature OLS estimations for tax revenues
and government financing, while columns 3 and 4 contain the within (FE) estimations and
columns 5 and 6 present first differences (FD) results. As expected, government revenues
and the nominal GDP strongly co-move. The key result of the exercise, however, is that the
coefficient is close to 1 when tax revenues are considered, but becomes slightly more than
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half of that when government financing is the outcome variable. These results indicate
the existence of a strong smoothing effect of non-tax revenues.
In the table, I only use observations for which both financing and tax revenues data
are available, thus the result is not due to differences in the composition of the financing
and tax revenues samples. I have repeated the exercise for 1927-38 and for an extended
time period (1920-38) using all observations available and obtained remarkably similar
results (see Appendix 4.A). This indicates that the smoothing role of non-tax revenues
was important and constant throughout the whole interwar period.
The rest of the analysis in this section shows that this smoothing effect is due to the
degree of fiscal capacity countries possessed at the eve of the Great Depression. In Section
4.6, I dig deeper into the channels, showing that fiscal capacity granted an easier access
to borrowing to more fiscally capable countries.
Table 4.6: The elasticity of tax revenues and government financing to changes in output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD
VARIABLES ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing
∆NGDP 0.929*** 0.563*** 1.012*** 0.617*** 0.875** 0.495***
(0.241) (0.124) (0.352) (0.132) (0.407) (0.176)
Constant 0.0429 0.0288*** 0.0430*** 0.0289*** 0.00242 -0.00337
(0.0277) (0.00670) (0.000161) (6.01e-05) (0.00738) (0.00837)
Country FE 3 3 3 3
Observations 239 239 239 239 199 199
Number of countries 32 32 32 32 32 32
R-squared 0.034 0.101 0.039 0.101 0.012 0.044
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Time frame: 1927-38. Countries included are: Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Roma-
nia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America
and Yugoslavia.
4.5.1 OLS results
I continue the analysis by introducing the main variables of interest – the two fiscal capacity
indicators – alongside the controls and by adopting the interaction model described by
equation 4.3. Table 4.7 reports the pooled OLS estimation results. In columns 1-4, I
control for the Polity 2 score from the POLITY IV database (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005)
– to capture potential differences between more or less democratic countries – and for
GDP per capita (GDPPC) from the latest version of the Maddison Project database
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(Bolt and van Zanden, 2013), to capture differences between more and less economically
advanced countries. Both controls are extremely important due to the fact that the level
of democracy and economic development are likely correlated with both fiscal development
and changes in revenue. I repeat the exercise in columns 5-8, adding the structure of tax
revenues as a control. Controlling for the source of tax revenues is important in order to
identify the effect of fiscal capacity because a different degree of revenue cyclicality could
be connected to a different reliance on the various tax bases, which could, in turn, be
related to the level of development of the tax system. As discussed above, I enter all these
variables as 1914-26 averages. I have experimented by adding other controls – such as
gold standard membership, trade openness, the size and composition of the public debt,
and the terms of trade – finding practically identical results throughout the analysis.
While these simple OLS estimates clearly suffer from two potential sources of bias –
omitted variables and reverse causality – which rule out any causal interpretation of the
coefficients, they nonetheless illustrate some informative correlations. Coherently with the
interpretation of the elasticity results outlined above, once I introduce the fiscal capacity
indicators and the controls in the regressions, the responsiveness of government financing
and tax revenues to changes in economic activity becomes very similar. This strongly
suggests that the variables in the regressions fully capture the smoothing effect of non-tax
government revenues.
In all specification the interaction term between the fiscal capacity measure and NGDP
comes out as strongly significant and negative. This indicates a countercyclical association
between fiscal capacity and changes in both tax revenues and government financing. While
the rest of the analysis confirms the latter, it indicates that the former might be simply
due to bias. In any case, the relationship also appears to be non-linear in the size of the
change in NGDP, meaning that it is stronger for larger changes in NGDP.
4.5.2 Fixed effects results
An important step towards a causal interpretation of the results is to include country fixed-
effects in the regressions. As discussed above, these account for the myriad of potentially
important time-invarying and slow-moving country characteristics both observable and
not. Examples include geography, demographic and economic structure, the presence of
natural resources and past success or failure in wars (this is important for the IV estimation
below). I also include time fixed-effects to account for common shocks across countries.
Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 present the results of the panel estimations for tax revenues
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Table 4.7: Pooled OLS estimation for tax revenues and government financing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing
∆NGDP 1.440*** 0.941*** 1.899*** 0.965** 2.100*** 1.300*** 2.254*** 1.057*
(0.416) (0.317) (0.525) (0.381) (0.514) (0.397) (0.681) (0.511)
Tax/NGDP -0.217 -0.376** -0.129 -0.481**
(0.176) (0.165) (0.180) (0.175)
∆NGDP*Tax/NGDP -8.498*** -13.51*** -10.21*** -14.53***
(3.008) (4.089) (2.388) (4.752)
IncomeTax -0.272 -0.283 -0.0952 -0.563***
(0.231) (0.247) (0.274) (0.152)
∆NGDP*IncomeTax -13.96*** -16.51** -18.27*** -20.32**
(3.529) (6.249) (2.283) (9.400)
Constant 0.0383* 0.0286** 0.0391** 0.0182 0.0141 0.0110 0.0362* 0.00942
(0.0201) (0.0112) (0.0164) (0.0118) (0.0207) (0.0132) (0.0184) (0.0221)
Additional controls
Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IncomeTaxShare 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*IncomeTaxShare 3 3 3 3
IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3
Observations 208 208 219 219 208 208 219 219
R-squared 0.307 0.306 0.165 0.145 0.326 0.322 0.171 0.149
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Time frame: 1927-38. Countries included: Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
and government financing respectively. In both tables, columns 1 and 2 provide the FE
estimates and columns 3 and 4 feature the FD results. Both estimators require time-
invarying regressors to be dropped. Columns 5 and 6 present the results of the HT
(Hausman and Taylor, 1981) estimator, which allows me to recover the coefficients of
time-invarying regressors even in the presence of fixed effects.
The panel results for tax revenues largely confirm the statistically significant (in all
specifications but one, column 4), sizable and non-linear countercyclical effect of fiscal
capacity. This is evidenced by the negative coefficients on the interaction term between
the fiscal capacity indicators – Tax/NGDP and IncomeTax/NGDP – and the change in
nominal GDP. The effect is somewhat smaller than in the pooled OLS estimations, which
suggests that the fixed effects account for some bias. As the IV analysis shows, the panel
estimation is insufficient to account for all bias. Once this is done, the significant effect of
fiscal capacity on tax revenue volatility disappears.
The results for government financing are stronger and more clear cut. The interaction
term between the fiscal capacity indicators and changes in GDP is statistically significant,
negative and close to the pooled OLS estimates. The statistically significant negative
coefficients of the non-interacted fiscal capacity indicators obtained with the HT estima-
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Table 4.8: Panel estimation for tax revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FD FD HT HT
VARIABLES ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue
∆NGDP 1.835*** 1.042** 0.644 0.375 1.762*** 1.038***
(0.586) (0.449) (1.000) (0.692) (0.516) (0.377)
Tax/NGDP -0.163
(0.163)
∆NGDP*Tax/NGDP -9.822*** -3.785 -9.309***
(3.182) (7.289) (3.063)
IncomeTax/NGDP -0.187
(0.253)
∆NGDP*IncomeTax/NGDP -19.24*** -14.44* -18.74***
(3.320) (8.303) (3.111)
Constant 0.153*** 0.156*** -0.00806 -0.00828 -0.0517 -0.0611
(0.0463) (0.0464) (0.0564) (0.0559) (0.0426) (0.0391)
Additional controls
Polity2 3 3
∆NGDP*Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3
GDPPC 3 3
∆NGDP*GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3
IncomeTaxShare 3 3
∆NGDP*IncomeTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3
IndirectTaxShare 3 3
∆NGDP*IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 208 208 184 184 208 208
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23
R-squared 0.373 0.375 0.126 0.132
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Time frame: 1927-38. Countries included: Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
tor further suggest that the interaction term coefficients represent a lower bound of the
smoothing effect of fiscal capacity on government financing. The non-linearity of the effect
of fiscal capacity in the size of the NGDP shock is also evident: the smoothing effect of
fiscal capacity increases as the size of the output shock increases. In summary, the coun-
tercyclical effect of fiscal capacity on government financing, however measured, is clearly
visible and very sizable.
4.5.3 IV Results
I start my IV analysis by running pooled regressions, which I report in Appendix 4.A.
These indicate that the smoothing effect of fiscal capacity is to be found in non-tax rev-
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Table 4.9: Panel estimation for government financing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FD FD HT HT
VARIABLES ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing
∆NGDP 2.053*** 1.015** 1.049** 0.233 2.012*** 0.953**
(0.505) (0.420) (0.487) (0.387) (0.530) (0.433)
Tax/NGDP -0.506***
(0.172)
∆NGDP*Tax/NGDP -12.62*** -10.14*** -12.86***
(3.625) (2.596) (3.822)
IncomeTax/NGDP -0.828***
(0.292)
∆NGDP*IncomeTax/NGDP -19.71** -15.15*** -19.84**
(8.219) (4.652) (8.698)
Constant 0.150*** 0.156*** 0.0628 0.0632 0.0121 -0.0191
(0.0287) (0.0303) (0.0423) (0.0426) (0.0265) (0.0265)
Additional controls
Polity2 3 3
∆NGDP*Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3
GDPPC 3 3
∆NGDP*GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3
IncomeTaxShare 3 3
∆NGDP*IncomeTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3
IndirectTaxShare 3 3
∆NGDP*IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Year FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 219 219 210 210 219 219
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23
R-squared 0.244 0.234 0.108 0.103
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Time frame: 1927-28. Countries included: Argentina, Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom and the United States.
enues: for tax revenues the effect of fiscal capacity appears to be indistinguishable from
zero, while for government financing it is once again statistically significant and negative.
The results also provide further evidence that the interaction term coefficients offer a lower
bound of the true smoothing effect of fiscal capacity.
Table 4.10 features the panel IV results for tax revenues and Table 4.11 for government
financing. In order to explore the robustness of the results, I run the regressions employing
the instruments both one at a time and in conjunction. In both Tables, columns 1-4 present
the FE and FD estimates using the warfare instrument, columns 5 to 8 contain the results
for the natural disasters instrument and columns 9 to 12 feature the instruments used in
conjunction.51
51It should be noted that in the IV estimations I use 1914-38 averages as fiscal capacity, rather than the
1914-26 averages used above, in order to decrease concerns over bias due to weak instruments. The 1914-
38 averages have a higher correlation with the instruments which, incidentally, also supports the idea that
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In the two-instrument set-up, I use the Fuller-k estimator due to its greater robustness
to the presence of weak instruments and the inclusion of multiple instruments (Stock,
Wright, and Yogo, 2002; Stock and Yogo, 2005). The Fuller-k, estimator is inconsistent in
the presence of heteroskedasticity and many instruments (Hausman, Lewis, Menzel, and
Newey, 2011), and although the many instruments condition is not met in this application,
I perform robustness checks with both the two stage least squares (2SLS) and Continuously
Updated Generalized Method of Moments estimator (CUE). The latter, in particular,
is consistent when errors are non-normal in the presence of many instruments. Both
estimators yield very similar results to the Fuller-k. When the equation is exactly identified
(one instrument and one endogenous regressor), all these estimators are equivalent.
The critical F-stat values for robust estimation for the Fuller-k estimator with two
instruments for a maximal 5% and 10% bias over OLS are 15.5 and 12.55 respectively
(Stock and Yogo, 2005). These are met for Tax/NGDP, but weak instruments are a
potential issue for the estimations using the IncomeTax/NGDP fiscal capacity indicator.
However, the fact that these results are similar to the results for the Tax/Revenue indicator
throughout the whole analysis and in the Panel IV framework is very reassuring.
The results in Table 4.10 illustrate the usefulness of the IV approach: the coefficients
of the interacted fiscal capacity indicators are much smaller than in the standard panel
framework, and statistically indistinguishable from zero in all specifications except one (FE
using natural disasters as instrument). When I use the instruments in conjunction and
the the more robust FD estimator, the coefficient turns positive (albeit still insignificant)
possibly indicating a pro-cyclical rather than countercyclical effect of fiscal capacity on
tax revenues. In terms of fiscal policy, this would mean that high fiscal capacity countries
had more procyclical tax revenues, which would be in line with the prescriptions of both
Keynesian and non-Keynesian models of fiscal policy. In any case, the general conclusion is
that no robust causal impact of fiscal capacity on tax revenues emerges from the analysis.
This indicates that the IV approach is correcting a source of bias that links a high tax
procyclicality to low fiscal capacity. A compelling possibility is reverse causality: high tax
revenue volatility might have made investments in fiscal capacity more difficult.
The results in Table 4.11, instead are clear-cut, large and highly statistically signifi-
cant. In the interwar period, fiscal capacity had a strong smoothing effect on government
financing, and this was evidently due to non-tax revenues. Moreover, this effect was highly
fiscal capacity develops gradually over the medium-long term. Given that I use instrumental variables,
the simultaneity between changes in revenues and capacity which was concern in the estimations above
is lo longer an issue. This is as also confirmed by the fact that the estimates are practically identical
qualitatively and quantitatively when the 1914-26 indicators are employed in the IV framework.
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non-linear and increased in magnitude with the size of the economic shock. As I will show
below, borrowing is likely to have played the dominant role in determining this effect.
The results are also confirmed when I instrument changes in output using the average
change in nominal GDP of trading partners weighted by pre-Depression trade shares (see
Appendix 4.A).
Two further robust results emerge from the estimation. On one hand, countries with
a higher per capita GDP were able to smooth their government financing more effectively
than lower income countries. On the other hand, countries with more democratic institu-
tions were subject to a higher volatility in government financing. Exploring these results
further is beyond the scope of this paper, but one can reasonably speculate that richer
countries found it easier to borrow on financial markets and thus smooth their revenues,
as also confirmed by the analysis in Section 4.6. More democratic countries, instead,
might have found it more challenging to borrow due to the political constraints and delays
involved in a parliamentary budgeting process. Empirical evidence on the link between
democracy and fiscal policy procyclicality is mixed. By analyzing OECD countries, Lane
(2003) finds a positive link between the dispersion of political power and fiscal policy pro-
cyclicality, but evidence from a country transitioning from autocracy to democracy – Spain
– demonstrates that the relationship between democratic institutions and the cyclicality
of policy is potentially more intricate (Battilossi, Escario, and Foreman-Peck, 2013).
In the interwar context, less democratic countries might have also found it easier to
engage in financial repression, with the aim of channeling resources towards government
borrowing. This was notoriously the case in Nazi Germany, for example (Poole, 1939;
Childs, 1958). The crucial point, however, is that the effects of fiscal capacity, economic
development and democratic institutions on the smoothing of government financing can
be identified separately, suggesting different underlying channels.
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Table 4.10: Panel instrumental variable estimation for tax revenues
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FE FE FD FD FE FE FD FD Fuller-k FE Fuller-k FE Fuller-k FD Fuller-k FD
VARIABLES ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue
∆NGDP 1.173 0.993** -0.199 0.251 2.150*** 1.288*** 0.655 0.363 1.519** 1.078** 0.0682 0.282
(0.832) (0.504) (1.049) (0.756) (0.622) (0.487) (0.825) (0.659) (0.700) (0.466) (0.956) (0.717)
∆NGDP*Tax/NGDP -3.200 9.255 -15.78*** -6.039 -7.662 4.474
(8.256) (12.41) (5.143) (7.320) (6.616) (10.76)
∆NGDP*IncomeTax/NGDP -6.552 19.67 -34.62*** -13.46 -14.60 10.62
(15.94) (29.69) (12.23) (14.87) (12.61) (25.17)
Constant 0.00477 0.00529 0.00480 0.00445 0.00478 0.00506
(0.00688) (0.00676) (0.00693) (0.00710) (0.00688) (0.00682)
Additional controls
∆NGDP*Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*IncomeTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 208 208 184 184 208 208 184 184 208 208 184 184
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
R-squared 0.358 0.361 0.118 0.101 0.336 0.349 0.116 0.126 0.358 0.366 0.124 0.115
Panel B: First stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆NGDP*YearsAtWar 0.000620*** 0.000303** 0.000606*** 0.000285*** 0.000475*** 0.00024*** 0.000493*** 0.000237***
(0.000144) (0.000110) (0.000118) (0.000100) (0.0001044) (0.0000854) (0.000078) (0.0000772)
∆NGDP*NatDisastNumb -0.00285*** -0.001300** -0.00290*** -0.00130** -0.00162** -0.000668** -0.00172*** -0.000735**
(0.000970) (0.000613) (0.000922) (0.000598) (0.000655) (0.000314) (0.000597) (0.000313)
Angrist-Pischke F-Stat 18.57*** 7.52** 26.40*** 8.12*** 8.64*** 4.49** 9.92*** 4.75** 15.97*** 5.21** 31.51*** 6.18***
Hansen J-Stat 3.207* 4.242** 3.241* 3.068*
Endogeneity test 0.276 0.925 1.718 3.279* 5.767** 4.230* 2.606 0.162 2.303 0.827 0.101 0.538
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Time frame: 1927-28. Countries included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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Table 4.11: Panel instrumental variable estimation for government financing
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
FE FE FD FD FE FE FD FD Fuller-k FE Fuller-k FE Fuller-k FD Fuller-k FD
VARIABLES ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing
∆NGDP 2.000*** 1.226*** 0.675 0.299 2.663** 1.450** 1.238*** 0.446 2.206*** 1.290*** 0.833** 0.343
(0.619) (0.439) (0.453) (0.370 (1.034) (0.625) (0.454) (0.370) (0.721) (0.482) (0.418) (0.356)
∆NGDP*Tax/NGDP -13.55** -6.781** -21.52** -14.14*** -16.02*** -8.841***
(5.273) (3.054) (9.470) (3.827) (6.140) (2.727)
∆NGDP*IncomeTax/NGDP -28.62** -14.25** -46.74* -29.01*** -33.80** -18.72***
(12.58) (5.756) (24.56) (10.83) (15.38) (5.944)
Constant 0.00553 0.00544 0.00607 0.00587 0.00568 0.00557
(0.00444) (0.00437) (0.00444) (0.00428) (0.00444) (0.00435)
Additional controls
∆NGDP*Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*IncomeTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 219 219 210 210 219 219 210 210 219 219 210 210
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
R-squared 0.233 0.227 0.103 0.101 0.212 0.202 0.099 0.095 0.229 0.222 0.103 0.100
Panel B: First stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆NGDP*YearsAtWar 0.000668*** 0.000316*** 0.000683*** 0.000325*** 0.000521*** 0.000252*** 0.000542*** 0.000253***
(0.0001485) (0.000112 ) (0.0000389) (0.000106) (0.000119) (0.0000876) (0.000088) (0.0000782)
∆NGDP*NatDisastNumb -0.00283*** -0.00130** -0.00301*** -.00147** -0.00143** -0.000627** -0.00142** -0.000725**
(0.00092) (0.000603) (0.000929) (0.000617) (0.000589) (0.000295) (0.000543) (0.000323)
Angrist-Pischke F-Stat 20.22*** 7.98*** 29.51*** 9.38*** 9.47*** 4.67** 10.51*** 5.66** 16.88*** 5.36** 28.63*** 7.20***
Hansen J-Stat 1.561 1.965 2.715* 2.785*
Endogeneity Test 0.944 1.384 0.264 0.005 2.301 2.710* 2.391 4.322** 0.546 0.711 0.057 1.634
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Time frame: 1927-28. Countries included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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4.5.4 Quantitative impact
This section offers an overview of the economic magnitude of the findings. I first report
the marginal effects of the variables of interest as well as some concrete examples of the
impact of fiscal capacity under various assumptions. I then offer some admittedly naive,
but suggestive counterfactuals through which I illustrate the path of revenues over the
course of the Great Depression in a number of countries by assigning them different levels
of fiscal capacity.
Summary statistics and marginal effects
Table 4.12 presents the summary statistics of the dependent variables and the principal
regressors employed in the estimations above. The range of values taken by both sets
of variables is large and offers much scope for investigating the quantitative effects of
fiscal capacity on government financing. For the rest of this section, I consider only
negative changes in NGDP for illustrative purposes, but the effects for positive changes
are symmetric.
Table 4.12: Summary statistics of the principal variables
1st Percentile 1st Quartile Mean Median 3rd Quartile 99th Percentile
∆ TaxRevenue -32.8 -3.3 4.9 2.9 8.9 42.2
∆ TaxRevenue (< 0) -41.5 -12.3 -8.8 –5.6 -2.2 -0.2
∆ GovtFinancing -36.1 -4.3 2.3 2.1 8.3 59.7
∆ GovtFinancing (< 0) -37.7 -13.7 -10.1 -7.4 -2.8 -0.1
∆ NGDP -25.6 -3.4 1.3 2.4 6.6 25
∆ NGDP (< 0) -30.5 -11 -7.4 -5.6 -2.2 -0.1
Tax/NGDP (%) 1.5 5.0 6.5 6.2 8.0 14.4
IncomeTax/NGDP (%) 0.2 1.1 2.1 2.0 2.6 8.5
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. The fiscal capacity indicators are 1914-26 averages, while ∆NGDP,
∆ TaxRevenue and ∆ GovtFinancing are for the 1927-38 period.
Table 4.13 presents the marginal effects of the fiscal capacity indicators on government
financing. I computed these using the HT and Panel IV coefficients obtained employing
the two instruments in conjunction. The HT coefficients represent the more conservative
estimate, given that the IV estimates are almost always significantly larger. Due to the
nonlinearity of the effect of fiscal capacity, I calculate marginal effects for different changes
in output. More precisely, I use the median negative change in NGDP in the acute Great
Depression phase (-8.5%) and two other values well within the observed range (-5% and
-15%). The nonlinearity emerges very strongly from the exercise: the HT marginal effect is
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around four times larger for an income shock of -8.5% compared to -5% for the Tax/NGDP
fiscal capacity indicator and six times larger for the IncomeTax/NGDP indicator. The
marginal effect grows by around another two and a half times when the GDP shock is
-15%. The nonlinearity is less pronounced for the Panel IV results because the coefficient
of the non interacted fiscal capacity indicators is absent. Nonetheless, the coefficient grows
by more than one and a half times for both indicators as the magnitude of the shock to
GDP becomes larger.
Table 4.13: Marginal effects of fiscal capacity on government financing for different
magnitudes of contractions in nominal GDP
∆NGDP= -5.0% ∆NGDP= -8.50% ∆NGDP= -15.0%
HT
Tax/NGDP 0.009 0.038 0.093
IncomeTax/NGDP 0.003 0.018 0.044
Panel IV
Tax/NGDP 0.029 0.049 0.086
IncomeTax/NGDP 0.019 0.033 0.058
IV/HT
Tax/NGDP 3.229 1.28 0.932
IncomeTax/NGDP 5.691 1.853 1.307
The Panel IV coefficents are those obtained used both instruments in conjunction. The fiscal capacity in-
dicators take their average values for 1914-26: Tax/NGDP=6.5%, IncomeTax/NGDP=2.07%. The effects
are rounded up to three decimal points.
I provide a clearer overview of the magnitude of the effect of fiscal capacity in Table
4.14. I use the same changes in NGDP as above and average values for the other regressors
to illustrate how the predicted change in government financing mutates with different
degrees of fiscal capacity. For a -8.5% income shock, bringing a country from the 1st
quartile to the 3rd quartile of fiscal capacity reduces the predicted fall in government
financing by almost a quarter. The effect is stronger – a nearly 40% reduction in the
decrease of financing – for a fall in NGDP of 15%. For levels of fiscal capacity near the
right tail of the distribution, the predicted change in government financing turns positive.
This suggests that high capacity countries would have been able not only to limit the
procyclicality of fiscal policy, but to run potentially countercyclical fiscal policies.
Some (naive) counterfactuals
Counterfactuals offer an even more straightforward way to grasp the size of the effect of
fiscal capacity on government financing. These compare countries’ predicted government
financing paths based on different fiscal capacity scenarios to their actual paths. The
analysis of this paper is not structural, so fully fledged counterfactuals are simply not
obtainable. However, the examples below are both intuitive and suggestive as to how much
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Table 4.14: Predicted changes in government financing for different levels of fiscal ca-
pacity and changes in NGDP
Tax/NGDP Predicted ∆GovtFinancing IncomeTax/NGDP Predicted ∆GovtFinancing
∆NGDP=-5%
smallest -6% smallest -0.6%
1st quartile -5.5% 1st quartile -0.5%
median -5.3% median -0.3%
3rd quartile -5.1% 3rd quartile -0.2%
Largest -4.2% Largest 0.7%
∆NGDP=-8.5%
smallest -9.6% smallest -1%
1st quartile -7.6% 1st quartile -0.1%
median -6.8% median 0.6%
3rd quartile -5.8% 3rd quartile 1.1%
Largest -2% Largest 6.2%
∆NGDP=-15%
smallest -16.3% smallest -1.6%
1st quartile -11.5% 1st quartile 0.5%
median -9.6% median 2.3%
3rd quartile -7.2% 3rd quartile 3.7%
Largest 2% Largest 16.3%
The coefficients used correspond to the HT estimates. For Tax/NGDP, smallest=1.53%, 1st quar-
tile=4.95%, median=6.24% 3rd quartile= 7.95% and largest= 14.4%. for IncomeTax/NGDP , small-
est=0.17%, 1st quartile=1.12%, median=1.96% 3rd quartile= 2.6% and largest= 8.47%.
the path of government financing was influenced by the level of fiscal capacity countries
possessed on the eve of the Great Depression. I use the more conservative HT coefficients
and the Tax/NGDP indicator only in my calculations for synthesis. Results are similar
using the income tax indicator and alternative coefficients.
While going through the counterfactuals, it useful to recall what the optimal path of
fiscal aggregates over the business cycle would look like according to standard economic
theory. Both in a Keynesian and tax-smoothing framework tax revenues should fall during
recessions. In the tax-smoothing world, tax revenues should not change as a share of GDP
over the business cycle, while in the Keynesian world they can fall further than output to
stimulate aggregate demand. In both cases, this would imply counter-cyclical borrowing
to smooth government financing and fund the acyclical, or counter-cyclical – here the
tax-smoothing and Keynesian doctrines potentially differ again – government expenditure
(Barro, 1979; Lucas and Stokey, 1983; De Long and Summers, 1986).
Recalling a broader view of public revenue and expenditure is also useful. In countries
where states collect low levels of revenues as a share of GDP, sharp falls in public financing
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and expenditure can endanger the very ability of states to function and provide basic
public goods. This can have potentially severe economic and political consequences in
both the short and long run. Moreover, fiscal policy volatility and procyclicality can, both
directly and to the extent that they contributes to macroeconomic volatility, also damage a
country’s growth prospects (see discussion in Section 4.2). In summary, the optimal path
of government financing should be less procyclical than that of tax revenues – or even
countercyclical – in order to, at the very least, not exacerbate business cycle volatility or
affect the functioning of the state infrastructure.
The first example I provide is that of the United States (Figure 4.3). The US was
one of the worst hit countries in the Great Depression, with nominal GDP contracting by
approximately 46% and real GDP per capita by 31% between 1929 and 1933. Government
financing and tax revenues followed a similar path, contracting cumulatively by 47% and
35% respectively between 1929 and 1933.
The path of US government financing was thus markedly pro-cyclical during the worst
years of the Great Depression and non-tax revenues provided no smoothing. What pre-
vented an outright collapse in spending was an increase in short-term borrowing, which
led to the general fiscal policy stance being essentially neutral. Fiscal deficits reached less
than 6% of GDP by 1933 and were, for the most part, the result of budgetary planning
errors (De Long, 1998), thus the need to resort to short-term sources of finance. By com-
parison, the fiscal deficit reached 10% of GDP in 2009, while the cumulative contraction
in real GDP per capita between 2007 and 2009 was less than one sixth of the interwar
one, around 5% compared to 31%.
The New Deal introduced by the newly elected Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 led to
the implementation of a number of new public expenditure programs. The policies aimed
at combating the Depression also paved the way for a dramatic expansion of the Federal
Government, and not just on the expenditure side (Wallis and Weingast, 2005; Fishback
and Wallis, 2013).52 For instance, the income tax – individual, corporate and payroll –
was strengthened at both national and state level and became the main source of tax
revenue. While national income tax collection fell in 1929-33, it rose for the rest of the
decade and shot up during WWII with the reduction of personal deductions, increases in
marginal rates and the beginning of withholding (Wallis, 2000). Thus, a centralization
and expansion of tax revenue collection – in other words, an expansion of fiscal capacity
52Some economic programs were funded by national sources and administered by sub-national bodies,
while the national system of defense and old age was run by the central government. National collection
and federal expenditure became standard for education, highways, water and sewage, and public welfare
(Wallis, 2000).
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(a) Dynamics of economic activity and fiscal aggregates
(b) Government financing counterfactuals
Figure 4.3: US counterfactual, 1927-33
The NGDP, government financing and tax revenues are annual percentage changes. The fiscal balance
a share of GDP is in levels. The counterfactuals are based on the HT model for the TAX/NGDP fiscal
capacity indicator for 1914-26
– accompanied the introduction of new policies on the expenditure side.
Given the average response of government financing to changes in NGDP embedded in
my estimates, how different could the path of financing, and therefore fiscal policy, have
looked like during the slump had the US entered the Great Depression with a different
level of fiscal capacity? As a first first counterfactual, I assign to the US government in
1927 the fiscal capacity it had towards the end of my period of analysis, more precisely in
1937, when the drastic centralization of fiscal resources and expansion in income taxation
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described was already well under way. The result is a significant reduction in the fall of
government financing in the Depression years and a general decrease in its procyclicality.
In the second counterfactual, I transform the US into a fiscally centralized country by
assigning the fiscal capacity of local governments (states and municipalities) to the federal
government. The result is to render financing essentially acyclical. The final counterfactual
assigns to the US federal government the fiscal capacity of the United Kingdom, the most
fiscally capable nation in my sample. In this case, government financing becomes markedly
counter-cyclical. Therefore, given even the extremely underwhelming average fiscal policy
response to the Great Depression embedded in my estimates, the United States might
have been able to run a less pro-cyclical and even a counter-cyclical fiscal policy in the
acute Great Depression years had it possessed a higher level of fiscal capacity on the eve
of the slump, potentially easing some of its pain.
The counterfactual for Argentina yields similar lessons (Figure 4.4), but with some
interesting differences. Argentina, like the US, was hit hard by the Depression. Nominal
GDP contacted by nearly 27% and real GDP per capita by 17%. The external sector
was particularly badly hit with trade as a share of GDP falling by more than one third.
Tax revenues and government financing both collapsed with economic activity, so that
when the Argentinean provisional government took office after the September Revolution
of 1930, revenues were insufficient to cover the government’s expenses (Alhadeff, 1985).
In fact, public expenditure fell in unison with revenues. Fiscal policy was thus completely
passive with a fiscal deficit close to zero: neither short nor long-term borrowing played a
role in the smoothing of the government’s resources.
In comparison to the US, Argentina had less democratic institutions and a lower per
capita income. My estimates indicate that the former led a stronger counter-cyclical
policy response of financing, while the latter, made preventing its collapse comparatively
more difficult. The main difference between Argentina and the US, however, was the
structure of the country’s fiscal system and the scope of fiscal reforms undertaken as a
result of the Depression. The provisional government set itself the task of reducing the
country’s reliance on custom duties and indirect taxes by increasing direct taxation from an
extremely low starting point. The first income tax in the country’s history was announced
in 1931 and introduced in 1932, amid considerable political resistance (Alhadeff, 1985) and
the rebound in government financing after 1932 can be attributed largely to this new tax,
as well as to a partial improvement in economic conditions. Nonetheless, income taxation
continued to play a considerably smaller role in Argentina compared to the more advanced
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(a) Dynamics of economic activity and fiscal aggregates
(b) Government financing counterfactuals
Figure 4.4: Argentina counterfactual, 1927-33
The NGDP, government financing and tax revenues are annual percentage changes. The fiscal balance as a
share of GDP is in levels. Counterfactuals are based on the HT model for the TAX/NGDP fiscal capacity
indicator for 1914-26
European and North American fiscal systems for the rest of the interwar period.
Even this relatively modest improvements in fiscal capacity, however, would have made
a big difference in terms of fiscal policy had they taken place before the Depression hit.
The gray line in the graph suggests that, had Argentina attained the level of capacity it
had 1937 before the outbreak of the Depression, the government might have been able to
obtain an essentially acyclical path in government financing instead of a markedly pro-
cyclical one. The dark blue line, instead, indicates that obtaining the fiscal development
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of the United Kingdom might have allowed the country to run a strongly counter-cyclical
fiscal policy.
4.6 Exploring the channels: fiscal capacity and borrowing
The results of the analysis so far indicate that fiscal capacity affected the revenue smooth-
ing ability of countries in the interwar period by influencing non-tax revenues. The most
natural candidate for performing this function is borrowing because of both its large size
compared to other non-tax revenues and its direct link to fiscal development and institu-
tional quality.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the close relationship between fiscal capacity and borrowing in the
interwar period. The charts illustrates the positive correlation between fiscal capacity (as
measured by tax revenue over GDP) and the debt-to-GDP ratio at the central – panel (a)
– and central and local – panel (b) – level for 1927-38. In the analysis below, I show that
high capacity countries did not simply have a higher stock of debt throughout the interwar
years, but were also able to accumulate more debt with respect to low capacity countries
during this period. Moreover, borrowing was not only determined by the accumulated
past fiscal capacity, but was facilitated by the reforms undertaken by some countries in
the interwar years. I furthermore show that higher fiscal capacity countries faced lower
borrowing costs. As a final step, I explore the two principal channels that could explain
these findings. One is that a higher fiscal capacity simply signaled a higher present value of
future tax revenues available for debt repayment. The other is that fiscal capacity signaled
institutional quality and credibility making access to borrowing easier. The results support
the latter channel.
4.6.1 Fiscal capacity and borrowing capacity
I relate fiscal capacity to debt levels though the following basic model:
lnDebt/NGDPi,t = β0 + β1FiscalCapacityi,t + xi,tγ + i,t (4.4)
which takes the more general form:
lnDebt/NGDPi,t = β0+A(`){lnDebt/NGDPi+FiscalCapacityi+xi}+ci+lt+i,t (4.5)
when dynamics and fixed effects are introduced. A is a matrix of polynomials in the lag
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(a) Central Government
(b) Central & Local Government
Figure 4.5: Fiscal Capacity and Government Debt, 1927-38
Source: for details on the tax revenue data see 4.B, for the debt data see 3.B; the nominal non-PPP
adjusted GDP data is from Klasing and Milionis (2014)
operator, ` is an aribitrary number of lags, l and c are country and time fixed effects
respectively, and  is the idiosyncratic error term.
I begin the analysis by running static pooled estimations (Table 4.15). In columns 1-2
and 5-6 the natural logarithm of the average debt-to-GDP ratio for 1927-38 is regressed
against average 1914-26 fiscal capacity indicators and controls, using OLS and LIML IV
estimators respectively. The instruments for fiscal capacity are the same used in the
analysis above. In columns 3-4 and 7-8 I repeat the exercise using annual values of the
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debt-to-GDP ratios. The results indicate that, even after controlling for the structure of
tax revenues, economic development (as measured by GDP per capita) and the level of
democracy (as measured by the Polity2 score), higher fiscal capacity countries were able
and/or willing to borrow more.
Table 4.15: Static estimation for debt-to-GDP ratios
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV IV
LN Debt/NGDP
Tax/NGDP 14.07*** 9.506*** 19.25*** 21.67**
(3.998) (2.675) (6.135) (9.607)
IncomeTax/NGDP 23.88** 29.17*** 39.72*** 44.06**
(9.045) (4.854) (15.10) (17.69)
Constant -2.981*** -2.082*** -2.576*** -2.053*** -3.042*** -2.272*** -3.289*** -2.230***
(0.752) (0.643) (0.602) (0.591) (0.572) (0.490) (0.768) (0.540)
Additional controls
Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IncomeTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 23 23 287 287 23 23 282 282
R-squared 0.457 0.405 0.302 0.335 0.521 0.485 0.073 0.262
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel B: First Stage
Tax/NGDP IncomeTax/NGDP Tax/NGDP IncomeTax/NGDP
YearsAtWar 0.00048*** 0.000244** 0.0003559** 0.0002237**
(0.0001264) (0.0000921) (0.0001576) (0.0000888)
NatDisasterNumb -0.0015283** -0.0006687* -0.002047*** -0.0007248***
(0.0006689) (0.00034) (0.0005216) (0.0001778)
F-Statistic 12.3279*** 4.68507** 13.015*** 9.34125***
Shea’s Adj Part R2 0.4211 0.5214 0.2921 0.4402
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time farme: 1927-38. Countries included in columns 1, 2, 5, 6 are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States; columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 additionally feature Brazil, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Romania and
Yugoslavia.
In Table 4.16, I add another important layer to my analysis by making the estimations
dynamic (see the table notes for details on the different specifications in the four columns).
This is important for four reasons. First, the debt-to-GDP ratio exhibits a high level
of persistence; failing to account for this would lead to miss-specification and bias in
the estimates. Second, by introducing lagged terms of the dependent and independent
variables in the model, I allow these variables to interact with each other, reducing the
possibility of omitted variable bias. Third, dynamic estimation using Generalized Method
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of Moments (GMM) estimators allows me to instrument the regressors with more distant
lags of themselves further reducing the possibility of bias. In the table, I present results
obtained with the the difference GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991), but similar
results also emerge with the system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1995). The
latter estimator is more efficient, but the difference estimator is preferable in this context
because the debt-to-GDP was very likely non-stationary in this period. Last, but not least,
by using a dynamic framework, I am able to show that: 1) high capacity countries did
not simply have a larger debt stock, but were able to borrow relatively more during the
interwar years, 2) debt levels responded dynamically to changes in fiscal capacity taking
place in the interwar years.
Table 4.16: Dynamic estimation for the debt-to-GDP ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LN Debt/NGDP LN Debt/NGDP LN Debt/NGDP LN Debt/NGDP
L.LN Debt/NGDP 0.264 0.437*** 0.772*** 0.853*
(0.172) (0.138) (0.110) (0.483)
Tax/NGDP 11.61*** 7.682*** 7.801*** 9.103**
(2.925) (1.718) (2.547) (4.262)
L.Tax/NGDP -3.641 -2.250 -4.345** -3.822
(3.849) (3.041) (1.784) (4.526)
Additional controls
∆NGDP 3 3 3 3
Polity2 3 3 3 3
IncomeTaxShare 3 3 3 3
IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3
Lag of controls 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3
Observations 192 192 200 200
Number of countries 31 31 31 31
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
L. stands for lagged. All changes (∆) are percentage changes. I employ the two-step difference GMM
estimator and insert one lag of the dependent variable as a regressor. I use the 4th lag of LN Debt/NGDP,
∆NGDP and Tax/NGDP as instrument for these variables for which I insert the contemporaneous and
lagged values for all columns except column 4, where i use the 4th and 5th lag, in order to increase the
explanatory power of the instruments, which is diminished by the use of time fixed-effects. The rest of
the regressors are not instrumented in column 1 and instrumented with their 1st lag in the rest of the
specifications. The results are robust to different lag structures and instrumenting. Standard error are
robust in all specifications and small sample adjustments are employed. Columns 3 and 4 employ orthogonal
differences proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) rather than first differences in order to preserve sample
size in the presence of gaps in the data. See Roodman (2009) for the details on the Stata command used
in the estimations. Time frame: 1927-38. Countries included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Brazil, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Romania and Turkey.
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The results are consistent across specifications and confirm the large and statistically
significant effect of fiscal capacity found in the static estimations: high capacity countries
were systematically able and/or willing to borrow more. This is true even if country fixed
effects, which account for time-invarying country characteristics, time fixed effects, which
account for common shocks, and the size of the lagged debt stock are controlled for.
In order to identify the channel through which fiscal capacity led to more borrowing,
I proceed with two further steps. The first is to show that fiscal capacity had a posi-
tive effect only on long term borrowing and not on short term borrowing. This exercise
is informative because long-term borrowing and institutional quality are tightly linked.
Long term borrowing in the interwar period was the result of a planning and budgeting
process, while short-term borrowing was often associated with emergency funds needed
to cover shortfalls in revenues. Moreover, countries normally accessed long-term borrow-
ing by floating bonds on capital markets, both international and domestic, and thus by
submitting themselves to the scrutiny, however imperfect, of underwriters and lenders.
The association between long term borrowing and creditworthiness is still relevant today:
developing countries often choose to borrow short term because it tends to be cheaper,
particularly during crises. This is due to the higher credit risk and uncertainty associated
with long-term investments in counties with weak institutions and volatile macroeconomic
fundamentals (Broner, Lorenzoni, and Schmukler, 2013).53
The second step is to test whether the source of tax revenues matters. As discussed in
detail in Section 2.1, income taxation is strongly associated with fiscal capacity whereas
a high reliance on trade taxes proxies a low level of fiscal development. Finding that not
only the level, but also composition of revenues mattered would be a strong indication that
the channel through which fiscal capacity influenced the ability to borrow in the interwar
period was institutional quality, rather than simply a higher present value of future tax
receipts.
Column 1 in Table 4.17 shows that a higher fiscal capacity is associated with more
long term borrowing. For short-term borrowing, instead, there no statistically significant
relationship with fiscal capacity (column 2). The results also demonstrate that a higher
share of income taxes in GDP is associated with more borrowing, whereas there is no
statistically significant relationship between trade taxes and borrowing. This is true for
both the total debt-to-GDP ratio (column 3), and when only long term borrowing is
53Another explanation is that short-term borrowing serves as a commitment mechanisms, which disciplines
countries into following sound policies due to avoid rollover crises, see references in Broner, Lorenzoni,
and Schmukler (2013), page 63)
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considered (column 4). When short term borrowing is considered, instead, the relationship
is no longer statistically significant (column 5). The results thus lend support to the
institutional quality channel.
Table 4.17: Debt-to-GDP ratios: long-term vs short-term borrowing and channels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES LN LT Debt/NGDP LN ST Debt/NGDP LN Debt/NGDP LN LT Debt/NGDP LN ST Debt/NGDP
L.LN Debt/NGDP 0.797***
(0.0910)
L.LN LT Debt/NGDP 0.778*** 0.711***
(0.168) (0.122)
L.LN ST Debt/NGDP 0.598*** 0.651***
(0.171) (0.143)
Tax/NGDP 9.195*** 10.56
(1.919) (6.242)
L.Tax/NGDP -5.982*** 1.193
(2.079) (6.834)
IncomeTax/NGDP 19.87** 18.76** 30.17
(9.483) (6.862) (31.63)
L.IncomeTax/NGDP -10.72 -8.062 -17.48
(6.895) (7.771) (34.14)
TradeTaxGDP 4.262 7.803 -23.63
(9.848) (9.811) (29.84)
L.TradeTaxGDP -1.044 -4.894 39.20
(11.02) (9.405) (48.05)
Additional controls
∆NGDP 3 3 3 3 3
Polity2 3 3 3 3 3
IncomeTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3
IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3
Lag of controls 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 191 182 200 191 182
Number of countries 31 30 31 31 30
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
L. stands for lagged. All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Except for the dependent variable, the
specifications in this section are the same as those of column 3 of Table 4.16. Time frame: 1927-38.
Countries included in columns 1,3 and 4 are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, Brazil, Egypt,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Romania and Turkey. Columns 2 and 5 exclude Egypt due to data
availability.
4.6.2 Fiscal capacity and borrowing costs
To complete the analysis of the effect of fiscal capacity on borrowing, I turn to analyzing
borrowing costs. The outcome variable is the spread of domestic bond yields over the
US domestic bond yield (see the Appendix 4.B for details on this data). The underlying
assumption is that yields reflect the expected probability of default, and that yield spreads
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reflect the expected probability of default relative to a baseline bond or country of issue
with very low or zero default risk (Tomz and Wright, 2013).54 I choose the US yield as
the baseline because the country’s economic size and high level of financial development
contributed to making it my samples’ lowest domestic yield for the entire period under
consideration (Figure 4.6).55
Figure 4.6: Domestic bond yields in selected countries, 1927-38
Yields expressed in percentage points. ARG=Argentina, AUS=Autralia, BRA=Brazil, CZE= Czechoslo-
vakia, GER=Germany, EGY=Egypt, GBR= United Kingdom, JPN=Japan, POL=Poland, USA=United
States of America. Source: League of Nations (1936/37, 1937/38, 1939/40); see Appendix 4.B for details.
I focus on domestic financial markets, for two reasons. The first is that the availability
of data on domestic bond yields is greater. More important, however, is the fact that with
the onset of the Great Depression, which all but froze international financial markets,
domestic credit became the main source of government financing: the domestic debt stock
of central governments in my sample increased from around 50% on average in 1927-29 to
around 60% in 1933-38.56
The other fundamental hypothesis of the exercise is that the strength and credibility
54Tomz and Wright (2013) also point out some pitfalls of working with bond yields. First, the assumption
is that borrowing takes place in the form of the emission of bonds on competitive markets. this however
is not always the case. Alternative sources of borrowing are banks, although this was uncommon in the
interwar period, but also international organizations and central banks which do not necessarily lend at
market rates. Second, not all sovereign bonds are actively traded on liquid markets.Third, contractual
features can vary across countries and different bond issues, impacting yields.
55See Basile, Landon-Lane, and Rockoff (2010) for a thorough discussion of interest rates in the US in the
interwar period.
56Countries included in this calculation are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Fin-
land, Germany, UK, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland,
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Australia, Japan, Canada, Egypt,
New Zealand, US, South Africa, India and Spain.
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of fiscal systems cannot be captured by introducing short-term policy variables, such as
budget deficits, as is commonly done in the literature. I argue, instead, that my fiscal
capacity indicators capture the deeply-rooted and structural characteristic of countries
that determine their fiscal development and broader institutional quality, and are thus the
main variables of interest.
The estimating equation is as follows:
lnBondY ieldSpreadi,t = β0 + β1lnF iscalCapacityi,t + xi,tγ + ci + lt + i,t (4.6)
where x is a vector of controls, c and l are country and time fixed effects respectively and
i,t is the idiosyncratic error term.
In the regressions, I distinguish between countries on and off the Gold Standard in order
to account for the possibility of Gold Standard membership acting as “good housekeeping
seal of approval”. The role of Gold Standard adherence on borrowing costs has been much
debated in the literature. Bordo and Kydland (1995); Bordo and Rockoff (1996) argue
that, indeed, during the heyday of the classical Gold Standard (1870-1913) long-standing
adherence to this international monetary system signaled the pursuit of orthodox policies,
which significantly lowered borrowing costs. Bordo, Edelstein, and Rockoff (1999) find a
similar effect for countries returning to gold in the 1920s, particularly if this was done at
the pre-WWI parity, which, the authors argue, was a strong signal of financial rectitude.
Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) confirm these results of the pre-WWI era, but not for the
1920s, for which they record the rising importance of debt burdens and British Empire
membership.57 Flandreau and Zumer (2004) and Alquist and Chabot (2011), instead, find
that sound policies and common risk factors were more important than Gold Standard
adherence even before WWI. In any case, in my context accounting for Gold Standard
membership also serves the purpose of controlling for the progressive disintegration of
international financial markets over the course of the 1930s.
Table 4.18 presents the results of the analysis. Column 1-3 illustrate the pooled OLS,
columns 4-6 the FE, columns 7-9 the FD estimates. Columns 1, 4 and 7 present a simple
model in which the bond yield spread is regressed against the Tax/NGDP fiscal capacity
57The effect of British Empire membership is another controversial topic. Ferguson and Schlularick (2006),
for example, find that colonies enjoyed lower borrowing costs than non-colonies while Accominotti, Flan-
dreau, and Rezzik (2011) argue that colonies were structurally different from non-colonies due to the
implicit monitoring by the British government. The authors thus refute the idea of Empire being a
“marginal” effect to be identified though a dummy ceteris paribus.
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Table 4.18: Determinants of domestic government bond yield spreads vis-a-vis the US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE FD FD FD HT HT
LN Spread
Panel A: Pooled On & Not On Gold
LN Tax/NGDP 0.406** 0.134 -0.317** -0.230** -0.254** -0.236** -0.865***
(0.194) (0.198) (0.114) (0.110) (0.104) (0.113) (0.292)
Panel B: On Gold
LN Tax/NGDP 0.102 0.0467 -0.127 -0.422
(0.265) (0.197) (0.227) (0.535)
Panel C: Not On Gold
LN Tax/NGDP 0.117 -0.225** -0.262* -0.853**
(0.228) (0.107) (0.151) (0.337)
Constant 0.896* 7.507*** 7.128*** 0.364 15.18** 14.39** 0.107 0.183* 0.190** 11.96*** 10.34***
(0.500) (1.693) (1.758) (0.348) (6.183) (6.805) (0.109) (0.0899) (0.0854) (4.082) (3.350)
10.37**
(4.327)
Additional controls
Default size 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
LN Debt/NGDP 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
LN Openness 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
LN GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
On Gold 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 221 209 209 221 209 209 189 180 180 206 72-134
Number of countries 27 25 25 27 25 25 20 19
R-squared 0.378 0.553 0.577 0.227 0.283 0.339 0.212 0.216 0.274
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Time frame: 1927-38. Countries included in columns 1, 4
and 7 are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, Brazil, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Poland and Romania; columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 9 exclude
Egypt due to data availability. Column 10 features: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Norway Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK; column 11 excludes Spain as it was never on gold in this
period.
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indicator, the size of the default as computed in Paper 1 (Chapter 3),58 and the debt-to-
GDP ratio also from Paper 1. In the columns 2,5, and 8, the model is enriched with further
controls: the growth rate of nominal GDP calculated from data provided by Klasing and
Milionis (2014), openness as measured by the share of trade in GDP provided by the same
authors, GDP per capita from Bolt and van Zanden (2013) and an on gold dummy based
on gold adherence dates summarized by Crafts and Fearon (2013).59 In columns 3, 6 and
9, I run separate estimations for countries on gold and off gold to account for structural
rather than marginal differences between countries adhering or not to the international
monetary arrangement. In columns 10 and 11, I re-run the model using the HT estimator
in order to employ the 1914-26 average of the controls rather than yearly values. This
reduces the possibility of reverse causality between bond yield spreads and the right hand
side variables.
Besides reducing the risk of omitted variable bias, the inclusion of fixed effects, also
minimizes issues of cross-country comparability of the data. This is important because
the bonds of different countries featured different contractual characteristics. Studying
the evolution of domestic bond yields through time offers a far better indicator of default
probabilities than raw comparisons across countries. By comparing the OLS and panel
estimates, it is immediately apparent that failing to account for fixed effects is a very
serious source of bias. In the OLS estimates, a higher debt-to-GDP ratio is associated
with lower borrowing costs (not shown), while a higher fiscal capacity is associated with
higher borrowing costs, even though once more controls are included the result becomes
insignificant. Once fixed effects are included, it emerges clearly that a higher debt-to-GDP
ratio increases borrowing costs, while more fiscal capacity decreases them, in line with my
hypothesis. A further intuitive result that emerges from the estimates, although it is not
significant in all specifications, is that countries with a higher GDP per capita had lower
borrowing costs.
The estimation also clearly indicates that controlling for Gold Standard adherence
with a simple dummy is inadequate. This echoes Accominotti, Flandreau, and Rezzik
(2011)’s argument for British Empire membership before WWI that differences between
empire and non-empire countries were structural and cannot be captured by just allowing
58This is the share of the principal of dollar denominated bonds in default over the total principal dollar-
denominated bonds. The measure is developed in the paper as a measure of default size on impact, which
purposely does not take into account ex-post elements such as the final haircut imposed on creditors,
which in most cases of defaults in the interwar period was only finalized after long negotiations, some of
which wee settled only after the end of WWII.
59I consider countries to be off gold if they have officially left the Standard or have introduced exchange
controls.
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for a different intercept. Indeed, the coefficient of the Gold Standard dummy cannot
be statistically distinguished from zero in any specification, which suggests that Gold
Standard membership was not a direct constraint on borrowing. However, once separate
estimations are run for countries on and off gold, a different pattern emerges. Specifically, I
find that fiscal capacity reduced borrowing costs for countries off gold, but not for countries
on gold.
This results represents a strong suggestion that, for countries not on gold, fundamentals
such fiscal capacity mattered more than for countries not on gold. One can hypothesize
that, without Gold Standard adherence to guide them, the strength of the fiscal system
became more important as a guiding principle for investors. The fact that, as the in-
terwar debt crisis unfolded and the Gold Standard disintegrated, rating agency Moody’s
increased the amount of data it supplied in its manuals, with tax revenues being a big
part of this, supports this hypothesis. Thus, while fiscally stronger countries might have
benefitted from an easier access to borrowing once free from the golden fetters, weaker ones
might have actually experienced an increase in their bond yield spreads. This hypothe-
sis provides an important qualification to much of the literature, which argues that Gold
Standard membership was the only factor that constrained countries’ policy responses to
the Depression (Temin, 1989; Eichengreen, 1992).
This result also speaks to findings by Bernanke and James (1991) and Bernanke (1995)
that economic conditions in countries that left the Gold Standard in 1931 and those that
did not were quite similar, while the recovery was much more robust in leavers thereafter.
The authors, in line with Eichengreen (1992), attribute this to the policy freedom that
leaving the fixed exchange rate provided, although they stress monetary policy, whereas
Eichengreen also outlined an important role for fiscal policy. The authors further dismiss
endogeneity concerns regarding the decision to abandon gold, highlighting that weaker
countries should have left the standard earlier and would have recovered more strongly
than those which actually left. This reasoning, however, rests on the assumption that
macroeconomic fundamentals can be captured by looking at short-term indicators and
that leaving the Gold Standard would have had similar effects in all countries, no matter
their institutional characteristics. My findings indicate that, on the contrary, differences
in deeply-rooted fundamentals like fiscal capacity might have led to asymmetric effects
of the decision to abandon the Gold Standard casting doubts on the idea that an early
departure from Gold would have led to less contractionary policies and a faster recovery
in all countries
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The quantitative impact of fiscal capacity is fairly large. The estimates indicate that
a 1% increase in fiscal capacity led to a lower bound decrease in the yield spread vis-a-vis
the US of around 0.23%. This means that a 1 percentage point increase in fiscal capacity –
which on average represented a 12.5% increase in the share of taxes in GDP – would have
decreased of the spread vis-a-vis the US by around 8 basis points. The estimated difference
in the spread between the country with the highest fiscal capacity and the average country
would have been over 100 basis points. When I employ the average 1914-26 fiscal capacity
indicator and the HT estimator, the effect is about 4 times stronger: a 1% increase in the
share of taxes in GDP lowered yield spreads by around 0.87%.
Table 4.19: Government bond yield spreads: institutional quality vs higher revenues
(1) (2) (3)
HT HT HT
VARIABLES LN Spread LN Spread LN Spread
On Gold Not on Gold
LN Tax/NGDP -0.173 0.176 0.132
(0.227) (0.390) (0.238)
LN IncomeTax/NGDP -0.367* -0.0971 -0.318*
(0.213) (0.264) (0.191)
LN TradeTax/NGDP 0.350 0.448* 0.0692
(0.302) (0.235) (0.290)
Constant 11.73*** 11.25*** 6.944*
(4.111) (1.960) (3.665)
Additional controls
∆NGDP 3 3 3
LN Debt/NGDP 3 3 3
DefaultSize 3 3 3
LN Openness 3 3 3
LN GDPPC 3 3 3
Polity2 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3
Observations 172 70 102
Number of countries 20 19 19
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Time frame: 1927-38. All variables are 1914-26 values except for
∆NGDP, LN Debt/NGDP, DefaultSize and LN Tax/NGDP, which are yearly values. Countries included in
column 1 are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
UK. Columns 2 and 3 exclude Spain, which was never on gold in this period.
As a final exercise, I provide some evidence of the channels through which fiscal capacity
affected borrowing costs (Table 4.19). The hypothesis is that it not only mattered how
much revenue countries raised, but also how. I run the same model as above using the HT
estimator to minimize reverse causality concerns and I insert the 1914-26 average shares of
trade and income taxes over GDP, while controlling for the yearly tax revenue as a share
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of GDP. Once again, I distinguish between off and on gold countries. The results indicate
that, indeed, how revenue was raised mattered a great deal, particularly in the absence
of the Gold anchor. A 1% higher share of income taxes in GDP lowered the yield spread
vis-a-vis the US by almost 0.37% on average and over 0.3% for countries off gold. I find no
significant effect for countries on gold considered in isolation and, more importantly, for
trade taxes. Therefore, revenue per se did not reduce the perceived probability of default,
it was rather the demonstration of being able to raise taxes in complex and demanding
way that, by signaling institutional quality, allowed countries to finance their deficits more
cheaply in the interwar period.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper investigated the impact of fiscal capacity on the dynamics of public revenues
in the interwar period. To the best of my knowledge, this is a first. My findings show
that a higher degree of fiscal capacity led to a lower volatility of government financing
in response to economic shocks. The analysis further indicates that the channel through
which fiscal capacity smoothed financing was by providing an easier access to borrowing
for governments, whereas there is no conclusive evidence of fiscal capacity lowering the
volatility of tax revenues. Finally, the results reveal that how tax revenue was raised
mattered. This suggests that fiscal capacity allowed countries to borrow more extensively
and more cheaply by signaling higher institutional quality, rather than simply a higher
present value of future tax receipts.
The findings of this paper speak to four main strands of literature. First, they suggest
that the literature on the Great Depression should take the deep-rooted constraints under
which countries’ governments operated more seriously into account in evaluating policy re-
sponses to the the slump. Gold Standard membership probably did impose a straitjacket
on countries, which constrained their policy choices, but so did historically-determined
factors, such as fiscal development. The two constraints probably interacted, leading to
asymmetric effects of membership to the international monetary system: whereas shed-
ding the golden fetters opened the possibility of a less restrictive fiscal policy for fiscally
strong countries, my findings suggest that it might have been the opposite for fiscally weak
ones. Second, the paper illustrates a new channel through which fiscal capacity can affect
economic outcomes besides fostering long-term economic development. I show that fiscal
capacity affected cyclical fiscal outcomes in interwar period, with deep potential reper-
cussions on both the short and long-term economic and political health of countries. In
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countries where financing volatility led to fiscal crises, which affected the action of states or
led to regime changes, long-term consequences might have been particularly severe. Third,
the findings of the paper lend support to the hypothesis that institutionally determined
borrowing constraints can contribute to fiscal policy pro-cyclicality, and that the size of
governments can affect their ability to be a stabilizing force in the economy.
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Appendices
4.A Additional analysis and robustness checks
In this Appendix, I outline some further results which integrate the analysis in the main
body of the paper.
4.A.1 Revenue elasticity: sensitivity to a changing the sample and in-
cluding local governments
Table 4.20 and 4.21 demonstrate that the relationships between economic activity and tax
revenues and economic activity and government financing are very similar if I consider a
longer time period – 1920-1938 instead of 1927-38, which is the period of analysis in the
paper – or include all available observations rater than restricting the sample to obser-
vations for which both outcome variables are available. While economic activity and tax
revenues once again co-move almost 1-to-1, the coefficient of the nominal GDP when gov-
ernment financing is the outcome variable is less than half size. In column 6 of both tables,
the coefficient even becomes statistically insignificant at conventional levels. This suggests
that non-tax revenues played an important smoothing role in overall public revenue and
that this was similar across the whole interwar period, notwithstanding the impact of the
Great Depression and the turmoil financial markets underwent starting from 1929.
It is harder to draw inference when I include local governments due to the small size of
the sample (Table 4.22). However, it wold appear that the 1) total government revenues
were less sensitive to changes in output than central government revenues, 2) the smoothing
effect of non-tax revenues is concentrated at the central level. The former is demonstrated
by the smaller coefficient relating changes in nominal GDP to both tax revenues and
government financing compared to that of central revenues; the latter is evident in the
very similar coefficient I find for both tax revenues and government financing.
4.A.2 Fiscal capacity and revenue volatility: pooled IV results
I report the results of the pooled IV results for completeness and to further illustrate the
relevance of my instruments. Table 4.23 presents the estimates. Panel A features the
results obtained with the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator,
whereas Panel B illustrates the first stage of the regressions. The LIML estimator is pre-
ferred to Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) due to its greater robustness in the presence
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Table 4.20: The elasticity of tax revenues and government nancing to changes in output,
1920-38
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD
VARIABLES ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing
∆NGDP 1.037*** 0.424*** 1.124*** 0.431*** 1.084*** 0.208
(0.215) (0.120) (0.281) (0.129) (0.358) (0.132)
Constant 0.0483** 0.0332*** 0.0473*** 0.0331*** -0.00329 0.00158
(0.0212) (0.00830) (0.00294) (0.00129) (0.00701) (0.00428)
Country FE 3 3 3 3
Observations 293 452 293 452 240 407
Number of countries 33 35 33 35 33 35
R-squared 0.052 0.047 0.065 0.051 0.027 0.009
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Countries included in columns 1, 3 and 5 are: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Ro-
mania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and
Yugoslavia; columns 2, 4 and 6 additionally feature Indonesia, New Zealand, and Uruguay, but exclude
Egypt due to data availability.
Table 4.21: The elasticity of tax revenues and government nancing to changes in output,
all observations 1927-38
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE FE FD FD
VARIABLES ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing
∆NGDP 0.910*** 0.519*** 0.987*** 0.506*** 0.794** 0.228
(0.186) (0.111) (0.272) (0.111) (0.333) (0.148)
Constant 0.0448* 0.0261*** 0.0442*** 0.0262*** -0.00411 0.00205
(0.0225) (0.00519) (0.00183) (0.000281) (0.00676) (0.00396)
Country FE 3 3 3 3
Observations 278 325 278 325 239 307
Number of countries 33 35 33 35 33 35
R-squared 0.036 0.097 0.047 0.092 0.012 0.013
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Countries included in columns 1, 3 and 5 are: Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Ro-
mania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and
Yugoslavia; columns 2, 4 and 6 additionally feature Indonesia, New Zealand, and Uruguay, but exclude
Egypt due to data availability.
of weak instruments and the inclusion of many instruments. For the LIML estimator,
critical values of the first stage F-statistic actually decrease with the number of instru-
ments included, contrary to 2SLS (Stock, Wright, and Yogo, 2002; Stock and Yogo, 2005).
The critical value for minimizing bias due to weak instruments with 4 instruments and
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Table 4.22: The elasticity of central plus local tax revenues and government financing
to changes in output,1927-38
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ∆TotTaxRev ∆TotGovFin ∆TotTaxRev ∆TotGovtFin ∆TotTaxRev ∆TotGovtFin
∆NGDP 0.344*** 0.468** 0.331** 0.330 0.249 0.402**
(0.0917) (0.169) (0.114) (0.191) (0.142) (0.146)
Constant 0.00395 0.0233* 0.00349 0.0184** -0.0136 -0.0144
(0.00399) (0.0115) (0.00401) (0.00676) (0.00797) (0.0137)
Country FE 3 3 3 3
Observations 46 46 46 46 35 35
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 11
R-squared 0.139 0.124 0.109 0.060 0.033 0.053
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.
2 regressors is 7.03 (see table 5.4 in Stock and Yogo (2005)), and is exceeded in all in-
stances except one (for the interaction term in column 2). Robustness checks carried out
with the Continuously Updated Generalized Method of Moments estimator (CUE), which
is consistent with non-normal errors in the presence of many instruments (note that 4
instruments does not qualify as many instruments), yielded practically identical results,
the only difference being larger standard errors as expected due to the estimator’s wider
dispersion (Hausman, Lewis, Menzel, and Newey, 2011).60
The table compares the estimates for tax revenues and government financing directly:
columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 feature estimates for the former and columns 3, 4 ,7 and 8 for
the latter. The first 4 columns present the baseline specification, whereas columns 5
to 8 control for the composition of tax revenues. The fiscal capacity coefficient is no
longer significant in the specification with tax revenues as the dependent variable, which
highlights the usefulness of the IV approach compared to OLS. This result is not due to
large differences in the magnitudes of the coefficients compared to the OLS estimates, but
to the standard errors being much larger. IV estimates are known to yield larger standard
errors than their OLS counterparts, but the satisfactory first stage statistics and large
increase in the errors are good reasons to believe that this might be due to the effect being
in fact indistinguishable from zero. The panel results in the body of the paper further
support this notion.
For changes in government financing, instead, the smoothing role of fiscal capacity
60As above, I use 1914-38 averages for the fiscal capacity indicators.
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Table 4.23: Pooled instrumental variable estimation
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆TaxRevenue ∆TaxRevenue ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing
∆NGDP 1.123* 0.706* 2.161*** 1.135*** 1.639*** 1.297*** 2.145*** 1.287**
(0.591) (0.366) (0.691) (0.368) (0.624) (0.428) (0.730) (0.529)
Tax/NGDP -0.167 -0.240 -0.124 -0.212
(0.141) (0.191) (0.173) (0.174)
∆NGDP*Tax/NGDP -5.178 -13.73** -6.092 -14.98**
(5.548) (5.867) (5.400) (5.999)
IncomeTax/NGDP -0.393 -0.500* -0.243 -0.459
(0.309) (0.303) (0.363) (0.301)
∆NGDP*IncomeTax/NGDP -3.728 -18.32** -11.70 -30.86**
(11.04) (8.661) (10.45) (14.50)
Constant 0.0402** 0.0370*** 0.0328 0.0262** 0.0153 0.0130 0.0164 0.00896
(0.0178) (0.0126) (0.0244) (0.0123) (0.0179) (0.0135) (0.0204) (0.0209)
Additional controls
Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IncomeTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*IncomeTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 239 239 266 266 208 208 219 219
R-squared 0.281 0.273 0.161 0.145 0.311 0.313 0.149 0.135
Panel B: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Tax/NGDP IncomeTax/NGDP Tax/NGDP IncomeTax/NGDP Tax/NGDP IncomeTax/NGDP Tax/NGDP IncomeTax/NGDP
YearsAtWar 0.000555*** 0.000368*** 0.000506*** 0.000368*** 0.000498*** 0.000262*** 0.000489*** 0.000264***
(0.000127) (0.000114) (0.000156) (0.000116) (0.000096) (0.000079) (0.000116) (0.00008)
NatDisastNumb -0.00103** 0.0000402 -0.00112** 0.0000344 -0.00168*** -0.000713** -0.00162*** -0.000703**
(0.000465) (0.000186) (0.000523) (0.000195) (0.000580) (0.000307) (0.000576) (0.000292)
∆NGDP*YearsAtWar 0.000558*** 0.000349*** 0.000548*** 0.000350*** 0.000481*** 0.000244*** 0.000513*** 0.000251***
(0.000112) (0.000110) (0.000108) (0.000103) (0.000100) (0.0000818) (0.000111) (0.0000835)
∆NGDP*NatDisastNumb -0.000980*** 0.0000572 -0.001050*** 0.000019 -0.001586** -0.000657** -0.001329** -0.000601**
(0.000367) (0.000203) (0.000378) (0.000209) (0.000635) (0.000299) (0.000572) (0.000282)
F-Statistic 8.792*** 17.855*** 7.353*** 11.790*** 16.923*** 7.036*** 13.526*** 11.828***
F-Statistic Interaction 8.5453*** 6.4871*** 13.11*** 12.500*** 10.224*** 5.0642** 15.312*** 15.156**
Shea’s Adj Part R2 0.306 0.469 0.2051 0.424 0.631 0.642 0.557 0.641
Shea’s Adj Part R2 Interaction 0.419 0.470 0.361 0.479 0.621 0.626 0.548 0.624
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Time frame: 1927-38. I employ the LIML estimator. All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Time
frame: 1927-38. Countries included in columns 1-4 are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hun-
gary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, the United States and Yugoslavia; columns 5-8 exclude Brazil, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Romania and Yugoslavia due to data availability,
is confirmed. The coefficients for the Tax/NGDP indicator are quantitatively almost
identical to the OLS ones, whereas the IncomeTax/NGDP ones are significantly larger.
The findings, also further corroborate the notion that the effects of fiscal capacity on
revenues are strongly non-linear and that, failing to account for this, would lead to serious
misspecification issues.
4.A.3 Instrumenting changes in output
As an additional robustness check, I instrument changes in output using changes in output
in trading partners weighted by pre-Depression (1926) bilateral trade flows (see Appendix
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4.B for sources). I not only instrument the fiscal capacity indicators and the changes in
output, but also all the other interaction variables using the weighted partners output
changes interacted with the regressors. Table 4.24 outlines the result. Not all instruments
are very strong, as demonstrated by the large standard errors. I use the Fuller-k estimator
to partially account for this. In any case, the results are clear cut and consistent with the
rest of the paper when I use the FE estimator. With the FD estimator, the coefficients
are even larger, but the reduction in the variability of the data due to first differencing
further increases the standard errors rendering the coefficient statistically insignificant.
This, however, in no way affects the conclusions of the paper that fiscal capacity had a
strong smoothing effect for government financing in the interwar period.
Table 4.24: Panel IV estimation using the weighted GDP of trading partners as instru-
ment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FE FE FD FD FD FD
VARIABLES ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtFinancing ∆GovtExpenditure ∆GovtExpenditure
∆NGDP 3.678** 2.629* 4.555* 3.206 2.928*** 2.305***
(1.818) (1.465) (2.721) (2.053) (0.950) (0.782)
∆NGDP*Tax/NGDP -23.32* -28.83 -13.44*
(12.33) (19.64) (6.941)
∆NGDP*IncomeTax/NGDP -47.91* -53.58 -27.06**
(28.57) (40.06) (11.91)
Constant 0.0129* 0.0125 -0.00490 -0.00538
(0.00766) (0.00808) (0.00793) (0.00779)
Additional controls
∆NGDP*Polity2 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*GDPPC 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*IncomeTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3
∆NGDP*IndirectTaxShare 3 3 3 3 3 3
Country FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Time FE 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 219 219 191 191 182 182
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23
R-squared 0.154 0.120 -0.170 -0.189 0.063 0.063
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Fuller-k estimation. All changes (∆) are percentage changes. Time frame: 1927-38. Countries included:
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, the United Kingdom and the United States.
4.A.4 Further robustness checks
I have carried out a broad range of further robustness checks, which I do not show due to
the already considerable length of this paper. The main result of the paper – the smoothing
effect of fiscal capacity for government financing – is robust to using an extended sample
(1920-38) and to using 5 year moving avarages for fiscal capacity indicators rather than
1914-26 averages. This is true for pooled OLS, Panel, IV and Panel IV estimations. As
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mentioned in the text of the paper, the inclusion of further controls – such as gold standard
membership, trade openness, the size and composition of the public debt burden, and the
terms of trade – also do not affect the result.
4.B Data description and sources
Nominal non-PPP-adjusted GDP (NGDP) and Openness: I use the nominal,
non-PPP-adjusted GDP figures estimated by Klasing and Milionis (2014) for the period
1870-1949. These are based on Maddison’s GDP estimates and obtained using the so-called
“short-cut method”. This method has a long history; Prados de la Escosura (2000) offers
a detailed description. In essence, it exploits the relationship between PPP adjusted and
non-PPP-adjusted GDP determined by the relative prices of traded and non-traded goods
and the relative income level of the country compared to the benchmark country. In doing
this, it makes use of the Balassa-Samuelson theorem. These data offer clear advantages
compared to standard GDP figures in constructing measures of the debt burden, given
that the latter are also in unadjusted nominal terms. They also capture an important
additional feature of the Great Depression besides the contraction of output: the huge
deflation that accompanied it.
Trade openness: Openness figures are from Klasing and Milionis (2014). The authors
obtain the openness figures by combining their estimates of nominal GDP with trade data
from Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009).
Bilateral trade: I use bilateral trade data from Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins (2009) and
Barbieri and Keshk (2016) in 1926 to calculate the Pre-Depression weights to assign to
changes in output of the trading partners with which I instrument changes on output.
GDP per capita (GDPPC): GDP per capita is taken from the Maddison’s Project’s
latest update (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013), which incorporates the latest available esti-
mates.
Polity2: This is the polity2 score from the POLITY IV database (Marshall and Jaggers,
2005). It is a combined score of autocracy and democracy (both measure between 0 and
10) and is obtained by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy one. The two
scores are weighed indicators of the competitiveness of political participation, the openness
and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive.
Central & local debts and debt service: See Appendix 3.B.
Years at War: these are the years spent fighting major external conflicts by a country in
the period 1816-1913 as reconstructed by Dincecco and Prado (2012) based on Clodfelter
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(2002)’s database of major external conflicts in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and
Oceania between 1500 and 2000. The variable takes into account the fact that a country
might be involved in more than one conflict per year and can thus exceed 97, as in the
case of the United Kingdom.
Natural Disasters: is from the EM-DAT database of the Centre for the Epidemiology
of Disasters based at the Universite´ Catholique de Louvain (CRED, 2017), which is the
most commonly used sources for studies on natural disasters. The data refers to all
natural disasters to hit countries in the sample between 1900 – the starting state of the
database – and 1926 – the starting date of the analysis. The CRED definition of natural
disasters implies one of these conditions: 1) ≥ 10 casualties, 2) ≥ 100 people affected, 3)
declaration of a state of emergency, 4) call for international assistance. I have enquired
about the reliability of these data for the early 20th century directly with CRED. As
discussed in the body of the paper, they believe that the data underestimates the number
of disasters, particularly small disasters, in poorer countries. This indicates that a more
accurate reporting would strengthen my results.
Domestic Bond Yields: These data are from various publications of the are of the
League of Nations: League of Nations (1939/40) pages 251-54, Table 117; League of Na-
tions (1937/38), pages 256-60, Table 131; League of Nations (1936/37), pages 245-59,
Table 127. Bond type (coupon %): Australia Government bonds (4); Austria Government
Bonds (miscellaneous) Argentina Government (5); Belgium Government bonds (3); Brazil
Government Unified (5); Canada Province of Ontario; Chile Internal Government (7);
China Internal Loans; Colombia Internal Government (7); Czechoslovakia Government
Bonds (miscellaneous); Denmark Perpetual Government Bonds (3.5); Egypt Government
(3.5); Finland State Loans (miscellaneous); France Irredeemable Government Bonds (3);
Germany Public Bonds (6 until 1935, then 4.5); Greece Refuge Loan (8); Hungary Forced
Loan 1924 (5); India State Loan (4); Italy Government Bond (3.5); Japan Government
Bonds (miscellaneous: average of public bonds); Netherlands Irredeemable Government
bonds (2.5-3); New Zealand Government Bonds (4); Norway Miscellaneous Bonds (4.5);
Poland 1919/20 Dollar Loan (6); Romania Government Bonds (miscellaneous); Spain
Internal Debt (4); South Africa Inscribed (5); Sweden Government Bonds (3.25); Switzer-
land State and Federal Railways (miscellaneous); United Kingdom Consoles (2.5); United
States Treasury (miscellaneous: average of all outstanding not callable for 12 years or
more); Yugoslavia 1921 Loan (7).
Tax revenue categorization: I re-categorize the data in the original sources as follows.
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Income (direct) taxes= taxes on income, earnings and capital. Indirect taxes=taxes on
capital transactions and transportation+ taxes on sales+ taxes on consumption; Custom
duties; Non divisible taxes.
Tax revenues and composition at central and local level: This data from is from
various publications of the German Imperial Statistical Office, and is complemented by
data from Moody’s investment agency, the League of Nations and Ritschl (2002b). All
data is in local currency. As a general rule, when the sources overlap and disagree, I use
data from the later source. In order to minimize issues of reverse causality, when fiscal
years do not correspond to calendar years I assign data from the year in which the fiscal
end to the whole calendar year. For example, if the fiscal year ends in June 1924, I assign
data for July 1923 to June 1924 to 1924. This inevitably introduces some noise in the data,
but is preferable to increasing the risk of the tax data influencing the regressors. The data
all refer to realized revenues rather than budgets. Data coverage could be expanded by
using budgets, but these were notoriously unreliable in the interwar period, especially in
poorer countries. The sources with the corresponding page numbers are: Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1930a) page 844-847, Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25) page 349, Statistisches
Reichsamt (1930b) Statistisches Reichsamt (1932) page 188*-189*, Statistisches Reichsamt
(1933) page 214*-215*, Statistisches Reichsamt (1934) page 232*-233*, Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1936b) page 256*-257*, Statistisches Reichsamt (1937) page 270*-271*, Statistis-
ches Reichsamt (1938) page 274*-283*, Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40) page 310*-311*,
Moody’s (1933) and League of Nations (1936/37) page 264-273. The country by country
breakdown of the sources is as follows.
Austria: central – 1925-27 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1928-30 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1932), 1931-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937); local (states and local communities)
– Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1931-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Belgium: central – 1913, 1925, 1927 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1926, 1928-1935
Statistisches Reichsamt (1937); 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938); 1937 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1939/40); local – 1926, 1928-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Bulgaria: central 1914, 1925-28 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a); 1929-30 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1932), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1934-37 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1938), 1937 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local – 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1937).
Czechoslovakia: central – 1926 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a); 1927-28 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1932); 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt
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(1938).
Denmark: central – 1914, 1927 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a); 1926, 1928, 1930-34 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1937); 1936-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local – 1926, 1928,
1930-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Estonia: central – 1925, 1927-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934).
Finland: central – 1925-27 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1928-29 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1932), 1930-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934)
, 1934-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1936-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
France: central – 1912, 1925-27 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1928-30 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1932), 1931-32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1933-35 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1937), 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938); local (departments and municipalities)
1929-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1932), 1931-32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1933-35
Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Germany: central – revenue only 1921-24 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25) , 1925-29
Statistisches Reichsamt (1930b), revenue only 1930-38 Ritschl (2002b) Tabelle A.1, com-
position 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b); local (States, municipalities and hanseatic
cities) – revenue only 1926-38 Ritschl (2002b) Tabelle A.10.
United Kingdom: central – 1914, 1926-28 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1929-31 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1932), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1933 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1934), 1934-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1936-37 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1938), 1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local – 1930-31 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1932), 1932-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1934-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Greece: central – 1929-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1932), 1931 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1933), 1933-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), Statistisches Reichsamt (1938).
Hungary: 1913, 1927-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1932-35 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1937), 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local (counties, cities and municipalities)
1929-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1932-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Ireland: central – 1929-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1932), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1934), 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Italy: central – 1914, 1926-28 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1929-31 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1932), 1932-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1936b), 1936-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local (provinces and municipalities)
1928 Statistisches Reichsamt (1932) and Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1932-33 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1937).
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Latvia: central – 1926, 1928, 1930-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1927, 1929 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1933); local – 1926, 1928, 1930-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Lithuania: central – 1925-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1934), 1933-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b),, 1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938),
1937 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Netherlands: central – 1913, 1926 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1925, 1927, 1929-34
Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1935 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1936 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1939/40); local – 1925, 1927, 1929-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Norway: central – 1914, 1927 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1926, 1928, 1930-35 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1937), 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1939/40); local – 1926, 1928, 1930-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Poland: central – 1925, 1927-28 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), Poland 1929-30 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1932), 1931-32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1933-34 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1937), 1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1939/40); local – 1933-34 citetReichsamt37.
Romania: central – 1928 Statistisches Reichsamt (1932), 1929-30 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1933), 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937
Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Spain: central – 1914,1925-27 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1928-29 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1933), 1932-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b).
Sweden: central – 1913, 1927 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1926, 1928-33 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1937), 1935 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1936-37 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1938), 1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40); local – 1926, 1928-33 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1937).
Switzerland: central – 1913, 1925-27 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1928-30 Statistis-
ches Reichsamt (1932), 1931-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937), 1934-1937 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1939/40); local (cantons and municipalities) – 1925-30 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1934), 1931-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937).
Yugoslavia: central – 1929-20 Statistisches Reichsamt (1932), 1931-33 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1934).
Argentina: central – 1925-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935-37 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1939/40).
Bolivia: central – 1925-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1932-35 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1938).
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Brazil: central – revenue only 1927-29 percentage changes Moody’s (1933), 1930-37 Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Chile: central – 1926-27, 1929-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1931-32 Statistisches
Reichsamt (1934), 1934-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1939/40).
Colombia: central – 1925-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1934-36 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1938), 1937 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Peru: central – 1925-32 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1933-36 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1939/40).
Australia: central – 1914 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1926-31 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1934), 1933-34 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938),
1938 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Japan: central – 1914.1926-28 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1929-30 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1932),1931-33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b),
1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937-38 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Canada: central – 1925-28 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1929-30 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1932), 1931 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1933-34 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1936b), 1935 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938).
Egypt: central – 1913, 1926-31Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1935 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1938), 1936-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
South Africa: central – 1926-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1932 Statistisches Re-
ichsamt (1934), 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1935-36 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1936b), 1937 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
USA: central – 1914, 1926, 1928 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1927 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1937), 1929-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1932), 1932 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933),
1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1934), 1935-37 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938).
Turkey: central – 1925-27 Statistisches Reichsamt (1930a), 1928-30 Statistisches Reich-
samt (1932), 1933 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1934 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938),
1935 Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
India: central – 1926-30 Statistisches Reichsamt (1933), 1931 Statistisches Reichsamt
(1934), 1934-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), 1936 Statistisches Reichsamt (1938), 1937
Statistisches Reichsamt (1939/40).
Government financing and expenditure at central and local level: data govern-
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ment financing and expenditure also comes from publications of the German Imperial
Statistical Office. All data is in local currency. As discussed in the paper, government
financing is a composite of tax revenues, non-tax revenues and long-term (over 1 year
maturity) borrowing, essentially it is the budgeted part of government revenues. Non-tax
revenues include the profits of publicly owned corporations, public monopolies and un-
classified revenues (such as the the sale abroad of certain commodities). As is the case
with most public sector data in the interwar period, accounting standards tend to differ
across countries As for tax revenues, when fiscal years do not correspond to calendar years
I assign data from the year in which the fiscal end to the whole calendar year and the data
all refer to realized revenues rather than budgets. The authors of the yearbooks made an
effort to make the data more easily comparable across countries, but issues remain (e.g. in
Spain short term borrowing cannot be separated out). In the analysis, the problem is min-
imized by exploiting the time-series rather that cross sectional variation in the data. For
instances where only some local bodies are included for some years (provinces are included,
but not municipalities), I use the information from years where data is available for all local
bodies to estimate the missing revenue using the average ratio between central and local
revenues. The common sources with page numbers are: Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25)
page 126* Statistisches Reichsamt (1935) page 229*-235*, Statistisches Reichsamt (1937),
Statistisches Reichsamt (1936b), Statistisches Reichsamt (1938) page 274*-283*, Statis-
tisches Reichsamt (1939/40) Statistisches Reichsamt (1941/42). The country by country
sources are as follows.
Austria: central financing & expenditure – 1923-26 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page
208, 1927-35 Statistisches Reichsamt (1937); local financing & expenditure (states and
municipalities with population over 5000)– 1927-31 Statistisches Reichsamt (1935).
Belgium: central financing & expenditure – 1912 Statistisches Reichsamt (1924/25), 1920-
33 Statistisches Reichsamt (1936a) page 43, 1936 (revenue only) Statistisches Reichsamt
(1938), 1937 (revenue only) Statistisches Reichsamt (1941/42); local financing & expendi-
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Chapter 5
Paper 3: Slavery, Fiscal Capacity
and Public Goods Provision in
Brazil: Evidence from Rio de
Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo, 1836-1912
5.1 Introduction
This paper studies the effect of slavery on the development of fiscal institutions at the local
level in Brazil. I focus on the two key Southeastern provinces/states of Rio de Janeiro
and Sa˜o Paulo and show that a high incidence of slavery in the 19th century was causally
associated with lower public revenue and expenditure per capita and worse public goods
provision at the municipal level in the early 20th century. My analysis indicates that
slavery interacted with and helped to shape the deep structural changes that affected
Brazil starting from the mid-19th century, and thus helped to define the attributes of
local institutions in this crucial period. These then persisted as local governments gained
prominence in Brazil’s Old Republic (1891-1930). This mechanism helps to explain the
large degree of variation in fiscal capacity and public goods provision within Brazil in the
early 20th century.
In the analysis, I find that standard regressions are inconclusive regarding the effect
of slavery on developmental outcomes, in line with previous research. This reflects serious
challenges to causal inference due to the spillover effects in fiscal decisions, measurement
error, and the fact that booming areas attracted large numbers of slaves and were also
able to increase public revenues and expenditure. I overcome these issues by employing
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spatial models and an instrumental variable strategy based on finely measured geographical
indicators. I then use the location of immigrant settler colonies to investigate one of the
potential channels through which slavery affected fiscal development. I find compelling
evidence that slavery’s impact was at least partially due to its negative influence on the
establishment of foreign immigrants, who were a major force in the expansion of the
public sector in Southeastern Brazil, where they settled en masse in the late 19th early
20th century. This is because migrants, unlike slaves, had a political voice, were used to
European levels of public goods provision and could “vote with their feet”.61
Brazil represents an ideal testing ground to improve our understanding of both the
historical origins of fiscal institutions and the effect of slavery on economic and insti-
tutional development for various reasons. First, the country was the largest receiver of
forced migrants during the Atlantic slave trade, with nearly 5 million Africans transported
across the ocean between the 16th and 19th century (Klein and Luna, 2010). Second, de-
spite significant improvements in recent decades, Brazil today is still characterized by an
overall weak institutional environment and low fiscal capacity. Tax revenue as a share of
output is in line with, if not above, that of countries with a comparable level of economic
development. However, income taxes – a strong indicator of fiscal capacity – represent
only a small share of this revenue. Brazil is furthermore plagued by corruption and tax
evasion, as well as inefficient and wasteful public spending, features which are strongly
connected with institutional weakness.62 Finally, the country is characterized by substan-
tial intra and inter-regional differences in economic outcomes – such as income, education
and inequality – and in the quality of governance and institutions.63
Brazil’s woes with fiscal and state capacity have a long history. The small fiscal re-
sources commanded by all levels of government – national, provincial/state and municipal
– and the connected poor provision of public goods were a topic of discussion amongst
policy makers and commentators already in the 19th century (Nunes Leal, 1977).64 In
fact, there is ample evidence that low public spending acted as a constraint for growth
due to the suboptimal provision of infrastructure and education in the mid and late 1800s
61Moreover, migrant communities often built their own schools for which the government would cover at
least part of the costs (de Carvalho Filho and Colistete, 2010).
62See Shleifer and Vishny (1993) on the ties between state weakness and corruption.
63See Reis (2017) for a historical perspective on spatial income inequality in Brazil and Alston, Melo,
Mueller, and Pereira (2016) for an overview of the progress made by Brazil in some of these areas in the
last two decades.
64See also Abreu and do Lago (2001) for a survey of Brazilian fiscal history since colonization and Sum-
merhill (2015) for an excellent account of public finances and borrowing at the national level in Imperial
Brazil.
199
(Leff, 1997; Summerhill, 2005). The inadequate financing of local governments has been
an issue of particular importance in Brazil. This was true not only in the 19th century,
but also over the course of the 1900s, particularly after the fiscal and administrative cen-
tralization, which followed the revolution of 1930. The paltry resources commanded by
municipalities played an important role in the low provision of public goods, particularly
primary education, in this latter period (Kang, 2017). Up to this day, the fiscal capacity
of local governments matters for the de facto provision of public services. Gadenne (2017)
finds that Brazilian municipalities which expand their revenues through taxation, as op-
posed to grants from the federal government, are more likely to spend them on productive
public goods.
With its exploration of the role of slavery in the development of local fiscal institu-
tions, this paper relates to two main strands of literature. First, it speaks to the growing
literature on state capacity. Understanding the processes through which polities acquire
the capacity to tax and perform the basic tasks of modern states is of fundamental impor-
tance in order to shed light on the ways in which public institutions can support or stifle
economic growth and development.65 In line with much of the work in this field, I focus
on fiscal capacity. This is because, apart from being the most easily measurable element
of state capacity, fiscal capacity plays a pivotal role in supporting and complementing the
development of other state capacities (Besley and Persson, 2009).
Although research on state and fiscal capacity is a burgeoning field, little is still known
about the formation of fiscal institutions outside of Europe, particularly at the sub-national
level (Hoffman, 2015; Nafziger, 2016; Koyama and Johnson, 2017). Warfare is at the heart
of much of the historical literature on state formation and fiscal capacity development66
but, whereas in Europe the incidence of large armed conflicts throughout history provided
the stimulus for the creation of strong fiscal states and the expansion of modern forms of
taxation, no comparable developments took place in many other parts of the world, such
as Latin America (Centeno, 1997, 2002). At the same time, regional variation in fiscal
institutions across and within Latin American nations are large. Thus, there is the need
to go beyond the warfare-state formation nexus in order to understand these differences.
Second, this paper speaks to the literature on the economic effects of slavery. The
work of Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff has shaped much of the research in this
field. The authors postulated that slavery emerged and flourished in parts of the Americas
65Some contributions outlining this point are Acemoglu (2005); Besley and Persson (2014); Hoffman (2015);
Dincecco and Katz (2016); Bardhan (2016); Koyama and Johnson (2017).
66See, for example, Tilly (1975, 1990); O’Brien (2011); Besley and Persson (2010) and Dincecco and Prado
(2012).
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as a result of initial endowments favorable to large-scale plantation agriculture. This led
to high inequality, adverse institutional evolution and relatively worse economic develop-
ment compared to parts of the continent unaffected by large scale slavery (Engerman and
Sokoloff, 1997, 2012). Nunn (2008b) and Bruhn and Gallego (2012) offer a systematic eval-
uation of this hypothesis, which yields only a partial empirical confirmation. Nunn finds
a negative relationship between slavery and development, but not through the channel of
large scale plantation agriculture posited by Engerman and Sokoloff. Moreover, he finds
no support for inequality being the channel of persistence. Bruhn and Gallego find a link
between colonial activities involving increasing returns to scale and worse economic out-
comes today through the channel of less representative political institutions, but find no
link between the exploitation of forced labour and development. However, single country
studies have found evidence of a negative relationship between various forms of coerced
labour and long-term development in Latin America, for exmaple Dell (2010) for Peru and
Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2012) for Colombia.
Even though Brazil was the largest importer of slaves during the Atlantic slave trade,
the broad economic and institutional legacy of slavery in the country has not been firmly
established. Therefore, this paper offers prima facie evidence on the negative impact of
slavery on a fundamental ingredient of long-term economic development: fiscal capacity
and public goods provision. Moreover, it offers a new channel through slavery had an
impact, namely by shaping the settlement of foreign immigrants during the age of mass
migration.
Although a number of studies have attempted, amongst other things, to investigate
the link between slavery and long-term development in Brazil, their findings are largely
inconclusive in this respect (Summerhill, 2010; de Carvalho Filho and Colistete, 2010;
Reis, 2017). Some studies offer indirect evidence of the impact of slavery and of extrac-
tive colonial activities more generally (Naritomi, Soares, and Assunc¸a˜o, 2012; Musacchio,
Mart´ınez Fritscher, and Viarengo, 2014; de Carvalho, 2015), but the only paper showing
evidence of a clear cut and direct legacy of slavery in Brazil is Fujiwara et al’s work on
the link between slavery and contemporary inequality (Fujiwara, Laudares, and Valencia
Caceido, 2017). I review this literature in detail, alongside more general work on slavery
in Brazil, in Section 2.3 of the literature review chapter of this Dissertation.
More broadly the paper also speaks to the literature on the determinants of long-term
development. Much of the debate has been focused on identifying the ultimate cause of
why some countries are rich and some are poor, with institutions and geography normally
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being on either side of the debate.67 However, it is becoming increasingly clear that both
institutions and geography matter, that they can influence each other, and that each can
matter more or less given a myriad of other circumstances.
The findings of this paper are very much in line with these ideas. On one side, they
suggest that geography does matter, since, in addition to any direct effects of endow-
ments on fiscal development, the allocation of slaves was determined at least in part by
geographical features. However, the changing salience of geographical characteristics for
the allocation of slaves across Brazilian municipalities was due to events unconnected to
geography, namely the gradual decline and eventual abolition of slavery over the course of
the 19th century. The delayed settlement of some areas of the country was furthermore
aided by the late and slow diffusion of railways in Brazil, which, in turn, was mainly
due to financial and political factors. The result of this is that frontier areas in Brazil
relied less on slave labour compared to equally endowed areas closer to the coast because
they were settled later. In turn, these developments helped to shape local institutions.
This demonstrates that, as argued by North, Summerhill, and Weingast (2000), endow-
ments transform themselves into political and economic outcomes through complex and
non-linear mechanisms and that the same endowments need not yield the same outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I provide some historical background as
well as information on Brazil’s administrative set-up in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 outlines
the empirical strategy employed the paper, Section 5.4 illustrates the data, and Section
5.5 presents the results of the analysis. Section 5.6 briefly concludes.
5.2 Background
5.2.1 Public finance in Brazil’s municipalities
During Brazil’s constitutional monarchy (1822-1889), which followed independence from
Portugal, municipalities – Brazil’s smallest administrative units – had very little auton-
omy. They relied on provincial governments for the approval of municipal regulations and
the appointment of local functionaries. Decisions regarding local budgets also had to be
approved by the provincial assembly. Indeed, despite its size, Brazil was a very central-
ized country that left municipalities little power or resources of their own. On top of this,
the rural oligarchs, who controlled provincial and national governments, also had a strong
67See Nunn (2009) for a brief discussion.
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influence on municipal affairs, a phenomenon known as Coronelismo (Nunes Leal, 1977).68
In the more remote areas of the country, the hold of power of the coronels on admin-
istrative processes and law enforcement was practically complete. The local population
turned to local oligarchs offering votes in exchange for aid and protection, in a classic
example of clientelism and patronage. In this context, boundaries between the public and
the private tended to be blurred as public funds were used for private interests and private
funds used for civic improvements. Moreover, the impersonality needed for bureaucratic
efficiency was rare (da Costa, 2000). The situation was only marginally different in impor-
tant coastal cities and other urban centers. There, other power groups, such as merchants
and professionals, exerted influence alongside traditional elites (Woodard, 2005). Inter-
estingly, neither the oligarchs nor their clients appointed to public administration were
particularly interested in expanding the revenues of the municipalities since their main
interest lay in power and authority, rather than in direct embezzlement or corruption
involving public funds (Graham, 1990; Abreu and do Lago, 2001).
However, citizens were not entirely powerless. Colistete (2017) shows that, in the
province of Sa˜o Paulo citizens successfully lobbied the provincial government through mu-
nicipal assemblies for the installation of primary schools. This took place even under very
adverse conditions of isolation, poverty and illiteracy. After 1875, immigrants were par-
ticularly prominent as signatories of petitions requesting the creation of primary schools.
The financial and political position of Brazilian municipalities changed slowly, but
steadily over time, particularly following the Ato Adicional (Additional Act) of 1834, which
gave provinces legislative power over their own and municipal taxation and expenditure,
on the condition that these did not interfere with those of the central government (Abreu
and do Lago, 2001). In 1826, shortly after independence, Brazilian municipalities raised
essentially no revenues of their own. By 1856, municipal revenues had reached around 3.3%
of total public revenues and by 1885-86 they stood at 5.2% (Sokoloff and Zolt, 2007).69
The end of the Monarchy in 1889 and the creation of a more federalist republic in 1891,
led to municipalities gaining prominence. During what has become known as the Old
Republic (1891-1930), mayors were elected rather than appointed in most states, and the
new Constitution established that provincial and municipal ordinary budgets would have
to fund primary education. Additionally, in booming regions of the country, municipalities
increased their revenues rapidly thanks to growing intakes from taxes on coffee and on
68The term Coronel (colonel) in this context is not tied to the military. It is a term used to identify
influential local figures and oligarchs who traditionally bought posts in the National Guard.
69da Costa (2000) reports a lower figure, less than 3%
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activities and professions (de Carvalho Filho and Colistete, 2010).
Even after these reforms, however, the distribution of public revenues across various
levels of government and the scarce resources commanded by municipalities continued to
be a prominent issue. In the late 19th and early 20th century, it was widely believed that
Brazil’s municipalities, particularly rural ones in the backlands, did not possess enough
resources to provide basic services like healthcare and education to the population. There
was, moreover, a feeling that large urban centres absorbed fiscal resources from these
regions and thus curbed their development (Nunes Leal, 1977). In turn, the development
of the backlands came to be seen as necessary for the continued industrial development of
Sa˜o Paulo and Rio de Janeiro through the expansion of the domestic market, making the
issue salient for both central and state governments.
In any case, within a context of overall low public revenues, municipalities had become
important players in the collection of tax revenue and the provision of public goods by
the beginning of the 20th century. As shown in Figure 5.1, between 1907 and 1938,
municipalities were responsible for around 15% of total public revenue and 14% of total
public expenditure on average. At the state level, municipalities produced 24% and 23% of
total revenues and expenditures respectively, employed around one third of all workers in
civil administration, and were responsible for significant shares of expenditure in key areas.
As an example, in 1919-23 close to 20% of public expenditure on education in some states
and over 50% of average expenditure on public works were performed by municipalities.
In Rio de Janeiro, municipalities were responsible for around 31% of the state’s public
revenue and 29% of its public expenditure between 1907 and 1938, while in Sa˜o Paulo
the figures were 30% and 26% respectively, higher levels than the Brazilian average. In
Rio de Janeiro municipalities were responsible for 50% of public works and around 6%
of education expenditure, while in Sa˜o Paulo they were responsible for only 2% of public
education expenditure, but still provided over 45% of public works expenditure. More-
over, notwithstanding the low expenditure on education, municipal schools in Sa˜o Paulo
provided around one third of school places in 1912.
5.2.2 Economic growth and structural changes in 19th and early 20th
century Brazil
Brazil’s economy in 19th century experienced a long period of stagnation, at least on the
surface (Figure 5.2). Growth in the 1870s and 80s was later reversed, so that in 1900
Brazil’s GDP per capita stood more or less at its 1800 level. Sustained growth only began
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(a) All of Brazil
(b) Rio de Janeiro & Sa˜o Paulo
Figure 5.1: Municipal finances in Brazil, 1907-1938
Source: Brazil (1939/40)
around the turn of the 20th century and was particularly fast between the 1930s and the
late 1970s. However, the apparent stagnation of the 19th century masks deep structural
changes. One of the key developments of this period was a permanent shift in the center
of gravity of the Brazilian economy from the Northeastern sugar-producing regions to the
Southeastern coffee-growing provinces. Although the process possibly began earlier with
the discovery of gold in Minas Gerais, the coffee boom was instrumental in bringing it to
fruition (Klein and Luna, 2010).
Rough estimates indicate that per capita income in the Northeast fell by 30% be-
tween 1822 and 1913. The disastrous performance of the region was driven by the poor
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Figure 5.2: Real GDP per capita in Brazil and the USA, 1800-2010
Logarithmic scale. Source: Bolt and van Zanden (2013)
performance of the region’s two main exports: cotton and sugar. While in 1822 sugar
represented 49% of Brazil’s exports and cofffee 19%, by 1913 cotton and sugar combined
were only 3% of Brazil’s exports while coffee accouted for 60% (Leff, 1997).70
The diffusion of railways further contributed to the deep structural changes of the 19th
century. Pre-railways, goods were usually transported by mules or carts on unpaved roads
stretching over uneven and mountainous terrain. This meant that ransport costs were so
high as to absorb around 1/3 of the value of coffee production, for example. Inadequate
transportation infrastructure thus affected the export sector, but also constrained the
growth of the internal market by limiting the reach of domestic producers of non-cash crops
to their immediate surroundings. The development of an internal market for manufactured
goods was similarly stunted (Leff, 1997; Summerhill, 2005).
The country’s first railway line was bulit in 1854, but by 1890 the network was still
70The expansion of coffee production in the southeast, however, did not translate into significant wage
increases for workers. This was due to the elasticity of the labour market, which was fueled by the
reallocation of slaves to the coffee regions on one side, and (subsidised) immigration on the other. Although
the second half of 19th century is usually seen as the most dynamic one in the century due to the coffee
export boom, a revisionist view has drawn attention to the post independence decades. According to
this view, the shock of the abolition of slavery in the British Caribbean combined with other structural
changes interacted with and facilitated Brazil’s continued reliance on slave labour and expansion of the
frontier (Leff, 1997) . This view is supported by a reassesment of official export statistics which have been
found to be unreliable (Absell and Tena-Junguito, 2015). Leff (1997), however, warns against placing
emphasis exclusively on the export economy. The majority of the population in 19th century Brazil was
engaged in the domestic agricultural sector producing for local markets. In particular, most of the free
population (1/2 to 2/3 of total population in 1800, around 70% in 1820) was employed outside the export
sectors where, instead, slave labour was predominant. In 1911-13, exports accounted for 16% of Brazil’s
GDP and exports had grown faster than the rest of the economy in the 19th century, meaning that their
importance was even lower in the 19th century.
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limited. Substantial construction towards the interior only started during the last decade
of the 19th century and by 1914, Brazil’s railway expansion was equivalent to that of the
US in the 1850s.71 Private local and foreign capital, particularly British, contributed to
the expansion of railways, while governments – central and local – were not nearly as
active as they were, for example, in the US in the financing of transportation infrastruc-
ture (Leff, 1997; Summerhill, 1997). Nonetheless, government intervention was essential in
kick-starting railway construction. This set off a virtuous cycle between infrastructure in-
vestment and public revenue growth by facilitating the growth of exports (Bignon, Esteves,
and Herranz-Lonca´n, 2015).72 By the turn of the 20th century, the widespread diffusion
of railways meant that the growth that had been limited to the export sector expanded to
the domestically oriented sectors and the internal market (Leff, 1997; Summerhill, 2005).
Rio de Janeiro and, especially, its neighbor Sa˜o Paulo benefitted hugely from develop-
ments in this time period. The province of Rio de Janeiro had enjoyed a more precocious
prominence compared to Sa˜o Paulo as home of the colonial capital since 1723 and of inde-
pendent Brazil after 1822, even though the capital city formed a separate political entity.73
Rio de Janeiro also partook in large scale sugar cane production and, later, in the coffee
boom. As a consequence of these factors, it was home to vast number of slaves, which
often entered the country precisely through the port of Rio de Janeiro, especially from the
18th century onwards.
Sa˜o Paulo became the economic powerhouse of Brazil at a later stage, and mainly
thanks to the coffee boom that began in the 1830s. Sugar cane and cotton were cultivated
in Sa˜o Paulo, but the province was not an important producer of either. It was also not
touched by the gold boom of the 18th century. Its first true commodity-based boom was
that of coffee. By the late 19th century, however, Sa˜o Paulo dominated coffee production
in Brazil and Brazil dominated coffee production in the world. Around the same time,
other forms of economic activity started to flourish, and by 1940 the state had become
the country’s most important industrial and financial centre.
Thus, the coffee boom played a big part in the structural changes that affected Brazil in
the 19th century, and had lasting effects on the structure of the economy. New domestically
financed and owned industries took root precisely in the regions that benefitted the most
71The location of railway lines was influenced by the financial and poltical power of local landowners and
thus tended to follow the existing settlement of population and economic activity. Being located next
to railways tended to increase the value of land, besides providing easier access to markets. This led to
disputes, which potentially slowed down concessions and construction. Landowners also lobbied to keep
tariffs low and promote import of machinery from abroad at low or zero tariffs (Summerhill, 1997).
72Similar developments took root also in many other parts of Latin America.
73The city remained the nation’s capital until the inauguration of Bras´ılia in 1960.
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from growing exports and foreign capital inflows in the late 19th and early 20th century
(Haber, 1997). Today, the Southeast is still the richest region in Brazil while the Northeast
is relatively poor. There are indications that path dependency also worked at a more micro
level. Monasteiro (2010) finds almost no instances of reversal of fortunes in the income
per capita of Brazilian municipalities between 1872 and 2000.
5.2.3 Slavery and experiments with free labour in the 19th century
Structural changes in the economy were mirrored by changes in the structure of the popu-
lation. After Independence, slaves were concentrated in the province of Rio de Janeiro, in
the sugar-growing regions of the Northeast and in the gold-mining areas of Minas Gerais.
However, as coffee production spread to the Southeast, this region started to acquire slaves
in substantial amounts (Leff, 1997; da Costa, 2000).
Coffee growing started to expand rapidly around 1830. The main production centre
in this early phase, which reached its peak around 1850, was the Para´ıba Valley, which
is located across the border of Sa˜o Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, in the eastern part of the
former and the western part of the latter (Fausto, 1999). Over time, the heartland of coffee
production shifted dramatically away from the Para´ıba Valley towards the north and west
of Sa˜o Paulo and towards Minas Gerais (Klein and Luna, 2010). By the second half of the
1800s, differences in productivity were dramatic: Para´ıba valley growers produced around
20-50 arrobas74 of coffee per 1000 trees compared to 80-100 in the West of Sa˜o Paulo (da
Costa, 2000).
Mounting pressure from Britain made the continuation of slave-based coffee production
increasingly difficult as the 19th century progressed. The slave trade to British colonies
was abolished in 1807 and in 1815 it became illegal north of the equator. In 1831, British
insistence led to the adoption of a first law abolishing the slave trade in Brazil. This,
however, had little practical consequences on the actual inflow of slaves due to the lack
of a real political desire to end slavery, which played a very large role in Brazil’s agrarian
economy, and the inability of the government to impose its will on the oligarchs that dom-
inated the provinces both politically and administratively. So, the slave trade continued
practically unabated and actually grew in numbers as coffee plantations boosted demand
for labour (da Costa, 2000). In 1850, however, the international slave trade was finally
de facto abolished through the implementation of severe and effective measures against
smuggling, which continued at a drastically reduced rate for a number of years. Once
74An arroba corresponds to 15kg.
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again British influence was decisive for this outcome (Fausto, 1999).
The internal reallocation of slaves to the coffee growing regions became particularly
important after the abolition of the international slave trade and remained so until the
abolition of the transfer of slaves across provinces in the late 1870s. The number of slaves
arriving to the Southeast from the rest of Brazil ranged between 6,000 and 9,000 a year in
the 1850s and 60s (Slenes, 1975; Klein, 1978). This meant that, while in 1823 Minas Gerais,
Rio de Janeiro, and Sa˜o Paulo held around 386,000 slaves and the Northeastern provinces
of Bahia, Pernambuco and Maranha˜o held around 484,000, in 1872 – when the slave
population reached its peak in absolute, but by no means relative, terms – the traditional
sugar growing regions held 346,000 slaves and the coffee regions approximately 800,000.
Even with slave numbers in sharp decline, the slave population in the fast growing West
of Sa˜o Paulo grew by 15% between 1874 and 1883, while decreasing in absolute numbers
in older coffee growing regions (Klein and Luna, 2010).
Notwithstanding this large internal reallocation of slaves, the huge expansion in coffee
production, the high mortality rates of the slaves and the abolition of slave imports meant
that slave labour became increasingly inadequate to satisfy the labour demand of the
Southeast. Moreover, the Lei do Ventre Libre (Law of the Free Womb) of 1871 marked
the beginning of a strong abolitionist movement within Brazil. Although the law had a
small direct impact, since most children technically born free were forced to remain with
their masters until they turned 21, there were substantial indirect effects. Self purchase
by the slaves increased, third party interventions to free slaves became more common,
and active legal actions by the slaves to obtain freedom were more likely to be successful.
The rapid increase in abolitionist sentiment, combined with increasing slave revolts and
successful escapes, eventually culminated in the abolition of slavery in 1888 (Klein and
Luna, 2010).
In the face of these developments, planters and policy-makers alike started to look
for alternatives to slave labour. Initial experiments with the subsidization of immigrants
to form colonies were generally unsuccessful due to badly designed contracts between
colonists and planters and the lack of incentives pushing the two parties towards the same
goals. The province of Sa˜o Paulo with its rapidly expanding coffee plantations was at
the forefront of such experiments and the provincial government cooperated with private
individuals to promote the settling of Europeans on Paulista plantations as early as 1829,
and more vigorously from the 1840s. Initial share-cropping colonies were set up principally
in the more recently settled lands of the west of the state where colonists worked alongside
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slaves, albeit with distinct functions (da Costa, 2000).
By the second half of the 1850s, however, discontents were being voiced by both
planters and colonists. Notwithstanding very high slave prices, due the abolishment of
the slave trade, planters still relied heavily and appeared to prefer slave to free colonists’
labour.75 Although there were exception to this generally negative experience and some
planters continued to experiment with and promote free labour, planters seemed generally
ill-equipped to deal with the peculiarities of free labour. A common point of contention was
the tendency of settlers to refuse to work when dissatisfied. And dissatisfied they tended
to be, with the terms of their contracts, with their living quarters, with their confinement
to the plantations, and with the tasks of repairing roads and other infrastructure, which
they saw as falling outside their contracts. Moreover, Catholicism was the only recognized
religion in the country, while protestantism was the chief cult amongst Swiss and Ger-
man colonists. This created further frictions with the planters (da Costa, 2000). Another
cause of discontent, which also reveals that both planters and the authorities intended the
colonists to be a direct replacement for slaves by tying them to specific plantations, was
the fact that immigrants who received subsidies to relocate to Brazil were barred from
buying land for three years after their arrival (Fausto, 1999).76 Against this backdrop,
settlers abandoning the plantations with unfulfilled contracts and outright revolts became
frequent (da Costa, 2000).
Although settler colonies established at a later stage are generally considered to have
been more successful than these early experiments, the experience with this type of sub-
sidized migration is not generally seen as particularly fruitful (Cameron, 1931). Sending
countries were also worried about the conditions of migrants to Brazil, particularly those
residing in colonies and working on coffee plantations. Growing concerns in Italy, for exam-
ple, eventually led to the “Decreto Prinetti” of 1902, named after Italy’s foreign minister
of the time, which made subsidized emigration from Italy illegal, and was targeted mainly
at migration to Brazil. Prussia nominally prohibited emigration to Brazil as early as 1859,
and similar measures were implemented for the whole German empire from 1871 (Fausto,
1999).
The economic changes of the second half of the 1800s had a profound impact on free
labour, however. Transportation improved, machinery started being introduced on coffee
plantations and coffee prices worldwide were were genarlly high. This shifted the balance
75Not all colonists were perceived equally. In general, Portuguese settlers appear to have been perceived
as better suited for plantation work than the other two major colonist nationalities of the time: Swiss
and Germans (da Costa, 2000).
76This provision became effective with the approval of the 1850 Law on Land.
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in favour of free labour and specialization. Initially, however, obstacles to the widespread
diffusion of agricultural free labour, such as traditional sharecropping arrangements, still
prevailed. This led to both the perpetuation of slavery in traditional coffee and sugar
producing regions and the reallocation of more slaves from declining areas to booming
ones. Only when the abolition of slavery was looming large, did interest in importing
free labour become strong again. Between 1872 and 1885, 42,000 mostly Italian and
Portuguese immigrants entered Sa˜o Paulo. In 1886-87, 122,000 entered the province, and
800,000 more in the following decade (da Costa, 2000). Between 1885 and 1909, a total
of around 2.8 million European migrants entered Brazil and the majority went to satisfy
the demand for labour of coffe plantations, industries and other activities in the Southeast
(Figure 5.3).77
Figure 5.3: Immigrant inflow into Sa˜o Paulo in absolute numbers and a share of total
migration to Brazil, 1820-1930
Source: Cameron (1931)
Thus, eventually, the project of substituting slaves with immigrants was a success. This
success was helped by heavy state intervention. Monetary incentives and propaganda both
played a role. The virtues of migrating to Brazil were extolled in Europe via pamphlets
and other publications exemplified by the magazine “O Immigrante” published for the
first time in 1908 by the Secretaria da Agricultura (Department of Agriculture) of Sa˜o
Paulo in six languages: portuguese, spanish, italian, french, german and polish (Figure
5.4). Planters lobbied both the central government and the provincial governmet of Sa˜o
77Most other immigrants settled in the southern provinces of Santa Catarina, Parana´ and Rio Grande do
Sul. There, they generally received land and set up their own communities instead of substituting slave
labour on plantations (Leff, 1997).
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Paulo to subsidize immigration. This led to the government generally fronting the cost of
the voyage for the immigrants. Apart from increasing the net private return of moving
to Brazil, this helped to overcome credit constraints faced by potential immigrants that
might otherwise have prevented them from undertaking the trip. For a limited time, the
Imperial government also payed a small daily wage to colonists. However, by 1900 push
factors in Europe were so strong that the majority of immigrant arrivals were unsubsidized
(Cameron, 1931).
Figure 5.4: Cover page of the first edition of the propaganda magazine “O Immigrante”,
published in January 1908
Source: Arquivo pu´blico do estado de Sa˜o Paulo
5.3 Empirical strategy
The central goal of this paper is assessing how slavery affected the development of munic-
ipal fiscal institutions in Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo. The hypothesis is that a greater
reliance on slave labour in the 19th century reduced the demand and supply of public
goods and the degree of local fiscal capacity. Naturally, in order to identify slavery’s im-
pact on local institutions, this needs to have persisted after its abolition and until the
early 20th century, when I observe my outcomes.
There are several potential channels through which slavery might have influenced fiscal
development. First, a widespread reliance on slave labour might have heightened ethnic
cleavages, making resource sharing through taxation and public goods more difficult. This
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hypothesis does not appear to be supported by the data, however. I find that, after
controlling for the incidence of slavery, more ethnically fragmented municipalities had
consistently higher fiscal capacity and public goods provision. This result runs contrary to
much of previous research, which finds a negative relationship between ethnic and linguistic
fragmentation and public goods provision (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999; Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2005), but is in line with more recent work, which suggests that the effect
of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization will depend, in practice, on the degree of local
mixing and of cross-ethnic interactions (Desmet, Gomes, and Ortun˜o-Ort´ın, 2016). Thus,
at least at the local level – see Lieberman (2003) for some more general considerations
on racial relations and taxation in Brazilian history – ethnic fractionalization might have
contributed to more mixing and resource sharing in Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo. The
absence of racial ghettos in Brazil (Klein and Luna, 2010) reinforces this idea, which
however, requires further exploration in future research.
A second channel for the link between slavery and low fiscal capacity is the fact that
slaves were not educated. This reduced the need to fund public schools, and thus the
need to raise public revenue. Third, a high incidence of slavery deprived a large share of
the population of a political voice. Moreover, it limited the incentive of municipalities to
attract workers or prevent them from emigrating by providing public services, since slaves
obviously could not “vote with their feet”. This also reduced the strength of free citizens’
demands and the accountability of local politicians for as long as slave labour was a viable
alternative to free labour. A final channel, closely related to the latter, is that the presence
of slaves influenced the distribution of foreign immigrants across municipalities and that
this, in turn, helped to shape local institutions.
Late 19th century migration clearly played a big role in Brazilian economic develop-
ment. Stolz, Baten, and Botelho (2013), for example, find that it had positive effects on
human capital and income per capita in the long term. de Carvalho Filho and Monasteiro
(2012) look specifically at settler colonies and show that, in the Southern state of Rio
Grande do Sul, proximity to 19th century immigrant colonies is related to better economic
outcomes today. At least part of the effect of immigration is probably due to its impact
on local institutions. Unlike slave labour, free labour provided a stimulus for the provision
of public goods. This is because migrants, unlike slaves, could “vote with their feet” and,
unlike the local population, were used to higher European levels of public goods provision.
Thus, competition between municipalities keen on attracting workers from abroad presum-
ably manifested itself in the provision of public goods, such as education healthcare, public
213
hygiene, sewers, public lights and public works. Migrant communities also tended to set
up their own schools, which were often partially financed by public coffers (de Carvalho
Filho and Colistete, 2010). In a different setting, that of pre-modern Germany, Dittmar
and Meisenzahl (2016) show that local level fiscal institutions and public goods provision
can indeed shape migration patterns. They find that reforms, which led to the expan-
sion of fiscal capacity and public education, led to the production and the immigration of
upper-tail human capital in cities which adopted them. Similar mechanisms might have
been at work in Brazil.
Furthermore, in areas wishing to attract migrants, or where migrants settled, the pa-
ternalistic and clientelistic relationships that characterized much of Brazilian local politics
– summarily known as Coronelismo – were less likely to thrive. This is because these
relationship would need to be established anew with a different class of citizens that was
geographically mobile. In the US South, landowners successfully lobbied the Federal gov-
ernment through their representatives to limit the growth of the welfare state. Their aim
was tying the work force – ex-slaves in particular, initially – to the land by offering ser-
vices within paternalistic and clientelistic relationships (Alston and Ferrie, 1985, 1993).
Although different tools, such as vagrancy laws, were used in the Brazilian context to
keep freed slaves tied to the plantations (Huggins, 1985; Klein and Luna, 2010; Bucciferro,
2017), similar mechanisms might have been at work in post-abolition Brazil as well. This
possibility will be explored in future research.
In summary, the migrant settlement channel I propose in this paper is tightly linked to
political representation. However, it is not the type of political representation embedded
in the formal institutions emphasized by much of the literature – for example Acemoglu,
Bautista, Querub´ın, and Robinson (2008) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2012)) – and ana-
lyzed by Summerhill (2010) and Funari (2017) in the Brazilian setting. These studies have
focused on the extent of the political franchise and the right to vote, I argue that it was the
migrants’ geographical mobility and their ability to punch above their weight politically
due Brazil’s labour shortage that mattered. This might explain why the latter authors
find no link between narrowly defined political inequality and long-term development.
As shown, there are ample reasons to believe that the inflow of immigrants stimulated
local fiscal development and public goods provision. But in what way could slavery have
affected the settlement of foreign immigrants? Many authors have argued that the ex-
istence of slavery stunted the development of efficient markets for free labour and mass
immigration from Europe (Klein and Luna, 2010). However immigration did eventually
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take place, and became thunderous already before slavery was abolished. Moreover, free
labor existed before mass immigration, and the incidence of slavery was vastly different
across the Brazilian territory. Therefore, it is clear that the institution of slavery affected
local free labour differently in different parts of the country.
In Sa˜o Paulo, the duality between slave and free labour was very salient, especially in
the 1880s, when large scale immigrant inflows to the province began and slavery had not
yet been not abolished. The presence of large slave populations in a municipality likely
reduced the settlements of immigrants due to both a lower demand for labour and the
extremely negative perception slavery had acquired by the late 19th century both in and
outside Brazil. Evidence of this are the pamphlets created to attract European immigrants
to Brazil by the Society for the Promotion of Immigration78, which purposely failed to
mention the existence of slavery (Fausto, 1999). It is also useful to recall that Brazil was
one of the last countries to abolish the institution. Rhetoric aside, this quotation from a
report of the president of the province of Sa˜o Paulo to the provincial assembly in January
1889, merely 8 months after the abolition of slavery, illustrates the impact slavery had on
potential immigrants to Brazil:
We were not known to civilized nations. Slavery made us barbarians in the eyes
of foreigners and, due to ignorance or bad faith, outside of Portugal, which as
a whole could not populate just one of our provinces, the idea of migrating to
Brazil for those who could, if at all there, was considered terrible. It appeared
as a country not habitable by civilized people, due to endemic diseases and its
climate. This false judgement is now completely undone. Thousands of letters
from Italians, Belgians Germans, Spaniards and individuals from other nations
cross the seas, bringing to the relatives and friends that remained behind the
welcome news that immigrants found in the Paulista land an adoptive home
that is free and happy, where there is room for all aspirations and for all faiths,
with a governmental structure modeled in line with the most civilized in the
world.79
78In Portoguese: Sociedade Promotora de Imigraca˜o. It was founded by members of the Paulista elite
keen on promoting European migration to the province in 1886.
79Author’s translation of the relatorio apresentado a´ Assemble´a Legislativa Provincial de Sa˜o Paulo pelo
presidente da provincia, dr. Pedro de Azevedo, no dia 11 de Janeiro de 1889. Jorge Steckler & Comp.“Na˜o
eramos conhecidos das nac¸o˜es civilsadas. A escravida˜o fazia-nos passar aos olhos dos estrangeiros como
uns barbaros e, por ignorancia ou ma´ fe´, fo´ra de Portugal, que todo elle na˜o chegaria para o povoamento
de uma so´ de nossa Provincias, a ide´a em que era tido o Brazil entre os que podˆıam emigrar, si na˜o era
nulla, era pessima. Figurava-se-lhes un paiz impossivel de ser habitado por gente civilisada, devido a
emfermidades endemicas e ao seu clima. Esto falso juizo esta´ desfeito interiamente. Milhares de cartas de
Italianos, de Belgas, de Allema˜es, de Hespanho´es e de individuos de outras nac¸o˜es atravessam os mares,
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Therefore, slavery likely affected the development of fiscal capacity and the provision
of public goods both directly and indirectly. On one hand, slaves lacked the however
limited political voice that free Brazilian citizens had. On the other, slavery influenced
the settlement of foreign migrants and thus the extent to which this dynamic group of
citizens was able to shape local institutions.
There are also good reasons to believe that the impact of slavery persisted after its
abolition, and that its persistence was directly tied to its previous pervasiveness. In areas
with a long-history of slave labour, such as the Para´ıba valley and the state of Rio de
Janeiro, ex-slaves often remained as artisans, workers in the growing industrial sector or
as sharecroppers on coffee plantations . Slaves in frontier areas of Sa˜o Paulo, instead,
tended to follow their predecessors who had either been freed or had escaped slavery
in relocating to other areas, particularly the city of Sa˜o Paulo (Fausto, 1999). Thus,
on frontier plantations the replacement of slaves with European immigrants took place
very rapidly after abolition. At the same time, the shadow of slavery continued to affect
those areas that had been most affected by it throughout the 19th century, potentially
strengthening its legacy. Non-white Brazilians also continued to face discrimination and
their social mobility remained limited (da Costa, 2000).
5.3.1 Threats to identification and solutions
I perform my analysis in two steps. In the first (Sections 5.5.1-5.5.4), I use the rich
data sources for Sa˜o Paulo in conjunction with a spatial models and an instrumental
variable approach to establish the causal effect of slavery on fiscal capacity and public
goods provision. In the second step (Section 5.5.5), I use data for both Rio de Janeiro and
Sa˜o Paulo to test the robustness of this relationship by expanding it to a setting with a
significantly different history.
Importantly for the interpretation of the results, I control for the initial level of state
capacity in my analysis. This is essential to avoid an obvious omitted variable bias, due
to the fact pre-existing institutions might affect both my regressors and the outcome.
However, it also means that I capture the effect of slavery on the development of local
institutions after 1872. The total effect of slavery on fiscal capacity and public goods
provision is likely to be larger. My results can thus be interpreted as lower bound estimates
of the true effect of slavery. However, post-1872 developments likely capture the lion’s share
levando as parentes e amigos, que ficaram, a grata noticia de que os emigrados encontraram na terra
Paulista uma patria adoptiva livre e feliz, onde ha logar para todas as aspirac¸o˜es e para todas creanc¸as,
sob un regimen governamental modelado pelos dos mais civilisados do mundo.”
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of the effect of slavery, particularly in Sa˜o Paulo. 1872 was the peak year in terms of slave
numbers in the province (Summerhill, 2010). Moreover, the very limited independence
and dearth of own revenues of municipalities in the first half of the 19th century, suggest
that the late 19th century played the key role in the development of local institutions.80
The identification of the causal effect of slavery on fiscal capacity development and
public goods provision faces several serious threats. The clearest is that some factor might
be driving both the share of slaves in a municipality and the size and composition of public
revenues and expenditure in that same municipality. The prosperity and/or the growth
rate of the local economy might be such a factor. If rich or fast growing municipalities
acquired large numbers of slaves and also expanded their public sectors, the effect of
slavery on fiscal capacity would be biased upwards. Indeed, the simple OLS regressions
below illustrate a positive relationship between the slave ratio and fiscal capacity indicators
when only a limited set of controls is used (Table 5.1).
A straightforward solution to deal with this issue is to introduce a wide range of
controls able to capture differences across municipalities related to both the incidence of
slave labour and fiscal development. As the analysis below shows, this goes a long way
in dismantling the idea of a positive effect of slavery on local fiscal institutions (Table
5.2). However, the regressions still do not support the existence of a negative relationship
between slavery and fiscal capacity. This is plausibly due to the fact that some unobserv-
80As shown above, the role of municipalities in tax collection and administration became more important
over the course of the Imperial period. An interesting demonstration of this is the evolution of the
taxation of transactions involving slaves. The siza tax was applied to transactions of immobile goods. Its
standard rate was 10%, but its extension to the internal slave trade was with a rate of 5% (meia siza).
The tax concerned transactions of Brazilian-born slaves (but really this meant slaves not newly entered
in Brazil) and was introduced alongside a number of new taxes, between 1801 and 1814. These were all
applied uniformly across the country giving, for the first time, a degree of fiscal uniformity to the (then)
Portuguese colony (Costa, 2005; Rodrigues, Craig, Schmidt, and Santos, 2015). Part of the reason for
its introduction was paying for the arrival of the Portogues court in Brazil in 1808 (Abreu and do Lago,
2001; Fernandes, 2005). This tax became particularly important after the abolition of the international
slave trade in 1850, both as a source of revenue for provinces and for the purpose of slowing down the
transfer of slaves to the booming coffee growing regions. This was important because of the belief that
an excessive transfer of slaves out of the Northeast would lead to growing support in the region for the
abolition of the institution. In any case, the Ato Adicional of 1834 had devolved the administration of
the tax to provincial governments (Costa, 2005) and the large reallocation of slaves from the Northeast
to the Southeast meant that the number of transactions in these areas increased greatly. The tax was
levied on the final price of slaves in the purchasing region (Klein and Luna, 2010), thus increasing the
oversight of the state and of local governments, as well as their ability to tax. Additionally, from 1884
transactions involving slaves had to obligatorily go through public courts and slaves became subject to
registration. These reforms were introduced in order to reduce tax evasion of both the meia siza and on
taxes on slaves in urban areas. They appear to have been quite effective in raising fiscal revenues, but
were not uniformly successful across Brazil. In Rio Grande do Sul, the changes were implemented with
little resistance and further taxes on slavery were introduced, amongst other reasons, to help subsidize
European immigration (Costa, 2005). In a number of states in the North, the tax was substituted with
levies on slaves sold outside the provinces. Following the obligation of registration, Minas Gerais simply
abolished the meia siza. In Sa˜o Paulo, the meia siza was suspended for a period in 1849-50, and the
registration of slaves was imperfectly implemented (Costa, 2005).
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able factors might still be driving both the incidence of slave labour and the the size and
allocation of public revenue and expenditure. Moreover, not all of these factors need be
related to prosperity/growth – they could, for example, be related to the local colonial
history – making the direction of the bias unclear.
A further threat to identification is the fact that I measure my slave ratio indicator (as
well as the other variables) with noise and, as a consequence, measurement error. This is
due to the creation of new municipalities between when I observe my right-hand side vari-
ables (1836 and 1872) and my outcomes (1908-12). If the measurement error were random
and restricted to only one variable (i.e. classical measurement error), this would lead to
attenuation bias, pushing the coefficient of the affected variable towards zero. However,
neither condition for classical measurement error is likely to be met. Municipalities were
clearly not created randomly and the error affects all variables measured in 1872 and 1836.
In order to reduce noise as much as possible, I identify parishes present in the 1872
census which had become municipalities by 1912 and use their own data instead of the
aggregate municipal measures. I also subtract these parishes form the municipality they
belonged to in 1872, further increasing the precision of my estimates. An alternative to
this strategy would be to aggregate municipalities in minimum comparable areas (MCAs)
with unchanged borders between the two periods of observation. This, however, would
entail the loss of a large degree of variation and information, since very heterogeneous
units would be averaged out in the same geographical areas. For this reason, I prefer the
painstaking manual linking of municipalities over time.
Not all 1908-12 municipalities can be identified in the 1872 census. Out of Sa˜o Paulo’s
173 municipalities in 1912, I identify 122. The remaining 51 are assigned values from their
municipality of origin. For Rio de Janeiro, data can be retrieved for 48 out of the 49
municipalities existing in 1912. For the 1836 Sa˜o Paulo data, no parish level information
exists, so I rely on data aggregated at the level of the 40 municipalities existing at the time.
These variable thus amount to, essentially, regional, rather than municipal level controls.
I further address the measurement error issue by introducing a dummy for municipalities
created after 1872. This emerges as significantly negative in most specifications, indicating
that younger municipalities tended to be less fiscally endowed.
In order to satisfactorily deal with both measurement error and the possibility of endo-
geneity for my main variable of interest, I also employ an instrumental variable strategy.
This relies on finely measured geographical variables and on exploiting the relationship
between the timing of the coffee boom in the different regions of Sa˜o Paulo and Rio de
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Janeiro and the changing availability of slave labour.
Planters in the Para´ıba valley and the Central region of Sa˜o Paulo started cultivating
coffee on a large scale while the Atlantic Slave Trade was still in full swing; specifically
during the period 1830-1850, see Section 5.2. Moreover, they could rely on the relatively
abundant supply of slaves from other parts of the country, particularly the declining North-
east, to complement new arrivals from Africa. This became especially important after the
abolition of the Slave Trade in 1850. By this point, immigration from Europe was still
in its early and largely unsuccessful stage and did not represent a valid alternative to
large-scale coerced labour. Coffee planters in the frontier regions of the North and the
West of the state settled into virgin and semi-virgin territory in the second half of the 19th
century and the early 20th century. Unlike their predecessors, they could not rely on new
arrivals of slaves. Moreover, they faced rapidly rising slave prices due to the dwindling
internal supply and the ban of interprovincial transfers, which preceded abolition by ap-
proximately a decade. On the flip-side, subsidized mass immigration from Europe made
up for the slack, particularly starting from the 1880s, with huge numbers of arrivals.
Thus, the timing of exploitation of land for cultivation – prevalently of coffee – de-
termined the extent to which plantation owners could rely on slave vs free labour. In
order to capture this timing, I use the interaction between the suitability of land for coffee
production and distance from the port (either Rio de Janeiro or Santos, whichever one is
closer to the centroid of the municipality) as an instrumental variable for the incidence of
slavery. Either variable on its own could be a good indicator of the timing of the coffee
boom, since more fertile and less distant areas are likely to be exploited first for cash
crop production. However, both variables are extremely likely to affect fiscal capacity
through channels other than reliance on slave labour, thus violating the exclusion restric-
tion. Specifically, both variables are important determinants of production possibilities,
and thus future growth and prosperity.
The interaction between the two variables, instead, captures the timing of settlement
but, since distance and land suitability are introduced as separate controls, avoids the
pitfalls outlined above. The variable is clearly relevant: in the analysis below I show that,
as distance from the port increased, the importance of land suitability in determining
the share of slaves in a municipality’s population increased. Conversely, as distance from
the coast decreased, the suitability of land for coffee production became less and less
important in determing the allocation of slaves across municipalities. This means that,
ceteris paribus, in areas close to the coast, which were settled early, the distribution of
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slaves was scarcely affected by the fertility of land since slave labour was abundant. In
areas settled later, instead, the scarcity of slave labour led to only the most fertile areas
attracting large slave numbers.
Following the conceptualization of slavery provided by Fenoaltea (1984), it can be
argued that, as slave prices increased and slave labour became more scarce relative to free
labour, forced labour could keep its productivity edge over free labour only in tasks where
violence could be used as an incentive and for tasks requiring little skill or care. This
would also be compatible with the experience of other slave economies, like the Caribbean
countries, and the US’s Second Middle Passage, which involved the transfer of vast number
of slaves from coastal areas to the plantations of the South in the 19th century (Berlin,
2003; Klein and Luna, 2010). The fact that transactions involving the transfer of slaves
between provinces were taxed strengthens this potential mechanism, given that it further
raised slave prices.
The instrument also satisfies the exclusion restrictions because, once suitability and
distance from the port are controlled for, the effect of the timing of settlement should
not affect fiscal capacity development and public goods provision directly, particularly
conditional on the wide array of controls in my analysis.81 Additionally, the diffusion of
railways meant that, by 1912, transportation costs had fallen dramatically and distance
from ports played a relatively less important role in determining production possibilities.
An alternative to using the this instrument would be to rely directly on information
we have about the timing of coffee production across different regions of Sa˜o Paulo, in a
similar fashion to Naritomi, Soares, and Assunc¸a˜o (2012). This presents two issues. One
is the low geographical disaggregation of this information, which would lead to very noisy
and spatially autocorrelated estimates. The second is that endogenizing the timing of the
exploitation of land for coffee production using geographical variables is clearly preferable
to assuming that this timing was exogenous to municipal characteristics.
The final threat to identification is due to the spatial nature of the data. The error
term is likely to be correlated across observations because neighboring municipalities were
subject to similar shocks and because of the measurement issues outlined above. Not
accounting for this would lead to incorrect standard errors and thus incorrect inference
81A potential worry is that the soil of lands settled early for coffee production were exhausted more
extensively due to aggressive early production techniques, which were refined over time as virgin lands
were settled. If this were the case, more recently settled lands could simply be more productive, potentially
invalidating the IV strategy. Fortunately, the fact that the FAO data is measured for the 1960-90 period
means that such developments in land quality would be captured. Thus the FAO data is actually preferable
as a control for land quality compared to contemporary land surveys, which may have been successively
affected by farming techniques correlated to the treatment I am attempting to capture.
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regarding the existence of an effect of slavery on fiscal capacity. Additionally, munic-
ipalities’ decisions regarding the size and allocation of public funds did not happen in
isolation, and the existence of spillover effects between neighboring municipalities is very
likely. Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015) develop this argument theoreti-
cally by showing that decisions regarding state capacity and public goods provisions in a
municipality will indeed depend on the same decisions being made in neighboring munic-
ipalities. Using a network approach, the authors show that these decisions can be either
strategic complements – when the presence of high capacity neighboring municipalities
makes it more likely that a municipality will also choose to invest in a high degree of
capacity – or strategic substitutes – when a municipality is able to free ride on other mu-
nicipalities’ capacity. The authors find empirical support for the complementarity channel
in their study of Colombia.
In order to deal with these issues, I run a series of specifications that account for both
spatial autocorrelation in the error term and for spillover effects between municipalities.
Complementarity appears to be the dominant channel in the Brazilian setting as well. I
find evidence of positive spillover effects of public expenditure in general and of expenditure
on public education specifically between neighboring municipalities. A very plausible
explanation for this result is that citizens in a municipality could demand a similar level
of public goods provision to that of their neighbors against a credible threat of moving.
5.3.2 Model
The basic model I employ in my estimations is described by equation 5.1:
yi = β0 + β1SlaveRatio1872i + xiφ+ cs + i (5.1)
where y is one of six outcome variables: 1) revenue per capita, 2) expenditure per capita,
3) the share of expenditure dedicated to public services, 4) public services expenditure
per capita, 5) the share of public expenditure dedicated to public education, 6) public
education expenditure per capita. The main variable of interest – SlaveRatio1872 – is
the share of slaves in the total population of the municipality in 1872, while xi is a vector
of controls, c are state fixed effects (these are relevant when Rio de Janeiro is included in
the regressions) and  is the idiosyncratic error term. I run this basic model using both
OLS and IV techniques.
I then extend the model to account for the spatial nature of the data in several ways.
The most straightforward is s spatial autoregressive model with spatial autoregressive
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disturbances (SARAR); see Anselin and Florax (1995) and Drukker, Prucha, and Raci-
borski (2013b,a) for some background and information on the practical implementation
and estimation of the model. This is described in equations 5.2 and 5.3:
yi = β0 + θWy + β1SlaveRatio1872i + xiφ+ cs + ui (5.2)
ui = ρMu + zi (5.3)
where z are idiosyncratic innovations and W and M are non-stochastic spatial weights
matrices, with zeros on the main diagonal, which weigh observations based on the inverse
of the distance between the centroid of municipality i and all other observations. This
means that the spatial lag for observation i will be:
yi =
n∑
j=1
wijyj
where wij is the element of matrix W that identifies the inverse of the distance between
observations i and j. This model accounts for spillover effects by explicitly taking into
account the effect of neighbors’ decisions on the decision of each municipality with regards
to the outcome. In this application W = M , so the error term is similarly spatially
weighted to account for spatial autocorrelation. Once again, I use both OLS and IV
techniques to estimate this model.
SARAR type of models have been criticized due to endogeneity issues. If neighbors’
outcomes influence the outcome of each unit of observation, including a spatial lag of the
outcome in the regression will mechanically introduce a bias since the neighbor’s outcome
will also be influenced by the outcome of the unit being observed. In order to overcome
this issue, Gibbons and Overman (2012) suggest including spatial lags of the explanatory
variables, rather than of the outcome. This “neighbor“ model is outlined in equation 5.4
yi = β0 + β1WSlaveRatio1872 + xiφ+ WXγ + cs + ui (5.4)
where WSlaveRatio1872 and WX are the spatial lags of the main explanatory variable
and of the controls respectively. I run such a model in my analysis using IV techniques
and, in order to further diminish worries of endogeneity, I use the instrumented spatial lag
of the slave ratio as the main explanatory variable instead of the municipalities’ own slave
ratio, in a similar spirit to Acemoglu, Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015). As a final
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exercise, I run a model using three stage least squares (3SLS) in which the spatial lag of
the neighbor’s outcome is predicted using the spatial lag of the instrumental variables and
of the controls and then introduced in an IV estimation of the impact of slavery on the
outcome. In this way, I avoid the pitfalls of the SARAR model, but am still able to detect
any spillover effects between municipalities, which are lost in the type of model described
in equation 5.4.
5.4 Data
In the analysis, I rely on data from three cross sections: 1836, 1872 and 1908-1912. The
1872 data, which I use to construct my slavery measure and most of my controls, comes
from Brazil’s first country-wide census (Brazil, 1876). The 1836 data used to construct
additional controls for Sa˜o Paulo only are from Bassanezi (1998), who relies on information
provided by Mu¨ller (1838). The main outcome variables – public revenue and expenditure
for 1908-1912 – are from the 1908-12 statistical yearbook (Brazil, 1908-1912) as is the data
on population. Additional outcome variables for Sa˜o Paulo referring to the allocation of
public expenditure are from Sa˜o Paulo’s statistical yearbook of 1912 (Sa˜o Paulo, 1912).
Figure 5.5: Coffee Prices, 1870-1939
Source: Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007)
The choice of the three cross sections is partly motivated by data availability. Fortu-
nately, however, these dates also capture three fundamental periods in Brazilian history.
The 1836 cross section offers information on the early phase of the coffee boom and of the
development of Sa˜o Paulo as a major economic and slave centre. The 1872 data capture
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the peak of slave numbers in Southeastern Brazil, as well as the initial phase of the deep
structural changes to hit the country in the second half of the 19th century.
The 1908-12 endpoint is ideal for my analysis for several reasons. First, it is temporally
far enough from the abolition of slavery in 1888 to rule out a direct effect on the outcomes.
At the same time, it is not too far removed to plausibly argue for the existence of a
persistent indirect effect of slavery. Second, it lies around the middle of Brazil’s Old
Republic (1889-1939). This was an era of relative decentralization, which means that
local governments were important actors within the public sector. The early 20th century,
in particular, was characterized by marked improvements and expansions in municipal
public services in Sa˜o Paulo (Rowe, 1908) making an analysis of this period particularly
meaningful. Third, the cross-section captures the final stage of pre-WWI mass migration
from Europe to Brazil. Given the importance of migration in my story, it is crucial that
my period of observation encompasses this migratory flow. Fourth, 1908-12 is a convenient
endpoint to allow for a sufficient number of colonies to have been built after my period of
observation and to be used for placebo tests. Finally, coffee prices, which presumably had
an important impact on public revenues and could thus influence my results, were close
to their long-run average in this period (Figure 5.5).
Below, I discuss my outcome variables, data on slavery and the geographical controls.
Appendix 5.B provides a summary of the sources and of the methods used to construct
all the variables in the analysis.
5.4.1 Data on slavery and public finance
Figure 5.6 illustrates my main variable of interest: the incidence of slaves in the total
population in 1872 . The borders of the municipalities are those of 1911-12. As with all
the maps I use, these are based on infortmation provided by the Instituto Brasileiro de
Geografia e Estat´ıstica (IBGE, 2011). The variation across municipalities is very large:
slaves made up from around 1% of the population to over 60%. As expected, Rio de
Janeiro had many more slaves than Sa˜o Paulo in relative and absolute terms. The eastern
and north-central regions of Sa˜o Paulo, however, also had large slave populations. The
former was home to the initial phases of the coffee boom, while the latter experienced its
directly subsequent expansion. The southern and western parts of the state had a much
lower incidence of slave labour.
The main outcome variables of the analysis – revenue and expenditure per capita in
1908-12 (Figures 5.7 and 5.8) – also offer a vast degree of variation, especially within Sa˜o
224
Figure 5.6: Slave ratio in Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo, 1872
Author’s calculation. Source: Brazil (1876)
Paulo. Municipal intakes and outlays ranged between less than 0.2 milre´ıs per capita and
more than 150. Sa˜o Paulo emerges as substantially more fiscally endowed than Rio de
Janeiro, reflecting the emergence of the province as Brazil’s economic powerhouse.82 In
line with the historical narrative, the city of Sa˜o Paulo, Santos – Sa˜o Paulo’s main port –
and the north-central region – a major coffee-producing area – emerge as the most fiscally
endowed areas in the province.
Figure 5.7: Municipal public revenue per capita in in Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo,
1908-12
Author’s calculation. Source: Brazil (1908-1912)
821908-1912 also saw a temporary increase in municipal revenue collection in Sa˜o Paulo. In the analysis
below, I exploit the variation within the two states, to eliminate potential confounding effects due to this.
225
Figure 5.8: Municipal public expenditure per capita in Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo,
1908-12
Author’s calculation. Source: Brazil (1908-1912)
Figure 5.9 offers an illustration of the additional outcomes variables available for Sa˜o
Paulo in 1912. These are: 1) municipal expenditure dedicated to public services – public
works, street cleaning, public lighting, public healthcare, the running costs of markets,
cemeteries and slaughterhouses, public water, public sewers and municipal education – as a
share of total public expenditure; 2) municipal per capita expenditure on these same public
services; 3) municipal expenditure dedicated to education as a share of total expenditure;
4) municipal per capita expenditure on education.
These variables offer a much broader perspective on local institutions and, conse-
quently, on the impact of slavery on developmental outcomes. The variables provide
information not only on the fiscal resources commanded by municipalities, but also on
what share of these was dedicated to the provision of essential public goods and other
public services. Moreover, they provide genuinely additional information regarding local
institutions because they are only imperfectly correlated with each other and with revenue
and expenditure per capita. The shares of expenditure dedicated to public services and
education, for example, exhibit a very low and statistically insignificant correlation with
revenue and expenditure per capita. The per capita public services and education variables
are unsurprisingly significantly correlated with total expenditure per capita. However, I
show below that slavery had an impact on these outcomes even after controlling for total
expenditure per capita.
Data on slave numbers in 1836 for Sa˜o Paulo allows a comparison of the incidence
of slavery over time (Figure 5.10). Although 1872 likely represented the peak year of
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(a) Public services/Expenditure (b) Public services/Population
(c) Public education/Expenditure (d) Public education/Population
Figure 5.9: Public goods provision in Sa˜o Paulo, 1912
Author’s calculation. Source: Sa˜o Paulo (1912)
slavery in Sa˜o Paulo in absolute numbers, in relative terms this was not the case. In
fact, slave ratios in 1872 tended to be smaller than at the earlier date. Nonetheless, some
municipalities had relatively more slaves in 1872 than in 1836. In both 1836 and 1872,
slavery was particularly prevalent in the traditional coffee growing areas of the Para´ıba
valley and the Central region, confirming that these areas continued to rely heavily on
slave labor in the second half of the 19th century. The pace at which the incidence of slave
labour changed between 1836 and 1872, however, was very uneven across municipalities,
offering a large degree of variation to exploit in my analysis.
5.4.2 Geographical controls and land suitability
In order to account for geographical factors in my analysis, I produce the following mu-
nicipal level controls: altitude, latitude, longitude, area and distance from the principal
port (Rio de Janeiro or Santos, whichever is closer to the centroid of each municipality). I
furthermore calculate municipal land suitability indicators based data from the Food and
227
(a) Slave ratios in 1836 and 1872 and 45°line
(b) Slave ratios in 1836 and 1872, by region
Figure 5.10: Slavery in Sa˜o Paulo: 1836 vs 1872
Author’s calculation. Traditional coffee-growing regions are: Vale do Para´ıba and Central. The frontier
areas are: Alta Sorocaba, Noroeste, Araraquarense, Baixa Paulista, and Mogiana. Source: Bassanezi
(1998), Mu¨ller (1838).
Agriculture Organization (2012), which exploits monthly statistics on climatic variables
and precipitation.
Although the FAO land suitability data is constructed using data from the 1960s until
the 1990s, it is also extremely useful and widely used in historical studies. To get as
close as possible to conditions faced by planters in the 19th and early 20th century, I use
suitability data based on the absence of irrigation and the lowest possible level of inputs
by planters. The low input scenario is essentially a subsistence agriculture situation, with
labor intensive techniques, no use of chemicals and minimal conservation measures. These
assumptions are conservative given that the production of cash crops in Sa˜o Paulo and Rio
de Janeiro was well beyond subsistence and that, in the second half of the 19th century,
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mechanization of some processes had started to take place.
Figure 5.11 illustrates the suitability of land for the production of the three key crops
I use in my analysis: sugar, cotton and coffee. The data squares nicely with historical
accounts of crops cultivation. The Para´ıba valley, located across the border between the
two states, stands out as a relatively suitable area for coffee production. Indeed, it was
the first large-scale coffee production centre in the country. The north and west of Sa˜o
Paulo also emerge as very suitable for coffee production and, in fact, these areas witnessed
a huge expansion in coffee production in the late 19th and early 20th century, as virgin
and semi-virgin lands were cleared of forest and exploited for agricultural production.
(a) Sugar cane (b) Coffee
(c) Cotton
Figure 5.11: Land suitability for cash crops production in Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo
Author’s calculation. Source: Food and Agriculture Organization (2012). A darker shade of blue indicates
higher suitability for the production of each crop.
Regarding sugar cane, the east of Rio De Janeiro emerges as a particularly suitable
area for its production, as was indeed historically. The west and north of Sa˜o Paulo also
appear to be suitable for this cultivation, as well as for that cotton. However, the late
exploitation of the province’s backlands means that Sa˜o Paulo was never a big player in
the production of these two commodities, although sugar was the province’s main export
before the arrival of coffee. Although the land suitability data is clearly spatially clustered,
it still offers a large degree of variation even between neighboring municipalities, which I
exploit in my analysis.
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5.5 Results
I organize my results in five parts. Section 5.5.1 presents the basic OLS analysis for Sa˜o
Paulo. Section 5.5.2 illustrates the results of the standard IV analysis, while section 5.5.3
outlines the results of the spatial regressions. Section 5.5.4 explores the channels through
which slavery affected fiscal development, by focusing on the immigrants settlement chan-
nel. Finally, Section 5.5.5 adds Rio de Janeiro to the analysis.
5.5.1 Basic analysis for Sa˜o Paulo
I start my analysis for Sa˜o Paulo by relating the incidence of slavery in 1872 to my six
outcome variables, including only basic controls: a dummy for Santos – which is a clear
outlier – latitude, longitude, altitude, distance from the closest port and the suitability
of land for the production of coffee, sugar and cotton, and using simple ordinary least
squares (Table 5.1).83 Based on these results, one could conclude that the incidence
of slavery positively influenced the development of fiscal capacity, as suggested by the
positive coefficients on the slavery indicator for revenue and expenditure per capita. For
the other outcomes variables, the results are inconclusive. However, as argued above,
these estimates are marred by multiple sources of bias and are no more than conditional
correlations. They simply indicate that municipalities with relatively more slaves in 1872,
tended to have higher revenue and expenditure per capita in 1908-12
I continue the analysis in Table 5.2 by adding all my controls variables for both 1836
and 1872. The inclusion of the 1872 variables is essential in order to isolate the effect
of slavery from that of competing factors. The 1836 controls are also important, as they
provide information about earlier differences across Sa˜o Paulo’s regions, which might have
affected both the successive incidence of slave labour and the development of local fiscal
institutions.
The 1836 controls are: 1) the incidence of slavery both as a standard variable and as
a quadratic term, to account for local conditions which made some regions particularly
amenable to slave labour; 2) the size of the population, to account for differences between
small and large urban centers; 3) the number of tax collectors per capita, as a proxy for
historical state oversight and fiscal capacity; 4) sugar and coffee production per capita,
to account for the early presence of these profitable activities intimately linked to slave
labour.
83Altitude is dropped from successive regressions to preserve degrees of freedom, as it is insignificant in
all specifications.
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Table 5.1: Basic OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES RevPerCap ExpPerCap PubServShare PubServPerCap PubEduShare PubEduPerCap
SlaveRatio1872 12.76** 12.22* -0.278 0.160 -0.00747 0.226
(6.355) (6.328) (0.170) (3.352) (0.0272) (0.179)
Constant -4.560 -2.795 -1.803 -4.227 0.173 0.475
(27.93) (23.23) (1.198) (12.93) (0.167) (0.705)
Additional controls
Santos dummy 3 3 3 3 3 3
Geo variables 3 3 3 3 3 3
Land suitability 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 173 173 161 161 161 161
R-squared 0.834 0.864 0.089 0.245 0.129 0.464
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Revenue and expenditure per capita are 1908-1912 averages, the other outcome variables are measured in
1912. Geographic controls include: longitude, latitude, altitude, distance from the port of Santos or Rio
de Janeiro (whichever is closer to the centroid of the municipality). The land suitability indicators refer
to rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee, sugar cane and cotton. See Appendix 5.B for information
on how the controls are constructed.
The 1872 controls are: 1) the number of public employees per capita, which proxies
the 1872 level of fiscal and state capacity; 2) the share of citizens who could read and
write, to account for differences in human capital, prosperity and educational provision;
3) the share of citizens born outside the state living in the municipality, to control for
internal migration; 4) the share of citizens born outside of Brazil (excluding slaves) living
in the municipality, to account for foreign immigration (both migration variables are also
meant to control for the prosperity and growth prospects of the local economy); 5) the
share of citizens working in agriculture, to control for the rural focus of the municipalities;
6) the size of the population both as a standard variable and as quadratic, to account
for differences between municipalities containing large and smaller urban centers and con-
nected non-linearities; 7) population density, a commonly used proxy of prosperity and
urbanization.
In addition, I control for the degree of ethnic fractionalization using the index proposed
by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) and for the share of non-whites in the population,
both measured in 1872. I use the share of non-whites alongside the more sophisticated
fractionalization index because the latter might not capture racial cleavages well in the
Brazilian context, which was characterized by a relatively porous concept of race. These
variables are particularly important for three reasons. First, the ethnic make up of the
municipalities is clearly and directly related to the incidence of slavery. Second, previous
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Table 5.2: OLS estimation with additional controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES RevPerCap ExpPerCap PubServShare PubServPerCap PubEduShare PubEduPerCap
SlaveRatio1872 7.722 7.750 -0.411 -7.519 -0.00186 -0.0596
(7.333) (6.106) (0.320) (4.696) (0.0496) (0.226)
Constant 34.22 43.02 -3.212* 9.347 -0.0522 0.789
(46.80) (33.29) (1.710) (20.73) (0.222) (1.085)
Additional controls
Geo variables 3 3 3 3 3 3
Land suitability 3 3 3 3 3 3
1836 variables
SlaveRatio 3 3 3 3 3 3
SlaveRatioSq 3 3 3 3 3 3
PopSize 3 3 3 3 3 3
TaxCollector 3 3 3 3 3 3
SugarProd 3 3 3 3 3 3
CoffeeProd 3 3 3 3 3 3
1872 variables
StateCapacity 3 3 3 3 3 3
Literacy 3 3 3 3 3 3
NewMunicipality 3 3 3 3 3 3
DomMigrants 3 3 3 3 3 3
ForMigrants 3 3 3 3 3 3
ShareAgricWork 3 3 3 3 3 3
PopSize 3 3 3 3 3 3
PopSizeSq 3 3 3 3 3 3
PopDensity 3 3 3 3 3 3
NonWhiteShare 3 3 3 3 3 3
EthniFrac 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 171 171 159 159 159 159
R-squared 0.898 0.914 0.144 0.341 0.158 0.547
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Revenue and expenditure per capita are 1908-1912 averages, the other outcome variables are measured in
1912. Geographic controls include: longitude, latitude, distance from the port of Santos or Rio de Janeiro
(whichever is closer). Altitude is insignificant and thus excluded to preserve degrees of freedom. The land
suitability indicators refer to rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee, sugar cane and cotton. See
Appendix 5.B for information on how the controls are constructed.
work suggests a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision
(Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005),84 which means ac-
counting for this factor is essential in order to disentangle its effect from that of slavery.
Third, if economic outcomes such as wages and income differed between whites, blacks,
mulattos and mestizos, geographical variation in fiscal capacity might simply reflect dif-
ferences in the local ethnic composition, rather than the institutional characteristics of
municipalities.
84A similar relationship has been proposed by Lieberman (2003) for Brazil at the national level, but it
might have hampered the development of fiscal capacity at a more micro level as well.
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I have also experimented with further controls, such as the share of foreigners amongst
the economic elite, the ethnic polarization index proposed by Reynal-Querol (2002)85 and
the local income per capita estimates for 1872 produced by Monasteiro (2010).86 These
yielded insignificant coefficients and did not change the other results. Therefore, I have
excluded them from the analysis to preserve degrees of freedom.87
The introduction of all the controls eliminates the statistically significant positive as-
sociation between slavery and fiscal capacity found in the previous exercise. Nonetheless,
the coefficients remain positive for revenue and expenditure per capita. For the other
outcome variables, they are negative but statistically insignificant. As discussed above,
in order to draw inference on the relationship between slavery and the fiscal outcomes, it
is insufficient to include even such a wide array of controls, as some unobservable factors
might still be driving both the incidence of slavery and the outcomes. Moreover, the spa-
tial nature of the data is not yet accounted for. In order to move towards causal inference,
I now turn to the IV analysis.
5.5.2 IV analysis for Sa˜o Paulo
My IV strategy is outlined in detail in Section 5.3.1. Table 5.3 illustrates the first stage
of the regression for the whole sample and for the restricted sample for which the public
goods data are available. The first stage F-statistics are all safely above the commonly
used threshold of 10, which indicates a sufficiently strong instrument.
As discussed above, the instrument – the log of the interaction between land suitability
for coffee production and distance from the closest port – is meant to capture how the
timing of exploitation of land for coffee production affected the reliance of municipalities
on slave labour. The first stage of the IV indicates that as land suitability for coffee
production increased, distance to the coast diminished in importance as a determinant
for the incidence of slavery. On the flip side, this means that land suitability decreased
in importance as a determinant of the slave ratio as municipalities got closer the port.
Consistently with the historiography, I interpret this to reflect the fact that areas closer
to the port were settled earlier, while both the domestic and the international slave trade
were still thriving. Coffee suitability played a small, if any, role in determining the slave
ratio in this slave-abundant setting. Frontier areas, instead, were settled as slavery was
85See also Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
86Monasteiro’s estimates refer to minimum comparable areas, rather than municipalities, so this test was
performed by aggregating municipalities to form these geographical units.
87Some of these variables are also highly correlated with the other controls, leading to multicollinearity
and less precision in the estimates.
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Table 5.3: First stage of the IV
(1) (2)
Full sample Restricted sample
VARIABLES SlaveRatio1872 SlaveRatio1872
LN(CoffeeSuit*DistPort) 0.0586*** 0.0650***
(0.0177) (0.0197)
DistPort -0.000612*** -0.000657***
(0.000116) (0.000131)
CoffeeSuit -0.000110 -0.000144
(9.47e-05) (0.000100)
SlaveRatio1836 -0.650** -0.555*
(0.263) (0.289)
SlaveRatio1836sq 1.743*** 1.546***
(0.468) (0.516)
Literacy1872 -0.187*** -0.217***
(0.0479) (0.0521)
ForMigrants1872 0.843*** 0.801**
(0.318) (0.333)
ShareAgricWork1872 0.0991*** 0.113***
(0.0345) (0.0400)
PopSize1872 7.26e-06** 7.38e-06**
(2.87e-06) (3.15e-06)
PopSize1872sq -2.34e-10** -2.34e-10**
(9.74e-11) (1.07e-10)
EthniFrac1872 0.246*** 0.301***
(0.0643) (0.0761)
Constant 0.596** 0.645**
(0.278) (0.272)
Additional controls
Other 1836 variables 3 3
Other 1872 variables 3 3
Geo variables 3 3
Land suitability 3 3
Observations 171 159
R-squared 0.696 0.699
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The restricted sample refers to the municipalities for which the additional public goods outcome variables
are available. Geographic controls include latitude and distance from the port of Santos or Rio de Janeiro
(whichever is closer). The land suitability indicators refer to rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee,
sugar cane and cotton. Santos is excluded from the estimation. I drop the non white share variable and
the coffee and sugar production variables in order to preserve degrees of freedom. They are insignificant
and do not change the results qualitatively or quantitatively. I also drop longitude because, while not
statistically significant, it is closely related to my instrument, and decreases its strength when included.
All other controls included in previous estimations remain.
in sharp decline or already abolished and European migration was taking off. Therefore,
these municipalities could not generally rely on large scale forced labour, but could count
on immigration as an increasingly reliable substitute. In this slave-scarce setting, coffee
suitability played an important role, and only very fertile areas with expanding coffee
plantations were able to attract relatively large numbers of slaves.
The incidence of slavery is strongly related to the majority of the other controls in-
cluded in the regression. Unsurprisingly, municipalities with more slaves were character-
ized by lower literacy, a higher share of workers in agriculture and more ethnic fraction-
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alization. Some more unexpected and interesting relationships are also evident. First,
municipalities with more slaves also tended to have more foreign-born citizens. Impor-
tantly, this result does not in any way invalidate my argument that slavery discouraged
the settlements of foreign immigrants. The results of this first stage are simple conditional
correlations, which most likely reflect the fact that booming areas attracted large numbers
of both free and coerced workers. As such, it is a strong suggestion that the migration
variables capture at least part of the prosperity and growth potential of the municipalities.
Second, up to a certain point more populous municipalities tended to have more slaves, as
suggested by the positive coefficient on the population size variable. However the largest
urban centers, captured by the quadratic population size term, tended to have relatively
less slaves. Finally, the relationship between slavery in 1836 and 1872 exhibits a U shape.
For an incidence of slavery of up to around 20%, regions with more slaves in 1836 tended
to have relatively less slaves in 1872. However, large slave centers in 1836, identified by
the quadratic slave ratio term, also had large numbers of slaves in 1872, confirming the
persistence of the institution in traditional slave-based economies.
Table 5.4 illustrates the results of the second stage of the IV estimation. What emerges
clearly is that slavery had a negative effect on the development of fiscal capacity and public
goods provision. This effect is evident on revenue per capita, expenditure per capita, the
public services share, public services expenditure per capita and education expenditure
per capita and is statistically significant and large. I find no effect of slavery on the share
of expenditure dedicated to education, but I recover this result in the spatial analysis.
The estimates indicate that a 10 percentage points increase in the slave ratio (which
is slightly more than a one standard deviation increase), would have reduced revenue per
capita by around 8.4 milre´ıs and expenditure per capita by around 6.7 milre´ıs . Expendi-
ture on public services and education would have been lower by around 4 and 0.2 milre´ıs
per capita respectively. These are very large effects given that average revenue and expen-
diture per capita, excluding Santos, were around 7 and 6 milre´ıs per capita respectively.
Expenditure on public services and public education was approximately 2.5 and 0.1 milre´ıs
respectively. In the spatial analysis below, I find smaller, more realistic coefficients. This
suggests that spatial techniques can take care of additional bias not accounted for by the
IV strategy alone. I now turn to illustrating the results of these estimations.
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Table 5.4: Standard IV estimation
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES RevPerCap ExpPerCap PubServShare PubServPerCap PubEduShare PubEduPerCap
SlaveRatio1872 -84.16** -67.31** -2.395** -41.522** -0.116 -2.307**
(41.43) (32.63) (1.214) (20.478) (0.173) (1.120)
Constant 125.2*** 121.9*** 2.027 74.612** 0.348* 4.950***
(44.09) (39.29) (1.883) (28.355) (0.192) (1.328)
Additional controls
Geo variables 3 3 3 3 3 3
Land suitability 3 3 3 3 3 3
1836 variables 3 3 3 3 3 3
1872 variables 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 171 171 159 159 159 159
R-squared -0.014 0.040 -0.148 0.0284 0.128 -0.015
Panel B: First Stage Statistics
F-stat 11.00*** 11.00*** 10.91*** 10.91*** 10.91*** 10.91***
Part R-squared 0.0457 0.0457 0.0548 0.0548 0.0548 0.0548
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Revenue and expenditure per capita are 1908-1912 averages, the other outcome variables are measured
in 1912. Geographic controls include latitude and distance from the port of Santos or Rio de Janeiro
(whichever is closer). The land suitability indicators refer to rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee,
sugar cane and cotton. Santos is excluded from the estimation. I drop the non white share variable and
the coffee and sugar production variables in order to preserve degrees of freedom. They are insignificant
and do not change the results qualitatively or quantitatively. I also drop longitude because, while not
statistically significant, it is closely related to my instrument, and decreases its strength when included.
All other controls included in previous estimations remain. Standard errors are heteroskedaticity robust,
but results do not change if I cluster them at the 1872 municipal level.
5.5.3 Spatial analysis for Sa˜o Paulo
As discussed above, if ignored, the spatial nature of the data can lead to bias and incorrect
standard errors, which would affect the reliability of the results . In order to account for
this, I run my spatial analysis in the three steps discussed in Section 5.3.2. The first step
is the SARAR IV estimation, which accounts for both spillovers between municipalities
and spatial autocorrelation in the error term. The second step is the “neighbor” IV
estimation suggested by Gibbons and Overman (2012), to account for the potential bias
of the SARAR model. I illustrate the results of this exercise in Appendix 5.A in order
to reduce the number of regression tables in the text. These are broadly qualitatively
consistent with the SARAR IV results. The final step in the analysis is a 3SLS approach,
which aims to avoid the pitfalls of the SARAR model, like the “neighbor” approach, but
which also estimates spillover effects between municipalities directly, unlike the latter.
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I illustrate the results of SARAR IV estimation in Table 5.5. Compared to the standard
IV regressions, I also control for overall expenditure per capita when estimating the impact
of slavery on expenditure per capita on public services and on education (columns 4 and 6),
but the results are robust to excluding the variable. I do this to further demonstrate that
slavery did not only reduce overall public resources, but also affected their allocation. The
coefficients in the Table are substantially smaller than those of the standard IV estimation.
A 10% increase in the slave ratio decreased revenue and expenditure per capita by 2 and
1.4 milre´ıs per capita respectively. The effect for public service expenditure is 0.8 and 0.06
milre´ıs per capita respectively. The overall message, however, is unchanged: slavery had
a strong negative effect on fiscal development and public goods provision in Sa˜o Paulo.
The only exception is due to the slavery coefficient for the public services share becoming
statistically insignificant. However, I recover the statistically significantly negative result
using the more sophisticated technique of step three. In line with the findings of Acemoglu,
Garc´ıa-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015) for Colombia, positive and statistically significant
coefficients for lambda – which represents the spatial lag of the dependent variable –
suggest positive spillover effects from neighboring municipalities in expenditure per capita
and public education expenditure per capita.
I present the results of the final step of my spatial analysis in three tables: Table 5.6
for revenue and expenditure per capita, Table 5.7 for public services, and Table 5.8 for
education. The main results of the estimations are in columns 1 and 5 of each table. These
illustrate the effect of the slavery indicator and of the spatial lag of the outcome on the
outcome itself. The slave ratio used in the estimation is predicted in columns 2 and and
6 of each Table using the same instrument and controls as in the standard IV above. The
spatial lag of the outcome is predicted in columns 3 and 7 using the spatial lag of the
controls and of the slave ratio, which, in turn, is predicted in columns 4 and 8 using the
spatial lag of the instrument. All four equations for each outcome variable are treated as
a single system of equations, with the error term correlated across all equations.
The results of the estimation are quantitatively somewhere in between the standard
and SARAR IV estimates. Qualitatively, the negative impact of slavery on all six outcomes
emerges clearly and strongly. The positive and statistically significant coefficients of the
spatial lag of the outcome for total expenditure and expenditure on public education
further support the existence of positive spillover effects and strategic complementarities
in fiscal capacity and public goods provision across municipalities.
For further robustness, I provide an additional important test in Appendix 5.A. This
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Table 5.5: SARAR IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES RevPerCap ExpPerCap PubServShare PubServPerCap PubEduShare PubEduPerCap
SlaveRatio1872 -20.38*** -14.13** -0.326 -8.042** -0.0652 -0.592**
(7.292) (6.864) (0.366) (3.786) (0.0498) (0.243)
ExpPerCap 0.383*** 0.0137***
(0.100) (0.00253)
Constant 41.67 38.29 -0.101 2.418 0.155 1.330*
(32.58) (26.29) (1.262) (15.55) (0.146) (0.728)
Lambda 0.500 0.723* -0.190 0.382 1.016 0.832*
(0.377) (0.392) (0.397) (0.720) (0.683) (0.470)
Rho -1.324 -0.835 -0.00194 -1.815 -3.061 -1.662
(1.255) (1.754) (0.936) (1.877) (1.959) (1.565)
Additional controls
Geo variables 3 3 3 3 3 3
Land suitability 3 3 3 3 3 3
1836 variables 3 3 3 3 3 3
1872 variables 3 3 3 3 3 3
Santos dummy 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 171 171 159 159 159 159
R-squared -0.014 0.040 -0.148 0.0284 0.128 -0.015
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Revenue and expenditure per capita are 1908-1912 averages, the other outcome variables are measured
in 1912. Geographic controls include latitude and distance from the port of Santos or Rio de Janeiro
(whichever is closer). The land suitability indicators refer to rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee,
sugar cane and cotton. Santos is excluded from the estimation. I drop the non white share variable and
the coffee and sugar production variables in order to preserve degrees of freedom. They are insignificant
and do not change the results qualitatively or quantitatively. I also drop longitude because, while not
statistically significant, it is closely related to my instrument, and decreases its strength when included.
All other controls included in previous estimations remain. Lambda and rho are the coefficients of the
spatial lag of the dependent variable and of error term respectively.
demonstrates that my results do not change if I exclude two potentially problematic rev-
enue items from my revenue per capita measure: loans and government subsidies. In the
Appendix, I explain the results of this exercise in detail.
5.5.4 The settlement channel
In Section 5.3, I discussed the various channels through which slavery might have affected
fiscal capacity and public goods provision. Empirically, I focus on one key mechanism:
the immigrant settlement channel described in detail in the same section. In brief, the
hypothesis is that the settlement of migrants stimulated the development of fiscal capacity
and public goods provision in the province, and that settlement patterns were, in turn, at
least partially determined by the incidence of slavery.
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Table 5.6: Revenue and expenditure, 3SLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES RevPerCap SlaveRatio1872 SL RevPerCap SL SlaveRatio1872 ExpPerCap SlaveRatio1872 SL ExpPerCap SL SlaveRatio1872
SL RevPerCap 0.638 0.915**
(0.405) (0.400)
SlaveRatio1872 -33.35** -21.02*
(13.07) (11.67)
CoffeeSuit 0.0160** -0.000107 0.00878 -0.000103
(0.00732) (9.80e-05) (0.00658) (9.84e-05)
DistPort 0.00421 -0.000582*** 0.00815 -0.000579***
(0.0143) (0.000131) (0.0126) (0.000131)
LN(CoffeeSuit*DistPort) 0.0568*** 0.0561***
(0.0200) (0.0201)
SL SlaveRatio1872 -97.44*** -78.55***
(12.12) (11.48)
SL CoffeeSuit 0.0587*** -0.000355*** 0.0575*** -0.000357***
(0.00827) (8.30e-05) (0.00782) (8.35e-05)
SpatLagDistPort -0.0340*** -0.000779*** -0.0380*** -0.000796***
(0.00880) (9.93e-05) (0.00832) (9.99e-05)
SL LN(CoffeeSuit*DistPort) 0.110*** 0.111***
(0.0114) (0.0115)
Constant 35.70 0.563** 0.193 0.00383 30.96 0.566** 0.301 0.00410*
(32.22) (0.273) (0.352) (0.00246) (28.35) (0.274) (0.332) (0.00247)
Additional controls
Geo variables 3 3 3 3
Land suitability 3 3 3 3
1836 variables 3 3 3 3
1872 variables 3 3 3 3
Santos dummy 3 3 3 3
Spatial lag of controls 3 3 3 3
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172
R-squared 0.870 0.692 0.951 0.997 0.897 0.693 0.948 0.997
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
SL stands for spatial lag. Revenue and expenditure per capita are 1908-1912 averages. Geographic controls
include latitude and distance from the port of Santos or Rio de Janeiro (whichever is closer). The land
suitability indicators refer to rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee, sugar cane and cotton. Santos
is excluded from the estimation. I drop the non white share variable and the coffee and sugar production
variables in order to preserve degrees of freedom. They are insignificant and do not change the results
qualitatively or quantitatively. I also drop longitude because, while not statistically significant, it is closely
related to my instrument, and decreases its strength when included. All other controls included in previous
estimations remain. Lambda and rho are the coefficients of the spatial lag of the dependent variable and
of error term respectively.
The problem with testing this hypothesis is that, leaving slavery aside for a moment,
immigrants did not distribute themselves randomly across Sa˜o Paulo’s municipalities. Pre-
sumably, they tended to locate where labour demand and opportunities were more abun-
dant. These same locations tended to acquire large numbers of slaves. In fact, I find
that, in 1872, municipalities with relatively more slaves also had larger shares of foreign
born non-slave citizens. Thus, a direct analysis of the impact of slavery on migrant set-
tlement and of the latter on fiscal development would be potentially marred by omitted
variable bias, the omitted variables being the demand for labour and growth potential
of each municipality. I rely, instead, on the location of settler colonies set up by the na-
tional/provincial governments in conjunction with private companies and planters between
1829 and 1939 to proxy the settlement of migrants.
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Table 5.7: Public services, 3SLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES PubServShare SlaveRatio1872 SL PubServShare SL SlaveRatio1872 PubServPerCap SlaveRatio1872 SL PubServPerCap SL SlaveRatio1872
SL PubServShare -0.0551
(0.419)
SL PubServPerCap 1.270
(0.806)
SlaveRatio1872 -1.850*** -20.93**
(0.507) (9.401)
CoffeeSuit 0.000278 -0.000146 -0.00450 -0.000143
(0.000320) (0.000105) (0.00575) (0.000105)
DistPort -0.000430 -0.000657*** 0.00516 -0.000653***
(0.000575) (0.000134) (0.00883) (0.000137)
LN(CoffeeSuit*DistPort) 0.0654*** 0.0656***
(0.0208) (0.0213)
SL SlaveRatio1872 -1.033*** -23.60***
(0.246) (4.463)
SL CoffeeSuit 0.000577*** -0.000320*** 0.0213*** -0.000319***
(0.000164) (8.69e-05) (0.00296) (8.69e-05)
SL DistPort -0.000399** -0.000812*** -0.0109*** -0.000811***
(0.000174) (0.000102) (0.00314) (0.000102)
SL LN(CoffeeSuit*DistPort) 0.110*** 0.109***
(0.0122) (0.0122)
Constant 1.384 0.633** 0.0123* 0.00384 31.91 0.621** 0.214* 0.00385
(1.229) (0.281) (0.00678) (0.00242) (22.37) (0.283) (0.123) (0.00242)
Additional controls
Geo variables 3 3 3 3
Land suitability 3 3 3 3
1836 variables 3 3 3 3
1872 variables 3 3 3 3
Santos dummy 3 3 3 3
Spatial lag of controls 3 3 3 3
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
R-squared -0.029 0.699 0.990 0.997 0.247 0.698 0.945 0.997
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
SL stands for spatial lag. The outcome variables are measured in 1912. Geographic controls include
latitude and distance from the port of Santos or Rio de Janeiro (whichever is closer). The land suitability
indicators refer to rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee, sugar cane and cotton. Santos is excluded
from the estimation. I drop the non white share variable and the coffee and sugar production variables in
order to preserve degrees of freedom. They are insignificant and do not change the results qualitatively or
quantitatively. I also drop longitude because, while not statistically significant, it is closely related to my
instrument, and decreases its strength when included. All other controls included in previous estimations
remain. Lambda and rho are the coefficients of the spatial lag of the dependent variable and of error term
respectively.
The intuition for using these is that municipalities with settler colonies were more
likely to attract migrants both directly – the colonies were created through government-
subsidized arrivals of Europeans – and indirectly – through migrant networks and family
re-conjunctions – than municipalities without settler colonies. At the same time, settler
colonies created while slavery was not yet abolished were located, on average, in munici-
palities with relatively smaller slave populations. For colonies created after the abolition
of slavery, instead, there is no negative association between their location and the inci-
dence of slavery. If my hypothesis that slavery affected fiscal capacity development and
public goods provision by shaping the settlement of foreign migrants is true, one would ex-
pect municipalities with settler colonies founded while slavery still existed to be positively
associated with these outcomes and to explain away the effect of slavery.
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Table 5.8: Municipal education, 3SLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES PubEduShare SlaveRatio1872 SL PubEduShare SL SlaveRatio1872 PubEduPerCap SlaveRatio1872 SL PubEduPerCap SL SlaveRatio1872
SL PubEduShare 0.800
(0.842)
SL PubEduPerCap 1.092**
(0.552)
SlaveRatio1872 -0.209*** -1.369***
(0.0748) (0.370)
CoffeeSuit -8.73e-05* -0.000137 -9.64e-05 -0.000128
(4.76e-05) (0.000105) (0.000241) (0.000104)
DistPort 6.79e-05 -0.000648*** -8.59e-06 -0.000644***
(7.02e-05) (0.000136) (0.000349) (0.000134)
LN(CoffeeSuit*DistPort) 0.0653*** 0.0654***
(0.0211) (0.0208)
SL SlaveRatio1872 -0.139*** -1.448***
(0.0309) (0.220)
SL CoffeeSuit 8.23e-05*** -0.000316*** 0.00143*** -0.000311***
(2.05e-05) (8.69e-05) (0.000147) (8.64e-05)
SL DistPort 7.89e-06 -0.000808*** -0.000655*** -0.000795***
(2.17e-05) (0.000102) (0.000156) (0.000101)
SL LN(CoffeeSuit*DistPort) 0.109*** 0.107***
(0.0122) (0.0121)
Constant 0.281 0.605** 0.00214** 0.00381 2.425*** 0.564** 0.0187*** 0.00397
(0.179) (0.282) (0.000854) (0.00242) (0.932) (0.279) (0.00605) (0.00242)
Additional controls
Geo variables 3 3 3 3
Land suitability 3 3 3 3
1836 variables 3 3 3 3
1872 variables 3 3 3 3
Santos dummy 3 3 3 3
Spatial lag of controls 3 3 3 3
Observations 160 160 160 160 160 160 160 160
R-squared -0.004 0.698 0.957 0.997 0.411 0.697 0.969 0.997
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
SL stands for spatial lag. The outcome variables are measured in 1912. Geographic controls include
latitude and distance from the port of Santos or Rio de Janeiro (whichever is closer). The land suitability
indicators refer to rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee, sugar cane and cotton. Santos is excluded
from the estimation. I drop the non white share variable and the coffee and sugar production variables in
order to preserve degrees of freedom. They are insignificant and do not change the results qualitatively or
quantitatively. I also drop longitude because, while not statistically significant, it is closely related to my
instrument, and decreases its strength when included. All other controls included in previous estimations
remain. Lambda and rho are the coefficients of the spatial lag of the dependent variable and of error term
respectively.
This strategy is potentially invalidated by the fact that settler colonies were not created
randomly. Although it does not appear that colonies were located in particularly favorable
locations (Cameron, 1931), one could envisage that they were placed in municipalities with
more growth potential or better initial institutions. In order to account for this issue, I
include colonies created after the end of slavery in my estimation as a separate variable. If
settler colonies were indeed placed in more favorable locations and/or if the settlement of
immigrants did indeed improve local institutions, these colonies should also be positively
associated with my outcomes. In either case, they should not explain away the effect of
slavery if my identification strategy is valid. Finally, I also introduce placebo colonies.
These are settlements founded after the end of my period of observation, i.e. post-1912.
Finding a positive effect of these colonies on my outcomes would be a strong signal that
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colonies were simply placed in more favorable locations, and that my identification strategy
is not valid. Reassuringly, this is not the case.
The colonies I use in the estimation are detailed in Figure 5.12. The final year for my
first group of colonies is 1889 rather than 1888 (the year slavery was abolished) because
colonies completed in that year were devised before the abolition of slavery by the Imperial
government. The second group of colonies includes those founded between 1890 and 1912,
while last group includes colonies founded between 1913 and 1938.88
Figure 5.12: The location of settler colonies in Sa˜o Paulo, 1829-1938
Source: Gagliardi (1958)
Table 5.9 illustrates the results of the exercise using standard IV estimations, but
spatial models yield similar results (see Appendix 5.A). The results confirm both the hy-
pothesis and validity of the identification strategy. For expenditure per capita and revenue
per capita, the coefficient of the pre-1890 colonies is positive, large and highly statistically
significant. Moreover, the inclusion of this variable greatly reduces the size of the slavery
coefficient, making it statistically insignificant (columns 1 and 3). When the pre-1890
colonies are excluded, instead, the slavery coefficient retuns to be large and statistically
significantly negative, even if the 1890-1912 and post-1912 colonies are included (columns
88The creation of first group of colonies was overseen by the imperial government, the second by the
provincial government, while in the last group all except two, which were implemented by the Federal
government, were implemented by the provincial government, as well. There is no evidence of a discon-
tinuity in the strategy regarding the creation of these colonies between the three periods. If anything,
colonies set-up by the provincial government were considered more successful due to improvements in the
design of settler contracts and of conditions on plantations. However, the overall experience with this
type of immigration was not generally considered to have been particularly successful (Cameron, 1931).
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2 and 4). Furthermore, the coefficient of the 1890-1912 colonies is positive and statis-
tically significant, as expected, while the coefficient of the post-1912 placebo colonies is
indistinguishable from zero, as required by the identification strategy.
The inclusion of the pre-1890 colonies also reduces the first-stage F-stat indicating that
this variable captures part of the variation in the distribution of slaves across the province
attributable to the instrument. This suggests that, indeed, forced and free labour stood
in contrast to each other while slavery still existed. The inclusion of the post-slavery
colonies, instead, has no impact on the first stage statistics. Quantitatively, the impact of
the colonies is large: a municipality with a pre-1890 colony had on average nearly 6 milre´ıs
higher per capita revenue and approximately 4 milre´ıs higher per capita expenditure. This
is in the same ballpark as the effect of a 10 percentage points increase in the slave ratio
found above.
For the other outcomes the results are less clear cut. In all cases, except for the
share of expenditure dedicated to education, the inclusion of the pre-1890 colonies reduces
the size of the slavery coefficient and of the first stage F-stat. For the share of public
services and for public services expenditure per capita, the inclusion of pre-1890 colonies
also renders the coefficient insignificant. However, the coefficient on the colonies itself
is insignificant for the public service share. For per capita education expenditure, the
estimates are essentially unchanged by the inclusion of the pre-1890 colonies, suggesting
a different channel than that of immigrant settlement for the impact of slavery. This will
be explored in future research.
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Table 5.9: The settlement channel, IV estimation
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES RevPerCap RevPerCap ExpPerCap ExpPerCap PubServShare PubServShare PubServPerCap PubServPerCap PubEduShare PubEduShare PubEduPerCap PubEduPerCap
SlaveRatio1872 -4.875 -70.90** -18.47 -69.81** -1.564 -2.370** -9.776 -41.35** -0.229 -0.113 -2.113** -2.304**
(25.13) (33.20) (23.10) (32.15) (1.157) (1.191) (17.78) (20.24) (0.178) (0.171) (1.034) (1.078)
ColoniesPre1890 5.768*** 3.703*** 0.0793 3.106*** -0.0114 0.0188
(1.492) (0.920) (0.0606) (1.044) (0.00785) (0.0465)
Colonies1890-1912 0.789 2.231* 1.840* 2.771** -0.0156 0.00132 -0.326 0.335 0.0131 0.0107 0.0881** 0.0921**
(1.131) (1.310) (1.037) (1.353) (0.0508) (0.0529) (0.532) (0.716) (0.00830) (0.00818) (0.0399) (0.0413)
ColoniesPost1912 -0.336 0.338 -0.659 1.139 0.0138 0.0280 -0.267 0.288 0.00835 0.00630 0.0238 0.0271
(1.229) (1.574) (1.084) (1.653) (0.104) (0.126) (0.844) (1.636) (0.0127) (0.00998) (0.0881) (0.0945)
Constant 48.00* 125.3*** 72.54*** 130.3*** 1.050 2.031 36.37 74.76*** 0.493** 0.352* 4.755*** 4.987***
(28.35) (40.15) (25.43) (39.57) (1.830) (1.891) (25.73) (28.34) (0.213) (0.193) (1.262) (1.298)
Additional controls
Geo variables 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Land suitability 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1836 variables 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1872 variables 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 171 171 171 171 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159
R-squared 0.584 0.010 0.494 -0.030 0.041 -0.141 0.257 0.031 0.053 0.144 0.084 0.017
Panel B: First Stage
F-stat 9.38*** 10.34*** 9.38*** 10.34*** 9.12*** 11.49*** 9.12*** 11.49*** 9.12*** 11.49*** 9.12*** 11.49***
Part R-squared 0.0490 0.0437 0.0490 0.0437 0.0554 0.0577 0.0554 0.0577 0.0554 0.0577 0.0554 0.0577
Observations 171 171 171 171 159 159 159 159 159 159 159 159
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Revenue and expenditure per capita are 1908-1912 averages, the other outcome variables are measured in 1912. Geographic controls include latitude and distance from the
port of Santos or Rio de Janeiro (whichever is closer). The land suitability indicators refer to rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee, sugar cane and cotton. Santos is
excluded from the estimation. I drop the non white share variable and the coffee and sugar production variables in order to preserve degrees of freedom. They are insignificant
and do not change the results qualitatively or quantitatively. I also drop longitude because, while not statistically significant, it is closely related to my instrument, and
decreases its strength when included. All other controls included in previous estimations remain.
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5.5.5 Adding Rio de Janeiro
As discussed above, Rio de Janeiro has a very different history from that of Sa˜o Paulo. The
city of Rio de Janeiro became Brazil’s colonial capital in 1763 and in 1808 the Portuguese
court moved there to escape Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal. After Independence, the
city became the capital of the new nation and remained so until it was replaced by the
newly-contructed Bras´ılia in 1960. The capitancy/province of Rio de Janeiro was home
to a substantial production of sugar cane during colonial times, and was the birthplace of
large-scale coffee production in Brazil in the early 19th century. Moreover, Rio was the
main port of entry of slaves into Brazil in the 1800s. Although coffee production in Rio
experienced stagnation and decline after 1850, the combination of all these factors meant
that Rio de Janeiro had far more slaves in relative terms than Sa˜o Paulo throughout
history.
Table 5.10: Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo, standard and spatial IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV IV SARAR IV SARAR IV
VARIABLES RevPerCap ExpPerCap RevPerCap ExpPerCap
SlaveRatio1872 -63.22* -55.29* -13.78** -13.85**
(35.47) (31.65) (6.697) (5.950)
Constant 71.77** 67.20*** 15.00 10.93
(28.41) (23.15) (17.98) (13.28)
Lambda 0.765*** 0.945***
(0.269) (0.264)
Rho -0.0592 -0.469
(0.677) (0.832)
Additional controls
Santos dummy 3 3
Rio de Janeiro dummy 3 3 3 3
Geo variables 3 3 3 3
Land suitability 3 3 3 3
1872 variables 3 3 3 3
First stage F-stat 8.85** 8.85**
First stage part R2 0.0223 0.0223
Observations 219 219 220 220
R-squared -0.226 -0.295
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Lambda is the spatial lag and rho is the spatially weighted error term. Geographic controls include latitude
and distance from the port of Santos or Rio de Janeiro (whichever is closer). The land suitability indicators
refer to rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee, sugar cane and cotton. Revenue and expenditure
per capita are 1908-1912 averages. Santos is excluded from the estimation in columns 1 and 2. The 1872
controls and other variables are those used in previous estimations. Population density is excluded from
the last two columns due to missing values.
Rio de Janeiro was different from Sa˜o Paulo also from an administrative point of view,
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mainly because of its earlier settlement and smaller geographical extension. This is evident
from the fact that, while over half of Sa˜o Paulo’s municipalities in 1912 were created after
1872, in Rio this figure was less than one third. Furthermore, in subsequent decades, the
creation of new administrative units continued at a much faster pace in Sa˜o Paulo than in
Rio, particularly in the former state’s western frontier regions. Rio’s municipalities also
tended to be much larger than Sa˜o Paulo’s. In 1872, the former had on average over 25,000
inhabitants while the latter only had 9,000. By 1912, this gap had substantially, but not
completely, narrowed.
I show the outcome of including Rio de Janeiro’s municipalities in the analysis in Table
5.10. For this exercise, I cannot include the 1836 controls and I can only look at the fiscal
capacity outcomes, since the 1836 controls and information on public goods expenditure
are not available for Rio. In order to account for structural differences across the two
states, I add state fixed effects in the regressions.
I find remarkably similar results to those of Sa˜o Paulo in isolation. Using both standard
IV and SARAR IV models, I find a strongly negative effect of slavery on fiscal capacity.
Similar results also emerge using 3SLS. Once again, coefficients are smaller when I use
my spatial model, but the qualitative result is unchanged. The negative impact of a 10
percentage point increase in the slave ratio can be quantified with a 6.3-1.4 milre´ıs drop
in per capita revenue and 5.5 -1.4 milre´ıs drop in per capita expenditure. These are large
numbers given that, excluding Santos, average revenue and expenditure per capita in the
two states were 5.1 and 4.3 milre´ıs respectively in 1908-12.
The results also confirm the existence of large positive spillover effects between neigh-
boring municipalities. This suggests the existence of strategic complementarities in deci-
sions regarding the development of fiscal capacity at the local level.
5.6 Conclusion
Slavery has long being singled out as one of the determinants of economic underperfor-
mance in both sending and receiving countries. Despite this, no conclusive evidence of
the impact of slavery on broad economic and institutional outcomes in Brazil, the largest
importer of slaves during the Atlantic slave trade, exists. In this paper, I provide evi-
dence that slavery negatively affected the development of fiscal capacity and public goods
provision in Brazil, by analyzing municipal level outcomes in Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo.
Although the raw data and standard regressions are inconclusive regarding the rela-
tionship between slavery and fiscal capacity, in line with previous work, I show that this is
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due to the existence of multiple sources of bias. Once these are accounted for using spatial
models and an instrumental variable strategy, the strongly negative effect of slavery on
the development of fiscal capacity and on the provision of public goods provision in Rio
de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo’s municipalities emerges clearly.
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Appendices
5.A Additional analysis and robustness checks
In this section, I present some further estimations, which illustrate the robustness of the
results of the paper. I have performed many additional robustness checks not shown here
in the interest of space. However, one of these deserves to be mentioned.
I have assessed the robustness of my results in relation to the other existing study,
which offers clear cut findings regarding the effects of slavery on developmental outcomes
in Brazil. Fujiwara, Laudares, and Valencia Caceido (2017) show that municipalities on
the Portuguese side of the line drawn as a result of the Treaty of Tordesillas had more
slaves than those on the Spanish side in 1872 and use this fact in a regression discontinuity
framework to test the long-run legacy of slavery on inequality and other outcome variables.
I employed the distance from the Tordesillas line interacted with a dummy indicating
whether a municipality was on the Portuguese or Spanish side as an instrument for the
incidence of slavery and found that this was only weakly related to slave ratios in Sa˜o
Paulo. The inclusion of controls eliminated even this weak correlation. I also tested the
sensitivity of my results to adding these variables directly in the regression in an attempt
to capture any residual differences between municipalities on either side of the Tordesillas
line not accounted for by my controls, but found the results to be completely unchanged.
The first robustness check I present here is the “neighbor” style estimation described
in Section 5.5.3 (Table 5.11). As suggested by Gibbons and Overman (2012) to overcome
the endogeneity issues connected with SARAR models, I introduce the spatial lag of the
explanatory variables as controls rather than the spatial lag of the depednet variable.
Additionally, I use the spatial lag of the main variable of interest – the 1872 slave ratio
– instead of the variable of interest itself. This is to minimize any remaining worries
of endogeneity. The spatial lag of the slave ratio is furthermore instrumented using the
spatial lag of the instrument. The first stage F-stats are very large, revealing that the
instrument works even better by averaging over large geographical areas.
The impact of slavery on revenue and expenditure per capita and on the education
outcomes is statistically significant and strongly negative, confirming the findings above.
The coefficients are negative also for the public services outcome variables, but not mea-
sured precisely enough to be statistically significant at conventional levels. This is not
particularly worrying given that the three stage least square estimation presented in the
body of paper recovers a significantly negative effect of slavery on these variables as well.
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In this estimation, the lack of significance is very probably due to the low number of
degrees of freedom left given the large number of controls utilized.
Table 5.11: “Neighbour” IV estimation
Panel A: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES RevPerCap ExpPerCap PubServShare PubServPerCap PubEduShare PubEduPerCap
SL SlaveRatio1872 -510.3*** -408.6*** -9.149 -178.1 -2.458** -19.72***
(153.4) (133.7) (8.512) (112.3) (1.129) (5.500)
Constant 40.32 43.47 -0.209 30.85 -0.0661 1.432
(34.81) (28.79) (2.244) (31.04) (0.226) (1.164)
Additional controls
Geo variables 3 3 3 3 3 3
Land suitability 3 3 3 3 3 3
1836 variables 3 3 3 3 3 3
1872 variables 3 3 3 3 3 3
Spatial lag of controls 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 171 171 159 159 159 159
R-squared -0.014 0.040 -0.148 0.0284 0.128 -0.015
Panel B: First Stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES SL SlaveRatio1872 SL SlaveRatio1872 SL SlaveRatio1872 SL SlaveRatio1872 SL SlaveRatio1872 SL LagSlaveRatio1872
Instrument & other variables of interest
SL LN(CoffeeSuit*DistPort) 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.125***
(0.159) (0.159) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177) (0.177)
SL DistPort -0.000857*** -0.000857*** -0.000841*** -0.000841*** -0.000841*** -0.000841***
(0.000153) (0.000153) (0.000162) (0.000162) (0.000162) (0.000162)
SL CoffeeSuit -0.000393*** -0.000393*** -0.000388*** -0.000388*** -0.000388*** -0.000388***
(0.0000926) (0.0000926) (0.0000962) (0.0000962) (0.0000962) (0.0000962)
F-stat 59.17*** 59.17*** 49.9*** 49.9*** 49.9*** 49.9***
Part R-squared 0.333 0.333 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.352
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
SL stands for spatial lag. Revenue per capita is 1908-1912 average. Santos is excluded from the estimation.
In the IV estimation I drop the non white share variable and the coffee and sugar production variables.
They are insignificant and does not change the results qualitatively or quantitatively. Geographic controls
include latitude and distance from the port of Santos or Rio de Janeiro (whichever is closer). The land
suitability indicators refer to rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee, sugar cane and cotton. Revenue
and expenditure per capita are 1908-1912 averages. The 1872 controls and other variables are those used
in previous estimations.
The next robustness check consists in omitting sources of revenue that might affect
my results from the revenue per capita measure. More precisely I omit state subsidies
and borrowing. Both the data and the historiography do not offer much evidence on
the mechanisms with which government subsidies were assigned. Some municipalities
received none, while other received substantial amounts, with no consistency over time.
Neither does it appear that poorer municipalities received more subsidies. If anything,
municipalities with higher non-subsidy revenues per capita tended to receive more help
from the government. This suggests that subsidies might have been tied to political rather
than economic considerations. It could also mean that they satisfied temporary funding
needs connected, for example, to large infrastructure investments, such as the installation
of sewers or public lights. The erratic and apparently arbitrary nature of the subsidies
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makes their relationship with fiscal capacity unclear. Did subsidies substitute and prevent
fiscal capacity accumulation? Did municipalities endowed with adequate fiscal capacity
not exploit it because the could rely on transfers from the state instead? Were the subsidies
an alternative to borrowing for capital investments and other revenue shortfalls?
The relationship between borrowing and fiscal capacity is less controversial, but still not
entirely straightforward. Before World War II, it was commonplace to classify borrowing
as part of public revenues, often in a separate extraordinary revenue section of public
accounts. Today, instead, borrowing is considered as a separate item in public accounts.
This is because the proceeds of borrowing reflect funds that will have to be repaid, but
also because it is unclear to which fiscal year the “revenue” coming from loans should be
assigned to. So, should loans be considered part of a government’s fiscal capacity? O’Brien
(2011) suggests that they should. This is reasonable in light of the intimate relationship
between fiscal capacity and borrowing capacity (see Chapter 4). However, the issue of
how to assign loans to fiscal years remains.
These considerations indicate that there is no clear way in which the inclusion of the
two revenue items should lead to bias. It appears safe to assume that subsidies and loans
are not connected with the legacy of slavery though a channel other than fiscal capacity.
In case this assumption were violated, estimates of the impact of the institution might
be biased either upwards on downwards. Given these complex considerations, I have left
the two revenue items in my main analysis, reassured by the fact that my other outcome
variables will reliably capture the two aspects of fiscal capacity I am interested in: the
share of resources commanded by a municipality, and its allocation to public services.
To dispel any worries of bias coming from loans and subsidies, I also re-run my analysis
excluding these items using standard IV, SARAR IV, “neighbor” IV and 3SLS methods
(Table 5.12). The estimations yield results that are consistent with my previous analysis
both qualitatively and quantitatively. Only the standard IV yields an insignificant albeit
still negative coefficients. Thus, the strongly negative impact of slavery on fiscal capacity
development emerges clearly from this excercise as well.
Moreover, I also find evidence of positive spillover effects, which were absent in previous
estimations for revenue per capita (excluding the specification when Rio de Janeiro is
included in the estimation). This suggests that the variable excluding loans and grants
might, indeed, represent a cleaner measure of fiscal capacity.
The final robustness check regards the immigrant settlement channel. Table 5.13 shows
that when I use the SARAR IV estimator results are broadly consistent with the standard
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Table 5.12: Revenue per capita excluding loans and government grants, standard and
spatial IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
IV SARAR IV “neighbor” IV 3SLS
VARIABLES RevPerCapAlt RevPerCapAlt RevPerCapAlt RevPerCapAlt SlaveRatio1872 SL RevPerCapAlt SL SlaveRatio1872
SL RevPerCapAlt 0.641* 0.729*
(0.328) (0.415)
SlaveRatio1872 -36.90 -10.05* -18.18**
(28.04) (5.808) (8.819)
SL SlaveRatio1872 -377.0*** -25.18***
(107.6) (5.551)
LN(CoffeeSuit*DistPort) 0.0565***
(0.0212)
DistPort -0.0202** -0.000113 0.0179 0.00118 -0.000592***
(0.00966) (0.00697) (0.0112) (0.00884) (0.000136)
CoffeeSuit 0.0129** 0.00998* 0.00625 0.0120** -0.000102
(0.00636) (0.00578) (0.00500) (0.00560) (0.000105)
SL LN(CoffeeSuit*DistPort) 0.108***
(0.0121)
SL DistPort 0.0958* -0.00192 -0.000793***
(0.0556) (0.00394) (0.000101)
SL CoffeeSuit spl 0.0518 0.0294*** -0.000319***
(0.0599) (0.00370) (8.65e-05)
Rho -1.248
(1.182)
Constant 76.09** 26.16* -10.88 18.66 0.614** -0.107 0.00355
(32.43) (14.84) (24.99) (21.89) (0.281) (0.153) (0.00242)
Additional controls
Geo variables 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Land suitability 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1836 variables 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1872 variables 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Spatial lag of controls 3 3 3
First stage F-stat 10.91*** 49.9***
Observations 159 160 159 160 160 160 160
R-squared 0.388 0.612 0.660 0.696 0.980 0.997
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
SL stands for spatial lag. Lambda is the spatial lag and rho is the spatially weighted error term. Santos is
excluded in columns 1 and 3 due to issue of singularity of matrix. Geographic controls include latitude and
distance from the port of Santos or Rio de Janeiro (whichever is closer). The land suitability indicators
refer to rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee, sugar cane and cotton. Revenue per capita are 1908-
1912 averages. Lambda is the spatial lag and rho is the spatially weighted error term. The 1836 and 1872
controls and other variables are those used in previous estimations.
IV estimation. Using three 3SLS yields very similar results, but I refrain from reporting
it to avoid the further proliferation of regression tables.
For revenue per capita, the introduction of the pre-1890 colonies dummy reduces sub-
stantially the magnitude of the slavery coefficient from -20 to -13. However the coefficient
remains significantly negative even when the dummy is included, indicating that the settle-
ment channel might not be the only way slavery shaped local institutions. For expenditure,
instead, the results are qualitatively very similar to the standard IV estimation in that the
slavery coefficient becomes insignificant when the pre-1890 colonies dummy is included.
The same is true for the public services per capita outcome. In all these cases, the pres-
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ence of the 1890-1912 and the post 1912 placebo dummies does not affect the impact
of slavery, in line with my hypothesis. As for the standard IV estimation, the SARAR
estimates indicate the settlement channel was not the way in which slavery negatively
affected expenditure on municipal education. For the public service and education shares
this exercise is not very informative, as the negative impact of slavery on these outcomes
is not evident either with or without the pre-1890 colonies, in contrast to the more robust
3SLS results. This suggests different underlying channels for the effect of slavery, but
might also reflect missing observations in the additional outcomes.
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Table 5.13: The settlement channel, SARAR IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES RevPerCap RevPerCap ExpPerCap ExpPerCap PubServShare PubServShare PubServPerCap PubServPerCap PubEduShare PubEduShare PubEduPerCap PubEduPerCap
SlaveRatio1872 -13.22** -19.98*** -10.09 -14.44** -0.0749 -0.217 -6.463 -7.404** -0.0600 -0.0569 -0.601*** -0.584**
(6.637) (7.207) (6.139) (6.634) (0.337) (0.355) (4.082) (3.688) (0.0498) (0.0479) (0.233) (0.233)
ColoniesPre1890 6.205*** 3.905*** 0.0968* 1.867 -0.00671 0.00440
(1.544) (0.892) (0.0580) (1.387) (0.00786) (0.0363)
Colonies1890-1912 1.401 0.314 2.070** 1.391 -0.0565 -0.0552 -1.107* -1.194** 0.00948 0.00961 0.0309 0.0302
(1.014) (1.582) (0.956) (1.130) (0.0412) (0.0412) (0.589) (0.594) (0.00725) (0.00724) (0.0317) (0.0317)
ColoniesPost1912 -0.291 0.951 -0.369 0.374 -0.0241 -0.0277 -0.221 -0.390 0.00908 0.0102 0.00465 0.00528
(1.310) (1.134) (1.083) (0.962) (0.0922) (0.0907) (1.091) (1.119) (0.0110) (0.0113) (0.0496) (0.0496)
Constant 47.26* 41.73 41.17* 38.35 -0.678 -0.226 -2.614 1.168 0.169 0.133 1.422* 1.363*
(24.74) (33.75) (23.15) (26.40) (1.241) (1.271) (14.24) (16.08) (0.144) (0.142) (0.740) (0.749)
Lambda 0.276 0.543 0.543 0.724* -0.109 -0.205 0.583 0.348 0.917 1.133 0.768 0.807*
(0.320) (0.395) (0.360) (0.395) (0.442) (0.442) (0.718) (0.749) (0.713) (0.737) (0.479) (0.483)
Rho -3.545** -1.358 -2.063 -1.043 -0.377 -0.0506 -2.302 -1.727 -2.815 -3.287* -1.798 -1.749
(1.501) (1.285) (2.022) (1.711) (0.998) (0.952) (1.866) (1.842) (1.936) (1.964) (1.615) (1.604)
Additional controls
Santos dummy 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Geo variables 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Land suitability 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1836 variables 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1872 variables 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Observations 173 173 173 173 161 161 161 161 161 161 161 161
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
SL stands for spatial lag. Lambda is the spatial lag and rho is the spatially weighted error term. Revenue and expenditure per capita are 1908-1912 averages, the other
outcome variables are measured in 1912. Geographic controls include latitude and distance from the port of Santos or Rio de Janeiro (whichever is closer). The land suitability
indicators refer to rain-fed, low input potential yields of coffee, sugar cane and cotton. Revenue per capita are 1908-1912 averages. Lambda is the spatial lag and rho is the
spatially weighted error term. The 1836 and 1872 controls and other variables are those used in previous estimations.
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5.B Variable definition and sources
Throughout the paper, I provide information on the sources of the data. In the text, I
also outline how I deal with the creation of new municipalities after 1872, as well as any
additional data issues. In this Appendix, I describe in more detail how the variables used
in the estimation are constructed. Unless otherwise stated, all the 1872 data are from that
year’s census (Brazil, 1876) and refer to both Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo. The 1836
data comes from Bassanezi (1998), which in turn relies on Mu¨ller (1838), and is for Sa˜o
Paulo only.
Revenue and expenditure per capita: refer to the public revenue and expenditure of
the municipalities of Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo normalized by the size of the population
for the respective years. I collect these variables for five years – 1908-1912 – from the 1908-
12 Brazilian statistical yearbook (Brazil, 1908-1912) and calculate averages to smooth out
idiosyncratic annual variations.
Composition of revenue and expenditure: I collect this information for Sa˜o Paulo in
1912 from the state’s statistical yearbook from the same year (Sa˜o Paulo, 1912). The data
are more detailed than in the Brazil-wide yearbook, and thus provide a more complete
picture of the municipalities’ public finances. Revenues are classified as follows. Ordinary
revenue: any remaining positive balance from the previous exercise, tax on industries and
professions, property tax, transportation taxes, tax on coffee trees, taxes on water, sewer
taxes, income of the cemetery, income of the slaughterhouse, income from the market,
income from public lighting, recovery of active claims. Extraordinary revenue: deposits
and cautions, state subsidy, loans obtained in the fiscal year. The components of expen-
diture are as follows. Ordinary expenditure: public works, street cleaning, public lighting,
public health, market, cemetery, slaughterhouse, public water, public sewers, public edu-
cation, wages and subsidies of municipal workers, office and publication expenses of the
municipality, judicial expenses, extraordinary expenses, other expenses. Extraordinary
expenditure: refunds and and returned deposits.
Using these data, I construct my additional outcome variables. The public service
share is simply the share of expenditure on items clearly identifiable as public goods or
other public services in total municipal expenditure. These services are: public works,
street cleaning, public lighting, public health, market, cemetery, slaughterhouse, public
water, public sewers, public education. The pubic services per capita measure is the
expenditure on these same services normalized by population size. The public education
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variables single out the, arguably, most important public good provided by municipalities
in this period normalized by total public expenditure and population size respectively.
For my robustness checks I also construct a further revenue outcome variable. This is
total revenue per capita excluding state subsidies and loans. I exclude the former because
they may or may not reflect local level fiscal capacity (I discuss this issue in detail in
the previous Appendix). I exclude loans because borrowing is not a revenue in a strict
sense, and because it is unclear to which fiscal year the loans should be assigned and no
information is available regarding maturities.
Slave ratio: is simply the share of slaves in the population of each municipality. I
calculate this for 1872 and 1836.
Population size: is the number of people living within a municipality. I calculate this for
1872 and 1836. For 1872, I also calculated a quadratic term to account for non-linearities
such as Zipf’s and Gibrat’s Laws (Gabaix, 1999).
Population density: is the number of people living within a municipality normalized by
the surface area of that same municipality. I calculate this for 1872.
Initial state capacity: I construct two variables to proxy initial state capacity, one
for 1836 and one for 1872. The 1836 variable is the number of tax collectors in each
municipality normalized by population size in 1836. The 1872 variable is the number of
public workers residing in a municipality normalized by population size in 1872.
Sugar and coffee production: This is the production in weight of these two commodi-
ties in 1836 at municipal level normalized by population size in the same year.
Literacy: this variable measures the share of the population who is reported as able to
read and write. I calculate this for 1872.
New Municipality: is a dummy indicating whether a municipality was created after
1872.
Domestic migrants: is the share of Brazilian citizens in each municipality not born in
the state where they currently reside. I calculate this for 1872.
Foreign migrants: is the share of citizens living in a municipality born outside of Brazil
excluding slaves. I calculate this for 1872.
Share of agricultural workers: is the share of citizens of the municipality working in
the agricultural or pastoral sector. I calculate this for 1872.
Non white share: the 1872 census divided the Brazilian population into four self-
reported categories: brancos (whites), pardos (mulattoes), pretos (blacks) and cablocos
(mestizios). I calculate the share of non whites in the population of each municipality
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using all non-white categories.
Ethnic fractionalization: I calculate the degree of ethnic fractionalization in each mu-
nicipality using the the index proposed by Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999). The index’s
formula is:
EthnicFrac = 1−
4∑
i=1
Ethnicity2i
where Ethnicity corresponds to share of the population belonging to each of the four
self-reported categories outlined above.
Geographical controls and land suitability: I construct these variables based on
municipal borders in 1911 as per the maps provided by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia
e Estat´ıstica (IBGE, 2011). All variables are municipal averages. Latitude, longitude and
distances refer to the centroid of each municipality and are as the crow flies distances
which take into account the earth’s curvature. The raw altitude data in 1km by 1km cells
is from WorldClim (www.corldclim.org). The land suitability data are from the Food and
Agriculture Organization (2012) and are based on monthly statistics of climatic variables
and precipitation for the period 1960-90, collected in 10-30 arc minutes cells.
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5.C Images
(a) Slaves on their way to work on the fields in Rio de Janeiro, 1858
(b) Coffee plantation in the settler colony of Conde do Parnahyba in Mogi
Mirim - Sa˜o Paulo, undated
Figure 5.13: Slaves and colonists
Image (a) is a lithography held at the Acervo Banco Itau´ in Sa˜o Paulo based on a photograph by Victor
Frond held at the Biblioteca Nacional in Rio de Janeiro. Image (c) is from the digital archive of the Museu
da Imigrac¸a˜o do Estado de Sa˜o Paulo
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Figure 5.14: Tax paid on a transaction involving slaves (meia siza) in Bonfin - Minas
Gerais, 4 July 1872
The price of the sale of three slaves – Antonio, Joa˜o and Francisco – to Antonio Pinto Mascarenhas
amounted to 3100 milre´ıs while the tax paid was 151.08 milre´ıs, curiously about 44 milre´ıs less than the
5% tax rate would imply. Source: Acervo Banco Itau´, Sa˜o Paulo
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this concluding chapter, I will not repeat the points made in other parts of this Dis-
sertation. I have laid out the general motivation and contribution of this work in the
introduction (Chapter 1). I have reviewed the vast literature that has informed this work,
and illustrated how this research helps to fill some of the existing gaps in our understand-
ing in Chapter 2. In the three research papers, I have outlined in even more detail the
motivation and contribution of this work (Chapters 3- 5).
Below, I will only briefly summarize some general lessons and ideas, which I believe
the Dissertation raises or supports. The main discussion will deal with potential future
avenues for research.
6.1 General lessons
This Dissertation has offered a new perspective on the origin and impact of a key insti-
tutional characteristic of countries: fiscal capacity. In the three papers that make up this
dissertation, I have shown that:
1. Fiscal capacity is not only important for long term development, but also in short
term and cyclical outcomes. More generally, my findings support the idea that
deeply-rooted fundamentals and institutions can shape how countries react to shocks
and constrain the available policy options.
This is demonstrated by the fact that more fiscally fragile countries were much
more likely to default during the Great Depression and by the fact that the path
of their public revenues was strongly influenced by the level of fiscal development
they possessed at the even of the slump. These findings highlight the importance of
incorporating institutional constraints in both historical research on the Great De-
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pression (and beyond) and in theoretical research in macroeconomics and finance.
Although some steps in this direction have been taken in recent years, most macroe-
conomic models still ignore the fact that states are not always effective and that
their capacities might be severely limited by their institutional development.
Regarding research on the Great Depression, while much work has been dedicated
to the impact of Gold Standard membership and the influence of WWI in upsetting
the balance of power within countries, I argue that it needs to be recognised that the
Depression hit countries possessing vastly different and deeply-rooted institutions.
This not only shaped the policy choices available to them, but also determined the
outcome of these policies. This is most evidenvet in the fact that, after leaving the
Gold Standard, weak countries saw their borrowing costs rise, while fiscally strong
once experienced lower borrowing costs.
2. Fiscal capacity is a useful and comprehensive measure of institutional quality.
While this is the central tenet of the literature on state formation and state capacity,
we still lack much direct empirical evidence that this is the case. Research has
highlighted the existence of a positive correlation between the ability to tax and
important outcomes, such as income per capita and a low incidence of civil conflict.
Some studies have attempted to establish a causal link between these variables.
However, the channels and exact mechanisms though which fiscal capacity translates
into better economic performance and less conflicts are not yet entirely clear. I
show that fiscal capacity gave countries an easier access to borrowing and reduced
the likelihood of default. Both these factors can play an important role in the
long-term health of countries by allowing them to smooth public revenues, reduce
macroeconomic and political volatility and provide public goods consistently. Thus,
the intimate link between fiscal capacity and borrowing, might be one of the channels
through which fiscal development leads to better economic outcomes.
3. The development of fiscal institutions takes place though to complex political econ-
omy mechanisms, which go beyond the warfare-state formation nexus discussed in
much of the literature.
In this work I have illustrated two such mechanisms. First, I have argued that the
incidence of natural disasters can act as a constraint to the development of centralized
fiscal institutions. This is because most disasters tend to be small, and because
specific disaster types tend to affect specific areas repeatedly. This means that
260
specialized local level relief provision can be more effective than centralized efforts.
Moreover, local level disaster relief raises the heterogeneity of preferences regarding
public goods, and is also a public good with little spillover effects. This makes
resource mutualization more difficult and facilitates local compared to centralized
provision. Second, I have shown that slavery damaged the development of local
fiscal institutions and public goods provision in Brazil. Part of this effect was due to
the interaction between slavery and mass migration. By discouraging the settlement
of foreign migrants which could count on a disproportional political weight, slavery
nagatively affected the development of fudamental ingredients for long term economic
growth.
6.2 Future work
While helping to answer some questions, this Dissertation has also raised many new ones
and highlighted the need for further work in some areas. Below, I illustrate what I believe
to be some promising avenues for research.
With regards to my paper on the Great Depression debt crisis, one of its most obvious
extensions is to go beyond defaults on dollar denominated bonds and analyze defaults
on debts denominated in pounds, francs and other currencies. Although US lending was
dominant in the interwar period, a holistic picture of the crisis would reinforce the find-
ings of my study. The main challenge for this exercise is identifying detailed sources on
outstanding debts and default dates for both central and local governments to construct
the outcome variables.
My expectation is that the main result of the analysis will be very similar to my findings
for dollar-denomniated debts, since, in the vast majority of cases, defaults involved the
debts of countries in all currencies. However, the fact that British and US creditors were
sometimes treated differently in the interwar period due to the British governmnet’s more
interventionist attitude – the German default is a case in point (Eichengreen and Portes,
1988) – might lead to some variation and interesting political economy considerations. For
example, it is possible that falling public revenues were less conducive to default on sterling
bonds compared to dollar bonds, all else equal, because the former were prioritized. Such
a finding would echo the result that liquidity constraints and gold reserves played a much
bigger role in local defaults compared to central level ones, since scarce resources were
allocated in a hierarchical way to debt repayments.
A second important offshoot of the my defaults paper would be a direct and explicit ex-
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plorations of the fiscal limits of defaulters during the interwar years. Using recent advances
in the literature on endogenous fiscal limits and asymmetric information discussed in the
paper, it would be very valuable to attempt to assess how fiscal limits might have changed
with the onset of the Depression. In particular, it would be extremely useful to investigate
how the slump affected countries’ ability to tax and service debts by concentrating on one
or two country case studies.
With regards to the themes discussed in my second paper, I envision an exploration of
the consequences of the dynamics of fiscal aggregates I describe. In the paper, I note that
the early 1930s were rife with regime changes and a general increase in authoritarianism.
Fiscal instability and outright crises might have been important contributors to both, if
they affected the ability of states to function normally and provide public goods. System-
atically investigating the link between the dynamics of public revenues and expenditure
and political outcomes would be a very valuable exercise. The Great Depression offers
the ideal backgound to do so due to the large degree of economic and political volatility.
This analysis would also involve a simple theoretical framework on which I have already
started working.
My paper on local fiscal institutions in Brazil warrants extensions across time and
space. While it would be interesting to do the analysis for all of Brazil, this would require
a dramatically different identification strategy. A less demanding extension would be
to bring the state of Minas Gerais into the mix. This had a different colonial legacy and
production structure from Sa˜o Paulo and Rio de Janeiro and would thus provide a genuine
test of external validity for my results. At the same time, the state also partook in the
coffee boom and experienced a strong development in the 19th century. This would allow
me to use the same or similar identification strategy to the one used for Rio de Janeiro
and Sa˜o Paulo. Similarly to Sa˜o Paulo, Minas Gerais also appears to have rich municipal
level sources dating from before 1872, which could be exploited construct a wide range of
controls.
Regarding the time dimension, I would like to explore the persistence of my results to
the present. Persistence papers are, by now, a staple in economic research. Investigating
the persistence, or lack thereof, of the effects of slavery on local institutions and develop-
ment more broadly would be a valuable exercise, given the deep further structural changes
Brazil underwent in the 20th century.
An additional connected project would be a further analysis of the impact of migration
on institutional development in Brazil. A promising strategy for this study would involve
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exploiting an exogenous source of variation provided by a policy intervention by the Italian
Government. The 1902 “Decreto Prinetti” outlawed subsidized emigration from Italy and
was mainly targeted at migration to Brazil, due to worries regarding the conditions of
Italian migrants, particularly colonists working on coffee plantations. In combination
with pre-existing immigrant settlement patterns, this policy very probably affected the
number of migrants to settle in each municipality. This is because migrants tend to
cluster in national networks and settle where their predecessors settled. Therefore, using
information about the number of Italian migrants of each municipality before the decree,
one can estimate the expected number of new arrivals in the absence of the decree by
using the emigration life-cycle theory, which posits that a country’s total emigration will
be a non-linear function of time (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). The number of “missing
migrants” – the difference between the expected and actual numbers of migrants – would
be the treatment effect. This approach is similar to the one Bin (2017) uses to gauge
the impact of immigration quotas in the United States, but with the added benefit the
decree was implemented by a foreign government and is therefore much more credibly
exogenous to the conditions of Brazilian municipalities than the immigration quotas were
to conditions across the US.
I look forward to the challenges of these new projects and hope to enjoy them as much
as I enjoyed the four years spent working on this Dissertation.
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